CORRUPTION: A CASE SDUTY ON BANGLADESH

Transcription

1 The 4 th Multi-country Study Mission on Public Governance Country Paper: Bangladesh CORRUPTION: A CASE SDUTY ON BANGLADESH AHMAD KAIKAUS Deputy Secretary Ministry of Establishment Government of the People s Republic of Bangladesh

2 Corruption is one of the main concerns in the present day global political economy. Increasing number of studies on corruption during the last decades combined with efforts to measure, to monitor, and to control corruption corroborates that there is unprecedented rise of corruption. If anybody asks a citizen of Bangladesh to identify the prime problem in the state of Bangladesh, the answer is most likely to be the corruption. Transparency International also identifies Bangladesh in the lower end of its Corruption Perceptions Index ranking. Bangladesh is a developing country with numerous social and economic problems. To achieve higher growth, it is expected that the country would strive to improve its condition through augmented economic, social and political activities. When it is observed that these activities are associated with the abuse or misuse of public institutions and the outcome is disappointing, then it may legitimately be hypothesized that corruption is affecting the development process of this country. However any discussion on corruption could be elusive, if we concentrate more on the impact than on its causes. Girling (1997) argues corruption is the symptom, not the disease. He recognizes the disease as the dilemma of our time where the desire for the good society by democratic means suffers in an economic system that may well contribute materially but does not contribute morally. He also argues that corruption develops from capitalist conditions, collusive politics, and normative (social) perceptions. Girling contends that corruption cannot be evaluated in terms of one dimension (the economic, or the political, or the social) only it requires a synthesis of all three dimensions. Moreover, corruption is related with the use and abuse of power. Lee-Chai and Bargh (2001) refers to the days of Adam and Eve, and argues that it may have started from the infamous tree of knowledge. They state, A command was given by a powerful figure, a direct order was violated, and insubordinates were duly punished. So began the human struggle with power. We hunger for it, fear it, revel in it, and abuse it. Similarly, Jain (2001) argues that power leads to temptation for misuse, and when such misuse is not disciplined by the institutions that represent the rights of the citizens, corruption can follow. Two aspects of corruption emerge from the above explanations: corruption is related to the economic conditions, political activities and social perceptions; power and abuse of power is integral part 1

3 of the society. Corruption may increase when economic conditions are not controlled by appropriate democratic values, and the abuse of power is not punished properly. Jain (2001) argues that corruption is related to the behavior of the individual who has been chosen to rule or govern. He explains the ruler is not expected to define morality, but to act according to the established norms and design the legal framework. In reality politics become important because political values, institutions, and parties play an important role in defining the values of the society and in defining the norms that individuals in positions of power have to follow, as well as in designing the control systems that determine the limits of the behavior of the political elite. Therefore, in analyzing corruption we need to specify or define what is perceived to be corruption in a society and its impacts, try to recognize the causes of corruption based on socioeconomic and political conditions, and possible curative measures to combat corruption that may intrigue further research. In this paper, corruption in Bangladesh is examined where corruption is alleged to be rampant at recent days. Bangladesh appears to have established democratic system in its governance as it has instituted a credible election process in the last decade through which it elects its government. In a modern democracy, individuals choose their values and their rulers in conformity with those values. It may be argued that the rulers reflect the morality of the ruled. Hence the question may arise whether the recent eruption of corruption is the demonstration of the behavior of the majority or whether this is a problem in the democratic institutions that functions in the country. In this paper attempt has been made to expose some aspects of corruption that may cause the gravity of this problem. The paper is structured in the following order. Section 2 outlines the problems in defining corruption, and attempts to formalize a definition of corruption for this study. Section 3 describes the general impacts of corruption recognized in many studies. Section 4 describes different theories on the causes of corruption. In Section 6 discusses the nature and extent of corruption in Bangladesh. The causes of corruption is attempted to be identified in Section 7. In Section 8, some policy measures for fighting corruption are discussed, which is followed by conclusion. 2

4 2. Definition of corruption For the purpose of analytical study on corruption we need to understand what we consider as corruption. Friedrich (2002) claims the word corruption has a history of vastly different meanings and connotations in English as well as in other languages. DeLeon (1993) argues that although an operational definition is critical to agree on what constitutes corruption, the answer varies principally as a function of the inquiring discipline. Gardiner (2002) argues there are several major problems in attempting to define corruption. There are differences when corruption is defined in the official laws and when it is defined in the public opinion. There are also differences among countries when the problem of corruption is defined. Scott (1972) argues for establishing a working definition before discussing the problems of corruption that will encompass much of the behavior we commonly have in mind and yet be sharp enough to establish clear boundaries for analysis. He admits that corruption involves a deviation from certain standards of behavior. Scott proposes three criteria, the public interest, public opinion, and legal norms, from which we may define corruption. Depending on these three criteria, corruption refers mostly to the abuse of public power for private ends. For the purpose of this study we would consider the outline of Jane (2001) about the corruption. He defines corruption, more comprehensively, as the involvement of inappropriate use of political power and reflection of a failure of the political institutions within a society. He also contends corruption seems to result from an imbalance between the processes of acquisition of positions of political power, and the rights of citizens to control the use of that power. We may consider corruption as the involvement of inappropriate use of public power for private gains, and that seems to reflect the failure of the public institutions. 3. Impact of corruption There seems to be a growing concern as the intensity of inappropriate use of public offices has increased, and the upsurge appears to be much higher in developing countries. This has initiated controversies on the impacts of corruption. Many argue that corruption is not always harmful; rather it brings some kind of efficiency through market based solution in the system. Tanzi and Davoodi (2001), 3

5 however, refer to such arguments as romantic view of corruption. They explain that this view portray corruption as almost a righteous activity and perhaps good for the growth in a world strangled by bad governments. Klitgaard (1988) listed those arguments as economist s reminder, political scientist s reminder, and manager s reminder. These views argue that corruption can play a positively useful role in developing countries. Although optimal level of corruption is not zero, but these arguments are based on the assumption that fighting corruption may be so costly as not to be worthwhile, but that corruption itself may create economic, political, or managerial benefits. Careful analysis of the situation arising out of corruption would, obviously, not supportive of these arguments claim. Opposing the so called good side of corruption, Klitgaard mentions that such arguments refer to the benefits from specific corrupt acts, not from general corruption pervading many or most decisions; and the benefit of corruption in a bad prevailing system. He argues that mounting evidence of corruption in developing countries seem to make it clear that harmful effects of corruption greatly outweigh the (occasional) social benefits. Nye (1967) distinguishes three outcome of corruption: effects on economic development, national integration, and governmental capacity. Nye systematically estimated the likely benefits and costs on various variables of corruption, and he contends that costs of corruption in less developed countries will exceed its benefits. Different studies on the consequences of corruption make it clear that the adverse effect of corruption is far more than any assumed benefit. Tanzi and Davoodi (2001) claims that romantic view of corruption has been replaced in recent years by realistic view, which show that bribe payment is not the remedy for red tape and burdensome government regulations. They contend that the highest bribe is paid by the rent-seeker, not the most efficient individuals; corruption is subject to increasing returns which perpetuate it; and corruption creates an atmosphere that can lead to collapse of political regimes. For a sample of ninety-seven countries in 1997, Tanzi and Davoodi found that countries with higher perceived corruption tend to have lower per capita GDP. However, the causal relation may be other way around, i.e. countries with lower real per capita income tend to have higher corruption. Their study with the same countries also shows that countries with higher corruption tend to have lower growth rate. Tanzi and Davoodi analyzed the impact 4

6 of corruption on enterprises especially on small enterprises and its differential effect between large and small enterprises, impact on investment, and impact on the allocation of talent. Their study shows that corruption increases the costs of enterprises and reduces their rates of return, and it tends to have more damaging effects on small enterprises than on large enterprises. Regarding impact of corruption on investment, their evidence sustains the notion that corruption reduces size and quality of investment. More intriguing finding of their study is regarding the allocation of talent, which has a long term impact in societies. Their regression result suggests that corruption allocates talent in growth reducing fashion. Tanzi and Davoodi also show that corruption affects the structure of taxes. 4. Theories on the Causes of Corruption Although many tend to argue that corruption may be beneficial in countries where institutions are not working properly, but there is little doubt that those arguments are based on exceptional situations, and corruption, in general, is harmful for the economy as well as for the society. It is, therefore, significant to concentrate to identify the causes of corruption. As the concern about the corruption has grown, many studies have also been done to identify the causes of corruption. Girling (1997) argues that corruption is not just a deviant aspect of social behavior as identified by the legal institution. Corruption stems from the incompatibility in important respects of the economic and political systems. Rose- Ackerman (1999) identifies several factors that may lead to corrupt practices in the public officials. Governments in providing goods and services for free or selling them at below market prices establishes dual prices (state price less than the market price) exist, firms will then pay off officials for access to below-market state supplies. When the supply of credit and the rate of interest are controlled by the state, bribes may be paid for access. Exchange rates often do not reflect underlying economic fundamentals, thus producing incentives to pay bribes to get scarce foreign exchange at favorable rates. The allocation of scarce import and export licenses is a frequent source of payoffs, and patronage with bribes linked to the value of the benefits conferred. Broadly, Rose-Ackerman identifies three situations from where corruption emerges. The public benefit is scarce and fixed in supply, the officials in charge for its 5

7 allocation have no discretion to increase or decrease total supply; officials can influence the quality and quantity available; and the service is available to all who qualify, but officials have discretion to determine who meets the requirements. She also argues that public regulatory programs may create opportunity of corruption as firms may pay to get a favorable interpretation of the rules or to lighten the regulatory load. Paying taxes and customs duties is always burdensome. In addition, customs agents control something that firms value-access to the outside world. Thus businesses and individuals may collude with tax collectors and customs agents to lower the sums collected and to expedite services. As a result, revenue collection may both inadequate and distributed unfairly. Klitgraard (1988) argues that illegitimate activity flourishes when public officials have monopoly power over clients, when agents have great discretion, and when accountability of public officials to the principal is weak. He provides a stylized equation as, CORRUPTION=MONOPOLY+DISCRETION- ACCOUNTABILITY. He also explains through a simple decision tree the potentiality of corruption by an agent. Consider k be the agent s pay, R(0) the moral satisfaction she takes from not being corrupt, x be the bribe (or payoff from being corrupt), p the probability the agent is caught and punished if she is corrupt, f the size of the penalty, R(x) the moral cost to her of taking a bribe of x, and U the utility of the agent involved. The agent receives a payoff of k + R(0) when she is not corrupt. Then the expected utility to the agent of being corrupt, EU = U[R(x) + p(x-f) + (1-p)x]. Klitgaard argues if the expression is greater than her payoff from not being corrupt, she will take the bribe. These two arguments of Kiltgaard regarding the cause of corruption are quite plausible and we would observe support from evidence in Bangladesh. Privatization is considered as a means to reduce corruption. However, the privatization may also create opportunity for corruption. Rose-Ackerman states that privatization can reduce corruption by removing certain assets from state control and converting discretionary official actions into private, market-driven choices. However, the process of transferring assets to private ownership can be burdened with corrupt opportunities because of the absence of reliable way to valuing assets, poor specification of the ex post tax and regulatory regime, control of corrupt officials on information. 6

8 5. Nature and Extent of Corruption in Bangladesh TIB s presents types of corruption in Bangladesh, which would demonstrate the pervasive nature of corruption in Bangladesh. Types of corruption mentioned by TIB include commission payment for awarding contracts; kickbacks out of the deals and deposits in foreign currencies abroad; extending undue privileges, offering very expensive gifts and hospitality; misuse of the state resources; misappropriation of public funds, suppressing the evidence of crime and non-prosecution of criminals on payment of bribes, extortion and bribery, favoritism in appointments, transfers, postings and promotions of public servants on receipt of some gratifications, irregularities in procurement or construction contracts or different public deals to further personal interests of individuals and the like. These types of corruption point out the pervasive nature corruption in the public offices. However, the weakness of the report is that it does not have illustration of political corruption. Recently, most of the politicians are alleged to have active involvement in corruption; they normally play the role of facilitators in the whole process. It is, however, difficult to identify the involvement of the politicians in corruption except those who are in power and hold positions in public offices. The politicians, if they are in power, can now pressurize the bureaucracy to get the decision in their favor affecting the public interest; they can also influence the bureaucracy, even if they are not in power, through establishing an illicit relationship of lobbying, and discussion in the later part would be helpful to realize such political nature of corruption. 6. Causes of Corruption in Bangladesh TIB identifies major causes of corruption in Bangladesh, among others, are: poor socio-economic conditions; poor service condition of the public sector including low incentive package, poor opportunity for career advancement; extensive discretionary power on the part of public officials with limited accountability gives rise to corruption; multiplicity of laws, rules etc. and weak enforcement of these laws often encourages corruption; key watchdog agencies lack adequate, well-trained and skilled staff to undertake their responsibility in an appropriate manner; existence of patron-client relationship reinforces corrupt practices in public dealing; absence of effective commitment to moral values at the top; and lack of political will. The major causes pointed out by TIB, obviously, are valid. Nevertheless, it should be 7

9 noticed that they have pointed out to the flaws that are coming out of the system. Starting from the year 1991, Bangladesh has been practicing democracy in the sense that the country has been able to hold a transparent and fair election, and in the last three consecutive elections people have voted out the government in power, which is quite unlikely in developing countries. However, the intensity of corruption also seems to have increased during the last decade. This trend indicates that there are some flaws in the functioning process of the democracy in Bangladesh, which instead of preventing the corruption could encourage the illegitimate practice. We understand that in a democracy the government would be controlled by the elected politicians, and they would guide the public offices to perform their assigned duties to fulfill the public responsibilities. In case of Bangladesh, as TIB indicates, there is absence of effective commitment to moral values at the top, and lack of political will. A careful analysis of the TIB report on Bangladesh corruption would help us understand that the possible causes of corruption are rooted in the structural flaws of the democracy, which would be discussed in the later part of the section. Household survey of the TIB shows that the respondents identify lack of accountability (60.78%), lack of transparency (36.51%), discretionary power (47.88%), and monopoly power (37.79%) as major reasons for corruption. The instances described above also shows that there is lack of accountability, lack of transparency, monopoly power of the public officials, and their vast discretionary power are major reasons, among others, for corruption. Then the question may arise why the politicians allow public officials to enjoy such powers, which causes the widespread corruption. There seems to be an unholy alliance of businessmen, politicians and bureaucrats in such corrupt activities through which they can ignore the public interest and satisfy their own unjustified need. Rose-Ackerman (1978) in her model outlines this problem that in a democratic government, legislators needs for campaign funds, and bureaucrats desires for power, influence, and simple greed, all act together to twist public choices away from those preferred by a majority of the population. She argues that these tendencies can be checked by a combination of structural and motivational factors. The noticeable factor that emerges from the survey of TIB is that respondents identify influence of powerful people as a cause of corruption. 8

10 In recent times, participation of businessmen into politics has increased manifold. This points out to an aspect of the development of corruption. Porta and Vannucci (1999) argue that development of corruption requires the initiation of a political class that has internalized a particular set of behavioral norms. Particular subcultures are created by business politicians reduce the moral cost of participation in political corruption. They contend that business politicians normally stress the importance of friendship, underscore the significance of a relationship based on the exchange of favors. Such networks of relations simultaneously create the possibility of organizing and successfully concluding illegal transactions, protection from denunciations, and electoral support required to further individual careers and maintain the party system. Even in case where the business politician does not encourage such illicit relationship of his firm with the public officials, the officials may try to please the business politician for his own future prospect through undue favor. Many argue that such motivation worked in the case of Halliburton in the United States. Table-1 Causes of corruption identified by the respondents of survey Causes of Corruption Percent of people Lack of accountability Lack of transparency Discretionary power Monopoly power Low salaries of the staff 4.78 Shortage of resources 3.80 Influence of powerful people Red tapism Others 5.73 Source: Derived from the household survey report of TIB in 2002 for education, health, power, land administration, tax, police, and judiciary. In case of Bangladesh, political influence on the bureaucracy seems to have intensified, and the participation of business politicians has increased. This may cause the growth of corruption in the country. World Bank report on the politician s influence on the career of the public officials are presented 9

11 in the table, where the respondents believe that the promotion of the public officials depend more on political favor than on bribes. Therefore, a career bureaucrat may be encouraged to establish relationship with politicians for his career, and this may lead to higher propensity of corruption in a situation where politicians represent business interest more than public interest. Table 2 Requirements for promotion Categories of civil servants Gifts and bribes are necessary for promotions % of civil servants who believe that: Political pressure and favoritism are necessary for promotions Class I Class II 4 18 Class III 6 24 Class IV Source: Bangladesh: Improving Governance for Reducing Poverty, the World Bank, 2002 Independence of different organs of the government is important. But independence without proper checks and balances are more harmful, and may again encourage corruption. Therefore, one has to be careful in analyzing the causes and its possible remedies. High Court is constitutionally separated and the TIB report also indicates that High Court enjoys freedom in Bangladesh. However, in practice High Court does not demonstrate integrity in its performance. The partisan attitude has crossed the limit in recent days. The past government has appointed 19 judges in the High Court, one of them are alleged to have forged his results to get the law degree. Surprising attitude of the High Court was, when the alleged Judge s father filed a contempt petition, the Court accepted the petition for hearing. This shows that the High Court is more interested to safeguard its colleague than the image of the High Court. Similarly, the government could ignore the quality for its own interest in the absence of transparency and accountability. In case of US, congressional confirmation process could have decreased the possibility of bad selection of judges, if not eliminate completely. 10

12 Rose-Ackerman (1999) argues privatization is both an anticorruption reform and a new potential source of corrupt gains. Although privatization is desirable in a wide range of cases, reformers ought to design the process to reduce the incentives for rent seeking that remain. In Bangladesh, such type distortion has been occurred in the privatization process. Bangladesh government has been trying to sell out its state owned enterprises for a long period, yet the participation from the private entrepreneurs seems to be low. It is alleged that an illegitimate relationship has been established between the officials who are engaged in the process and a group of dishonest businessmen, and they are making the process complicated for non-transparent participation so that they can only sell the state owned enterprises to the desired participants only. The salary structure is a factor for the rise of corruption at least at the low level in the public offices, although it should not be the most crucial factor. TIB household survey shows that respondents consider low salary as a less significant issue (4.78%). Nevertheless, TIB survey does not provide enough information of the market price and salary structure in the public sector. Moreover, survey was conducted within the households who get the service; they are not the service providers. The households witness the public officials life pattern, which includes their illegal income. Hence they may ignore the impact of salary on their behavior. If we compare the salary history of the civil servants, we can easily imagine that the civil servants have been losing real income over the last three decades. There are also many other factors related with the purchasing power capacity of the civil servants. For example, quality of government schools and private schools was almost same during the 1970s. Therefore civil servants used to send their children to government schools where the costs were very low. Now the quality difference between a government school and a private school is quite substantial, and civil servants do not want to send their kids to government schools because of low quality. This also included a burden of cost on them. Privately everybody seems to accept the reality, but formally it seems to continue to be a taboo for the government. Moreover, if we consider the enhancement of corrupt activities in the civil service, we would be able to see a correlation of the decrease in the real income of the civil servants to the rise of corruption; although there are other factors involved as well. 11

13 Structural flaws in the democracy of Bangladesh might also be responsible for the rise of corruption where people belonging to executive power mostly characterized as business politicians may control the public offices in their favor. In most of the advanced democracies in the world, we have observed that the framers of guiding principles of the constitution have been careful in identifying the responsibilities of the public offices and they were also careful to formulate a system of checks and balances. Unfortunately, in establishing democratic institutions, Bangladesh failed to ensure this. Madison recognized that A factious spirit has tainted our public administration. He then explains, By faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of factions: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling it effects (Madison Paper No. 10). We have neither observed any attempt in the constitution to remove such causes nor any endeavor to control the effects in Bangladesh. 8. Possible Measures to Reduce Corruption in Bangladesh W now attempt to consider the remedial measure to overcome from this unhealthy atmosphere. Rose-Ackerman (1999) argues that the most straightforward way to limit corruption is to eliminate corruption-laden programs. Generally when the state does not have authority to control businesses, if there is no subsidy program, and if price controls are lifted, market prices will interact leading to the decrease of grafts. That means reforms that increase the competitiveness of the economy will help reduce corrupt incentives. Rose-Ackerman identifies laws can be streamlined to reduce official discretion and to make monitoring simpler and less arbitrary. To limit the discretion of regulators, she argues that marketbased schemes such as affluent charges and tradable permits may reduce corrupt incentives by replacing bribes with legal payments. Program simplification can be a potent anticorruption strategy. A second sort of simplification concerns the nature of the program itself. If an in-kind benefit program is riddled with corruption, conversion to a direct cash grant may remove a range of corrupt incentives. 12

14 Rose-Ackerman proposes the sanctioning strategies that focus both on improving the deterrent effect of arrest and punishment and on rewarding those who come forward with documentation of corrupt deeds. This type of strategy is also argued by Anecharisrico and Jacobs (1996), and Becker and Stigler (1974). They propose that once one takes the cost of prevention into account, the level of deterrence expenditures should be set where the marginal benefits equal the marginal costs. Becker (1968) also favors for the deterrence of criminal behavior, and argues that deterrence depends on the probability of detection and punishment and on the penalties imposed both those imposed by the legal system and more subtle costs such as loss of reputation or shame. Successful detection of corruption depends on insiders to report wrongdoing. Rose-Ackerman further argues high expected punishments ought to deter corruption, but a high probability of detection can be accomplished only if some are promised low penalties. In case of bureaucracy, Rose-Ackerman explains that patronage and political loyalty in the bureaucracy undermines the efficient delivery of services and leads to the unfair administration of tax and regulatory laws. She proposes to reform civil service to find ways to mediate the relationship with politics that may serve the public interest and decrease corruption. Klitgaard (1988) proposes some measures to control corruption. He emphasizes to select agents for honesty and capability, changing the rewards and penalties facing agents, gathering and analyzing information in order to raise the chances that corruption will be detected, restructuring the principalagent-client relationship to remove the corruption-inducing combination of monopoly power plus discretion plus little accountability, and changing attitude about corruption. These measures might be helpful in Bangladesh as we have observed that lack of accountability, transparency, and monopoly power are identified as major causes of corruption. TIB also made a number of recommendations regarding the elimination of corruption in government and private institutions of Bangladesh. They are: (a) the government must possess genuine political will if they want to curb corruption, (b) establishment of independent anti-corruption commission, (c) establishment of transparency and accountability in the public offices (the Official Secrets Act 1923 must be abolished to ensure transparency), (d) separation of judiciary, (e) ensure 13

15 punishment for corrupt activities, (f) appointment of an Ombudsman, (g) administrative reform, (h) participation of civil society to develop awareness, (i) further research is required to find out the causes of corruption and how it can be rooted out, and (j) active participation of mass media. Obviously, the proposals of the TIB are plausible; however independence of judiciary without proper checks and balances may become more harmful when judiciary has been identified as one of the most corrupt sectors in Bangladesh. There is no doubt that for the sake of justice, judiciary should be allowed to work independently. Independence can be enjoyed even in a checks and balance system, such as through proper recruitment, through introducing juror system. At the moment, judges have the monopoly in giving judgments, and this can be balanced by introducing juror system. This can also make the bribing costly for the people who tend to seek judgments in their favor. Jain (2002) argues the political institutions should work to strike a balance between conflicting goals that individuals might have, as well as the conflict between the goals of various individuals and groups within society. Although corruption makes itself visible as an economic transaction, it would not exist if the political institutions were able to exert the necessary influences and controls. For controlling power and politics, Jain argues that there should be openness of systems that would lead to better information analysis and better decision-making. He proposes for political reform that must include channels for participation of all citizens in the decision making process regardless of who actually occupies the power. He also suggests strengthening mechanism for controlling misuse of power. These measures are very much related with the legal framework of the country that controls politics and participation of political parties in the state affairs. The constitution of Bangladesh is the legal institution for the political authority, and a careful analysis of the constitution would reveal that the provisions of the constitution do not provide sufficient checks and balances to prevent abuse of power. Therefore, remedial measures for controlling politics and power, proper constitutional amendments should be done. 14

16 Conclusion In the fourth century B.C. in India, Kautiliya writes in his Arthasastra, Just as fish moving inside water cannot be known when drinking water, even so officers appointed for carrying out works cannot be known when appropriating money. Therefore corruption is with us from the very beginning when human society became familiar with power and opportunity, and also appears that complete eradication of corruption is not possible. However, attempt has to be made to bring such activities to the minimal level so that it does not bother us in our daily life. Kautiliya also suggests, And he (king) should make those who have amassed (money wrongfully) yield it up and should change them in (their) works, so that they do not consume (the king s) property or disgorge what is consumed. Under present democratic system, it is our responsibility to identify the problem and to solve it. In this paper, an attempt has been made to identify the nature and causes of corruption, not to get solution, rather to intrigue further research. 15

17 Reference: Das, S. K. (2001). Public Office, Private Interest: Bureaucracy and Corruption in India. Oxford University Press: New Delhi, India deleon, Peter (1993). Thinking About Political Corruption. M. E. Sharpe: Armonk, New York. Friedrich, Carl J. (2002). Corruption Concepts in Historical Perspective. Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts. Arnold J. Heidnheimer and Michael Johnston (Eds.). Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, New Jersey. Gardiner, John A. (2002). Defining Corruption. Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts. Arnold J. Heidnheimer and Michael Johnston (Eds.). Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, New Jersey. Girling, John (1997). Corruption, capital, and democracy. Routledge: New York. Jain, Arvind K. (2001). Power, Politics, and Corruption. The Political Economy of Corruption. Arvind K. Jain (ed.) Routledge: New York Jain, Arvind K. (2001). Controlling Power and Politics. The Political Economy of Corruption. Arvind K. Jain (ed.) Routledge: New York Klitgaard, Robert (1988). Controlling Corruption. University of California Press: Loss Angles, California. Lee-Chai, Annette Y. and Bargh, John A. (2001) (Eds.). The Use and Abuse of Power: Multiple Perspectives on the Causes of Corruption. Psychology Press: Philadelphia Leff, Nathan H. (1979). Economic development through bureaucratic corruption. Monday U. Ekpo (Ed.). Bureaucratic corruption in Sub Saharan Africa: Toward a search for causes and consequences. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America. P-329, 330, 333 Lowi and Ginsburg. The Federalist Papers Porta, Donatella della and Vannucci, Alberto (1999). Corrupt Exchanges: Actors, Resources, and Mechanisms of Political Corruption. Aldine De Gruyter: New York. Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1999). Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1978). Corruption: A study in Political Economy. Academic Press: New York. Scott, James C. (1972). Comparative Political Corruption, Prentice-Hall, Inc.: Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey Tanzi, Vito, and Davoodi, Hamid (2001). Corruption, growth, and Public Finances. The Political Economy of Corruption. Arvind K. Jain (ed.) Routledge: New York Tendler, Judith (1979). Rural works programs in Bangladesh: community, technology, and graft (report for the Transportation Department of the World Bank, mimeo, June 1979). P

18 17