Policy Change at the United Nations Tracing the Evolution of UN-Sanctions Practice

Transcription

1 Policy Change at the United Nations Tracing the Evolution of UN-Sanctions Practice First Draft Work in Progress Please, do not quote without author's permission! ICPP st International Conference on Public Policy, Grenoble June 2013 Sascha Werthes Associate Fellow Institute for Development and Peace, INEF University Duisburg-Essen swerthes@inef.uni-due.de Lecturer Goethe-University Frankfurt werthes@soz.uni-frankfurt.de

2 1. Introduction Since the end of the so-called Cold War the UN Security Council dramatically transformed its practice of international crisis management. Additionally to more well-known developments in UN peacekeeping, observers of the United Nations emphasize the astonishing rediscovery and increased imposition of sanctions as a tool for crisis management at the United Nations (see e.g. Cortright, Lopez 2000). Between 1990 and 2012, the Security Council authorized more than twenty new sanction regimes, compared to only two in the preceding forty-five years. In addition to this quantitative change one can observe qualitative shifts in the way when and how sanctions were imposed: e.g. imposing sanctions in response to intra-state conflict settings and by preferring smart sanctions instead of comprehensive sanction regimes since This paper argues that the evolution of UN sanctions practice has been inadequately explained to date, and proposes an explanation based on the assumption that decision-making in the UN can best be analyzed when perceiving the UN as an "organized anarchy". Organized anarchies are characterized by uncertain preferences, unclear organizational processes, and fluid participation in decision-making. Organizational choice or decisionmaking, therefore, takes place under conditions of ambiguity, in which alternative interpretations or perspectives on crisis situation are available. The UN fits to these defining criteria of an organized anarchy and for that reason the analytical framework of the Multiple Streams Approach can be expected to elucidate the decision-making processes underlying the evolution of UN sanctions practice. Drawing on Lipson's adaption (2007) of Kingdon's approach to analyze agenda setting and policy formation, the paper will explain major and sequential and incremental changes in UN sanctions practice as the result of policy entrepreneurs' linking of a solution (a certain kind of sanctions practice) to a problem (a threat to peace) in the context of macro- and micro-policy windows emerging throughout the 1990's. In sum, the paper will identify moments conducive for changing UN sanction policy when presenting developments in the decision-making environment (politics, problem, and policy stream) and present factors which help to explain why certain policy entrepreneurs were more successful in promoting change in one case and not in others. To begin with the paper will sum up briefly some basic empirical data on the evolution of UN sanctions practice throughout the 1990ies. This short general review of UN sanctions practice will highlight some of the quantitative and qualitative differences of UN sanction policy before and after the end of the so-called Cold War and between UN sanction policy at the beginning of the 1990ies and at the beginning of the new millennium. Moreover, it will emphasize that two major shifts in UN sanction policy (a quantitative one and a qualitative one) happened at specific moments in time which can be regarded as macro policy windows conducive for policy entrepreneur's engagement for specific policy modification of UN's crises and conflict management and that smaller shifts in the way the UN sanctions practice evolved followed a pattern which can be described as sequential and incremental. Here it seems that policy entrepreneurs were successful in influencing UN sanction policy when they engaged ad hoc in a pragmatic way in the context of micro policy windows.

3 2. The Evolution of UN Sanctions Practice UN crises and conflict management changed significantly throughout the 1990ies. In the 45 years before the end of the Cold War the UN only imposed two sanctions regimes (South Rhodesia, South Africa), but more than 20 new sanctions regimes where established between 1990 and Beside the quantitative shift in UN sanction practice we can observe a second qualitative shift. While the (UN) "sanction decade" (Cortright, Lopez 2000) started with imposing comprehensive sanctions regimes (Iraq, Former Yugoslavia, Haiti) we can observe a policy shift at the middle of the 1990ies. Since 1994 the UN refrained from comprehensive sanctions regimes and since then only imposed targeted and selected sanctions regimes. Additionally to these two major changes in UN sanction practice one can observe more minor changes in practice and the introduction of innovative modifications of UN sanctions policy. Table 1 gives an overview of the more well-known modifications and innovations in UN sanction practice. Table 1: Innovations in UN Sanction Policy, A general shift toward targeted and selected measures. No general sanctions after Worldwide financial sanctions and other targeted measures imposed in response to terror attacks against the United States. Financial sanction targeted against individuals and entities as well as governments. Lists issued from the UN Secretariat of designated individuals subjected to financial sanctions and travel bans. Arms embargos targeted against technical assistance and support services as well as weapons. UN enforcement support team created for sanctions against Taliban regime. Diamond embargoes imposed against rebel movements in Angola and Sierra Leone and against the government of Liberia. Sanctions imposed against Liberia for its violation of sanctions against RUF rebels in Sierra Leone. Investigative panels and monitoring mechanisms established as regular features of sanctions policy. A name and shame approach employed by investigative panels, identifying specific countries, companies, and individuals responsible for sanctions violations. Private industry associations and companies involved in the enforcement of diamond embargoes and financial sanctions. Private security firm hired to trace the finances of the UNITA rebel movement targeted targeted by UN sanctions. Nongovernmental organizations and private research groups actively involved in analyzing, monitoring, and evaluating UN sanctions policies. Minimizing humanitarian hardship a priority concern among UN policymakers. Assessment of humanitarian impact established as a regular feature of sanctions cases. Standardized methodology developed for assessing humanitarian impacts. Blanket exemptions granted for designated humanitarian agencies in the case of Afghanistan. Time limits established in sanctions cases. (Cortright, Lopez, Gerber 2002: 212)

4 These modifications and the introduction of new features of UN sanctions policy did not come along due to a strategic policy plan of institutional branches of the UN administration or simply when they were circulated as convincing policy reformulations in interested policy networks. Instead, they were incrementally introduced at three specific moments in time: when the UN Security Council had to decide if it wants to impose a new sanction regime due to a new crisis or conflict, when situations on the ground changed so significantly that a reform of the already established sanction regime became necessary, or when due to time limits of an existing sanction regime a new decision had to be made whether and if at all how to carry on with sanctions. This leaves us wondering why the UN turned to sanctions as a favored policy tool (instead of other alternative policy options, e.g. peacekeeping, humanitarian interventions or doing nothing) throughout the 1990ies and how we can understand the politics or decisionmaking process underlying the transformation of UN sanction policy. 3. A "Garbage Can Model"-Perspective: The UN as Organized Anarchy Literature in organization theory addresses agenda-setting processes primarily referring to domestic decision-making, but only rarely to multilateral settings (Lipson 2007: 80). This is astonishing as the UN is particular amenable to models focusing on agenda setting and decisionmaking in organized anarchies, or settings characterized by uncertain preferences, unclear organizational processes, and fluid participation in decisionmaking features typified by the UN (see also Lipson 2007: 80; Goede 2009). Additionally, one has to emphasize that especially organized anarchies are characterized by conditions of ambiguity when it comes to decision-making. However, organizational decision-making under conditions of ambiguity can be explained using a so-called garbage can model (GCM). This GCM in its multiple streamsvariant explains decision-making as the result of the partially random coupling of relatively independent streams of problems, policies, and politics (the so-called multiple streams approach) (see e.g. Kingdon 2003; Zahariadis 2007; Zahariadis 2003). Problems are joined to policies, in such settings, as a result of their coming to the fore at the same time, rather than due to a rational calculation that the solution was an optimal response to a pre-existing problem (Lipson 2007: 80). In this chapter I will propose a contextualization of UN sanctions practice related to agenda setting in the Security Council in terms of a modified GCM, hypothesizing that especially conditions at the end of the Cold War and changing contexts throughout the 1990 s produced a quite stable policy window that allowed sanctions to be applied and subsequently modified as a conflict and crisis managing tool in various situations. Many accounts of the evolution of peacekeeping or sanctions practice have in common that they recite a list of factors that were permissive of or favourable to the deployment of missions or the imposition of sanctions. These include: the end of the Cold War ; foreign policy shifts by both the Soviet Union and United States; increased cooperation among the permanent members of the Security Council (P-5); the effectiveness of Secretary-Generals (like Pérez de Cuéllar, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Kofi Annan); the ripeness for settlement of superpower proxy wars; the increased willingness of especially Western states to assert a right to interfere in the domestic affairs of (developing) countries; the rise in prominence of the international agenda of intrastate conflicts; success in early multifunctional missions in the waning years of the Cold War ; some kind of success of early sanctions episodes; and

5 especially a sense, or mood, or atmosphere of optimism and enthusiasm for UN engagement (Lipson 2007: 80, 81; see also Durch 1993; Goulding 1993; Mingst, Karns 2000; Matheson 2006; Thakur 2006; Weiss, Forsythe, Coate 2001). While all these factors are indeed permissive and conducive conditions for the evolution of UN engagement in situations of crisis and conflict, they do not sufficiently explain why the UN turned to variants of sanctions, or elucidate the politics or decision-making process underlying the transformation of the respective practice. Further explanations are required to understand the evolutionary shifts in UN practice. 3.1 The UN as Organized Anarchy To begin with, there was never a discrete and well documented decision to create modified sanctions regimes. Rather, as I hopefully have demonstrated, the new practices of sanctioning were developed on an ad hoc basis or by incrementally changing the mandates through the 1990 s and early new millennium. Therefore, the above review of UN sanctions practice was at least superficially necessary. The garbage can model was originally proposed by Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen (Cohen, March, Olsen 1972), but is even more prominently known by the adoption of John Kingdon in his multiple streams model (Kingdon 2003; Zahariadis 2007; see also Zahariadis 2003). GCM is used to explain decision-making in what is termed organized anarchies. Organized anarchies are defined by three characteristics: problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation. The UN can convincingly be described as such an organized anarchy (Lipson 2007; Goede 2009; Keohane 2002). As I will illustrate in the following the UN is characterized by all three of the defining characteristics of organized anarchy, and therefore, the GCM is applicable to decision-making within the UN. Problematic Preferences Basically problematic preferences refer to ambiguity regarding problems and goals. Organizational actors may be uncertain as to both the nature of problems they face and what they hope to accomplish, inverting rationalist models of decisionmaking, they may discover their preferences through acting, rather than acting to achieve their preferences (Lipson 2007: 81, 82). Obviously the UN is not a unitary rational actor. This holds true even if we think of the core bodies of the UN. The so-called preference of the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, or the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) are primarily a function of the preferences of the respective members of the body (in how far national interests serve as facilitator or barrier at the Council see e.g. Hawkins 2004; see also Parsons 1993). That is, differences in member-states preferences render the identification and existence of collective UN preferences problematic (Lipson 2007: 85; see also Mahbubani 2004). Additionally, the preferences of the UN Secretariat and its constituent s elements or established subsidiary bodies, while certainly influenced by member states, are also a function of the respective organizational culture and therefore, might be different to the preferences of the member states (interesting here the role of Special Representatives of the Secretary- General see e.g. Peck 2004; on the role of the UN-SG see e.g. Goulding 2004). We can also ascertain that preferences differ across UN bodies. Even within a single UN body, like the Security Council, ambiguity regarding problem definition or conceptions of policies may inhibit actors ability to determine their own preferences.

6 Unclear Technology The usage of the term technology does not refer to technological artefacts, but describes organizational processes and methods. That is, in organizations with unclear technology, organizational members are uncertain of the rules, structures, and processes by which decisions are made (Lipson 2007: 82). In so-called organized anarchies, the respective organizational members do not fully understand the workings of their organization. In this sense the UN can be characterized by unclear technology. As Lipson convincingly points out expressions of bewilderment and various statements of UN officials demonstrate the extent of uncertainty about the UN s procedures by its own personal (Lipson 2007: 85). The above review of sanctions practice likewise demonstrates how challenging it is to keep track of evolutionary steps changing rules, structures or processes. Thus, the organizational technology of UN decisionmaking is largely opaque even to highlevel UN personnel (Lipson 2007: 85). Moreover, one has to add here that is only very limitedly possible to build-up clear technologies as every conflict or crisis situation has its own characteristics. Therefore, one fit all concepts are hard or even impossible to create; even more so as the consequences of certain technologies are hard to determine in advance. Fluid Participation Basically, fluid participation is describing the notion that various and different actors are involved in different decisions, or in the same kind of decision at different times. Certainly decision-making at the UN is characterized by fluid participation. Moreover, fluid participation is actually institutionalized in the system of the UN. The rotation of nonpermanent members of the UN Security Council illustrates this vividly. Additionally, there are many other sources of changes in participation in decision-making. The organization apparatus of various bodies (e.g. the Secretariat, Sanctions Committees) might change. Additionally, there is a steady flux in personnel. New or sitting secretary-generals for example, appoint or overhaul staff and reorganize the staff s structure, and shift decisionmaking within the Secretariat. Moreover, changes in national governments produce new permanent representatives to the UN, and new individuals in the Security Council, the subsidiary bodies, and in many other UN bodies (see Lipson 2007: 85, 86). Finally, as the type of sanctions being applied have changed and the targets of sanctions change with every new sanctions episode the particular mix of (primarily) involved states and entities and individuals varies from case to case. Ambiguity From a garbage can model -perspective one can argue that these three characteristics interact with each other and produce distinctive patterns of decision-making processes. Moreover, as in every specific case alternative interpretations or perspectives on the situation are available, and the basis for choosing among them is unclear, in organized anarchies such as the UN, organizational choice definitely takes place under conditions of ambiguity (Lipson 2007: 86). As the review has demonstrated sanctions related decision-making in the Security Council, Secretariat, Sanctions Committees, and among member states was strongly characterized by ambiguity. It is argued here that every single case of a decision-making process is characterized with ambiguity. All actors involved in the processes try to capitalize

7 or play on ambiguity when pushing for a certain kind of option or framing a situation in a certain way. 1 In sum, there was a widespread variety and perplexity regarding the nature, source, and causes of the threats to international peace and security, the post-cold War order, the role of the United Nations, and the implications for engagement. As Zahariadis points out: Under such extreme conditions, theories based on rational behaviour are of limited utility. Because problems and preferences are not well known, selecting the alternative that yields the most net benefits becomes an impossible task. The problem under conditions of ambiguity is that we don t know what the problem is; its definition is vague and shifting. Distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant information is problematic, which can lead to false and misleading interpretations of facts. Choice becomes less an exercise in solving problems and more an attempt to make sense of partially comprehensive world (Zahariadis 2007: 67). 3.2 Multiple Streams and Policy Windows The traditional garbage can model conceives decision-making in organized anarchies in terms of independent streams of problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities. 2 It is important to note that the garbage can model in contrast to rational choice theory, in which solution are chosen for their optimal efficient resolution of pre-existing problems - sees these streams as, for the most part independent. That is, [s]olutions, or inherently preferred policies, may exist prior to and independent of any problem, and advocates of particular solutions will seek to attach them to any problem and choice opportunity that promises to serve as a vehicle for the policy s adoption. The linking of problems and solutions is determined more by temporal sorting in which problems and solutions that arise at the same time become linked in choice opportunities than by rational fitting of solutions to problems (Lipson 2007: 82). Therefore, who pays attention to what and when is critical. On that matter Zahariadis argues in referring to Drucker and Mackenzie Because the primary concern of decision makers policy makers, business executive, or top civil servants is to manage time effectively rather than to manage tasks (...), it is reasonable to pursue a lens that accords significance to time rather than to rationality (Zahariadis 2007: 68). Several incidents of UN sanctions practice might serve to illustrate this, especially when thinking of cases where no clear objectives or demands are made the target can easily comply with. What holds true for many people also holds true for policy makers: they often do not know exactly what they want and therefore, almost never make their objectives crystal clear, but it is true that quite often time constraints force politicians to make decisions without having formulated precise preferences. Decisions are made despite, and may even be facilitated by, opaqueness (Zahariadis 2007: 67). As Cohen, March, and Olsen emphasized it, organized anarchies can be described better as a collection of ideas than as a coherent structure (Cohen, March, Olsen 1972: 1). As Lipson points out Kingdon modified the original GCM in three significant ways. First, he uses only a three stream model (problems, policies, and politics). The politics stream 1 2 Note also the ambiguous role of informal groups (Prantl 2005) and the role of Groups of Friends (Whitfield 2004). Problems are issues requiring attention, but under conditions of ambiguity their meanings and interpretations are poorly defined. Therefore solutions, in this perspective, may be an answer looking for a question. Participants those involved in a decision process at a particular time vary over time and across issues. And choice opportunities occasions when an organization is expected to produce behavior that can be called a decision can be a function of routine activities, such as an annual budget process, or the result of specific events or circumstances (Lipson 2007: 82, citing Cohen, March, and Olsen).

8 subsumes the participants and choice opportunities streams of the original model. For the purpose of this study, I follow the redefined politics stream by Lipson as this is more appropriate to the context of international, rather than domestic, policy-making. That is, instead of solely domestic factors that make up Kingdon s politics stream, the political stream is conceived here as consisting of actors, interests, and ideas at three levels: (1) the multilateral setting; (2) politics within UN member states (e.g. support or hostility towards UN engagement, and willingness to pay dues); and (3) politics and organizational culture within the UN (Lipson 2007: 84). Second, Kingdon added the concepts of policy windows and policy entrepreneurs. Basically, Kingdon s model is more interested in explaining change in policy agendas, rather than organizational choice more broadly (Goede 2009: 7). Kingdon argues that agenda change only occurs when the opportunity arises with the opening of a policy window. That is, infrequently opportunities might arise to connect problems and solutions and move them onto the agenda for decision. Policy windows are opportunities for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problems and as opportunities for action on given initiatives (see Kingdon 2003: ). As such policy windows may open due to regular events, such as budget deadline or elections, or due to irregular occurrences such as crises of major shifts in political power (Kingdon 2003: 166). According to Kingdon two kinds of policy windows exist: problem and political windows. Problems that arise from sources exogenous to the political stream and demand a policy respond can constitute a problem (policy) window. On the other hand, political events as such (changes of government, shifts in the national mood, and the rise and fall of political fortunes) might also constitute a political (policy) window. However, the pure existence of a policy window does not automatically bring a certain kind of decision or even policy change. Here policy entrepreneurs come into play, linking problems and solutions during such windows of opportunity (Lipson 2007: 83; for a review of the concept see Mintrom, Norman 2009). Policy entrepreneurs have to engage actively at these moments, but even when policy entrepreneurs are present and act promptly, their efforts may fail. Nevertheless, it is important to note that usually when windows open they become focal points for the efforts of many policy entrepreneurs seeking to advance solutions and address problems that may be little or not all related to the proximate cause of the particular window (Lipson 2007: 83). Kingdon argues that sometimes more solutions are available than windows to handle them and that this might result in an overload, which can result in failure of all proposals, or selection of some for attention while others are ignored or abandoned (Kingdon 2003: 169). Likewise, if (too) many policy entrepreneurs try to push for (very) different options at the time (window), this might result in a stalemate where no options can be agreed on. Third, by reformulating the solution, or policy, stream Kingdon adds an evolutionary component to the garbage can model. As Lipson points out: In Kingdon s version, the policy stream corresponds to a policy primeval soup Within this soup, policy alternatives originate, mutate, and recombine into new forms. Kingdon sees mutation and recombination of existing policies, rather than the generation of entirely new policies, as the main processes by which new policies alternatives develop. Policy communities select alternatives from the soup according to criteria of technical feasibility, consistency with the policy community s values, and judgements of what is acceptable in the larger political system (Lipson 2007: 83, 84). Having now explained how to conceptualize the UN as organized anarchy and described the garbage can model-perspective, we can now move on to contextualize the evolutionary shifts in UN sanctions practice.

9 Figure 1: The Garbage-Can-Model: Agenda Change and Decision-Making at the UN Sascha Werthes 2010

10 4. Contextualizing the Evolutionary Shifts in UN Sanctions Practice From a Garbage Can Model -Perspective To explain at least in some way more reasonable the evolution of UN sanctions practice, I move on in employing briefly the multiple streams- approach based on the garbage can model -perspective of agenda-setting. This will help to contextualize how sanctions came to be considered, on the UN Security Council s agenda, an appropriate solution to multifaceted problems for which it is still (very often) regarded as inappropriate or a not really promising policy which is not likely to produce success. 3 To begin with one can convincingly argue that the UN fits the defining criteria of an organized anarchy, to which the garbage can model can be applied: unclear preferences, opaque organizational processes, and fluid participation (Lipson 2007; see Goede 2009). Drawing heavily on the work of John Kingdon (Kingdon 2003), Nikolas Zahariadis (Zahariadis 2007; Zahariadis 2003), and Michael Lipson (Lipson 2007), I will explain changes and consistencies in UN sanctions practice as the result of policy entrepreneurs linking of a solution (sanctions) to a problem (crisis and conflict) in the context of a policy window primarily created by the ending of the Cold War. As mentioned before, the period since the end of the Cold War has been a turbulent one for the International Society at large and the UN especially (see e.g. von Bredow 1994; Malone 2004; Brühl, Rittberger 2001). The Security Council authorized a multitude of peacekeeping missions 4 and sanctions regimes. Both ways of responding to situations of crisis and conflict multiplied throughout the 1990 s, indicating basically a quantitative change. Moreover, this quantitative change was accompanied by a qualitative shift in the nature of peacekeeping practice and in the nature of sanctions practice. For now, the evolution of UN Chapter VII practice and UN sanctions practice respectively has been only inadequately explained. Therefore, an explanation in terms of a modified garbage can model is proposed. A huge part of existing literature on UN sanctions practice has focused on questions of political effectiveness and operational efficacy, thereby not being due attention on explaining sufficiently how already existing kinds of evolutionary changes in practice came about. Yet the changing behavioural patterns in sanctions practice that have evolved throughout the 1990s remain to be addressed and explained. Moreover, understanding how and why sanctions practice was transformed remains to be answered more satisfactory as it also helps to understand when some convincing policy reform recommendations of (UN sanction experts and practioners) can be influential and when and how they might an impact on the evolution of UN sanction practice. That is, though existing studies routinely note a number of relevant factors (e.g. the end of the Cold War ; (practical) experience and lessons drawing at e.g. expert seminars like the Interlaken I+II, the Bonn-Berlin, and Stockholm processes; etc.), they do not explain adequately how these factors happen to influence the decision-making processes at the UN Security Council. Therefore, the critically observer remains wondering why some recommendation have been taken up and informed UN sanctions practice evolution and some have not. 3 4 For a more general discussion of the working method and procedure of the Council see Hulton (2004), Wolfram (2012). For different accounts of the evolution of peacekeeping see e.g. Bellamy, Williams, Griffin (2009); MacQueen (2006); Debiel (2002); Goulding (1993).

11 4.1 The Problem Stream Regarding the UN Security Council and its international crises and conflict management policy only those themes in the Problem-Stream are of interest, which call the UN SC to action or come to be perceived as a threat or breach of international peace. Additionally, a dynamic in the Problem-Stream can arise if a certain kind of UN policy as such becomes problematized. Developments in the problem stream in the 1990 s and at the beginning of the new millennium included the 1991 Persian Gulf War, political upheaval, humanitarian crisis, and violent conflict e.g. in Somalia; the breakup of Yugoslavia, and accompanying ethnic conflict; acts of (transnational) terrorism; nuclear proliferation; fragile states and peace processes, accompanied by conflict and humanitarian crises; military coup against a democratically elected government in Haiti; genocide, mass atrocities and civil war in Rwanda, Sudan, and FRY (Kosovo). All these kinds of problems were not really new. However, all these events became more and more salient as the Cold War receded, and media attention (on the so-called CNN factor see e.g. Hawkins 2004: ) and evolving norms of humanitarianism (for a broader and critical discussion see the papers in Barnett, Weiss 2008) helped to connect these new critically problems to more coercive policy strategies. All in all, this constituted an important change in the problem stream (see Lipson 2007; Goede 2009). At the same time, liberal norms promoted an emphasis on political circumstance and situations in the various regions, facilitating not only an expanded role for peace operations but also a broadened agenda for which sanctions were imposed. Likewise the unintended consequences of comprehensive sanction regimes (especially in the case of the Iraq sanctions regime) gained significant attention of and were emphatically criticized by various political actors. Thus, the rapidly changing international situation (as the Cold War drew to an end) and high profile crises and conflicts (due to media attention) constituted a rapidly changing problem stream. Moreover, the renaissance of a UN sanctions policy though basically welcomed became more and more criticized at the middle of the 1990ies as comprehensive sanction regimes produced such humanitarian unintended consequences. The decline of legitimacy and political support for a (comprehensive) UN sanction policy became so severe that proponents of a UN sanction policy in various crisis situations faced the problem of how to gain consensus and approval of the necessary majority of UN Security Council members. 4.2 The Politics Stream As described above (see also Figure 1), the politics stream with regard to UN engagement includes multilateral, national, and organizational elements. Various development and events helped to transform multilateral politics of the UN Security Council. First of all, the thawing of the so-called Cold War opened a political window. Basically, the complex problem of intrastate conflict and humanitarian crisis was linked to solutions of complex peacekeeping, sanctions, and sometimes even military intervention. The atmosphere of optimism prevailing in the Security Council until about 1993 is analogous to the national mood that Kingdon identified as an element of the political stream in the context of US government agenda setting (Lipson 2007: 89). National-level politics were certainly important in the multilateral shift, especially when it comes to substantiate a political shift. The retreat of the P-5 members to use the veto can be attributed to changes in national politics. Soviet/Russian cooperation was tied to the reforms

12 and ideational changes beginning with the Gorbachev regime. The decline of Reagan-era US hostility toward the UN, and the first President Bush s New World Order rhetoric, and Clinton administration enthusiasm for assertive multilateralism, all facilitated an expansion of the role of the UN and the possibility to use Chapter VII mechanisms (see Lipson 2007). When in 1994 the United Nations Development Programme published its report and proposed the idea of human security not many observers believed that the idea would have a lasting impact on international politics. However, since then normative-ideational shifts changed understanding of the relationship between sovereignty and international order, and the acceptance of liberal democracy as the standard of legitimate governance - can be observed (see e.g. Annan 1999). The idea of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is for the time being the culminating point of reference (Thakur 2006; see e.g.bellamy 2009; Evans 2008; MacFarlane, Khong 2006). These normative-ideational shifts can be conceptualized as elements of the political stream (Lipson 2007: 90). 5 These ideational changes occurred among elites who were key actors in the political stream. They had the effect of coupling elements intrastate conflict, humanitarian crisis, and international terrorism and Chapter VII instruments in the problem and solution streams. Adopting the view that internal (empirical) sovereignty and human security is necessary and of great importance for international peace and security implies broadening the agenda of engagement and modifying strategies and means so that they fit to the broadened agenda. Additionally, politics and organizational culture within the UN are central consideration in analyzing change. As Lipson argues, factors internal to the UN Secretariat the division of bureaucratic turf between different offices and officials, the personal initiatives of Secretaries-General Peréz de Cuéllar (interesting here Pérez de Cuéllar 1993)and Boutros- Ghali, and the organizational culture of the Secretariat and its different departments constituted important elements of the political stream (Lipson 2007: 90). Alongside Boutros- Ghali s An Agenda for Peace report we can probably also mention Kofi Annan s We, the people : The role of the United Nations in the twenty-first century report and In larger freedom: Towards development, security and human rights for all as both a reflection and catalyst of developments in the political stream. How important politics and organizational culture within the UN can be, is also exemplified in the UN sanctions committees and other subsidiary bodies for administrating and monitoring sanctions. The Angola sanctions regime and the initiative of Robert Fowler are illustrative here. 4.3 The Policy Stream What we can now perceive as the contemporary art of UN sanctions practice is in fact a change in the solution, or policy, stream. The above mentioned changes of behavioural pattern all illustrate this. This includes, for example, the general shift away from comprehensive to targeted and selected measures; not only targeting states but also entities and individuals as well as governments; accepting minimizing humanitarian hardship as a priority among UN policymakers; etc. The evolution of UN sanctions practice is a prime example and conforms almost perfectly to Kingdon s model of policy ideas and alternatives developing largely through mutation and recombination in a policy primeval soup. The idea of smart sanctions was not a wholly new creation, but a novel recombination of elements and to a certain degree alteration 5 For a more general discussion of the influence and impact of ideas immanent at international conferences, proposed by international commissions or reports see e.g. Schechter 2005; Thakur, Cooper, English (2005).

13 that had been present in the soup of collective security policy alternatives for long. The idea that external and internal networks of public, private, transnational, and international actors try to inform policy and develop policy-options also fits to the UN context. The Interlaken Process I + II ( ); the Bonn-Berlin-Process ( ); the Stockholm Process ( ) which brought together practioners, experts, and academics are perfectly illustrating this (see e.g. Biersteker et al. 2005; Staibano 2005). The sanctions tool was not only rediscovered as a policy option at the end of the Cold War. The way sanctions were imposed and implemented steadily evolved over time. Moreover, the mutation or alteration in UN sanctions practice present in almost every case - corresponds nicely to the problem and politics stream. 4.4 Political and Problem Policy Windows As already foreshadowed, the ending of the Cold War is often described as the primary factor making possible the shifts in UN crisis and conflict engagement that occurred at the end of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, and is sometimes even portrayed as their direct cause. Definitely this extraordinary development opened up previously foreclosed policy options and a clearer example of a policy window is hard to imagine (Lipson 2007: 87). Its main sources can be seen in both the problem and political streams. The high media coverage and increased visibility of ethnic and tribal conflicts (or falling and failed state situations), often coming along with humanitarian crises, in the early post-cold War period opened from time to time problem policy windows through which the solution of peacekeeping (see Lipson 2007), humanitarian intervention (see Goede 2009), but also sanctions was linked to the problem of intrastate crisis and conflict. 6 Moreover, as variously argued, the detente of superpower relations and the observable increased P-5 cooperation marked a dramatic turn in the politics stream, and created a political policy window. Additionally, problem policy windows 7 violently opened at the turn of the new millennium. International terrorist acts especially those of Lockerbie (1988), 9-11 (2001), and also the Hariri assassination (2005) all demanded a policy response. The dramatic events of 9-11 created the universal eye-witness and a universal feeling of insecurity or vulnerability. Here again a problem policy window opened through which the solution of sanctions could be linked. Likewise, the problem of nuclear proliferation created a visible problem policy window at the beginning of the new millennium. Finally, a changed understanding of the relationship between sovereignty and international order (illustratively exemplified by the ideas of human security or the responsibility to protect) constituted another additional and significant change in the political stream (see e.g. Lipson 2007; Bellamy 2009; Evans 2008; MacFarlane, Khong 2006; Barnett 1995), creating a political policy window. In sum, when adapting the modified version of Lipson s adoption of Kingdon s garbage can model-framework to the UN system, one can contextualize the evolution of UN sanctions practice in terms of the coupling of problems (intrastate conflicts; humanitarian crises; international terrorism; nuclear proliferation; and the need of (inter-)national political elites to be seen as doing something about it), a solution (sanctions, either comprehensive or targeted) and politics (the unsettled configuration; increased cooperation; and general optimism of the post-cold War period; normative-ideational shifts) in the context of the above 6 7 To get an idea about how developments in the three streams are brought together in discursive interactions at the Security Council see e.g. Johnstone (2003). With Keeler (1993) one can argue that the formerly existence of a macro window like e.g. the end of the Cold War makes possible the opening of various micro (problem) windows.

14 mentioned policy windows. These streams are interdependent, though loosely so (see also Lipson 2007: 87). But time and again, one nevertheless has to stress that policy entrepreneurs have to engage actively at these moments. And that even when policy entrepreneurs are present and act promptly, their efforts may fail. However, it is important to note that usually when windows open they become focal points for the efforts of many policy entrepreneurs seeking to advance solutions and address problems that may be little or not at all related to the proximate cause of the particular window. Therefore, a more detailed though brief look at the various streams deems necessary. 4.5 Policy Entrepreneurs The identification of policy entrepreneurs is not an easy task. Basically, one has to argue that the locus of political entrepreneurship promoting sanctions as an option varies from case to case, and can lie in the Security Council, the Office of the Secretary-General, subsidiary bodies of the Council, regional organizations, neighbouring countries, or even local parties to the conflict and crisis. When it comes to the Security Council one has to argue that sanctions as a policy instrument have gained attractiveness precisely because they enable Security Council members to forge shared responses during crises in which their policies might otherwise diverge. As Cortright, Lopez and Gerber argue especially in the first part of the 1990s, the UN Security Council became sharply proactive in addressing peacekeeping, security, and human rights concerns related to a more cooperative working relationship among the P5 (Cortright, Lopez, Gerber 2002: 6). However, even more interestingly they note: Although certain dimensions of that earlier cooperative trend have continued, recent years have witnessed more pronounced differences among the Permanent Five, especially the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia, and attemps to dominate particular sanctions episodes. In the attempts to develop smarter sanctions in Iraq (...) the United States and the United Kingdon took the lead but ran into strong counterpressure from Russia. In the sanctions against the Taliban (...) Russia and the United States dominated the proceedings and strong-armed the Council into adopting a package of measures that had little support from other Council members (Cortright, Lopez, Gerber 2002: 6). In referring to Lisa Martin (Martin 1992) they point out that international organizations are often subject to a certain kind of hijacking of the sanctions process (Cortright, Lopez, Gerber 2002: 6, 7). Interesting here is also the innovation of time limits. France and other members of the Security Council have strongly favoured the policy of establishing time limits as a way of avoiding the open-ended, seemingly endless sanctions that have remained in place in Iraq. The concern with time limits has been not only humanitarian but political, to prevent permanent members of the Council from blocking a consensus for the lifting of sanctions (Cortright, Lopez, Gerber 2002: 210). Accordingly, the U.S. and the United Kingdom opposed the idea of time limits when it was raised within the Security Council working group as a matter of general principle. In specific cases, however, the two countries have gone along with the establishment of time limits (Cortright, Lopez, Gerber 2002: 210). While U.S. and UK officials argued that that time limits might weaken the coercive impact of sanctions, French and Russian representatives countered that pressure on the target to comply will remain and additionally, that time limits will give the Council a chance to respond to humanitarian hardship that may arise and will force Council members to take more direct

15 responsibility for each sanctions case on a renewable basis (Cortright, Lopez, Gerber 2002: 210, 211). Members of the Security Council, especially the Permanent Five, can act as policy entrepreneurs or as spoilers to entrepreneurial move of others. This can be pretty good illustrated by the Council s attempts to impose more and more targeted and focused sanctions. As Cortright and Lopez argue, the more sanctions target a specific faction within an internal conflict or control the trade and movement of specific commodities, the more likely it is that some among the Permanent Five will object to them (Cortright, Lopez, Gerber 2002: 7). For example, France was unwilling to support a commodity embargo against timber exports from Liberia, despite its desire to bring peace and security to West Africa and its general support for UN arms and diamond embargoes. By identifying this particular export as the focus of control, the Council placed France, which imports a high percentage of Liberia s timber exports, in the perceived position of carrying a higher cost burden than other Permanent Five states (Cortright, Lopez, Gerber 2002: 7). Surely the UN Secretariat and its respective Generals figured as policy entrepreneurs (for a more general discussion see Kille 2007; Fröhlich 2008; Gordenker 2005). Especially, Boutros-Ghali s reports on An Agenda for Peace (A/47/277-S/24111) and its Supplement (A/50/60-S/1995/1) facilitated the process of review of the effectiveness of Security Council imposed sanctions and their often negative effects. Kofi Annan proposed on various occasions and in various reports sanctions as a valuable tool for conflict management, though always asking for designing them smarter and less blunt (see e.g. his report The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, 1998). In his annual report of 1998 (para. 62), for example, he argued: I have in the past underlined the need for a mechanism that renders sanctions a less blunt and more effective instrument. Therefore, I welcome the fact that the concept of "smart sanctions", which seek to pressure regimes rather than peoples and thus reduce humanitarian costs, has been gaining support among Member States. The increasing interest in more targeted sanctions was evident in the recent measures applied by the Security Council against the military junta in Sierra Leone and against UNITA in Angola. Moreover, he regularly argued for humanitarian exemptions. The UN General Assembly also acted as policy entrepreneur when, for example, making recommendation applicable to arms embargoes and travel bans (see e.g. A/RES/51/242, 26 September 1997). Moreover, as already indicated, individual governments acted as policy entrepreneurs. The Swiss, German, and Swedish government certainly fall into this category as they sponsored the respective Interlaken I+II, Bonn-Berlin, and Stockholm processes. Additionally, Canada s role as policy entrepreneur is quite well documented, especially with regard to the Angola sanction case (see e.g. Pearson 2001; Graham 2002; Nossal 2002). Then former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy exemplifies probable a policy entrepreneur par excellence. Likewise, he most clearly and deeply believed that world politics were in a fundamental period of evolution and Canada was in an excellent position to affect that evolution (Pearson 2001: 132; see also Riddell-Dixon 2005); thus, actually recognizing the existence of an open policy window and the opportunity to act as policy entrepreneur. 8 Additionally, in 2000, Canada used its position as president of the UN Security Council to finally gain approval for the creation of a formal working group on sanction. Under the Chair of Anwarul Chowdhury, then permanent representative to the UN of Bangladesh, the working group dealt with three areas: (a) administration of sanctions, (b) the design of Security Council resolutions, and (c) monitoring and assessment. Interestingly, these three 8 For a more general overview of Canada s various initiatives to act as policy entrepreneur see the edited volume by McRae and Hubert (2001).

16 areas of reform corresponded to the suggestions and actual policy developments that emanated from within the Council itself and from a variety of governmental and nongovernmental sources. That is, various kinds of policy entrepreneurs were engaged at that time and there was a broad agreement within the UN community and beyond that improvements were needed in the administration, design, and monitoring of sanctions policies (see also Cortright, Lopez, Gerber 2002: 8-9). Additionally, individuals can play their role. Surely, Robert Fowler acted as a key policy entrepreneur in the Angola case. But also Chowdhury acted as policy entrepreneur when trying in a methodical, deliberate, and consensus-building manner in the hope of overcoming the various differences within the group (Cortright, Lopez, Gerber 2002: 9). His personal engagement in the way he managed to forge a consensus on most reform matters through a mixture of private sessions and public hearings fits nicely to the idea of a policy entrepreneur (also see Cortright, Lopez, Gerber 2002: 9). Regional organizations also had their impact. The OAS played its role when asking the Security Council to respond to the crisis in Haiti. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU) convened the Copenhagen Round Table (24-25 June 1996), which took stock of lessons learned from the Yugoslav sanctions regime. The report of the Round Table, including its recommendations, was made available to the members of the Security Council (S/1996/776, 24 September 1996). 5. Conclusion The paper started with summing up briefly the evolution of UN sanctions practice throughout the 1990ies. This short general review of UN sanctions practice highlighted some of the quantitative and qualitative differences of UN sanction policy before and after the end of the so-called Cold War and between UN sanction policy at the beginning of the 1990ies and at the beginning of the new millennium. Moreover, it emphasized that two major shifts in UN sanction policy (a quantitative one and a qualitative one) happened at specific moments in time which can be regarded as macro policy windows conducive for policy entrepreneur's engagement for specific policy modification of UN's crises and conflict management and that smaller shifts in the way the UN sanctions practice evolved followed a pattern which can be described as sequential and incremental. The ex-post analysis of decision-making processes along the multiple-streams approach shed some light on how the evolution of UN sanction practice can be contextualized or explained. It gave some examples of how policy entrepreneurs were successful in influencing UN sanction policy when they engaged ad hoc in a pragmatic way in the context of macro and micro policy windows. In contrast to accounts that present the transformation of UN sanctions practice as a natural of inevitable consequence of the end of the Cold War or as a form of 'learning by doing' (Biersteker 2004: 2), this paper emphasized the contingency of the underlying decision-making processes, accentuating the necessity of open policy windows and substantial engagement of policy entrepreneurs.