FROM POLITICAL PROTEST TO URBAN POLICY NETWORKS: THE CASE OF SAINT PETERSBURG, RUSSIA. Aleksandr Sherstobitov.

Transcription

1 FROM POLITICAL PROTEST TO URBAN POLICY NETWORKS: THE CASE OF SAINT PETERSBURG, RUSSIA. Aleksandr Sherstobitov Department of Political Governance, Saint Petersburg State University, Russia ABSTRACT The recent electoral campaigns in Russia mobilized the new social group that ignored elections before. Electoral cycle of showed the great potential for political participation of middle class who lives in the big cities. A year after elections we see how this political protest transformed. It institutionalized in number of civil initiatives and NGOs that actively participate in urban public policy. In our research we focus on civil participation that appeared recently in Saint Petersburg, Russia. A lot of people who have become active during the electoral campaigns now turn their interest towards many urban issues: communal and housing sphere development, planning of public spaces, state and municipal bids control, development of transport infrastructure, observation at the municipal and city elections, etc. Many of the initiatives have already institutionalized and tend to participate in urban public policy both on municipal and city government level. In the framework of our research we observe the emergence of urban policy networks that is determined by the activity of people who participated in political mass protest actions in Keywords: social media, political mobilization, network communication, contentious politics INTRODUCTION Internet has become an important communication platform of political socialization, public discussion and agenda setting. Moreover, modern social networks in the Internet are not just a medium for communication, but they also possess a huge mobilization potential. Initially social media was used in election campaigns in order to shape voters behavior (e.g. Vitak et al. 2011, Hong and Nadler 2012). However the recent political events such as Arab Spring, Occupy actions, Russian political protests show that social networks become increasingly important in 1

2 contemporary political process in a broader context. Facebook, Twitter, Russian social media Vkontakte (vk.com) and others are used by range of political actors as arenas for mobilization of the real-world political action. There are several points of view on the mobilization potential of social media. Studies focused on the impact of social media in the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia show that Facebook and Twitter have become a tools for dissemination of information and mobilization of users for offline activity (Eltantawy, Wiest 2011; Mejias 2011; Tufekci 2011). Russian political scientists point out that Internet in Russia have not yet become effective media of political activity because of virtualization of actions, simplification of political discourse in social networks and the relatively low level of politicization of the blogosphere. Nevertheless, in our study, we suggest that social networks can act as tool for agenda setting, public opinion management, and influence on individuals political offline activity. This assumption is based on the examples of political protests mobilization and the coordination of these actions in social networks Vkontakte and Facebook during the Russian election cycle which included Parliamentary and Presidential elections. There are case studies of political mobilization in social media that support this approach. For instance, Morozov shows the close linkage of activity in social networks and protest behavior in Iran and Moldova (Morozov 2011). Due to the centralization of mass media resources within the political elite interests there are narrow channels for political communication of opposition and protest groups in contemporary Russia. That is why in our study we proceed from the idea that some political actors that faced declining opportunities for public discussion in traditional media could use social networks as the only possible communication resource. Thematic virtual communities in the social media become the principal agents of dissemination of political information, consolidation of associates and political mobilization. Obviously, the popularity of a community and, accordingly, the scope of its information influence depend on the numerical strength and activity of its participants. To encourage this activity, the group leaders/administrators regularly update the content, including reposts of 2

3 messages from other groups or users accounts. We assume that the community leaders post messages that refer to the popular opinion leaders, replicate the stereotypes and reproduce an appropriate discourse in order to shape users behavior. For instance, one of the most popular opposition groups in Vkontakte (numbering about people) bears a name NAVALNY / OPPOSITION which of its own record refers to the figure of one of the leaders of the protest movement, and the group s newsfeed is updated several times a day with messages and reposts from a wide range of other resources. Another significant factor of a virtual community s popularity is the number and the nature of relationships with other similar groups, that is, its place in the network, the nodes of which are the groups focused on political issues. Apparently, a great deal of interconnection with other popular actors of the network will increase the popularity of the group. The groups oriented towards uniting participants of real political actions are becoming the authoritative information source even for those who did not initially consider the prospect of direct participation in them. In particular, it can be seen through the example of the community The coordination of protest actions of St. Petersburg, whose activities are closely monitored by maximum number of members of the protest community localized in Saint Petersburg about people. In our research we focus on the protest and pro-elite segments of Russian social network Vkontakte and interactions of the actors within the above frameworks during the parliamentary and presidential election campaigns that occurred in October 2011 March This electoral cycle clearly manifested new ways and forms of civic engagement and political protest that involved local communities and activists who were not affiliated with political parties. DATA AND METHOD 3

4 Social network Vkontakte was chosen as an object of analysis as the most popular social media in Russia. At the moment, according to the different estimates, its active audience figures up to 80 million people, with more than 40 million hits daily 1. The majority of Vkontakte users speak Russian and live in Russia or former Soviet Union countries. We took Vkontakte groups (hereinafter groups) as the units of analysis, i.e. associations of users based on commonality of interests and values. For the purpose of group selection, a set of criteria based on group s dominant attitude towards the authorities, elites, institutions and political events was outlined: 1) attitude to V. Putin and D. Medvedev (support/disapproval); 2) attitude to political party United Russia and its policy (support / disapproval); 3) attitude to opposition leaders (A. Navalny, S. Udaltsov, B. Nemtsov, I. Yashin) (support / disapproval); 4) evaluation of parliamentary and presidential elections (legitimate / illegitimate); 5) attitude to protest actions (support / disapproval). According to these criteria, fifty of the most popular groups in each segment were distinguished. The lists of the groups with an indication of links and number of users can be found in Appendix A. The next stage of the research was delineation of relations between the groups. To do this, we analyzed 1) links to related groups that were listed at each group s main page; 2) reposts of public messages from other groups made by the group administrators in the period from December 2011 to March We considered group A having an outgoing tie with group B either if group B was listed in A s links or if group A have reposted message from group B. Then we applied network analysis with use of PAJEK software. 2 The same technique was used one year after to discover segments dynamics and transformations. In order to explain significant qualitative changes of the protest segment 19 interviews with activists were taken. 1 According to Statistics Vkontakte.ru. URL: ( ), Statistics of users profiles in Vkontakte. URL: ( ) 2 Batagelj V., Mrvar A. Pajek Program for Large Network Analysis. // 4

5 PROTEST AND PRO-ELITE SEGMENTS OF VKONTAKTE IN THE ELECTORAL CYCLE The first step was visualization of network segments maps, which are shown on pictures 1 and 2. In fact, these maps represent not the whole segments, but the cores because we have limited them up to 50 actors. The segments visualization and comparison of the maps do not provide the sufficient material for comparative analysis. The only fact that can be traced clearly from the visualization of networks is a vast number of isolated actors in pro-elite segment. Exploratory network analysis gives much more data for analysis and comparison. Density of protest segment is a bit higher than of pro-elite one 0,053 and 0,046 respectively. It means that 50 most popular protest groups have more ties between them. Average rank of protest segment is also higher 5,2 (against 4,5 for pro-elite segment): protest groups have 0,7 ties more on the average. These parameters show that the density of networks is not very high, though, probably messages should have been spreading faster through the protest segment. Another indirect factor to support this hypothesis is a centralization index: 0,15 for pro-elite and 0,1 for protest segment. This indicator reveals that protest segment is more decentralized, i.e. density of ties is distributed more evenly across the network, as well as actors influence. It is obvious that the more decentralized network is, the faster information can be spread through it. However, index of intermediate centralization is almost the same for the both segments: 0,15 for protest and 0,153 for pro-elite. Thus, a situation when an actor is an intermediary between two other actors, being placed on a shortcut between them, is observed slightly more often in pro-governmental network. This may be explained by plenty of isolated actors in progovernmental segment, which are left out of this calculation. One of the major differences between groups which form the two segments is a number of participants. Groups of a protest segment have much more users involved than groups of progovernmental segment, as it is shown by tables in Appendix A. For one hand, this can be 5

6 explained by the obvious fact that active Vkontakte users, who are basically educated young people living in big cities, tend to be more malcontent regarding the political regime. The results of recent sociological surveys in Russia show that this stratum is more opposite to the political elite. On the other hand, we may explain this by impact of the segment s characteristics, such as higher indexes of inclusion, cohesion and density. Accordingly, we may observe direct correlation between development of network communication within the segment framework and increase of number of active users. Picture 1. Pro-elite segment of Vkontakte (March 2012) 6

7 Picture 2. Protest segment of Vkontakte (March 2012) Regarding to the criteria of centrality, the most prestige actors of both segments have been detected. Pro-elite segment. 1) Читатели книг Николая Старикова (Readers of Nickolay Starikov s books). The key position of this group in pro-elite segment can be explained by the influence of Nickolay Starikov himself and his ideas. He is an author of numerous books on modern history, full of conspirological theories and blaming liberals and foreign agents for causing most of modern Russia s social and political problems. He justifies the importance of traditional values, strong authoritarian rule and Putin s policy. These ideas are popular among a certain part of Russian society, and the books are oriented on mass reader of this mentality. In this case we may see use of opinion leader technique. Nickolay Starikov himself is very active in public sphere, including social networks, so his authority can be definitely considered as a factor of the group s popularity. 2) МАРШ УСПЕХА! (The March of Success!). 7

8 The name of this community is apparently a reference to famous opposition s Dissenters March which for many years has been a regular rally of those who were dissatisfied with political regime in Russia. Significant position of this group in the structure of pro-elite segment emphasizes the value of groups aimed at offline activities, such as marches, rallies, meetings, debates and other events that take place in real world. This type of groups represents mobilization aspect of social networks. 3) Мы против «тунисского» сценария для России! (We are against Tunisian scenario for Russia). This group appeared (or got its name) shortly after the fall of Tunisian leader Ben Ali which was a result of wave of protests inspired (as it is stated by group s administrators) by foreign powers. The group s name contains an idea, which is intended to unite and mobilize those who are afraid of Russia to lose its sovereignty out of machinations of Orange revolution agents from the abroad. 4) Профсоюз граждан России (Citizens of Russia Professional Union). This group is not typical for both segments, as it is posting diversified materials of not only political subjects, but also information that is intended to promote civic engagement. Most likely, this group is also affiliated to Nickolay Starikov and his adherents. It doesn t refer to any other groups of pro-elite segment, but several of the segment s key actors have outgoing ties with this group. 5) Фронт Защиты Национальных Интересов (National Interests Protection Front). The central position of this group is determined by its ties with several crucial actors of the segment. 6) Информационная поддержка В.В. Путина (V. Putin s informational support). This group is characterized by a vast number of members, as well as symmetric ties with other actors close to the center of the segment. Protest segment. 8

9 1) Когда в этой группе будет участников, Путин пробежит по Старому Арбату в стрингах (When this group gets members, Putin will run through Stariy Arbat wearing g-string). This group has more participants than any other of protest segment. The mobilization technique is given in its name, which has become a famous meme in Russian Internet. It helped to assemble several hundreds of thousands people in a jokingly way, including those who are not actively involved in protest activities but still malcontent to the political regime. 2) Я против банды Путлера (I am opposed to Putler s gang). Although group s prestige is determined by a number of incoming ties, this group also has 9 outgoing ties, which is quite a lot for the segments being analyzed. It is possible that this factor also influences the central position of this group within the segment. Moreover, the name of the community is an example of putting label technique. 3) Марш несогласных (Dissenters March). The group is devoted to a certain offline event. Therefore there are many links to this community in other groups of a protest clique. This once again reinforces the thesis of mobilization role of such communities. 4) Мы против монополии на власть (We are opposed to political monopoly). Although this group is rather small, it has ties with key actors of the segment that determined its position in the center of map. Also the content of this group was updated constantly, which made it valuable source to cite. 5) Михаил Ходорковский: группа поддержки (Mikhail Khodorkovsky: group of support). This group s key position is determined by a tie with the most popular one (When this group gets members ). This case shows that one can secure significant position in network communication simply by detecting key actors and interacting with them. The use of Mikhail 9

10 Khodorkovsky name may also be considered as implementation of opinion leader technology, as M. Khodorkovsky, although still imprisoned, remains one of opposition s intellectual leaders. 6) Народ против «Единой России» (The people against United Russia ) It should be noted that the United Russia brand was under pressure on the Internet since spring 2011, when accusatory campaign organized by opposition politicians and civil activists have started. A slogan United Russia party of crooks and thieves, which first appeared in Alexey Navalny s blog, became a headliner of this campaign. Political mobilization. After key actors have been detected and the factors determining their central positions outlined, we may summarize crucial techniques that are used to make groups more popular and prestigious in terms of political mobilization. These are as follows: Cross-links with network s other most prestige actors; Maximization of links with other groups; Permanent content update in order to stimulate participants activity and make the group a source of valuable information; Connection between group s online and offline activities; Reposting materials from various Internet resources outside the social network platform; Applying additional motivating factors: use of opinion leaders authority, replication of popular stereotypes, memes etc. One more important goal of the research was to bring out mechanisms of assembling users into politically oriented protest or pro-elite groups. We began with the hypothesis that under conditions of public sentiments polarization the crucial factor is commonality of ideological choices that are aggregated as contrary values of social networks users. Analysis of 10

11 messages posted in groups, as well as participants profiles, led to ambivalent results. As to proelite segment, basic value orientations of the most users are actually common. They comprise the support of conservative ideas, vertical of power, idea of Russia s special role in world s politics, negation of liberal ideology, emphasizing the Orange threat and supporting the current regime. Protest segment, quite the opposite, had shown a significant scatter of value orientations of both communities and their participants. Messages of wide ideological range can be found in this segment from communist to radical right-wing. It turned out that the only point of tangency between all these actors is their attitude to the political elites and contemporary Russian political process. This fact brings us to conclusion that the method of groups selection based on this criterion was right. Also, this means that we may detect and analyze mobilization potential of social networks: when the society is polarized, segments of social networks are formed on the basis of a limited amount of common interests. In this particular case these are attitudes towards parliamentary and presidential electoral campaigns and elections. Ideology becomes a factor of secondary importance when the common grounds are so significant. This point clarifies why protest communities, much more active and numerous, are not demonstrating much higher indexes of density, cohesion, symmetry than pro-elite segment. We draw out that protest segment communication aimed to mobilize and coordinate protest efforts. This was illustrated by numerous offline protest actions happening at the same time they accumulated the whole range of political and social groups. On the contrary, pro-elite network appeared as a reaction to a rapid increase of size and potential stakes of opposition communities and was consolidated on the basis of declared common values. Content analysis of groups devoted to certain offline activities (such as The March of Success and Dissenters March ) revealed one more significant tendency. These groups not only acted as agents of mobilization, but also spread information about past events, interpret and discuss them in order to promote further communication. Thus, a correlation between mobilization of political action and network actors activity was detected. Mobilization of 11

12 participants offline activity eventually causes intensification of network communication, which is reflected, for instant, in growth of posts frequency in groups and users profiles right after the events. SHIFT FROM POLITICAL PROTEST TO CIVIL INITIATIVES. After the Presidential elections the protest activity started to decrease, especially after the protests were dissolved by police in May Nevertheless, political social networking even intensified. In order to study segments dynamics and transformations we conducted the same analysis 18 months after the elections. It appeared that pro-elite and protest segments showed different trends. Pro-elite segment was rather stable with slight increase of density (0,051 against 0,046 in 2012), average rank (5,8 against 4,5 in 2012). The list of the most popular and prestigious groups also changed insignificantly. Protest segment vice versa changed crucially (see Picture 3). First of all, the list of most popular and prestigious groups differs from the one that was outlined 18 months before. We have already concluded that groups that mobilize offline activity of users tend to be closer to the segment center. Transformations of the protest segment prove this assumption. The communities in the social network that institutionalized in real-world as NGOs or at least civil initiatives moved to the center of the segment map. They got much more ingoing links comparing to the previous survey. Density of protest segment increased from 0,053 in 2012 to 0,098 in 2013 while the average rank raised to 9,1 in 2013 from 5,2 in A lot of new groups also appeared and were involved into network communication. Most of them are communities of civil initiatives in different areas which vary from electoral observation to state bids control and consultancy in communal sphere. However, these groups still reposted protest messages from the politically oriented groups. 12

13 Picture 3. Protest segment of Vkontakte (September 2013) We identified the most central communities that appeared in the core of the protest segment and arranged 19 interviews with the activists of Saint Petersburg projects. These civil initiatives included Observers of Saint Petersburg, Municipal Saw, We follow the communal sphere, Just elections, Beautiful Petersburg, No.More.Garbarge, Bicyclezation, Let s do!. Our main finding in the interviews was that political protest became the starting point for development of civil initiatives. Social network of political protest communities that appeared spontaneously during the Parliamentary campaign in 2011 and created at first mobilized people to participate in mass protest actions. When the protest started to decrease many activists had already acquired social capital for further developments. As a result number of civil initiatives were institutionalized. Moreover, these actors intensify their network cooperation in the real-world. They collaborate in different projects together and exchange informational, intellectual, material and other resources. They also try to engage political parties, municipal bodies and public authorities into cooperation. To conclude, the study of transformations of protest segment showed significant shift of civic engagement. One year after the electoral cycle of network protest groups institutionalized in 13

14 NGOs and civil initiatives in different areas: election observation, anti-corruption activity, local issues etc. Thus, we observe the rise of policy networks at least on urban level. References Batagelj V., Mrvar A. Pajek Program for Large Network Analysis. // Eltantawy N., Wiest J.B. Social Media in the Egyptian Revolution: Reconsidering Resource Mobilization Theory // International Journal of Communication (5) Pp Hong, S. and Nadler D. Which Candidates Do the Public Discuss Online in an Election Campaign?: The Use of Social Media by 2012 Presidential Candidates and its Impact on Candidate Salience // Government Information Quarterly, Vol. 29, Mejias, U. The Twitter Revolution Must Die // International Journal of Learning and Media. 2011, 2(4): 3-5. Morozov E. The Net Delusion: the Dark Side of Internet Freedom. N. Y.: Public Affairs, 2011 Tufekci, Z. Can Leaderless Revolutions Stay Leaderless: Preferential Attachment, Iron Laws and Networks // Technosociology Retrieved May 13, ( Vitak J., Zube P., Smock A., Carr C.T., Ellison N., and Lampe C. It's Complicated: Facebook Users' Political Participation in the 2008 Election // Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking. March 2011, 14(3): doi: /cyber