Learning from the Pioneers

Transcription

1 Learning from the Pioneers Workshop Report St. Teresa s Pastoral Centre, Lodwar August 2013

2 Contents Acronyms... 2 Introduction Looking back: the history of drought management in Kenya Change and continuity Devolution and drought management Regional dimensions Peer review of the current drought management system Next steps and concluding reflections...29 Annex 1 List of participants...30 Annex 2 Official programme...34 Annex 3 Profiles of the pioneers...37 Annex 4 Official speeches...41 Annex 5 Presentations

3 Acronyms ALRMP ASALs CDC CDTF CMDRR CRA DDC DDMC DIDC DMP DPIRP DRR ECHO EDRP EU EWS FAO FFW HEA ITDG KEPHIS MTP NCPB NDCF NDMA NSC PPG RRC TDCPU TRP UNEP VAM WFP Arid Lands Resource Management Project Arid and Semi-Arid Lands County Drought Coordinator Community Development Trust Fund Community-Managed Disaster (Drought) Risk Reduction Commission on Revenue Allocation District Development Committee District Drought Management Committee District Information and Documentation Centre Drought Monitoring Project Drought Preparedness Information and Recovery Programme Disaster (Drought) Risk Reduction European Community Humanitarian Organisation Emergency Drought Recovery Project European Union Early Warning System Food and Agriculture Organisation Food for Work Household Economy Approach Intermediate Technology Development Group (now Practical Action) Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Services Medium Term Plan National Cereals and Produce Board National Drought Contingency Fund National Drought Management Authority National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management Pastoralist Parliamentary Group Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (South Sudan) Turkana Drought Contingency Planning Unit Turkana Rehabilitation Project United Nations Environment Programme Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping World Food Programme 2

4 Introduction The drought management system in Kenya has its roots in the work of the Turkana Rehabilitation Project (TRP) in the early 1980s and a consultancy carried out for TRP by Dr. Jeremy Swift in Since then, the system has expanded and evolved and is now the responsibility of the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA). The NDMA was established in November As part of its induction and knowledge management programme, the Authority invited back to Turkana a group of individuals who in their various ways have made a substantive contribution to the drought management system over time. These pioneers shared their expertise with the Authority s senior staff and partners a process affectionately characterised as the interaction of the analogue and digital generations. Together, the group pieced together the history of the past thirty years. They identified what has changed and what has remained constant, and subjected the various components of the drought management system as it operates today to peer review. The meeting was enhanced by the presence of representatives from two other institutions. First, the Deputy Governor of Turkana and the Member of the County Executive with responsibility for public service, decentralised administration and disaster management helped the group appreciate the opportunities and challenges of devolution for drought management, as well as the importance of close partnership between the NDMA and the County Government. Second, two senior officials with responsibility for disaster management in the Government of the Republic of South Sudan lent the meeting an international perspective, highlighting in particular the impact of cross-border conflict on food security and the importance of inter-governmental collaboration in drought management. In brief, participants expectations of the meeting were that it would deliver the following: 1. A better appreciation of the historical foundations of the drought management system in Kenya. 2. A better understanding of the current drought management system in Kenya. 3. A common understanding of the opportunities that devolved government presents for drought management, the associated challenges and how to overcome them. 4. Recognition of the individuals and organisations that have played key roles in shaping the drought management system. 5. A deepened understanding of lessons learnt, particularly with regards to institution building. This account of the meeting is organised not in conventional chronological fashion but around the main dimensions of the discussion set out above. The first section looks at the history of the drought management system since the 1980s, and the second at participants views of change 3

5 and continuity during that time. The third focuses on devolution and the fourth on the regional dimensions. The fifth section contains the pioneers and participants technical comments on the drought management system in operation today, while a concluding section summarises final impressions and next steps. The workshop discussions highlighted the critical importance of continuity. A core group of individuals has sustained their commitment to the drought management system over time, despite moving between organisations, positions and even countries. Some key institutional partnerships have also remained constant; the European Union, for example, supported TRP in the early 1980s and remains one of the closest partners of the NDMA today. During the opening session, when invited to say why drought management matters to them, it became clear that for many participants this commitment is driven by their direct personal experience of the suffering caused by drought. Box 1 contains a flavour of what people said. The NDMA has been created to end this suffering, and acknowledges with thanks the support it receives from many partners and well-wishers to help it do so. The meeting was facilitated by Michael Ochieng Odhiambo and financed by the European Union through the Kenya Rural Development Programme. Box 1: Why does drought management matter to me? Since childhood I have seen what drought does to our communities Drought evolves slowly we can manage it if all stakeholders collaborate Drought affects 80% of our country if we ignore it, we will not advance as a nation Drought has a huge impact on national resources and national development I have experienced the nightmare of responding to drought without drought management Drought is a key priority for my organisation and for Kenya I have lived in drought-prone areas for 50 years I know the impact It has become part of my life it is what I have done all these years My job is to ensure that we use and account for donor funds in an appropriate manner Ours is a new country (South Sudan) we would like to learn from Kenya s experience Unless we manage drought, we will not enjoy the benefits of devolution I have been working to improve the systems we use Climate change is here, and drought is a key hazard I want to remove the ghost of seeing children dying unnecessarily The suffering caused by drought is preventable we have an obligation to end it 4

6 Figure 1: Timeline Major drought affects the whole of Kenya, particularly the north-west; thousands die in Turkana. The Turkana Rehabilitation Project begins in 1980 under the Ministry of Regional Development supported by the European Union and the governments of the Netherlands and Norway. Lammert Zwaagstra is project manager between 1981 and TRP responds effectively to the next major drought in Turkana because it has all three of the following under one management system: some early warning capacity based on MUAC measurements, resources to respond through foodfor-work, and decision-making authority Jeremy Swift has been working on analysis of the drought and famine in the Sahel. Oxfam proposes bringing this experience and that of Turkana together in a district drought management plan and contracts Jeremy Swift to do so Jeremy produces 'Planning Against Drought and Famine in Turkana, Northern Kenya', which becomes the model for the drought early warning and contingency planning system in Kenya. In Turkana it is implemented by Rudolf van den Boogaard through the Turkana Drought Contingency Planning Unit (TDCPU) located under the District Planning Unit. Initial funding is provided by the Norwegian government Stephen Anderson and Jennifer Bush arrive in Turkana with the World Food Programme (WFP) and support TRP and TDCPU. Both Stephen and Jennifer contribute to the design and subsequent implementation of the Drought Monitoring Project (DMP). The DMP expands drought monitoring to Samburu, Isiolo, Marsabit and Moyale, as well as Turkana, and links this with recovery activities implemented by 12 NGOs. DMP, and the Drought Preparedness Intervention and Recovery Programme (DPIRP) which follows it, are both supported by the Netherlands government The DPIRP builds on the DMP in the same five districts and complements this with community development and drought management. Mike Wekesa joins DPIRP in 1995 and becomes its programme manager in Following the severe drought of , the Emergency Drought Recovery Project (EDRP) complements the DMP and DPIRP in Mandera, Marsabit, Turkana and Tana River, with limited activities in five other arid districts, and with support from the World Bank, UNICEF and others The Arld Lands Resource Management Project (ALRMP) builds on both DPIRP and ERDP in 11 arid districts, initially in those districts where DPIRP is not operational. Vincent Lelei as National Project Coordinator establishes the key institutional structures, followed by Mahboub Maalim in The second phase of ALRMP expands the drought management system to 28 districts, coordinated by Fatuma Abdulkadir from 2004 (who was previously with DPIRP in and then with ALRMP from 1998). A key objective of ALRMP is to institutionalise the drought management system. ALRMP provides a framework for longer-term implementation, government accountability, and integration of other issues. For example, a consultancy on conflict for Oxfam in 1999 leads to the establishment of the National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management in the Office of the President The creation of the National Drought Management Authority is prioritised by Hon. Mohamed Elmi in the new Ministry of State for Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands. The Authority is gazetted in November

7 1. Looking back: the history of drought management in Kenya The discussion was in two parts: first, the origins of the drought management system in Turkana in the 1980s, and second, its expansion and evolution in other parts of Kenya from 1992 onwards. The timeline in Figure 1 has been pieced together from the accounts of Mr. Lammert Zwaagstra, Dr. Jeremy Swift, Mr. Stephen Anderson, Mr. Mike Wekesa, Ms. Fatuma Abdikadir and Hon. Mohamed Elmi. It is important to note that many others who were not present at the meeting made equally important contributions at different times. The purpose of this section is not to provide a definitive and comprehensive account but rather to give a flavour of how a system and its institutional framework evolves over time. The story begins with Lammert. Part 1: Origins of the drought management system: At the end of 1980 there was a joint mission to Turkana from the European Union and the Netherlands government. A serious situation had developed after the 1980 drought and the mission decided to provide substantial support, channelled through the new Turkana Rehabilitation Project. There was a huge camp of Turkana at Kakuma. I still remember the scene today: it was absolutely silent, just a few people groaning and moaning. We found dead bodies all over the place laid out for burial. Many thousands died, often from measles and cholera. Livestock also died in huge numbers, largely because vaccination campaigns had not been carried out. While people have died in subsequent droughts, I believe that 1980/81 was the last drought in which they died in such vast numbers. Our priority was to move people out of the camps. The only way that could be done was to entice them back to their home areas which we did through substantial food for work programmes and interventions in many other areas, including human and animal health. However, in 1980/81 the whole of Kenya was affected by food shortages. There were huge queues across the country. NCPB was empty, so the food we distributed had to come from overseas, which meant moving it from Mombasa to Turkana on non-existent roads. This was why our logistics capacity was so important. We received a lot of support from WFP, particularly with logistics, which allowed us to supervise the food for work activities effectively, and we had flexibility in how we used the rations. For example, we decided to double them for a while, and we allowed extra food to be bartered so that it would get into the livestock economy. We also received support from ITDG, with which we introduced the first barefoot vets in Kenya, and from Oxfam, which provided us with a number of consultants such as Richard Hogg, who managed a large restocking programme. 6

8 We also realised that there was a total lack of data, and for this reason we carried out a survey of the district s resources between 1982 and We generated a range of maps which showed clearly that the areas of highest potential for pastoralism were not being used because of insecurity; rather, people were concentrated in the areas with least potential. The survey showed that 54% of the district was inaccessible to herders. This population distribution is unchanged today or rather it is worse, because the numbers of people are much higher. It would be useful to study this issue and understand what the opportunity costs to pastoralists are of being unable to access prime pasture, and to know how many people have died. Turkana at that time was in dire straits. Its neighbours were stronger and saw its weakness. The Matheniko, Jie and Dodoth had raided the barracks in Moroto and were now in possession of sophisticated weapons. This started an arms race in the region which continues today. The Turkana had never raided each other, but that nearly changed when a group of youth planned a raid in south Turkana. The elders tried unsuccessfully to dissuade them. However, while the warriors were camped on an island in the river upstream from Kakuma an enormous flood swept all but two away. So they never went on that raid, and there has never been any raid between the Turkana since that time. In 1984, when the next drought came, we were in a position to respond effectively since we had both the necessary capacity and resources under one management system in TRP. Our medical team under the leadership of Rudolf van den Boogaard acted as our early warning. We had three mobile dispensaries which could alert us to emerging stress. For example, we noticed increased enrolment in primary schools which was very unusual at that time; pastoralists were then very reluctant to send their children to school but were doing so because of the school feeding programme. As a result, Turkana was less badly affected by the 1984 drought. A presidential mission came and asked why. David Campbell, then manager of Oxfam in Kenya, suggested that we try to document what happened and offered to find a consultant, who turned out to be Jeremy Swift. Lammert Zwaagstra, TRP Project Manager, Note: the district resource survey mentioned by Lammert is available from the NDMA. 7

9 Jeremy Swift then picks up the story, linking his work in Turkana with the emerging international consensus at that time on drought and famine. 1 I would like to introduce the important distinction between drought and famine. Drought is an act of nature; we can t stop it, we can only mitigate its effects. But famine is an act of man and can be avoided. It s very important that we bear that distinction in mind. My background was as a researcher in disasters and resilience in various countries. I was working in the Tuareg area of Mali in 1971 and found myself in the middle of a major famine. I had those conventional views of drought and famine that failed to distinguish between the two. However, I came to realise that the Tuareg were dying not because there was no food but because it was too expensive to buy it. Also, I realised that drought has a long gestation: I could trace its evolution over five or ten years there were lots of signs that something was going on. Famine in Africa is mostly triggered by drought and market failure. If you ve not already done so, I would urge you to read the books by Amartya Sen and Alex de Waal; the latter showed that in major famines people often die of disease rather than starvation, as Lammert illustrated. Oxfam commissioned me to look at the situation in Turkana and to write a drought contingency plan. My first port of call was Lammert s office. TRP had a small plane in which he showed me around the district. As well as talking with officials, I concentrated on talking with herders about their experience. Several things in this work were new. We developed the phrase pastoral terms of trade to describe the rate at which animal products can be exchanged for cereals, which is determined by the relative prices of animals and cereals. The idea of a drought contingency plan and the concept of drought warning stages were also both new. And I don t think that emergency animal purchase had been tried elsewhere before. Following my report, TRP formed the Turkana Drought Contingency Planning Unit which implemented the early warning system, with rapid response delivered by TRP. I would like to highlight some lessons from this experience which I believe are still relevant today. 1 The titles of the two books Jeremy refers to are Amartya Sen s Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlements and Deprivation, published in 1981, and Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan by Alex de Waal, published in

10 1. Importance of a research base: the NDMA s authority will stem from either doing or commissioning research, and having a good understanding of the research available. 2. Early warning is essential for effective action: it gives you the time to see how things are changing. But the challenge is to keep early warning going during good times. New technologies are important in 1984 it was aerial livestock surveys that were cutting edge. But it s important to maintain the links with herders on the ground. The voices of the people who are living this must be heard. 3. Rapid reaction is key: we developed drought early warning stages that trigger a set of predetermined actions. When the drought contingency fund is established, rapid response will be improved. 4. Institutional development: to what extent should the NDMA put its emphasis at the national or the county level? In my view the balance between the two is important. 5. Time: it has taken a long time from the first ideas for a drought management system in the 1980s to the establishment of the NDMA in However, we should not think: Why didn t it happen faster?, but rather, That s how long things take, particularly if they ve been well thought out and periodically evaluated. We have to look at these innovations on a long timescale. 6. Resilience: this is the latest buzz word; everyone is using it, but actually we ve been talking about it for a long time but under another name. It s a key role for the NDMA. 7. International role: the NDMA wants to be a world-class authority. Please keep that vision. Kenya has something important to offer other countries and I hope that you will do that. Why is Kenya the world leader in drought management? It s been a combination of determination and standards. The NDMA is the result of field work, research and analysis, linked to institutions, and of the work of a group of dedicated civil servants. We always need champions. 8. Above all, there is nothing inevitable about famine. Kenya has shown in the past that it can prevent it. There is no reason why there should ever be a famine in Kenya again. Jeremy Swift 9

11 Plenary discussion 1: To what extent were discussions about governance and the rule of law part of your thinking at that time? Insecurity was a problem then but it has got worse; the government is failing in its responsibility to protect. However, security can only be built on a properly functioning rural economy, including its cross-border linkages. What is the role for customary institutions? Their role is very important, particularly in conflict management, and the NDMA needs to understand this and work with it. In 2008/09 successful negotiation between traditional institutions in Kenya and Uganda allowed many thousands of livestock to move into Moroto behind the Loima Hills. The economic returns of saving livestock in these numbers are very high. What expertise did you value then? TRP had strong technical expertise to ensure sustainable food for work activities; for example, Moshe Finkel carried out a lot of training with support from NORAD. Our expertise in early warning was at first largely based on common sense, but as we built the TDCPU we had access to many senior consultants, such as Dick Sandford. How should the NDMA engage with other actors? Contact with other government institutions is key, as is the role of external support: for example, the Norwegian government funded some of the critical early stages in Kenya. The European Union has also supported this work continuously from the early 1980s onwards; it has never wavered. The NDMA needs to remain open and outward-looking. What are your views on dependency in Northern Kenya? Rather than communities being dependent, it is often governments and agencies which are dependent on one or two types of intervention, and which often make people lose the things that made them resilient in the first place (such as mobility). It is the responsibility of governments to stop famine; this is a classic public good. The priority should be to build the basic foundations of a strong economy without which sustainability is impossible. If we don t invest in the basic infrastructure that any production system needs, then we will keep talking about dependency on things like food aid. Who should own the drought contingency plan? The original intention in 1985 was that it be owned by the district administration; the national implications were not addressed in any detail. Today, ownership is shared with the national government, but the primary sense of ownership should remain in the county. The NDMA will need to watch the tendency for attention to creep to Nairobi and keep the right balance between the county and the national levels. What about financing for contingency planning? An early warning system without a contingency planning and financing system is useless. Even though the National Drought 10

12 Contingency Fund (NDCF) is not yet established, we can still finance contingency plans in other ways. We should look at how resources can be set aside at each level (county, national, global) and then additional funds leveraged from the level above during times of stress. Before moving to the next chapter of the story, Mike Wekesa discussed the experience of the TDCPU. This was an independent technical unit set up by TRP in 1987 to run the early warning system with financial support from the Norwegian government. It was created at a time when the District Focus for Rural Development strategy was still dominant, through which power was being decentralised to the district administration. The District Development Committee (DDC) was the key coordination structure, and the so-called Blue Book set the parameters for response; nothing could be done outside that framework. The TDCPU needed to be embedded in this system. A District Drought Management Committee (DDMC) was established in Turkana as a sub-committee of the DDC (the forerunner of the District, now County, Steering Group) and the TDCPU was strategically positioned under the District Planning Unit. The DDMC gave the TDCPU legitimacy and voice and a framework for wider participation. Another key district-level institution was the District Information and Documentation Centre (DIDC), which became an important resource for planning and institutional memory. Although the focus today is on devolution rather than decentralisation and on the county rather than the district, these institutional lessons remain relevant. Part 2: Evolution and expansion of the drought management system: Stephen Anderson, Mike Wekesa and Fatuma Abdikadir then presented the second phase of the pioneers account. This started in 1992, when the drought early warning system was expanded to four other districts (Samburu, Isiolo, Marsabit and Moyale), as well as Turkana, under the Drought Monitoring Project (DMP, ). Monthly drought bulletins were produced, while 12 NGOs implemented drought recovery activities in response to that information, including restocking, animal and human health, and the rehabilitation of selected water points. The Drought Preparedness Intervention and Recovery Programme (DPIRP, ) followed the DMP. It was implemented in the same districts and supported by the same partner (the Netherlands government) but added community development and drought management components to the mix. The number of implementing partners increased to 54, both government and non-government. Access to flexible funds was key, provided by a partner which trusted the team to use them wisely. Both the DMP and the DPIRP operated in the north-west. These were complemented by the Emergency Drought Recovery Project (EDRP, ) which operated in nine arid districts, including in the north-east. Funds were channelled through government departments for activities in water, health, livestock, agriculture, roads and conservation. The EDRP was seen as something of a quick-fix project and helped reinforce the case for longer-term interventions. 11

13 All three of these projects fed into the Arid Lands Resource Management Project (ALRMP, ). For the first few years the ALRMP covered only those districts where the DPIRP was not operational. Later it broadened its agenda to address issues affecting livelihoods and development, such as conflict. Mohamed Elmi in Oxfam commissioned a consultancy by Jeremy Swift and Saverio Krätli which eventually led to the establishment of the National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management (NSC). The ALRMP and others took the lessons from peace building work in Wajir and expanded them to other counties. The peacebuilding committees established at that time eventually played an important role during the postelection violence in With the creation of the ALRMP, the drought management system became more firmly embedded within government. However, it then needed advocacy organisations outside government to raise issues on its behalf. 2 One of the ALRMP s main objectives was to institutionalise the drought management system even further in government. This was finally achieved in 2011 with the establishment of a state corporation, the NDMA. The following diagram shows in simplified form the chain of continuity between the institutions and projects described above: 3 TRP & TDCPU in Turkana DMP EDRP DPIRP ALRMP NDMA Each of these projects generated its own lessons, which were highlighted during the presentations and which are summarised in Table 1. Several of these lessons were also relevant to the early experience in Turkana. Across the board, all of the pioneers emphasised that effective drought management is built on legitimacy, credibility and trust, that often the key 2 ALRMP s work in this area led to the creation of several institutions, including the Pastoralist Development Network of Kenya (preceded by the Kenya Pastoralist Forum), the Pastoralist Thematic Group, the Kenya Livestock Marketing Council, and the National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management. 3 With reference to the first box in the diagram: the TDCPU has since closed, but TRP is still operating today, now under the Ministry of Environment, Water and Natural Resources. 12

14 thing is not what you do but how you do it, and that cultivating political champions can deliver the quality of response and long-term commitments required. Table 1: Lessons from drought management initiatives DMP DPIRP EDRP ALRMP Information is of little value if not connected to response. Context is key: information has to be interpreted so that the reasons for trends are understood. Funds need to flow through structures for legitimacy. Continuity of message and approach matters. DMP had insufficient connection to government systems. The role of champions in government is key. System-building takes time and the long-term commitment of resources and personnel. Drought management must be legally embedded within government. Need to move from managing hazards to managing risks. The credibility of the EWS is key. Minimise red tape in disbursing funds. Maintain a database of implementing partners. Pastoralists need support to carry out drought contingency planning. An institutional framework for drought management was lacking. Long-term implementation is necessary for meaningful impact. Refinement of EWS is a continuous process. A strong EWS can reduce political influence. Government leadership is essential across sectors, but government cannot go it alone: multisectoral and multiagency collaboration is very important, as is community participation. Institutional structures in government need appropriate legal and policy frameworks. Advocacy is needed to challenge misconceptions about pastoralism. There are no quick fixes: drought management takes long-term commitment, planning and resources. 13

15 Plenary discussion 2: The second discussion that followed the presentations of Stephen, Mike and Fatuma explored the following issues. Several participants at the meeting had worked in DMP, ERDP or DPIRP and could trace the transfer of assets and capacity to ALRMP. The position of the NSC: This has actually been weakened by NGOs over time. Some fund community-level peace building activities as if divorced from the broader security system, without recognising the responsibility of the state to protect and without working to address its limitations. The viability of irrigation in drylands: Both the national and county governments continue to promote it, despite the challenges which have been identified. Large-scale schemes in Kenya have generally been a disaster: none had community involvement, the systems were complex to maintain, and there was little consideration of wider economic and social issues. Low-tech schemes such as those introduced by TRP, which people can manage without further technical input, have been more effective. These conclusions are reinforced by a recent FAO study shortly to be available. There is also a problem of mind-set, whereby some people think that food security is only achieved through crops. The sources of additional funds in an emergency: The 1985 plan developed in Turkana proposed that donors be involved in the EWS and in effect certify it, making advance financial commitments. This was never acted upon. Resilience: This is an important concept. It requires several things, including coordinated approaches as well as a good understanding of household opportunities and constraints, market dynamics, and supply and demand. Financial capital for resilience, such as savings and insurance, was not really on the agenda in 1985 but has since become more prominent. At present one of our biggest problems is the smallness of resilience activities: each organisation does its own thing in its own small corner, with no mechanism to scale up what is useful. One option is to let communities do the scaling up, by empowering them in advance. 14

16 2. Change and continuity This section reflects participants views on how the context for drought management has changed, or not, since the early 1980s and the implications for the NDMA of these changes, whether as opportunities or challenges. Some of the most striking changes in the external context were felt to be population growth, urbanisation, and the penetration of various technologies (particularly mobile phones); the latter has had a major positive impact on connectivity, accountability and local economies. Urbanisation has significantly affected the resilience of pastoralism where water points and settlements have interfered with traditional grazing systems, but it also provides a market outlet for pastoral production. Water development in pastoral areas has been highly contentious, primarily because no effective system of land use mapping or management is in place. The pioneers recalled that urbanisation was starting in the 1980s but that people did not realise how far it would go. Planning must now be done with urbanisation as a major feature of the operating environment. Education was another area of change, in the broadest sense of the word, with higher levels of literacy (although still well below the national level), citizen awareness and public participation. Pastoralists also have a stronger voice in Parliament through the Pastoralist Parliamentary Group (PPG). There are now mobile schools and the National Council on Nomadic Education was approved in the Basic Education Act, However, the strategy for reaching pastoralist children currently out-of-school is not clear: is the purpose to provide only a basic level of education or to enable these children to compete on an equal footing with any others in Kenya? Conflict and insecurity was the dominant area of continuity: little appeared to have changed since the 1980s. Arguably, the situation is worse because of several factors: first, the spread of small arms, particularly cross-border; second, the politicisation and commercialisation of conflict in pastoral areas; and third, the impact of global security dynamics on areas such as the northeast and the coast. Within Kenya, the Constitution, devolution, new policies for example for the arid and semiarid lands (ASALs), disaster management, conflict management and nomadic education new institutions (such as the Senate, the Equalisation Fund and the NDMA) and new sources of revenue were all felt to be important developments which could enhance drought management. However, the group was challenged by the facilitator: if all these changes are so positive, what more is there to do? Their actual impact needs to be interrogated more deeply. Moreover, there were mixed views in the group about the extent to which meaningful change is really taking place in the relationship between government and communities and indeed, what is meant by community. It was suggested that both the Constitution and recent policies give greater recognition to traditional institutions and will strengthen them. However, it was also 15

17 noted that the word customary appears in the Constitution only once, and in a negative sense, and that the County Government Act makes no explicit provision for customary governance. South Sudan, on the other hand, recognises custom as a source of legislation and customary institutions as part of the governance structure. Development practitioners also undermine customary institutions, for example by working along the roadsides and by failing to engage with and understand the full pastoral system. One view was that communities have in fact successfully and pragmatically adapted to whatever has come their way to the plans and priorities of different actors; another was that they are being incentivised by food or cash but possibly not more deeply engaged. It was suggested that the NDMA has a unique opportunity to help clarify the opportunities and challenges in realising the potential of traditional institutions within Kenya s new governance and policy frameworks and of interrogating the rhetoric around participation and accountability. At the global level it was recognised that there are now new platforms and frameworks for disaster risk reduction (DRR) which are raising the profile of risk reduction and early response, but that these may not allow sufficient space for the specificity of drought management to be recognised. Donor interest in drylands has waxed and waned during the past thirty years. It is currently in one of its peaks, possibly driven by concern about climate change, and in the Horn of Africa at least is characterised by closer donor collaboration. Another recent change has been the emergence of stronger African leadership in drylands, illustrated by initiatives such as the African Risk Capacity (a pooled drought risk insurance mechanism being developed by the African Union) and the African Union s Policy Framework on Pastoralism, and of closer intergovernmental cooperation, particularly under IGAD. As far as drought management is concerned, the consensus was that there have been important changes in both policy and practice. Government administrations in the 1980s and early 1990s could deny that Kenyans were dying from famine, but this would not happen today, partly because of attitudinal changes within government, and partly because of a much greater openness within society and a free media. Practitioners are generally better equipped in knowing what to do but the underlying pressures on the drought management system are substantially greater partly because of population growth, and partly because of deepening vulnerability. Information is more accessible and systems are more sophisticated, but response is still poor largely because of the continued failure to institutionalise contingency finance within the drought management system. 16

18 3. Devolution and drought management Two officials of the County Government made important contributions to the meeting. First, Mr. Peter Ekai Lokoel, Deputy Governor for Turkana County, opened the meeting on behalf of the Governor. Before delivering the Governor s speech (reproduced in Annex 4), the Deputy Governor emphasised the determination of the county government to reverse the county s marginalisation by drawing on its untapped resources. Second, Mr. Loiyoto Ewoi, Member of the County Executive with responsibility for public service, decentralised administration and disaster management, made a presentation on the county government s plans with regard to disaster management and partnership with the NDMA. He began by thanking the pioneers, commenting that their work had benefited Turkana county and given it capacity which might be lacking in other counties. He also welcomed the creation of the NDMA, promising the cooperation of his office and of the county government as a whole. Mr. Ewoi noted that repeated drought emergencies are making people think how best to reduce them, and summarised the county s priorities in disaster management as being to: 1. Engage in research, so that the full range of disasters and their dynamics is understood. Different parts of the county are affected by different hazards, including drought, floods, conflict, fires and transport accidents. 2. Develop a county disaster strategy, in partnership with other stakeholders and as part of the county integrated development plan. 3. Develop stockpiles of emergency supplies in the county, to facilitate rapid response. 4. Support cross-border interaction within the Karamojong cluster, and agree appropriate penalties where necessary when peace agreements are breached. 5. Ensure that insecure areas are equipped with radio facilities. 6. Reduce the impact of drought by investing in activities that strengthen livelihoods. 7. Support the drought early warning system so that it covers the whole county, and act on its findings. 17 I am happy to be with you for this historic moment and to witness the work that was started 30 years ago. One thing we appreciate is the technical expertise that has been developed over years Turkana has been part of the museum: people say that if you want to see malnourished children, go to Turkana. But devolution will reverse that You who started this work will want to see change. Turkana is endowed with many resources oil, water. There were also traditional ways of managing drought initially thought to be primitive but now being built on. We want to join hands with everyone so that the resources we have are used for the benefit of the people of Turkana. This is our time: we will be an emerging county, no longer marginalised. Peter Ekai, Deputy Governor, Turkana

19 The question and answer session which followed the Minister s presentation focused on a range of issues, including supporting community-level DRR institutions, encouraging other ministries to act on the findings of the EWS, supporting early response strategies, incorporating the field monitors within the county systems, ensuring coordinated action by stakeholders across the county, providing quick-maturing crops, supporting pastoralism, and managing the proceeds from oil. The Minister gave positive responses in all these areas, highlighting ways in which the county government would provide leadership and support. In particular, he mentioned that the drilling of oil is likely to start in 2014, much sooner than expected, and that the county has already set aside Kshs. 610 million for quick-maturing crops. He also offered to consult on the county s capacity to take on responsibility for the field monitors. 18

20 4. Regional dimensions His Excellency Peter Lam Both, Chairman of the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) in South Sudan, and his colleague Banak Joshua, Director-General of Disaster Management, both attended the meeting. Their presence was an opportunity to explore cross-border issues and cement collaboration between Kenya and South Sudan on disaster and drought management. Their participation was facilitated by the UN-OCHA office in Juba, now headed by Vincent Lelei, formerly the National Project Coordinator of ALRMP during its first phase. Banak briefed the meeting on the work of his ministry, established in 2010 and recently combined with the ministerial briefs for gender and social welfare. His ministry is responsible for policy, while the RRC is responsible for implementation. The priority since independence has been to start reversing the country s prolonged marginalisation. In this respect there are parallels with northern Kenya. South Sudan has resources and capacity, but the challenge is how to use them most effectively. Banak welcomed the support South Sudan has been receiving from Kenya and requested that participants share any materials on disaster/conflict management or institutional and policy processes, since a disaster management policy is now in development. Hon. Peter Lam Both expressed his thanks for the warm reception and his appreciation for Vincent Lelei s support. He emphasised the importance of building strong institutions in South Sudan after fifty years of war, since these will ensure effective response while also protecting against corruption. He noted the challenges of cultural change and coordination, and of ensuring that international partners focus on building local capacity. A humanitarian organisations bill is now in Parliament which will ensure that the people of South Sudan are aware of what is being donated and done in their names. What I heard yesterday from the community was that these cross-border conflicts are more destructive than the drought itself. Once there are weapons, deaths increase. I believe that as government institutions we should be able to engage our governments to see how weapons can be taken out of the hands of communities. Some people think that holding the gun is their livelihood, so perhaps we need to look at incentives that help people survive in different ways. I know that my government will be very happy to engage on this, whether through IGAD or bilaterally, and I am asking the honourable [NDMA] Chairman to engage with his colleagues on this. His Excellency Peter Lam Both, Chairman, RRC South Sudan 19

21 The impact of conflict on food security arose many times during the meeting. During the field visit to Turkwel (Box 2) it was raised again; communities ranked it as being of greater concern to them than drought. Participants from both Kenya and South Sudan recognised that drought management is not possible without effective conflict management. Box 2: Pastoralist Field School in Turkwel The pioneers visited the Turkwel Pastoralist Field School, 35km from Lodwar. This was started in 2006 in order to help the agro-pastoralist community in the area cope with drought. With the assistance of VSF-Belgium, 15 women and 15 men were trained in livestock husbandry, ten of them as trainers of trainers. The group is also involved in fodder production, bee keeping and the care of small stock. In 2007 the group acquired a two-acre plot and planted Napier grass, with a mower and grass stems provided by the ALRMP. In 2010 GIZ helped them extend the plot to five acres and provided fencing and a water tank. The Diocese of Lodwar also assisted with a sprinkler irrigation system and support for the tank. The expansion of the plot has allowed the group to make a little more income; they succeeded in saving Kshs. 30,000 after the first harvest. The area visited is one of those where the NDMA has been piloting a campaign to strengthen community-level access to drought information. 20

22 5. Peer review of the current drought management system The pioneers and other partners present reviewed the drought management system in two ways: first, by responding to a series of presentations made during the meeting on different aspects of the system (contained in Annex 5); second, through a field visit to the Pastoralist Field School in Turkwel (Box 2). The presentations made by NDMA staff were as follows. a) Overview of the drought management system: James Oduor, CEO, summarised the NDMA s status, structure and systems, the advantages of a parastatal for drought management, and the areas in which the Authority is trying to innovate and strengthen its practice. b) Seasonal calendar: Luigi Luminari, Technical Adviser, presented a seasonal calendar for Turkana for the period January 2007 to April 2010, which analysed data from remote sensing and from the ALRMP bulletins and datasets. His presentation showed that: i. There are opportunities to integrate additional biophysical data within the EWS, including from remote sensing. ii. Some indicators are of little value and may be too subjective (such as distance to water or livestock body condition). iii. The warning stages of normal, alert and alarm should be more carefully distinguished; at present, the normal stage is insufficiently used. iv. The counties need good drought analysts who have a strong understanding of the context and the ability to triangulate different sources of information. v. The level of conflict reported throughout the period was shockingly high. vi. The drought contingency fund could have been triggered 1.5 years sooner than drought response actually started, were the systems now developed then in place. c) Early warning system: Valerian Micheni, Drought Information Manager, described the current early warning system the indicators used, sampling methods and challenges, and the areas where improvements could be made, including through the use of technology and remote sensing. d) Contingency planning and financing system: Lembara Saiyana, Drought Contingency Planning and Response Manager, explained the justification for the recent standardisation of contingency planning, the new business process, and the different ways in which communities are involved. Chrisgone Adede, Database Administrator, then presented the Crisis Toolkit, a web-based system which automates the management of contingency plans and the funding process, combining document management with decision-making. The 21

23 system is tailored for different users, such that donors will also be able to log in and monitor progress with respect to the activities they have funded. e) Drought information campaign: Lucy Kirauni and Peter Abiya, Communications Officers, described the recent pilot of an information campaign in Turkana which aims to improve community-level access to early warning information and action in response to the same. Table 2 summarises the technical feedback on these presentations given by both pioneers and partners and the NDMA s response. Table 2: Technical feedback and NDMA response Topic Feedback NDMA response Overview of the drought management system A key challenge is how to sustain participation in coordination structures across seasons and conditions. Should the NDMA have the legal powers to enforce participation? County governments should be well briefed about the Authority and the differences from the ALRMP. The County Drought Coordinators (CDCs) are currently working on this. Seasonal calendar and early warning system The methodology for developing response scenarios used by the military may be an interesting model to explore. An early warning system will never be infallible, but the remote sensing information now being included will make it more objective. This kind of retrospective presentation is extremely useful; we should look back much more to test the integrity of our methods. The idea of limiting the number of indicators is good; any information system is under constant pressure to add yet another piece of information. How does the system capture conflict? Readings from a vegetation index will differ if large areas are not accessible or grazed because of conflict and if other areas are consequently over-grazed. Is there any indicator of public opinion? We agree: we need the EWS to be manageable and sustainable. It is supposed to shine a light and give a warning, after which a detailed assessment is done to determine the actual levels of need. It s captured as an outcome of drought stress and included in food security assessments. We agree: the index may show the overall condition of pasture but it cannot show access. The key informants questionnaire looks at community opinion in a guided way. 22