Give participants a minute and then go round room asking people to give their name, their institution and what plant they d be.

Transcription

1 1

2 2

3 Give participants a minute and then go round room asking people to give their name, their institution and what plant they d be. If you were a candidate on the X factor, what would your first song be. And what would be your key message to convince the jury that of course you have the X factor?!? You are a castaway. You managed to bring with you one object which you decided you could not live without on the island. What is this object? Why did you choose this object? Do you watch sport on TV (such as the World Cup, Wimbledon, cricket, darts...)? If so which sports? What do you like/dislike about this ac>vity? If you don t, why? What did you do last Kme you went to see a film you really didn t like? What film was it? What s your favourite movie? Why? Questions: What s your favourite historical period and why 3

4 Ask participants why they are here, what their interest in the report is Give background to the study how it has expanded in scope and importance 4

5 5

6 6

7 AusAID making considerable investment in TNP2K and about to scale up SP programme so its thinking of who to support and how to support them to improve social protection policymaking processes and outcomes The aim is to assess the policy landscape and provide recommendations for AusAID s social protection and knowledge sector programmes Since TNP2K s primary focus is social assistance, we ve limited the scope of this study to social assistance related policymaking processes Most studies looking at the sector or specific programmes have been largely technical and haven t really explained why things don t work or not. Hence we ve undertaken an explicitly political analysis So the aim of the study is to try and understand the interests and beliefs that motivate different actors involved in policy at different stages and assess what impact this has on policy dynamics. We were initially going to do an analysis of policy design processes pre and post TNP2K. This expanded to look at policymaking across government, and then when we got to Jakarta we were asked to look at electoral and implementation processes as well. So not only have we had to hit a moving target we ve had to treat a large amount of material in a relatively short space of time. The core team included Dewi Susilastuti, Vita Febriany and myself, with Louise Shaxson, Harry Jones and Rebecca Holmes as reviewers. We also hired Andrea to help us organise interviews during the field work in November 7

8 4 broad elements to the methodology Inception phase consisted of two components: Literature review looking at political economy features of Indonesia and state of play in relation to social assistance programming. It also contained a detailed methodology including an interview guide Primary data collection phase featured41 interviews with 45 people during three weeks, 36 interviews in Jakarta, 5 in Yogyakarta, Range of stakeholders with bias towards plannersand technocrats. We collected specific information: PKH and Raskinand General information around social assistance (and poverty reduction)programming more broadly The analysis consisted of writing up detailed accounts of the evolution of PKH and Raskin and using those to draft a report And the final component is this workshop where we ll turn the analysis and observations into something more akin to recommendations 8

9 The fall of Suharto and the Reformasi saw the centralised system give way to a legalisation of political parties, a more active parliament and decentralisation. At the same time many of the pre-reformasi relationships and practices remain intact. So political relationships and practices are more complex and have to be analysed on a case by case basis Social assistance programmes were initiated in response to AFC Energy subside cuts provided room for renewal of, and changes to, programmes Some rhetoric about a more systematic approach being taken that may well be the case with social security, but doesn t appear so with regard to social assistance. Lots of domestic laws passed in the first half of the 2000s, which current social assistance programmes often refer to. A cluster based approach has been established, which has its roots in the 2005 national strategy for poverty alleviation and was integrated into the subsequent RJPM. But there seems to be little uptodatedocumentation which provides broad strategy/direction. 9

10 Political elite play a key role in allocating budgets and providing strategic direction. Key actors include the president, the vice president, key technocrats such as ministers for Finance and Bappenas as well as political appointments such as Kemenkokesra, Kemensos, Kemenag and Kemendiknas. Also chair and vice chairs in DPR commissions IV, VIII and XI. Below the national level, Bupati s at district level have de jure control over budgets and have significant influence over camats and kades/lurah below them Central government have de facto responsibility over design and overseeing implementation. Key responsibilities lie with six agencies, Bappenas, Kemensos and agencies whose primary focus is not social assistance Bulog, Kemendikbudand Kemenag, but outside these social assistance expenditure distributed across 12 ministries, 22 programmes and 87 activities. Other agencies play a key role such as BPS, Kemenkominfo and PT Pos. Local government and communities are asked to support various stages of social assistance policy implementation. Key players include the district offices of many of the central government agencies mentioned earlier. Research centres: these are few and include SMERU, and some national universities such as UI as well as those at regional level News media: we did a quick analysis of the Jakarta Post and Tempo magazine. Donors and international agencies: Until recently World Bank, Asian Development Bank were main donors, initially providing finance after the AFC then slipping into a TA role. Other agencies provide small scale technical support and include UNICEF, UNDP, ILO, GIZ 10

11 The cabinet is an important space for inter-ministerial dialogue. Leaders of parties in the ruling coalition meeting in a separate space called the Coalition secretariat. Power in the DPR is centred in its legislative commissions, where decisions are reached through consensus usually away from the DPR behind closed doors. These tend to be where budgetary decisions are made in consultation with ministers and deputies from relevant ministries. Television and radio news shows as well as magazines such as Tempo provide more public for a for politicians to engage with one another, with issues and with the public. At a political level, social assistance issues are usually subsumed by the broader subject of poverty reduction. The president and vice president and some of the more technocratic ministers seem to have a sound understanding of the causes and consequences of poverty. But below this, although politicians considered poverty reduction a sexy issue before elections, they tended not to have a good understanding usually resorting to personal attacks, populist slogans and empty rhetoric By being in a coalition, members often perceive that if they take a policy position, they will not be credited with success and incur excessive costs for their failure. Moreover, a consensual approach to decision making makes every party caucus a veto player. However, large scale assistance programmes have been rolled out quickly when politicians seek to avoid or mitigate the effects of crises (like after the AFC). And in 2008 SBY s government introduced BLT in 2008 which helped to boost SBY s popularity just before the 2009 elections. This might mean large scale social assistance initiatives become a feature of future election campaigns More broadly targeted programmes receive strong political support as they seem to benefit a larger group of the population including some of the more vocal near and non-poor. Raskin is a good example as beneficiaries seem to resemble the average rather than poor Indonesian 11

12 households. Narrow targeting however, seems to have limited traction with PKH having struggled to secure necessary increases in the budget to ensure it scale up as planned. Targeted interventions are historically a new feature and goes against cultural norms of horizontal equity. In kind transfers are favoured over cash as it ensures the poor consume things the government wants it to, they offer scope for politicians to keep particularistic promises to distribute tangible resources to particular clients in exchange for political support and they offer considerable rents for political parties to finance election campaigns. 11

13 Key spaces: project boards or steering committees, budgeting processes and redrafting pedums Discourse: cluster approach has got significant buy in from civil servants, but is interpreted in different ways linear route out of poverty, different causes require different solutions, integrated approach. technocrats are generalllysupportive of targeted approaches, less information on how difference of opinion plays out especially in relation to large programmes. Discussions were often operationally focussed and rarely touched on more strategic issues such as programme expansion, complimentary programmes. Policy windows: civil servants are more likely to take risks to push through reforms in the first two years after a president has been re-elected. Emergencies as noted before provide spaces for policies to be designed and rolled out quickly with little political input. Small programmes which go under the radar of politicians during budgeting processes offer opportunities for policymaking to be relatively technocratic. Inter-agency interactions: Kemenkokesra plays a peripheral role in coordinating programme design and implementation processes. Where the technical line ministry is perceived as weak, Bappenas plays a significant role in policy design i.e. in the case of PKH. High turnover of consultants creates challenges in managing knowledge and information. Getting officials from line ministries not involved in direct management of the programme is difficult. Local governments tend not to be involved in substantive discussions during drafting processes. Government-donor relations: relationships often based on personal chemistry but some of the larger agencies prefer to keeeprepresentatativesof donor agencies at arms length. Less well resourced agencies are more likely to involve external actors in policy discussions 12

14 Key spaces: multiple spaces for discussion at different levels. As above, programmes will have their own structures, most strategic are central and district level. In many programmes, jurisdictions and mandates across government and between national and local levels are unclear. Socialisation or awareness of programmes from the district level down to community levels tends to be weak. Institutions tend not to allocate budgets to support programmes led by other institutions. If information flows between the centre and the district, it is usually confined to oficeof the same agency there is little spilloverto other district offices. Given the premise of function follows money, commitment to supporting centrally administered social assistance programmes often depend on the strength of financial inducements for local actors. However, financiingfor social assistance has in many cases by-passed local actors who are expected to do work without financial inducements Clientelist resources, limited resources and civil service rules about the recruitment/allocation of staff has undermined bureaucratic functioning of PKH. The directorate in Kemsnsosrunning PKH relies heavily on consultants. But consultants don t always have the right skills/capacity. Contracts not always given to the best contractors. Scaling up programme gradually has been challenging given ministerial incentives to go national asap Distribution of cash and in-kind transfers are often based on local wisdom. Village elites often did not agree with BPS beneficiary lists. Targeted programme often go against long standing principles of sharing resources equally. As such Raskin rice often shared out equally. However, despite clientelist practices, strong leadership and bureaucratic discipline can inspire strong performance in one sense Bulogsability to distribute rice to a considerable proportion of the population so soon after the AFC was impressive. Bupati s can have considerable 13

15 influence if they feel the programme will in some way help them be re-elected. But they cant always galvanise junior instititions to act given capacity, institutional arrangements, etc 13

16 Demand and use Directors are key users but objectives behind commissioning research not always clear/strategic Importance of informal experiential knowledge International - Latin American CCT cases particularly influential Research/evaluation often used as ammunition/instrumental defending PKH from budget cuts, circulate patronage and strengthening personalistic ties, Production Lots of research on what needs to be done but not how evaluation, spot checks Grievance mechanisms based on weak assumptions Pressure to demonstrate impact might in future Mediation Directors are influential but reluctant to engage in media Some coverage of SA programmes in the media Few formal links between research and media But informality dominant 14

17 Not a new initiative although much more capacity Preceeded by BKPK, KPK, TKPK Formal and informal reasons for its establishment Decision doesn t provide detail, but it aims to improve design and implementation of 5 key programmes including raskin and PKH It also aims to provide visibility to the president and the ruling party, provide them with control over policy response and credit them with any success 15

18 AusAID funding gives TNP2K high level of security AusAID can broker relations between donors and government, but coordination amongst donors informal and weak Initial focus on unified database before turning to operational issues Created antagonism and insecurity amongst government civil servants More ambiguity with respect policymaking roles and mandates Oppositionparties see TNP2K as a threat e.g. PDI-P called for its dissolution, presumably as TNP2K and its objectives might affect parties discreationin distributing resources to specific clients 16

19 Electoral politics VP seen to have limited impact on key ministers without strength of personality and party backing, also the Bank centuralinquiry has probably discredited him somewhat PKH has been able to secure budget increase TNP2K has probably played some role in strengthening the position of Kemensos and Bappenas in securing additional budget, although in the grand scheme of things, these are marginal amounts and unlikely to trouble national legislators Drafting and consulting TNP2K and other actors have sometimes reached consensus about roles and responsibilities e.g. Raskin TNP2K has produced the content whilst Kemenkokesra has formally been seen to communicate word to district authorities Strategic issues being addressed but not formally captured -usually in powerpoint slides rather than form of strategy documents Taking a linear approach to policy limited engagement during drafting followed by more entrepreneurial approach in enacting reform, or developing pilots in Jakarta and testing them in the field perhaps forced on them by growing number of staff, with the organisation having to adopt more of a rigid hierarchy, but also influence of key advisors and shaped by deeper cultural issues 17

20 TNP2K has more convening power than Bappenas, Kemenkokesra and Kemensos It is helping to clarify mandates of different agencies -albeit centrally in relation to different programmes. Its clarified the role of local authorities in the delivery of Raskin for example through the pedum that was issued last year TNP2K is testing slightly different implementation processes in relation to different SA programmes. For instance with Raskin its testing a top down bottom up i.e. enforcing central targeting criteria with local discretion Although pilots are still underway, informants suggested that such pilots were unlikely to have desired effects. Socialisation approaches (one day workshop with district officials and Raskin cards) have been seen by some as superficial. Formal channels to and within district offices are weak and institutional arrangements with regard to certain programmes are not known or poorly socialised Responses to changes to targeting criteria and socialisation processes have been influenced by Bupati election strategies with new rules often no or mis-applied with national legislators expressing hostility towards TNP2K 18

21 Initial focus on producing data, but unclear about success in getting more powerful ministries to use it No explicit political analysis to inform the nature of reform measures (the how) Approach based on modifying technocratically optimal solutions to accommodate the politics Overly reliant on quantitative approaches but bringing in new knowledge producers to the sector International experiences closer to home more valued Brief policy windows and pressure to disburse resulting in poor quality 19

22 There is little data on public attitudes towards SA, despite the plethora of survey institutes. Collecting data on public attitudes towards SA activities esptargeting and approaches may help inform and improve the quality of engagement between technocrats and politicians Need to engage with and not ignore traditional moral sentiments such as bagarito. Promoting a public debate may provide opportunities for the poorest to have their say/put their case forward. More broad media framing to help shift beliefs: moving from episodic to thematic framing linking media outlets/editors to formal research centres such as SMERU Incisive investigative journalism to put spotlight on malfeasance -media is being used by politicians who use the threat of corruption prosecutions for political gain. So is there a way of working with this trend and supporting journalists to better name and shame those involved in for instance extracting rents from social assistance programmes 20

23 Bureaucratic reform is underway but progress has been slow, given vested interests who want to maintain the status quo and fragmented nature of government institutions. Given the inadequate training provided to civil servants especially at directorate and sub-directorate level, there may be some merit in undertaking small piecemeal training/education with some of the less clientelist agencies such as Bappenas in leadership, change management, policy coordination, M&E Helping to shift focus from outputs (things they have more control over) and spending money to achieving outcomes and impact (which require the contribution of numerous actors) might help to break them out of their institutional silos Providing directors with tools to help them be more strategic in their work such as helping them to define policy objectives, assess the amount of and confidence in evidence already in a certain area, and be able to commission more policy relevant work This might also include changing perceptions amongst civil servants of their own interests when it comes to working with others. This might be done by raising awareness amongst of costs and benefits of engagement versus non-engagement. 21

24 Most social assistance programmes require some level of co-production amongst several actors. However, without a strong centralising authority to promote coordination and better collaborative problem solving and in the presence of perverse incentives and overlapping jurisdictions and mandates, this is difficult. So there is need for more meaningful spaces for technical and political players to come together at multiple levels to discuss and seek consensus about addressing key bottlenecks This might require a neutral mediator or facilitator playing a role to convene, broker deliberations at various scales and help change their perceptions about their own interests to act or not. In the short run TNP2K is playing this role albeit along side several other roles. In the longer run AusAID may want to invest in arms length relationship with a facilitator reporting to a highly placed supervisor (TNP2K in a new guise) or something like UKP4. Such a facilitator needs to play a more reflexive role in its engagement with other actors, including drawing on more explicitly political action oriented research in addition to quantitative RCT type data. this will mean getting research out of practice rather than getting evidence into policy High level facilitators on their own are unlikely to alter ground level dynamics. Solutions to problems at local level, will be interactive, iterative, political and highly context specific. Local problem solving could be facilitated by TKPKDs, NGOs like Patiroor religious mass organisations like Muhammadiyah. Regarding coordination amongst donors and between them and government, AusAID could help establish a formal donor group on social assistance and encourage Bappenas to play a leading role in ensuring the work of donors is in harmony with that of different government agencies 22

25 Also any additional sets of recommendations 23

26 24

27 25

28 26

29 27

30 28

31 29

32 30

33 31

34 32