Jean Monnet Working Papers. Dipartimento di Sociologia e Ricerca Sociale Facoltà di Sociologia

Transcription

1 Jean Monnet Working Papers Dipartimento di Sociologia e Ricerca Sociale Facoltà di Sociologia

2 Rethinking European Identity Some Conceptual Challenges by Andrius Švarplys 1 Kaunas Technology University, Kaunas College Abstract Globalization as a new social reality constitutes a basis for adjusting Eurointegration studies vocabulary, if not rethinking. Identity with the notions like society, state, self, rational individual played a significant role in traditional paradigm of social sciences, IR, and political sciences, however it possibly looses a power of explanation or at least faces some conceptual challenges. Identity meaning changed over time from essentialist core of the individual to uselessness or emptiness of the notion in the postmodernists considerations. Applying these to the European studies, very important suggestions appear, the most challenging of which perhaps are an absence of European-Self and the impossibility to create European cultural identity without reference to the Other (Fortress Europe), or a need to reconcile the formal universal values with social power of particular identities (national, regional, sub-regional). The most appropriate way to think about postnational era s identities seems to be public spheres of communication where particular interests are flourishing and social identities created without top-bottom institutional interference but still in a general political framework of EU. Politics orientated towards multi-level system of governance may lead to the new allegiance forms emerging and balancing, including European among them. Keywords: European identity, Eurointegration, identity, postmodern identity, postnational, European-Self. Introduction. Why to re-think? A traditional vocabulary of Eurointegration studies exhausted itself and reached its limits. It s a striking and perhaps too dramatic thesis; nevertheless one may observe clear directions towards new understandings on European-matters, especially in terms 1 Andrius Švarplys is currently a PhD student in the Department of Social Sciences, Kaunas Technology University, Lithuania and a lecturer in Kaunas College. andrius.svarplys@ktu.lt 1

3 of society, identity, nation-state and others. A long period of time, actually since Eurointegration started, the primary object of academic interests have been the problem whether new political-economic institutions can stimulate interconnectedness between states with the emphasis on elite socialization and nation-states as the vital actors (Deutch, 1957; Haas 1958). Ideological founders R. Schuman, J. Monet and K. Adenauer too anticipated the European federalism on the basis that nation-states would promote the supra-political center European Union. IR and political sciences supported the mainstream in a period of Cold War with concerns on balance of power, states interests, international institutions, and regional institutionalization in a case of Europe etc. Formally, these considerations spread over the well-famous schools of Realists, Idealists and Institutionalists. The state was the ontological unit in understanding a world political order and state s interests was equal with state identity. In order to understand behavior of a state within a broader political system, a rational choice theory was lay down as an epistemological and methodological drive. At micro level Individual was self-controlling rational calculator seeking to optimize the good. All this was in correspondence with sociological holistic paradigm of structural functionalism (originated by Parson and Merton), emphasizing the importance of national political system in which institutions shape norms and actors in multi-level self-regulating structure. The old theory of Eurointegration reflected all ontology and epistemology of traditional IR theory, the main principle of which was state-centrist approach with the top-bottom function. Checkel witnesses that what was missed is a dimension of socialization: Until recently, scholars in both IR theory and EU studies have undertheorized socialization. Within IR, neorealists and neoliberals have had little to say about such dynamics.... More generally, social interaction, internalization, and the study of preference change have not been a central focus in their research program (Checkel, 2007). In other words, the political program s correspondence to social meaning was neglected, since the traditional problem was about to explain state s interests to create institutions and surrender them a part of sovereignty (Moravcsik, 1998). The focus was states will and the institutions of European Union as the expression of states interests. What was omitted is how these institutions might change the political, 2

4 cultural and social identities of the continent? What social meaning they would contain after facing different social surroundings? How to convey a European message to people in a way that they would internalize them? How does institutional socialization actually occur? The previous spillover conception that objectives of integration politics would naturally descend down to the people came to the actual problem of democratic deficit. The state of affairs now is a separation of political European elite from the people of nation-states, and the lack of common political identity. Traditional approach to European integration resulted in a notion of EU as a supranational entity built upon mechanisms and images of a nation state (EU as an aggregate of memberstates) and it seems to be very related to the big problems of identity and democracy absence. The first signs for a need to re-define the conceptual framework of Eurointegration came from constructivists who wanted to explain institutional change with references to the social meaning that actors give to the institutions 2. Norms and values and the meaning of the institutions itself appeared to be constantly constructed and sustained by actors. One of the major contributions of constructivist approaches is to include the impact of norms and ideas on the construction of identities and behavior (Christiansen et all, 2001: 532) Thus social learning and social context became a sphere where the new forms of social meaning may appear (Risse, 2000). Though there are attempts to reconcile rationalist and constructivist approaches basically on the middle-range theories (Checkel, 2000; Jupille, Caporaso and Ckeckel, 2002; Risse and Wiener 1999), a need to seek for different conception of society, identity and state can be formulated in a more radical way. A new paradigm seems to arise, contrary to the state-centrist, methodological individualism and rationalfunctional framework, according to some EU scholars at least. Ulrich Beck argues for instance, that a contemporary debate (on globalization) is a dispute about which basic assumptions and images of society, which units of analysis, can replace the axiomatic of the national state (Beck, 2000: 25). Globalization manifests a new social reality and traditional concepts of society, individual and state loose its power of explanation. Globalization and fragmentation are undermining traditional notions of community and reduce the moral significance of nation-states and inter-states 2 More about constructivist turn in European studies see: Christiansen et all,

5 boundaries (van Ham, 2001). European Union cannot be conceived only as an aggregate of nation-states with their interests, society cannot be conflated with the state, and the identity cannot be associated with a state s society in terms of a stable, homogenous unit or with a rational and purposive subject. A brief review just referred to the conceptual transformation within European studies concerning some leading theoretical and methodological problems. Certainly, it raises more questions than gives answers. Analysis of identity term, following below in this article, has an attempt to show what different meanings might be conceptualized around identity not taking them for granted, but at least to make an example for rationale of possible rethinking the steady vocabulary. After that, considerations provided what outcomes might result in applying postmodern ideas on identity to the European problems of cultural unity. Identity as substance As Phillip Gleason points to (Gleason, 1981), identity conception first emerged and diffused in academic sphere by psychiatrist Erik Eriksson s works in the 1950ies America. Eriksson was an immigrant from Europe and became famous in America because of psychological works, the most important of which were Identity and the Life Circle and Childhood and Society. By identity notion Eriksson tried to explain complicated relations between individual and society basically in psychological terms. Identity was the key-term in the process of individual socialization, that is, internalizing societies norms and values, becoming acceptable member of society. Eriksson found eight different stages of socialization individual passes through during his/her life, and the troubles of socialization consequently meant identity crisis another popular term. Eriksson s notion of identity, however, was ambiguous, since he described it as a process located in the core of the individual indicating no definite references. As Gleason remarks: Erikson was the key figure in putting the word into circulation. He coined the expression identity crisis and did more than anyone else to popularize identity. In his usage identity means something quite 4

6 definite, but terribly elusive. In fact, the subtlety of Eriksonian identity helps account for the vagueness that soon enveloped the term, for his idea are of the sort that cannot bear being popularized without at the same time being blunted and muddied (Gleason, 1983: 914) Identity is the essence of individual inside inevitably being in a constant interconnectedness with society outside. 3 Individual looses identity when individual cannot find a place in society, feeling it strange, alien and incomprehensible for him/her, then disassociation happens and identity crisis occurs. Hence, Erikssonian identity had a feature of substance of individual but originally was designed to explain the individual connectedness to society in psychological or even psychiatric terms in order to treat individual s mental troubles of disassociation. 4 The national character studies (came from World War II period) and plural ethnic minorities structure of American society helped identity notion to become more sensitive to cultural meaning, that is, suitable approach to think about how ethnic minorities feel in our society?. The social context of ies (Cuba crisis, Vietnam war, contra-cultural movements, students rebellions) finally helped to coincide psychological and cultural-social meaning of identity. Thinking about ethnic minorities and others social groups identity is very comparable with individual essence, just transferred to the larger unit of society but still thinkable as a stable essence (outlooks, behavioral norms, moral attitudes, memories, goals etc.) possessed by group members. as useless Social sciences picked up identity and imposed upon different social groups to explore a functional interaction of smaller units within bigger frame of society. Class, gender, workers, race, children, state, students, and American-Irish all had own identity. As perfectly Brubaker and Cooper pointed out, identity is elsewhere and nowhere (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000:1). They analyze the variation of identity conception in the social sciences and find it too full-meaning, nevertheless, recognizing the positive role it played: 3 It is favorable to compare with the IR theory mentioned above about nation as inside and international political system as outside. 4 Remarkably, the national-character studies not far away back from Eriksson time (during World War II) thought about nation s character in very similar-substantive-way, presuming the nation like a unit having specific features different from other nations. 5

7 Clearly, the term identity is made to do a great deal of work. It is used to highlight non-instrumental modes of action; to focus on self-understanding rather than self-interest; to designate sameness across persons or sameness over time; to capture allegedly core, foundational aspects of selfhood; to deny that such core, foundational aspects exist; to highlight the processual, interactive development of solidarity and collective self-understanding; and to stress the fragmented quality of the contemporary experience of self, a self unstable patched together through shards of discourse and contingently activated in differing contexts (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 8) The entire features enumerated by authors evoke the job done by constructivists in IR and the studies of Eurointegration mentioned above. By starting with psychological essence of the individual, identity opened the gate to capture social context and interaction, as role theory, symbolic interactionism school, reference-group theory successfully employed in opposition to macro-level sociology like structural functionalism. But Brubaker and Cooper goes further, beyond identity, to break down the usage on the grounds that identity means too much, too little, or nothing at all. Finally, identity as an analytical category of social sciences is rejected, because of its negative function to shadow real social processes. When we call something having identity (Ukraine s Russians, for example), we automatically constitute a substantive group at the same time concealing complexity of real social relations (to say primitive, some of them married Ukraine s woman and integrated fully, contrary to those who still bear deep sentiments to Russia). Because of its power to substantialize and thus blanket social reality, identity fails. The final argument is that the social sciences and humanities have surrendered to the word identity ; that this has both intellectual and political costs; and that we can do better (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000:1). and as empty If identity is seen in a much broader cultural sense as the analogous of the Self in modern paradigm, then the discussion turns into well-known modernist/postmodernist controversy. Poststructuralists, postmodernists, post-freudists, neo-marxists and feminists, sociologists of globalization considerably form a challenge to the traditional vocabulary of Western modernization. They largely contributed political and social sciences rethinking the leading categories like power, gender, 6

8 political, subject, self and many others, what helped to reverse our understandings. Their impact is too big and far-reaching to discus it in a broader manner here, however, postmodernist turn still undoubtedly encompasses identity. Following original postmodernism proponent J.F. Lyotard, what underpins postmodern thinking is suspicion and rejection of the grand metanarratives of Modernity like progressive emancipation of reason and freedom, the progressive or catastrophic emancipation of labor or the enrichment of all humanity through the progress of capitalist technoscience 5. One of the grounding principles of Modernity metanarratives was the Self or Subject as stable ontological unit (like Aristotle s substance ) holding various secondary attributes of reality (Aristotle s accidentals ) 6. Thus, a state had its self a nation, a nation s self was culture, individual self was I around whom the world and the self was organized, human being self in Christian tradition was a soul emanated from God etc. According to Lacan, Derrida, Foucault, Bauman, Mouffe and many others, there is no such a Self without temporality, reflexivity, social contexts, multiplicity, relativity, discontinuity, and power relations. Self is a discursive practice situating in different fluid contexts, which relative meanings coming up from, rather than reference to the substantial I who adapts reality. In the postmodern turn, the multiplication and fragmentation of the self is taken for granted fact. Postmodernism attacks the very idea of personal identity as coherence and continuity not only as empirically impossible to realize but also as ideologically misleading and even dangerous (Kohli 2000:116). Self in ego-psychoanalysis becomes an empty notion since it could not make sense without being immersed in the reality. As Lacan explains: it is hardly a question of adapting to reality, but to show that the ego is only too well adapted already, since it 5 Lyotard, cited in van Ham (2001: 9) 6 In general, essentialism or substantialism is a longstanding theory of classical Western metaphysics, which says the world consists of from the sort of eternal substances, essences, and principles that grounds reality, and governs it (Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, Hegel etc.). Reality, the world of sensitive things, is not sufficient in itself; it should be supported by forever lasting principles. Subjective versus objective had been a crucial problem for Western metaphysics and epistemology from Plato to Husserl. Well-known positivist Vienna Circle defended empirical science method against such metaphysical thinking, see: Carnap R. Hahn H. Neurath O.(1966; originally 1929) Later on, post-positivist thought accused positivist empiricism for monopolizing Truth on behalf of empirical sciences. See: Thomas Kuhn (1962), Paul Feyerabend (1975). 7

9 assists in the construction of that very reality 7. That s why one might call it a real crisis of identity. What next? Eriksonian identity as the person s sense of sameness and continuity collapsed in a way that collapsed a division of inside/outside, subject/object, I/reality, individual/society, as well as rational, independently self-motivated individual Subject, seeking to optimize benefits like in the Modernity paradigm. As Rumford observes: One of the most important aspects of a whole range of theorizing in the field of political sociology (especially work associated with postmodernism and post-marxism) has been to challenge established notions of the individual (the subject). The notion of the subject associated with modernity, the purposive, self-conscious, reflexive, rational human agent has given way under the influence of postmodern thought (broadly construed) to a notion of the decentered, fragmented and partial subject whose identity is neither given a priori nor fixed, but open, contingent and malleable (Rumford, 2002: 9). Theories on Europeanization cannot discard postmodernists ideas; on the other hand they can hardly follow postmodernism logic till the end. As Stuart Hall and Du Gay put it: identity is an idea which cannot be thought in the old way, but without which certain key questions cannot be thought at all (Hall and Du Gay, 1996). Arguably, identity spread over too deep into social sciences and humanities and associated with very different notions of high significance that easily could lost, as suggest Brubaker with Cooper. The Eurointegration vocabulary is a perfect example how different conceptions are messed up in the repository of European Union issues. Clearly, postmodernists ideas offers new ways of understanding the old phenomenon like state, society, nation, culture, individual subject, identity, social group, institution, power and many theorists work on the problem how to employ new conceptualization on Eurointegration topics. But what concrete suggestions may come from these considerations relative to the European identity formation? One may consider the following. 7 Cited in Bendle, 2002: 13. 8

10 Applying postmodern identity to European studies 1) Identity looses its stable features as subject s possessed understanding of the self, thought in a previous manner. Since there is no subject over reality, time, sociality, power, identity cannot be assumed as a given, fixed subject property; subject and identity both are discursively constructed. Identities in the reflexive modernity do not flow in an abstract social vacuum of self-realization but rather depends on the changing social surroundings (norms, values, institutions, authorities) and individual ideological resources or pragmatic interests (Lash, 1999), therefore identities can be multiple, fluid, intersected and created ad hoc. Following this logic, identities cannot be primordial and tied eternally with single ethnic, religious, national, class or cultural-linguistic community as has been in the Modernity, though all these remain important resources for imaginary identities. A significance to point to European studies is that European identity doesn t contradict, rather may possibly conflate with others owned identities despite of question of strength and range. 2) Identity construction inevitably goes with invention of the Other as the differences to the other. Usually there is no peaceful, tolerant identity formation with recognition of others values, for Self-establishment happens through and against the exclusion of the Other, both are mutually depended in identities creation. Maalouf (2000) even argue that denial of the Other is at the same time denial of the Self, because we loose an opportunity (actually refuse to) include some values of another group ( their ) as unacceptable for ours identity. According to Delanty, Europe has been always invented and reinvented on the basis of division and strategy for the construction of difference starting from Christian identity against Islam in the Middle-Ages, after that in the colonial politics to the New World, and to the ethnic minorities in the contemporary Europe (Delanty, 1995). Historical experience conveys some directives for present days and it s not easy to imagine today s Europe without construction of the Other, be it Islam, United States, European past itself (Holocaust), or other (Diez, 2004). 9

11 3) National identity should be re-conceptualized against substantive or primordial identity. Although A. Smith (1995), B. Anderson (1983) and E. Gellner (1983) show how powerful feelings of national belonging might be shaping a long history of nation-building, the all social trends accompanied by globalization should not be taken from account in deciding how national identity transforms by facing incomparably different social reality than nationalism came to existence (Kaldor, 2004). According to proponents for re-thinking modernist paradigm, nationalism in no way can be understood as the ontological category of primordial belonging to the nation, contrary, nationalism likewise other identities also seems to be a constructive reality. Still the basic constitutional and economic welfare achievements took place within nation state, but this conjunction for several hundred years of common history can be assumed as accidental, not a matter of fate (Habermas, 2001b; 1996). National state has no longer power to confine welfare resources only to its citizens in the age of open markets within European Union as well as outside, and lost its influence over identity formation processes because of free social mobilization, information flow and others trends of globalization (Delanty and Rumford, 2005). Presuming, national identity may be detached from national state s interests in a way that nationality becomes one of the multiple identities owned by individuals. Nationality still stays powerful in emotional sense of community, but the changing social surroundings possibly present limits on it and open a way to new forms of allegiances. How European identity formation can proceed alongside with national identity s transformation, it s a question for empirical investigations, which have probably to be committed in a re-conceptualized theoretical framework. 4) Regarding cultural European identity issues the problem is about substantive European Self. Since culture in general, and European culture in particular cannot be identical to itself without a constructive relation to outside differences (Derrida, 1994; Brague, 2001), European Self disappears as ontological unit or social reality. What is European Self is exactly a cognitive activity with strategic re-formulation of appropriate cultural meaning around totality of the Self. There is no European culture simply in the way that there is no European society or nation in singular. Consequently, European heritage no longer can be assumed as given unity from the past (Delanty, forthcoming), since there has never been Europeans as social unit. 10

12 The most realistic way to see European common culture is to think about the European family of cultures (Smith, 1992) like some cultural values spread across the continent with different speed. But even this moderate position suffers attack from multiple-modernization theory (Eisenstadt, 2000; 2001), because different regions of Europe experienced different logic of modernization resulted in quite distinct cultural values systems what cannot simply be reduced to the cultural unity of Europe. 8 Looking from the perspectives of Self emptiness, European Self (a common cultural heritage) seems to be a kind of narrative mounting from a need to legitimate Eurointegration. It s nothing new in the identities formation, since identities are discursively constructed, but the way cultural European unity is imagined is of an extreme significance. As consequence, Europe building process (EU cultural politics) would unavoidably follow exclusion logic if it would shape national identity formation process, that is, invent Europe with specific cultural values, mythology, and heritage. European Self then would arise in the same manner as national cultural identities emerged in the era of nation building. Then imaginary European culture would coincide with European society with geographical, social, and political boundaries, thus constitute perpetual balancing opposition to the national cultures or ethnic minorities within Europe, and the third party from outside. The Europe-building process, therefore, is less wanted to have features of supra nation state with substantive notion of culture, instead of another forms of cultural unity have to be realized to evade national essentialism with its aggressive face. What could be these? 5) The mainstream to theorize a common space for European unity is a theory of postnational public sphere (Habermas, 2001b; 2001a; 1992) designed to avoid either cultural identity s exclusion logic, or top-down policy making to enforce 8 For example, while in France the separation politics of state and religion has been for granted since Revolution, in Lithuania contrary, the Church (Catholic) has played a crucial nation-building role during the end of 19 and the beginning of 20 centuries and still continue to remain strong moral influence upon society. Similarly, Netherlands moral liberalism with advancing homosexual rights, light narcotic drugs cannot be adequately understood and implemented in Lithuanian society on the grounds of adverse moral attitudes. Recent Freedom-bus case - EU program promoting liberal views to minorities including homosexual - showed this very clear when they were not allowed by mayors decisions to enter Vilnius and Kaunas exactly because of diverse morals of our society. 11

13 Europeanization of societies. However, what specifically should be a model for postnational public sphere is a matter for a quest. A well-known Habermas constitutional patriotism has an attempt to create sphere for universal constitutional values where rational communication outweighs a proud of national cultural achievements, as well as liberal-democratic principles are held sufficient for nurturing loyalty of the people. Constitutional patriotism is incomparably more fundamental than particular identities (national, subnational or regional) and overpasses them on behalf of universal human rights, and that s the reason they re supposed to be compatible. But as Bellamy and Castiglione (2004) notes, Habermasian public sphere is an ideal one and offers too monistic vision of unrealistic Europe, because of the constitutional differences existing among different regions (Britain and Scandinavia for ex.). And that legal imposition of cultural politics through the Constitution unwittingly promotes the very talk of an ethnic Europe he seeks to avoid (Bellamy and Castilgione, 2004: 190). As Delanty (2002) points to, the question is how to reconcile thick identity (which he calls particularistic one, because of its cultural and social power for the people like national, sub-national or region identities) with thin identity (which he calls universalistic, because of resistance to divisive relations of self and other). The very idea of reconciliation is to have an allegiance to the more fundamental and universal democratic principles and avoid dividing nationalistic ambitious, meanwhile not loosing social power of particularistic cultural and social identities that are so widely spread in Europe. The postnational thesis of the attachment to the universalistic values is of itself too thin to generate allegiance to any polity in particular 9, because it is culturally neutral, since the whole point it is to neutralize culture of its ethnocentric dimensions, 10 at the same time universalistic reference is still desirable against unkind nationalism. European identity seems to appear (if overall would) from this tension. If to remember redefinition of European integration issues coming from the point of globalization and postmodern world with all consequences to identity we ve already discussed, then social dimension gets priority over legal institutional mechanisms not denying at all correspondence of both. M. Castels network society and Z.Bauman s liquid 9 Bellamy, 2004: Delanty, 2002:

14 modernity and many others suggestions elevate conception of society with the emphasis to the de-centric and diffusing nature of power and multitude identities intersected. Resting on this support, one may argue that European public sphere is more alike to the co-centric circles than to the linear top-down structure even if it formulated as admiration of universalistic constitutional principles, as Habermas wishes. Whatever identities are considered, under globalization trends they re likely to come from the social interactions instead of legal institutional policies, though later might serve as promoting resources for the former (legal conditions for free movement of the people, openness of labor markets etc.). Bearing in mind a need to reconcile particular with universal, a public sphere looks like formal procedural space for communication where various conflicting interests ( particular ) are transcended into European level ( universal ). As Schlesinger observes this issue: Interactions with European institutions constitute a kind of training process that may impact on people s notions of citizenship and identity.... Elements of European civil society have begun to emerge, organized through the mobilization of diverse and often competing interests, and orientated towards the political institutions of the EU.... Multi-level governance, and the continuing tensions and divergences between the supranational level and those of the member states and regions, require us to think in terms of overlapping spheres of publics (Schlesinger, 2003: 20) Universal European identity conceptualized in a substantive, though postnational manner (as universal constitutional values) lacks a social power, instead of formal communication space promoting particular interests competitions and articulation for another forms of identity. 11 Furthering public spheres and seeking bottom-top movement within general EU framework seems to be more adequate to global changes of societies than to codify references to the European cultural achievements even if they are universally fit. 11 For ex., it opens opportunities to think about identities in negative sense. To fight against some politics but within European policy framework isn t another manifestation of European civil society? Doesn t it promote a sense of common polity sphere? Or one can assume the European identity as nonidentity in a way of awareness that all identities are of constructive realities and on that basis avoid invention of the others; this is awareness that all political, social and cultural otherings are constituted in politically oriented discourses. 13

15 Political EU agenda for cultural and social unity and postmodern identity consideration - conclusion Political European Union program represents a legal framework to academic research. The political agenda changed within European Union officials since new tasks were formulated in the 1970s. The political turn happened when Tindaman s report saw daylight in 1975 and cultural shift occurred with Adonnino Report Citizen s Europe in Both visions were implemented in Maastricht (1922) and Amsterdam (1997) Treaties with a grand goal to create a Citizens Europe with more rights to the individuals and with a share of common cultural heritage and social sense of unity. This actually meant an overpass of economical EU towards closer sense of political, cultural and social common belonging. The Europe building process started, since you cannot fall in love with the market. The observation of the political documents of European Commission to execute politics on more intensive political, social and cultural unity shows that there has been a constant rising awareness of European Union s institutions detachment from the people. Citizens have little in the way of a European political consciousness and are not given much encouragement nor facility to engage in a consistent political dialogue with these institutions (European Commission, 2001:7). What was clear more and more that the gap between citizens and Europe becomes a big problem; parallel grew a need to create a communication sphere to negotiate ideas, values, and interests and promote civic participation, as well as illuminate EU politics to the people (European Commission, 2001; 2002a; 2002b; 2004). Thereby, social and cultural politics originated through various manifestations starting from Euro-flag, Euro-anthem, Euro currency, Euro-media and furthering programs like students exchange program Erasmus, European city of culture, Culture 2000 etc., but the more relevant thing here is a belief that sense of common belonging can arise through implementation of certain politics. Still observing academic reflection on EU cultural or social politics, one can make a statement that there are various attitudes stemming from optimistic hope ( we need time to civil European society to emerge through the creation of common European 14

16 public sphere ) to the pessimistic left-wing studies ( Europe is nothing more than a narrative of elite to homogenize Europe in a line of hegemonic cultural discourse ). However, a cultural turn in EU politics extended horizon to realize common European identity and created a sphere for constructivists reactions how institutional politics can affect social identities of the continent. Since politics turned to go towards ever close union, the Eurointegration research vocabulary too has been changing and witnessing how big ambiguities interrelated with conceptual discourses and political agenda. The main problem is still very hot: how can common (cultural, social) sense for Europeans arise if Europeans do not have cultural Self and the primary source of cultural identity still remain particular identities of nations and regions? Moreover, the attempts to create cultural Europe in a sense of Euro-nationalism, known as Fortress Europe, is very unfavorable, because of its Euro-centrism and exclusions of the Other. If EU is imagined as nation state on lager dimension only, then its cultural politics stays on the top-bottom line as elitist discourse to create Europeans (Sträth, 2000) and do not touch social identities of the people, except Euro-bureaucrats only (Shore, 2000). Contemporary Europe is in a multiple between : first, a need to have a commonly shared sense of unity beyond the pragmatic economic aid; second, the impotence to create substantive identity without being hostile to the Other; third, still strong national identity s capacities to bind socially people through the historical memories, language and culture; forth, a demand to reconcile particular identities with universal references escaping creation of Fortress Europe. The most appropriate way to think about postnational era s identities possibly appears to be a public spheres of communication where particular interests are flourishing and social identities created without direct institutional interference but still in a general political framework of EU. Politics orientated towards multi-level system of governance may lead to the new allegiance forms balanced, including European among them. 15

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22 Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence - University of Trento