Explaining the (Re)Emergence of Populism in Europe and Latin America

Transcription

1 Explaining the (Re)Emergence of Populism in Europe and Latin America Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser 1 Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) c.rovira.k@wzb.eu Paper to be presented at the IPSA/ECPR Conference, in Saõ Paulo (Brasil) February 16 to 19, 2010 (Please do not quote, or cite without the permission of the author) Abstract: Populism is becoming a common phenomenon both in Latin America and Europe. Indeed, the rise of populist actors such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Geert Wilders in the Netherlands has generated a heated debate. Yet, in the literature on populism there is a dearth of scholarly attention on cross-regional research. To contribute to fill this research gap, this paper aims to compare the European and Latin American experiences of populism and contrast the causes behind its (re)emergence. For this purpose, the paper is structured in two parts. I begin by systematizing the arguments developed in the scholarly literature about the causes of populism along two dimensions: on the one hand, demand-side and supply-side explanations, and on the other hand, national and international factors. Second, I examine contra-factual arguments in order to identify factors that may impede the (re)emergence of populism both in Europe and in Latin America. In summary, this paper will argue that explaining the (re)appearance of populism is a complex task, which cannot be achieved by developing a general theory, but rather by identifying how different factors negatively and positively affect the rise of populism in distinct cases. Keywords: populism, Europe, Latin America, cross-regional research, causal explanation 1 For helpful comments, I thank Carlos de la Torre, Sofia Donoso and Cas Mudde. The research for this paper has been possible thanks to a post-doctoral scholarship from the Alexander von Humboldt-Foundation.

2 Introduction The only general rule in history is that there is no general rule identifying one order of motivation as always the driving force (Taylor 2004: 33) There is little question that since the 1990s populism has been gaining strength both in Europe and Latin America. This has generated an intense scholarly debate, in which theoretical issues and practical questions are addressed. As a result, there has been an explosion of literature discussing not only the concept of populism, but also the impact of populism on democracy (Decker 2006; de la Torre and Peruzzotti 2008; Mény and Surel 2002; Taggart 2000). The growing interest in the topic is due to the common view of populism as a dangerous trend, which, by emphasizing the idea of popular sovereignty, may pursue problematic goals such as the exclusion of ethnic minorities (Abt and Rummens 2007; Pasquino 2008). However, populism can also be conceived of as a kind of democratic corrective since it gives voice to groups that do not feel represented by the elites, and obligates them to react and change the political agenda (Arditi 2004; Panizza 2005a). These opposing views have not been sufficiently discussed in the literature on populism. Furthermore, there is a dearth of scholarly attention on cross-regional research, which indeed could contribute to clarify the effects of populism on democracy. Instead, virtually all studies that have investigated populism so far have focused their empirical and theoretical analyses on one specific country or region. To contribute to fill this research gap, this paper addresses the following questions: How can we explain the (re)emergence of populism in Europe and Latin America since the 1990s? Are the arguments developed to elucidate the rise of populism in one region also useful to understand the situation of the other region? What can we learn by comparing the literature on the causes of populism in these regions? Before continuing, it is worth stressing that the arguments delivered for certain case studies do not necessarily explain the reality of other countries. For instance, the reasons behind the rise of Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands are quite different from the factors that explain the electoral triumph of Evo Morales in Bolivia. Therefore, I am sceptical about constructing a general theory of populism that aims to explain its (re)emergence in different parts of the world. Instead of offering a conclusive heuristic model about the causes of populism, this paper seeks to systematize and critically examine the arguments delivered in the academic literature. 1

3 Accordingly, I will distinguish different arguments, which might be more relevant in certain regional contexts and/or countries than in others. With this aim, the paper is structured in four sections. I begin by providing a brief description of the concept populism, arguing why a minimal and ideological definition should be the starting point of a cross-regional research agenda on populism. In the second and most extensive section, I systematize the debate on the (re)emergence of populism in Europe and Latin America along two dimensions: on the one hand, demand-side versus supply-side explanations, and on the other hand, national versus international factors. In the third section, I stress the importance of taking into account contra-factual cases, since these show that the rise of populism cannot be seen as a mechanical development, but rather as a process which is strongly conditioned by both political agency and the national and historical context. Finally, a brief conclusion is presented, in which the main ideas of the paper are summarized and future paths of inquiry are proposed. 1. A plea for a minimal and ideological definition of populism Arguably, most scholars would share the opinion that Jean-Marie Le Pen in France or Hugo Chávez in Venezuela could be labelled as populist. However, scholars do not agree on the specific features that make these leaders populist. In other words, populism is a good example of a widely used concept and yet with different meanings. Especially in the study of one particular country, populism can be defined in a way that not necessarily is appropriated to be used in other contexts (Collier 2001). However, since we are interested in undertaking cross-regional research, we need a concept of populism that can travel across different cases and even geographical areas. For this purpose, minimal definitions are extremely useful. By offering a lowest common denominator they help us to avoid conceptual stretching, i.e. the distortion that takes place when a concept developed for one set of cases is extended to additional cases to which the characteristics of the concept do not apply (Keman 2009; Sartori 1970). How can we develop a useful minimal definition of populism for undertaking cross-regional research? Paul Taggart (2000) put forward a definition of populism that is broad and amorphous and which includes North America, Russia as well as Europe and Latin America. More recently, Cas Mudde (2004; 2007) has built on this to propose an approach that can be used to lay the foundation for contrasting the European and Latin American experiences of populism. With the aim of fostering empirical research, he defines populism as [ ] a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, the 2

4 pure people versus the corrupt elite, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people (Mudde 2004: 543) 2. This definition has several advantages for undertaking cross-regional research. First of all, it grasps the nucleus of what the scholarly literature considers as populism, and hence it offers a benchmark upon which we can distinguish if particular leaders, movements or parties might be regarded as populist or not. Second, it permits us to separate populism from features that might regularly occur together with it, but are not part of it. For example, scholars have convincingly demonstrated that populism in Latin America is compatible with both neoliberal and state-led economic models (Roberts 1995; Weyland 1996), and in consequence, there are no reasons to assume that a certain economic doctrine is a defining attribute of populism. Third, it assumes that the categories of the pure people and the corrupt elite can be constructed and framed in very different manners (Stanley 2008). This means that particular forms of populism may defend distinctive models of society, in which the inclusion and exclusion of certain groups is fostered (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2011). From this angle, populism must not be confused with xenophobia and it is orthogonal with regard to the classic left-right axis (Ostiguy 2009). Mudde s notion of populism adheres to a discursive approach. Populism is conceived as a particular ideology that since the 1990s is highly widespread around the world. Interestingly, he states that his definition is broad and open to many usages, but [ ] this does not mean that all political actors are (at every time) populist. Despite the move towards a more catch-all profile, the ideological programs of most mainstream parties still accept the pluralist view of liberal democracy (2004: 545). The main point is that the populist ideology is at odds with pluralism, and consequently, populism assumes that once the people have spoken, nothing should constrain the implementation of their will, i.e. vox populi, vox dei. In other words, populism is a sort of democratic extremism, which it is not shared by actors and parties that defend the existence of constitutional limits on the expression of the general will. It is important to underline that this definition does not refer to the type of mobilization of the masses undertaken by the populist actor, an aspect that is central in definitions of populism in Latin American studies (e.g. di Tella 1997; Weyland 2001). In short, while it is true that a logical 2 It is worth noting that Hawkins (2009; 2010) has developed a similar concept of populism to study the Latin American experiences. In his opinion, [p]opulism is a set of fundamental beliefs about the nature of the political world a worldview or, to use a more rarified term, a discourse that perceives history as a Manichean struggle between Good and Evil, one in which the side of the Good is the will of the people, or the natural, common interest of the citizens once they are allowed to form their own opinions, while the side of Evil is a conspiring elite that has subverted his will (Hawkins 2010: 5). 3

5 connection to certain type of institutional aspects (e.g. direct communication between leader and the followers, lack of strong party organizations, etc.) exists, the latter are not a constitutive element but rather a consequence of populism (Hawkins 2010: 40). Seen in this light, populism can take different organizational forms and diverse patterns of socio-political mobilization (Roberts 2006). Moreover, Mudde s concept of populism intends to go beyond normative discussions about the ambivalent relationship between populism and democracy. This point is not trivial, since authors who adhere to the model of liberal democracy usually see populism as a pathology (e.g. Rosanvallon 2008), while scholars who sympathize with the notion of radical democracy are prone to conceive of populism as a positive force that strengthens political representation (e.g. Laclau 2005). Instead, Mudde s minimal definition focuses the debate on the core aspects of populism, and in consequence, it does not make broader generalizations about the potential impact of populism on democracy. Populism is not anti-democratic per se, and in light of this, cross-regional comparisons can contribute to gain new insights into the conditions that may determine when, why, and how populism works as a threat to or a corrective for democracy (Rovira Kaltwasser, forthcoming). Finally, it is worth stressing a last and for the purpose of this paper very decisive advantage of the approach proposed by Mudde. As it was previously stated, many definitions of populism tend to emphasize organizational aspects, since they assume that populism must be understood as a political strategy, which is used by political entrepreneurs with the aim of gaining support from a disaffected electorate (e.g. Jun 2006; Mayorga 2006; Paramio 2006). Although these definitions are not entirely wrong, they are problematic in the sense that they focus the debate nearly only on the supply-side of the populist phenomenon. By contrast, an ideological definition of populism assumes that to explain its (re)emergence we must take into account both the demand-side and the supply-side, because every ideology may be present at the mass-level and the elite-level (Freeden 2003: 74; Rueschemeyer 2006: 249). Put shortly, populism should be considered less as a political strategy that is implemented by malicious actors, and more as a Manichean worldview which might be raised by particular political leaders and is shared by different groups of a society. As several European and Latin American cases show, the support for populism do not only stem from the lower classes, but also from the middle and upper classes. 4

6 2. Systematizing the debate on the (re)emergence of populism in Europe and Latin America Explaining the (re)appearance of populism is an academic endeavour, which has been undertaken by many authors whose analyses generally are focussed on one region. For instance, Oxhorn (1998) maintains that Latin American societies are characterized by a social structure that favours the recurrent rise of populist leaders. Due to the widespread informal economies and the difficulties that this involve in terms of forming a class consciousness within the popular sectors, populism appears to be a usual way to mobilize the masses and claim the true representation of the common people. For the case of Europe, Mair (2002; 2006) has postulated that the declining importance of the political parties is generating a political void, which provides a fertile soil for the emergence of populist leaders, who try to establish a direct relationship with the people. As these examples illustrate, there are many arguments when it comes to explain the irruption of populist movements and parties. Accordingly, we need to organize the existing explanations that have been developed separately to analyze Europe and Latin America. For this purpose, it is crucial to distinguish between two dimensions that are present in the current scholarly debate on populism. The first dimension refers to demand-side versus supply-side explanations (e.g. Decker 2000; Eatwell 2003; Mudde 2007; Norris 2005; Rydgren 2007). The so-called demand-side explanations tend to focus on changing preferences, beliefs, and attitudes among the voters. By contrast, the socalled supply-side explanations put attention on the transformation of the political actors and parties, i.e. on the formation of new political proposals that can be appealing for the electorate. For instance, the increasing flexibilization of labor due to the implementation of neoliberal policy recipes and the consequent expansion of the informal sector would be an example of a demand-side explanation for the support for populist leaders in Latin America (de la Torre 2000). On the contrary, a supply-side explanation for the rise of populist radical right parties in Europe would be that the move towards the centre of the main parties has created a deficit of democratic representation that can be filled by new political entrepreneurs with a radical discourse (Bale 2003; Ignazi 2003). As these examples illustrate, while the demand-side explanations tend to analyze structural factors, the supply-side explanations usually develop arguments related to the agency. The second dimension is very obvious, but almost no author has taken it into account in an explicit manner. It refers to the distinction between national and international factors involved in 5

7 the emergence of populism. A good example of this dimension can be found in the transitology literature. In the seminal work on the transitions from authoritarian rule, Whitehead (1986) distinguishes between national aspects (e.g. bad economic performance) and international features (e.g. normative isomorphism) in relation to the forces that favour the decay of authoritarian systems. Without a doubt, in the case of populism it is also crucial to refer to the national and international factors that may be influencing its (re)emergence. For instance, the decline of the United States historic hegemony in Latin America has facilitated the (re)appearance of left-wing populist leaders, who foster new forms of international cooperation and condemn the neoliberal ideology promoted by the international financial institutions (Rovira Kaltwasser 2010: 56-57). At the same time, the rise of populist radical right parties in Europe is linked to the expansion of the European Union (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008: 13). Due to the latter, constitutionalism is becoming more and more developed but at the cost of the popular will, and as a result, there is a fertile soil for the appearance of political entrepreneurs who defend the idea of popular sovereignty and seek to stop or even reverse denationalization (Meny and Surel 2002: 7 11). Typology of the arguments used to explain the (re)emergence of populism National factors International factors Demand-side Explanations Discontent with the political class and/or the economic situation Demonstration effect Supply-side Explanations Political polarization of leaders and/or parties Criticism to global governance and/or foreign powers Relying on these two dimensions demand-side versus supply-side, and international versus national factors, it is possible to build a two-by-two matrix (see above). The development of this matrix represents a helpful starting point for the systematization of the existing debate about the causes of populism in Europe and Latin America. In the following, each box of the matrix will be explained in order to show the most common explanations, and offer a critical assessment 6

8 of the arguments delivered in the scholarly literature. It is worth noting that these arguments have been used to shed light on both the breakthrough and the electoral persistence of populism. Although I am aware that these are two different but interrelated processes (Mudde 2007: 254, 301), I will mainly focus the debate on those factors that are influential in the breakthrough phase. Given that the paper does not aim to elucidate the mechanisms through which populist parties and movements endure, the organizational elements that explain their electoral persistence will not be discussed Political polarization of leaders and/or parties Leaders and parties are commonly placed along the left/right axis. For instance, while the Spanish Partido Popular is considered to be on the right, the Spanish Partido Socialista Obrero is regarded to be on the left. According to Bobbio (1996), these dimensions must be understood as a way of categorizing political positions in relation to their attitude to the ideal of equality. From this angle, while the right is prone to assume that the majority of the inequalities are natural and they cannot be eradicated, the left tends to take for granted that inequalities are mainly socially constructed, and in consequence, they can and should be removed. Based on this, or a similar notion of left and right, it is possible to classify leaders and parties within a spatial dimension. Moreover, the distinction between left and right permits to analyze the polarization of a political system, i.e. the expansion of the ideological spectrum and the formation of an extreme position in one or both poles of the left/right axis (Sartori 1976: ). Of course, increasing polarization does not automatically lead to the appearance of populism. In fact, in countries like Italy and Germany both communism and fascism emerged under the circumstances of a process of growing political polarization. However, democracy is nowadays regarded as the only game in town, and in consequence, political polarization tends to be channelled through democratic channels. This provides a fertile ground for the rise of populist forces, which as was stated before are not per se anti-democratic: while they support majority rule, they are at odds with proclaiming restrictions to the principle of popular sovereignty. It is worth indicating that the argument about political polarization as a driver of populism is much more common in the European than in the Latin American debate on populism. The classic thesis in this regard was developed by Ignazi (1992), who argued that the formation of a new party family of populist radical right parties in Western Europe is directly related to the 7

9 increasing polarization of the political system. From this standpoint, political polarization is the by-product of the growing importance of post-materialist values, which have triggered the emergence of two new party families in each side of the political spectrum: on the one hand, the Greens, and on the other hand, the populist radical right. More recently, Ignazi (2003) refined his thesis by arguing that the emergence of populist radical right parties must be conceived of as a two step process. First, a radicalization of the existing political actors and parties must take place, since this opens a space for defending certain arguments that previously were unaccepted in the public opinion (e.g. anti-immigration). In a second phase, these actors and parties decide to moderate their positions and move to centre, unintentionally generating a political void which can be appropriated by new political entrepreneurs who wave the populist flag. Ignazi s argument about the impact of the growing ideological convergence of the mainstream parties on the formation of populist radical right parties in Western Europe has been brought forward by many other authors (e.g. Betz 1998; Kitschelt & McGann 1995; Mouffe 2005; Norris 2005). Accordingly, an increasing move to the political centre might not only favour the status quo, but also give rise to new political actors or parties which attack the establishment and propose radical solutions. This idea is indeed very common in Latin America, where populist actors underscore that there are no differences between the mainstream political parties, which are all interested in preserving their own interests and privileges, without taking into account the demands and needs of the people. As de la Torre (2000) posits, Latin American populists are truly innovators. Their rhetoric and proposals break with conventions and attack the very idea that there is no alternative. Not surprisingly, they usually are or present themselves as political outsiders who seek to get rid of the corrupt elites (Barr 2009). It is worth clarifying that the thesis of an excessive convergence of the mainstream leaders and parties as a trigger of populism in Latin America has been put forward rather implicitly than explicitly. For instance, Roberts (2007) contends that one of the common denominators of Latin American populists is their capacity to foster a (re)politicization of certain topics, which intentionally or unintentionally are not being addressed by the political establishment. This signifies that the mainstream political actors and parties do have a relatively high degree of ideological convergence, or that they simply do not allow for exercising political opposition as was the case in the so-called oligarchic regimes that existed in Latin America until the middle of the 20 th century (Collier and Collier 1991). Otherwise, there would not be much space left for the 8

10 emergence of populist actors who are able to (re)politicize those issues which seem to be relevant for great part of the electorate. In summary, the idea that political polarization either directly or indirectly leads to the irruption of populist leaders and parties is one of the common explanations for the (re)emergence of populism in Europe and/or Latin America. To improve the analytical leverage of this thesis it might be relevant to take into account the national and historical context, since there is no mechanical link between political polarization and the rise of populism. As the analysis of several European countries reveal, a growing political polarization can favour not only (right-wing) populist parties, but also other kind of political parties, such as the Greens or even mainstream parties (e.g. Meguid 2007). Moreover, a Latin American country like Uruguay has experienced a process of political polarization since the 1990s, which did not culminate in the irruption of populist actors, but rather in the formation of a well-organized left-wing political party that ended the bipolar nature of the political system (Altman, Castigiolni and Luna 2008) Discontent with the political class and/or the economic situation This is probably one of the most common explanations for the rise of populism both in Europe and Latin America. The argument is that a growing discontent with the political class and/or the economic situation leads to the rise of a populist leader, who promises solutions to overcome the crisis in question. Panizza (2005a: 11-12) has argued, for instance, that the emergence of populism goes hand in hand with economic hardship, since the latter generates deprivation and suffering for a great part of the population. Under these circumstances, the electorate might be attracted by the populist ideology, which emphasises that the people is the sovereign and has the right to overthrow leaders and regimes that are acting against its will. This is what Canovan (1999) calls redemptive politics: the democratic promise of a better world through action of the sovereign people. In the case of Europe, the link between economic conditions and populism comes to the fore in the thesis of the so-called Modernisierungsverlierer. This thesis is based on a political economy approach that maintains that both the growing liberalization of the European economy and the retrenchment of the welfare state have resulted in the formation of an important number of modernization losers, which are particularly tempted by the appeals of populist radical right parties (e.g. Betz 1994; Decker 2000; Kriesi 1999). Nevertheless, the empirical validity of this thesis has been questioned by certain authors who show that populist radical right parties have 9

11 been successful in national districts and/or countries in which there are no signs of economic decline (Betz 2002; Norris 2005). Accordingly, it is important to stress that the notion of modernization losers refers not only to objective indicators, such as the level of unemployment and poverty. As Lipset (1960) noted in his famous study, the fear of status loss is one of the most important drivers for the emergence of radical positions within the electorate. This means that the (re)appearance of populism should also be linked to subjective aspects, such as the anxiety produced by the potential inflow of immigrants. Political economy explanations are also common in Latin America, although in this context the emphasis lies not so much on the rise of modernization losers as on the structural transformation of the economy, and the consequent weakening of the traditional class-cleavage (Roberts 2002). As is well-known, the debt crisis of the 1980s brought about a period of neoliberal reforms within the region. One of the main consequences of these reforms has been an expansion of the informal economy vis-à-vis a decline of both state employees and labour unions (Centeno and Portes 2006; Klein and Tokman 2000). This structural transformation of the economy implied a major challenge for the established political parties, since their linkages with the electorate eroded. Moreover, the great heterogeneity of the so-called informal sector makes political representation through intermediate organizations difficult (Oxhorn 1998). Thus populist leadership seems to be a common way to articulate and mobilize the masses. At the same time, the rise of populism in Europe has been linked not only to an economic but also a political crisis. The common argument is that contemporary transformations such as globalization, the growing influence of the mass media and the omnipotence of lobbying activities are changing the way in which politics are structured. Most notably, Crouch (2004) maintains that we are witnessing the beginning of a post-democratic era. This means an epoch marked by the respect of the core democratic institutions (e.g. free and fair elections), but the reduction of the citizens to the role of manipulated, passive and rare participants. According to this account, populism might have a prosperous future in Europe in the 21 st century, since it embodies a democratic method through which the people can express their unease about politics and dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008). With regard to the discussion of the increasing problems of democratic representation in Latin America, the link between the idea of a political crisis and the emergence of populism is particularly evident. While the third wave of democracy has implied the (re)introduction of basic democratic institutions such as free and fair elections, few countries in the region have seen their 10

12 governments performance improving. Under these circumstances, there has been an increase of the electorate s dissatisfaction with the existing politicians and parties. State deficiencies in policy areas like citizen security, reduction of corruption and economic development do undermine the legitimacy of democracy in Latin America, paving the way for the rise of populist leaders (Mainwaring 2006; Mayorga 2006; Paramio 2006). In this sense, the (re)appearance of populism can be conceived of as an unintended consequence of the installation of low-quality democratic regimes, since they promise something they are not able to deliver. Although the argument of a growing discontent with the political class and/or the economic situation is very plausible for explaining the (re)emergence of populism, it would be erroneous to think of it as a kind of universal law. Indeed, as Bermeo (2009: 29) has pointed out, increasing economic inequality does not correlate in any simple way with populism neither in Eastern Europe nor in Latin America. Moreover, problems of democratic representation and dissatisfaction with the political establishment do not lead automatically to a growing demand for populist leadership. In consequence, discontent with the political class and/or the economic situation must be seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the rise of populism. Comparative studies must show why this discontent leads to the emergence of populism in some countries and not in others Demonstration effect From a theoretical point of view, the understanding of the rise of populism as a kind of demonstration effect can be traced back to the crowd psychology developed by authors like Gabriel Tarde and Gustave Le Bon. These scholars maintained that human beings are not rational actors and that their collective behaviour is determined mainly by emotional factors, particularly with regard to political leadership (Moscovici 1993). To a great extent, the bad connotation that the concept of populism has in the social sciences derives from the crowd psychology. As Laclau (2005) argues, the latter developed an analytical framework, which denigrated the masses and saw the very constitution of the people as a pathological phenomenon. In fact, this idea appears implicitly or explicitly in the analyses of many scholars, who consider that populism is one of the main challenges of contemporary democracy (e.g. Abt and Rummens 2007; Pasquino 2008; Rosanvallon 2008). Beyond the (normative) debate about the impact of populism on democracy, there are good reasons to think that the former might be seen as a contagious phenomenon. Rydgren (2005) in 11

13 particular has proposed that the rise of the French Front National in 1984 has had an impact in the whole of Europe, since this party established a new master frame which not only was different from fascism, but also combined three key features that are highly appealing for the European electorate: ethno-nationalism, cultural racism and populist attitudes. Rydgren s account is based on the contentious politics approach and the very idea that the people share mental maps and construct frames that not only allow for the codification of problems and solutions, but also for the mobilization of political claims. Seen in this light, diffusion is facilitated when a new master frame is developed and is capable of interpreting the feelings and interests of many citizens (Kolins Givan, Roberts and Soule 2010: 7). Thus, the populist ideology might spread among the population insofar as it makes sense to common people, touching themes that are not being addressed by the political establishment. In the case of contemporary Latin America, scholarship distinguishes between two waves of populism : a neoliberal one in the 1990s, and a radical left-wing one from the 2000s onwards (e.g. Freidenberg 2007; Gratius 2007). The very notion of a wave of populism implicitly says something about its diffusion. In fact, the concept of democratic wave is based on the idea that transitions from authoritarian rule usually occur within a specific period of time, in which international and regional factors have an impact across borders (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2005: 39). In the words of Nancy Bermeo (1992: 284): what we can not doubt is that people takes cues from the experience of their counterparts abroad and that they use these cues as cognitive and behavioural guidelines. This is probably especially true in situations of instability [ ]. It is then that demonstration effects are likely to be most powerful. Furthermore, de la Torre (2007) postulates that the current rise of radical left-wing populist leaders defend a particular model of democracy, which is very appealing to the Latin American electorate. This model of democracy is not based on the support of liberal procedures, but rather on the promotion of mass rallies, occupations of public spaces and direct forms of representation of the people s will. In a similar vein, Roberts (2007) maintains that the revival of left-wing populist alternatives is linked to a new critical juncture, which paves the way for the emergence of new patterns of political contestation across the region. As these examples illustrate, the (re)appearance of populism in Latin America is related to the diffusion of both ideas about how democracy should function, and frames that help to channel the political discontent of the people on the streets. 12

14 It is important to note that a demonstration effect refers to a particular mechanism of diffusion, which is focussed on the demand-side and not on the supply-side of populism. This implies that the study of a demonstration effect seeks to understand the behaviour of individuals, like for example, in what way and under which circumstances voters of one country start replicating the claims of the electorate of neighbour countries. The mechanism of diffusion that lies behind a demonstration effect is emulation. The latter must be understood less as a simple imitation, and more as borrowing the object of diffusion (i.e. the populist ideology) and adapting it to the local conditions (Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2008: 32). Not surprisingly, to explain the (re)emergence of populism several authors refer to the impact of the mass media (e.g. tabloid newspapers) due to its tendency to frame topics (e.g. immigration) in a way, which either directly or indirectly agrees with the populist claims (Mazzoleni 2003, 2008; Meyer 2006; Mudde 2004). In order to gain a better understanding of the diffusion of populism across countries, comparative and single case studies should put more attention in at least two aspects. On the one hand, scholars must analyse the way in which a particular articulation of the populist ideology is formed and then starts to spread. This implies that it is important to examine how a populist discourse formed in a singular country is adapted to the reality of another country. On the other hand, it is relevant to identify different networks supporting the propagation of populism among the population. In other words, the diffusion of populism relies on different mechanisms, such as personal ties (relational diffusion), indirect devices as the media (nonrelational diffusion), and third actors or mediators (mediated diffusion) (Tarrow 2010) Criticism to global governance and/or foreign powers Populism actors tend to conceive of the people in national terms, framing a political community with closed borders with a common past. Although this sovereign people might praise universal solidarity with people in general (e.g. the appeal of the European populist radical right parties to Christian values, especially after the events of 9/11), the core message is about a particular population living in a singular territory. Thus, the people are portrayed as a unity, which is threatened from both particular interests and foreign powers. This is what Taggart (2000) has called the politics of the heartland: a homogenising imaginary about who is the people that allows for indicating its real problems and reinforcing a sense of common identity. In fact, as was previously noted, populism is based on a Manichean distinction between the pure people and the corrupt elite. In this very process of differentiating between us and them, 13

15 populist actors normally make reference to global governance and/or foreign powers, whereby the latter are depicted as one of the biggest problems of contemporary democracy. To a certain extent, this criticism to international forces can be seen as an oversimplification of reality by which populist actors appeal to chauvinistic sentiments. Furthermore, both right-wing and leftwing populism tend to be inward-looking (Priester 2007: 44). Not surprisingly, contemporary forms of populism usually proclaim that the nation is in danger, because new forms of global governance and the influence of foreign powers are undermining the principle of selfdetermination (Canovan 2005: 47). This criticism to global (f)actors is particularly evident in the case of contemporary populism in Europe. An important reason for this lies in the elitist nature of the project of the European Union. Since the latter has been designed and carried out from above, populist actors have been able to exploit anti-elitist sentiments, claiming that the necessary public support for the realization and expansion of the European project is missing (Hayward 1996: 28). Although populist radical right parties levels of criticism to the European Union range from scepticism to rejection (Mudde 2007: chapter 7), there are little doubts that they are more prone than other parties to argue against the European Union. They are especially critical of giving up political power to Brussels, because this implies a frontal attack to the principle of popular sovereignty. As Christina Schori Liang (2007: 12) has argued, [d]rawing on their ethno-pluralist values, the populist radical right promotes the idea of a Europe of the Europeans, based on the core values of a European civilization a Europe whose sovereignty does not lie with Europe or with the existing states but with their cultural communities. Seen in this light, the emergence of populism in Europe is related to the formation of new forms of governance that go beyond the nation-state. Indeed, ceding sovereignty to supranational bodies is a process, which is not welcomed by all political actors. Hence, reasserting the national values against Europe seems to be a logical reaction, and populist radical right parties are one of the main players when it comes to defending the integrity of the nation-state (Berezin 2009: 243). This means that an unintended consequence of the Europeanization process, in part due to its elite-driven character, has been the generation of a fertile soil for the rise of political entrepreneurs, who are keen on waving the populist flag. Although in contemporary Latin America populism does not materialize in form of radical right but rather of radical left movements, the criticism to global governance and/or foreign powers is also very evident. In effect, the current wave of Latin American populism is characterized by a 14

16 frontal attack to the actors and institutions that are normally perceived as the guardians of neoliberalism: the United States, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The latter are portrayed as foreign powers seeking to impose economic policies, which are not only against the will of the people, but also permit the expansion of global capitalism at the expense of the poor (Silva 2009). Therefore, the (re)emergence of left populism in Latin America goes hand in hand with the growing legitimacy problems of the Washington Consensus, and the emergence of political entrepreneurs who have sought to outline a post-neoliberal model of development (Filgueira and Luna 2009; Macdonald and Ruckert 2009). To understand how the success of current Latin American left-wing populist actors is related to international factors, it is important to highlight two aspects. First, since the end of the 1990s, the commodity prices have been increasing and this has opened a singular opportunity for populist leaders in power to implement reforms that go beyond the neoliberal paradigm and are popular within the electorate (Cortés 2009; Weyland 2009). Second, both the increasing worldwide economic presence of China and the involvement of the United States in the Middle East represent a major change for the Latin American states, since they have much more room of manoeuvre for developing and implementing a new kind of economic and foreign policy (Hershberg 2010; Rovira Kaltwasser 2010). Under these circumstances, populist actors have had more resources and more space to promote a political agenda that not necessarily is the one favoured by the United States, but which is very appealing for certain groups of the electorate. 3. Contra-factual arguments As the previous debate has shown, the (re)appearance of populism occurs for various reasons in different national and regional contexts. Therefore, domestic factors and political agency are key for understanding why populism does emerge in some places and not in others. As Faletti and Lynch (2009) have argued, credible social scientific explanation can come about only if researchers are attentive to the interaction between causal mechanisms and the context in which they operate. Accordingly, there is no general law when it comes to clarifying the (re)emergence of populism in Europe and Latin America. The above sketched explanations must be understood as necessary but not sufficient conditions: they must be present for the effect to occur, but it may not always be enough for causing the phenomenon in question (Brady 2008: 227). In consequence, organizing the arguments that explain the (re)emergence of populism can be seen as one side of the coin. The other side refers to the identification of counter-factual claims. 15

17 This means that we need to take into account factors, which might hinder the (re)appearance of populism. Counter-factual analysis aims to show why in a context where the causes that hypothetically should produce an effect are present, the phenomenon in question does not come into view because other features of the context are not propitious (Levy 2008: 629). By emphasising that the context is an important element of causal explanation, counter-factual analysis is closely linked with comparative-historical methodology, which argues that early events shape subsequent causal trajectories (Mahoney 2004: 91-92). Following this approach, it is possible that past events can trigger self-reinforcing dynamics, which may well hamper the (re)appearance of populism. Without the aim of developing a detailed account of counter-factual arguments, in the following I will briefly discuss three lines of reasoning that are common in the scholarly literature on populism in Europe and Latin America Dealing with the authoritarian past in Europe If we revise the above-sketched explanations, the situation of a European nation like Germany is very puzzling. In this country we can find many of the factors that explain the (re)emergence of populism (e.g. discontent with the political class, political polarization of leaders and parties, etc.), but populist actors have been extremely unsuccessful. Even though it is true that populist radical right parties have occasionally been present at the federal level, they have not achieved to enter into the national parliament. This can neither be explained by an absence of demand for populism, nor by organizational failures and institutional constrains (Decker and Hartleb 2006: 201). Populist radical right parties in other European countries face similar difficulties yet they have emerged at the national level, and in some cases with great success. This German singularity is related to the political culture of the country. The shadow of the Nazi past is so pervasive that the populist discourse faces a very hostile environment, particularly when it appears combined with the topic of anti-immigration (Decker 2008: 125). Thus in Germany populist radical right leaders and parties are confronted with the problem of being stigmatized as defenders of the Nazi ideology. As David Art (2006) has argued in detail, the poor performance of right-wing populism in Germany goes hand in hand with the negative reactions of established political parties, the media and civil society. Since they combat the populist radical right strongly, almost no space is opened for its breakthrough. Accordingly, the rise of right-wing populism in Germany is hindered by the existence of a political culture, which is very sensitive to the 16

18 emergence of extreme political positions that might show any similarity to fascism. In fact, if populism has possibilities of success in Germany, then this will rather be on the left-side than on right-side of the political spectrum (Hough and Koß 2009). This brief analysis of the German case shows that, at least in Europe, the way in which a country deals with the authoritarian past can have an impact on the appearance of populist radical right parties. Indeed, Germany had a genuine working-through (Aufarbeitung) of the past, and as result, there is little ground for the development of nationalist and nativist attitudes. By contrast, European countries with strong nationalist subcultures (e.g. Austria, France or Poland) have a fertile soil for the emergence of the populist radical right, since the latter can appeal to ideas and sentiments about national superiority that are not only widespread among the electorate, but also tolerated and shared by part of the elites (Mudde 2007: 245-7) Learning process within the Latin American left As is well-known, most Latin American countries went through terrible authoritarian regimes during the 1970s and 1980s. The rise of these dictatorships cannot by explained by a singular cause. Nevertheless, the behaviour of not only leftist, but also populist actors and parties previous to the democratic breakdowns in the region was a key factor. Given that they showed little commitment and in some cases even open disdain to the rules of public contestation that are inherent to the model of liberal democracy, many have argued that their attitude and behaviour to great extent provoked the authoritarian reversals that took place in most Latin American countries in the 1970s and 1980s (Castañeda 1993; Lechner 1999). In light of this experience, the transition to democracy was facilitated by a learning process within the Latin American left. This was particularly evident in the Southern Cone, where the left parties no longer saw democracy as a bourgeois pretence and started to praise the rule of law (Angell 1998: 121; Bermeo 1992: 284-7). However, this learning process did not take place with the same intensity all over the region. This is one of the reasons why the contemporary left in Latin America differ in many aspects and even supports different models of democracy. In certain countries, most evidently in Bolivia and Venezuela, there is a populist left, which mistrusts political parties and other representative institutions as the instruments of corrupt politicians and entrenched oligarchical interests. It privileges majoritarianism over the checks and balances of liberal politics (Panizza 2005b: 721-2). By contrast, in countries such as Chile and Brazil, a moderate left has emerged, which tries to 17

19 improve the operation of the new market model to produce more dynamic growth, use the proceeds to fund social initiatives sustainably, and negotiate these reforms with the opposition in a setting of liberal pluralism (Weyland 2010: 10). This distinction between these two lefts has been underpinned by a political economy argument: Latin American countries that are heavy dependent on one natural resource, like oil or gas (e.g. Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela), have more propensity see the emergence of a populist left, since the latter can use the recent commodity boom to argue against alleged constrains on socioeconomic and political change (Schamis 2006; Weyland 2009). Quite different is the situation of those Latin American nations that have a more diverse economy, and where the left has experienced a lasting learning process in terms of adhering to the model of liberal democracy. As the political development of countries like Brazil, Chile and Uruguay demonstrate, the left can avoid the populist discourse and can adapt a moderate approach (Lanzaro 2006). This implies a long process of ideological and programmatic revisionism that paves the way for a gradual movement to the centre. In these cases, left actors and parties consider populism not only morally but also strategically dangerous Proper functioning of the institutions of democratic representation Populism and democracy have an ambivalent relationship. Arguably, many scholars assume that populism is a pathological development, which is at odds with democratic representation. For instance, Taggart (2002) maintains that populism has an aversion to all kind of institutions that seek to establish a vertical link between the demos and the political elite, and in consequence, it is a dangerous phenomenon. In a similar vein, Rosanvallon (2008: ) postulates that populism triggers an endless process of scrutiny and criticism of the government, to the point that the ruling authorities are seen as enemy powers and where the only legitimate authority are the masses and the leader that they select. This negative view of populism is also very common in Latin America, where populist leaders are depicted as ambiguous democrats, who have a tendency to concentrate power and transgress the checks and balances in order to fulfil their electoral promises (e.g. Mayorga 2006). As the cases of Chile and Uruguay show, a possible mechanism to hamper the rise of populism is to foster and secure the proper functioning of institutions of democratic representation, particularly political parties and other mechanisms aiming at cultivating a vertical linkage between governed and governors. As Navia and Walker (2010: 246) have pointed out, [b]ecause populism cannot 18