Key words: democratic values, support for democracy, emerging democracies, authoritarian legacy, public opinion, Chile

Transcription

1 Democratic Values Before, During and After Authoritarian Rule: The Case of Chile, Patricio Navia Universidad Diego Portales/New York University Rodrigo Osorio, Universidad de Santiago/Universidad Diego Portales June 17, 2016 (9288 words) Abstract Studies on support for democracy in transitional democracies tend to overlook the determinants of democratic values in the pre-authoritarian period. Democratic values before the authoritarian experience might survive throughout the dictatorship and after the transition, though their determinants might be affected by the authoritarian experience. In Chile, the military dictatorship ( ) adopted market-friendly reforms that explain the country s democratic and economic success, but its legacy remains polarizing. Using statistical analysis with polls conducted before and after the dictatorship, and complementing it with process-tracing for the authoritarian period, we assess the evolution in democratic values between 1972 and Support for democracy was strong before Under military rule, it remained high and Chileans favored gradual over drastic change to restore democracy. Since democracy was restored, views on the military regime have worsened. Before and after the authoritarian experience, there has been continuity in the determinants of democratic values. Key words: democratic values, support for democracy, emerging democracies, authoritarian legacy, public opinion, Chile Paper presented at the 24th World Congress of Political Science, July 23-28, 2016, Poznań, Poland 1

2 Democratic Values Before, During and After Authoritarian Rule: The Case of Chile, Studies on support for democracy in emerging democracies that experienced a democratic breakdown, authoritarianism and a transition back to democracy normally overlook what happened before the authoritarian period. Because there is insufficient data on democratic values before the authoritarian experience, the effect of long-held views on democracy and authoritarianism often goes unassessed. Countries are labeled as emerging democracies even though people in those countries might have held democratic values before their authoritarian experience and transition to democracy. The case of Chile offers an opportunity to assess the levels of democratic values and their determinants before, during and after an authoritarian period. Public opinion polls that assessed support for democracy and the government were conducted before the 1973 democratic breakdown and during the Augusto Pinochet dictatorship ( ). Polls on support for democracy have also been conducted regularly since democracy was restored in Though these polls used different methodology and there are no panel polls that cover the entire period they still provide valuable information on the views and attitudes held by people before, during and after military rule. We use statistical analysis with polls conducted between 1972 and 2013 to assess the evolution in democratic values support for democracy and for authoritarianism and explore their determinants. We also use process-tracing to assess how support for democracy evolved under authoritarian rule. The 1973 military coup and the Pinochet dictatorship remain divisive in Chile. Having transformed Chile in profound ways, the military dictatorship set the foundations for the market-friendly economic model and political institutions in the country. After discussing the theory on support for democracy and for democratic values, and the effect of past authoritarian experiences on democracy, we discuss the evolution in support for democracy and authoritarianism in Chile between 1972 and We estimate a probit model on the determinants of support for democracy and authoritarianism in a 1973 poll conducted in the capital city of Santiago and in a 2012 national poll. The Determinants and Evolution of Democratic Values Democracy is normally defined in procedural terms (Collier and Levitsky 1997). Elections and institutions that regulate the exercise of power are essential elements of a democratic system (Dahl 1971, Przeworski 1991). Schumpeter defined democracy minimally as that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people s vote (Schumpeter 2003, 269). Institutional strength has been noted as a condition for the emergence and sustainability of democracy (North 1990, Acemoglu and Robinson 2005, 2001). Economic development facilitates the emergence of democracy (Lipset 1960). Legitimacy is an essential condition for the feasibility and stability of democracy (Lipset 1959, 1960, Dahl 1971, Przeworski 1991). As countries develop economically, democracy is more likely to emerge 2

3 (Lipset, 1959), though others have argued that democracy occurs randomly but it is more likely to survive under higher levels of development (Przeworski 2003, Przeworski et al. 2000, Przeworski and Limongi 1997). Inglehart adds the importance of values as a determinant of democracy: there is no question that economic factors are politically important, but they are only part of the story (Inglehart 1988, 1203). For Inglehart, political culture is closely associated to the viability of political institutions. Lipset had previously underlined the importance of education as a necessary condition for a wellfunctioning democracy (Lipset 1959, 1960). As education connects the emergence and presence of democracy to people s values, political culture emerges as both a determinant of democracy and a result of its presence (Almond and Verba 1963). Easton (1965) argued that political principles or values are an important source of legitimacy that derives from the conviction by members of society that it is right and proper to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime. The conviction is not contingent on specific inducement or rewards, except in the long run. If there is a strong inner conviction of the moral validity of the authorities or the regime, support for the regime may persist even in the face of repeated deprivations attributed to the failures of the authorities (Easton 1965, 278). Among the attitudes, beliefs and values that comprise political culture (Shin 2007), the valuation people make of democracy as the most preferable form of government stands as a central indicator of democratic values and support for democracy (Diamond 1999, Linz 1990, Linz and Stepan 1996b). But support for democracy might respond to considerations other than values: a majority supports democracy for instrumental reasons. These instrumental motives do not reflect a high valuation of democracy per se; they reflect support for democracy insofar as it is thought to be linked with prosperity and order (Thomassen 2007, 420). In reviewing the research on support for democracy, Inglehart (2003) reports a causal link between development and the strengthening of values. He concludes that the emergence of post-industrial society is conducive to rising emphasis on self-expression, which in turn brings rising mass demands for democracy (2003, 57). Democracy is also affected by historical developments in each country. In emerging democracies, an authoritarian past did tend to limit the quality of democracy (Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring 2013, 387). Memories of the past have an effect on what happens today: the cumulative experience of past generations affects the level of democracy in contemporary political regimes (Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring 2013, 394). In fact, past events have been found to be determinant in explaining the level and quality of democracy. Rose and Mishler report that, in Eastern Europe, the political legacy of the past is more important than current government performance, economic attitudes, social structure differences, and national culture and traditions (Rose and Mishler 1996, 47). Evans and Whitefield (1995), also using evidence from Eastern Europe, find that stronger normative support for democracy influences perceptions of the workings of democracy, rather than, or more likely as well as, vice versa (Evans and Whitefield 1995, 512). In Asia, studies on views on democracy have identified an authoritarian nostalgia that hinders democratic development (Zhu, Pak, and Chang 2007). In Latin America, an authoritarian past has been found to have a positive effect as new democratic governments enjoy a honeymoon of sorts: in new democracies, the recent history of authoritarianism may lead people to cut elected governments some slack (Stokes 2001, 10). However, the economic performance of new democracies will 3

4 also influence support for democracy (Przeworski 1991), but presumably it will also influence the way people assess the past authoritarian regime. In emerging democracies, the presence of democratic values affect and reflect the survival and stability of the regime. Though there are different forms of dictatorship (Gandhi 2008), and different causes trigger transitions to democracy (Przeworski 1991), all new democracies face comparable institutionalization challenges and democratic legitimacy issues. The way the transition takes place influences the institutional depth and the strength of the party system in the resulting democratic order (Przeworski 1991, Haggard and Kaufman 1997, O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986, Linz and Stepan 1996a). In emerging democracies, support for democracy has increased in recent decades (Diamond and Plattner 2008), improving the legitimacy of regimes (Chu et al. 2008). Yet, there is a growing consensus on the literature on third-wave democracies that democratization is incomplete until an overwhelming majority of the mass citizenry offers unqualified and unconditional support for democracy (Shin 2007, 268). Since authoritarian regimes are often characterized by a culture of fear and repression (Corradi, Fagen, and Garretón 1992), new democracies must heal open wounds. Two decades after the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991), emerging Latin American democracies have encountered different consolidation challenges (Seligson and Smith 2010, Mainwaring and Scully 2010, Mainwaring 2006, Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Pizarro Leongomez 2007, Dominguez and Shifter 2003). Some countries have struggled to build democratic institutions and others have experienced economic turmoil. In Latin America, support for democracy has been mostly studied in post-authoritarian contexts (Payne et al. 2003, Lagos 2001). Lagos (2008) used Latinobarometro surveys to show that Latin American societies have evolved politically and economically, but the levels of public support for democracy and attitudes toward democratic regimes have slowly and unevenly evolved. Carlin (2006) shows that support for democracy in Latin America has been explained by economic improvements. He argues that the most important predictors of overt and intrinsic support for democracy in Latin America are also the most proximate: education and income. Yet the diffusion of values that are intrinsic to democracy in the region also depends heavily on aggregate levels of economic development (Carlin 2006, 63). Carlin observed that overt support is less a function of economic development and more a function of the extent to which the fruits of economic development alleviate persistent poverty and are equally distributed across society. Carlin and Singer (2011), measuring support for values associated with Dahl s polyarchy in twelve Latin- American democracies, show that though there are true polyarchs, their ranks are dwarfed by citizens who reject or are ambivalent toward at least one of polyarchy s core tenets. Non-polyarchs have lower levels of education and fewer resources than polyarchs (Carlin and Singer 2011). The Americas Barometer (LAPOP) 2010 poll reported that Latin American countries with a better perception of the way the government handles the economy present higher levels of support for democracy. Countries with higher presidential approval also showed stronger support for democracy. People with higher income, higher levels of education and those in older age groups and urban residents more strongly support democracy. Conversely, women and those who had a more pessimistic view of the economy had weaker support for democracy (Luna, Zechmeister, and Seligson 2010). Using a different wave of LAPOP polls, Carlin, Love, and Singer (2014) show 4

5 stable support for democracy, though they report a small decline between 2012 and The evaluation Latin Americans make of the legitimacy of their regimes is also affected by criminal violence (Carreras 2013, Pérez 2003). In turn, Munck finds that support for democracy in Latin American elites is associated with ideology. Because of past authoritarian experiences in the region, when rightwing parties supported military regimes, the left presently supports democracy more than the right (Munck 2015). Others have also linked indicators of the quality of democracy to past democratic experiences in Latin America: we show that countries with stronger histories of democracy between 1900 and 1977 are more democratic today. The only countries that have attained a very high level of democracy in contemporary Latin America Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay had the region s strongest democratic legacies from 1900 until 1977 (Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring 2013, 379). As democracy evolves in Latin America consolidating in some countries and weakening in others support for democracy also evolves differently between and within countries. The effect of education and income is not the same in all countries or overtime within countries. The outputs of a democratic order and economic policies affect the valuations people make of democracy and also the way they assess past regimes, including authoritarian governments. Given the absence of relevant data, these studies tend to either overlook the effect of democratic values before the authoritarian experience or simply make assumptions about such effect. Support for democracy today might indeed be informed by the strength of democratic values before the dictatorship, but that relationship should be tested whenever possible. Similarly, the evolution in support for democracy under authoritarian rule might also shed light on how support for democracy evolves after the transition. Using data from before the 1973 coup, during the military dictatorship and after democracy was restored, we analyze the evolution in support for democracy in Chile from 1972 to Chile: from Democracy to Dictatorship to Democracy In 2013, 40 years after the breakdown of democracy, 16% of Chileans believed that the military had good reasons to stage the coup of September 11 th, Ten years earlier, that figure was 36%. 1 Back in February of 1973, 68.2% believed that a military coup would not be good for the country and only 25.7% believed that it would be a positive development. 2 After the end of the dictatorship in 1990, support for democracy has stabilized at around 60% (since 1995, when Latinobarómetro first asked the question), but views on the military government have become increasingly negative. 3 Chile has experienced one of the most successful democratic transitions in Latin America. The country has made significant progress in reducing poverty and expanding opportunities (Navia 2010, Funk 2013, Sehnbruch and Siavelis 2013). Before its 17-year military dictatorship, Chile had a democracy, with a stable and institutionalized party system and growing levels of political 1 Data from Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Contemporánea (CERC) 2 Data from Hamuy polls (Navia & Osorio 2013). 3 Data from Latinobarómetro: 5

6 participation and social inclusion. In a contested presidential election in 1970, socialist Salvador Allende won with a plurality vote. Allende sought to implement radical transformations to build a Chilean Road to Socialism (Valenzuela 1978, Faúndez 1988). After almost 3 years in power, the country was in an economic and political crisis caused by the policies of the Allende government and by the visceral opposition of conservative and rightwing parties. The military coup of September 11 th, 1973, brought an abrupt end to a democratic experience that had lasted for almost four decades (Valenzuela 1978, Sigmund 1993). The authoritarian experience was characterized by massive human rights violations, by the implementation of neoliberal reforms and by the concentration of power in the hands of General Augusto Pinochet (Huneeus 2007). The military dictatorship promulgated a new constitution in 1980 that established a protected democracy framework but allowed for a transition to a limited democracy (Loveman 1994, 2001). The constitution granted overwhelming power and an 8-year term to Pinochet. At the end of that term, a plebiscite would determine the continuation of military rule. Legislative elections would be held in Political parties were banned until the late 1980s, but there was increasing opposition activity after the 1980 constitution came into effect. An economic crisis in 1982 forced the dictatorship to make concessions to the democratic opposition. GDP decreased by 10% in 1982 and there was a further 3.8% decrease in Unemployment reached 30% in 1982 and remained above 20% until The economic crisis provoked widespread protests against and forced Pinochet to shuffle his cabinet, bringing in experienced rightwing politicians who started a dialogue with the moderate opposition. A plebiscite in 1988, held under unfavorable conditions for the democratic opposition, opened the way for a transition to democracy when a majority of Chileans denied Pinochet of a new term. Four consecutive governments from the center-left Concertación coalition ruled between 1990 and That year, the Alianza coalition became the first rightwing government since the dictatorship. Under democratic rule, the economy has shown robust growth. GDP per capita has more than tripled in real terms. Inflation was brought under control, from above 20% in the late 1980s to a stable 2-3% in the last decade. Though democratic governments have introduced targeted social spending and poverty-reduction initiatives, the tenets of the market-friendly economic model put in place by Pinochet have been the foundations on which the national economy has flourished and poverty has declined from a high of 40% in 1990 to less than 15% in In addition to the economic reforms implemented by the dictatorship, political party alignments were affected by the authoritarian experience. Before the coup, parties were aligned on a leftcenter-right continuum with stable and long-lived parties occupying the spectrum (Sartori 1976, Valenzuela 1978). After democracy was restored, some reported the re-emergence of the old party system (Valenzuela and Scully 1997, Valenzuela 1995), while others suggested that a new cleavage realigned the party system on an authoritarian/democratic divide (Tironi and Agüero 1999, Tironi, Agüero, and Valenzuela 2001, Torcal and Mainwaring 2003). Thus, there is widespread agreement that there has been continuity in the party system before and after military rule. 6

7 There has been far less evidence of continuity from before the authoritarian experience in terms of democratic values. In 2012, compared to the rest of Latin America, Chile showed average levels of support for democracy (Zizumbo-Colunga and Smith 2012). Those with a better perception of the economy and higher levels of education support democracy more strongly (Luna, Zechmeister, and Seligson 2010). Huneeus and Maldonado (2003) argue that Chile is among Latin American countries with low support of democracy, despite the good economic indicators. Moreover, several studies on democratic values in the post 1990 period have shown the lasting legacies of authoritarianism on political views of Chileans (Huneeus 2003). Though Huneeus highlights the prevalence of the left-center-right alignment, he also recognizes an authoritarian/democratic divide: the military coup remains present among Chileans, even among those who were not yet born when it happened (Huneeus 2003: 34). Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Contemporánea (CERC) polls from 1986 to 2002 show that, unlike other countries with a similar histories, the experience of a past authoritarian regime does not strengthen the legitimacy and support for present-day democracy. They report that those who support the Pinochet dictatorship are less likely to support democracy (Huneeus and Maldonado 2003). Using LAPOP polls, Carlin (2011) finds that the profile among those who support democracy does not reflect the dominant authoritarian/democratic divide in the party system. Given the insufficient information on what levels of democratic values existed in Chile before 1973, and on their determinants, there can only be speculation on the effect of the authoritarian experience on democratic values after the transition to democracy. The determinants of democratic values before 1973 might also show continuity in the post 1990 period. Based on our theory discussion and the evidence available from Chile, we test three hypotheses: H1: The authoritarian experience does not alter support for democracy. Given the assumption that cultural values determine support for democracy, having experienced authoritarianism should not affect the determinants of support for democracy. H2: Support for democracy is stronger before and after authoritarianism among those with higher socio-economic conditions and among those with a positive economic outlook regardless of the type of regime the country has. The claim that democracy is associated with higher socio economic status should not be conditioned on having gone through an authoritarian experience. Thus, the socio-economic determinants of support for democracy should be unaffected by the dictatorial experience. H3: Support for democracy is stronger after authoritarianism among those identified with the left. As the 1973 coup was against a leftwing government and the military dictatorship was rightwing, support for democracy in Chile should be higher among leftists in all periods. Democratic Values before 1973 We use public polls conducted before the 1973 coup to analyze democratic values before the authoritarian experience. With representative samples from the capital city of Santiago (about 35% of the national population), Eduardo Hamuy conducted the first reliable polls in Chile (Hamuy, 7

8 Salcedo, and Sepúlveda 1958, Navia and Osorio 2015b). The polls were not conducted to assess democratic values since that intellectual debate had not yet taken off but they did include questions that can be used today as proxies of democratic values. Hamuy polls have been used to explain political developments during the pre-1973 period (Prothro and Chaparro 1974, Valenzuela 1978, Huneeus 1987), Allende s victory in 1970 (Prothro and Chaparro 1974), the breakdown of democracy (Fleet 1985, Valenzuela 1978, Bermeo 2003) and attitudes and opinions under authoritarian rule (Huneeus 1987). They have also been used to compare political party electoral bases before and after the dictatorship (Torcal and Mainwaring 2003), to compare values and views before and after authoritarian rule (Huneeus and Morales 2001) and to analyze electoral registration patterns before 1973 and after 1990 (Madrid 2005). Others have used electoral data to assess the levels of support for Allende and the extent to which society became increasingly polarized before the coup (Sartori 1976, Valenzuela 1978) or to question such polarization (Bermeo 2003), but polls have only been scantly used to explore the polarization debate (Prothro and Chaparro 1974, Navia and Osorio 2015a). While we touch on that debate, our objective is not to analyze the evolution of party and ideological identification, but to explore democratic values, identifying ideologically-based differences in the way Chileans viewed and expressed support for democracy and opposition to authoritarianism. Before 1973, Chileans did not have a negative perception of the role of the military in politics. Though military presence in Latin American politics was a recurrent phenomenon at the time, it was less common in Chile. The military had undue political influence in the 1920s under the Carlos Ibañez dictatorship ( ) and until democratic elections were restored in Between 1932 and 1973, there were scattered military revolts and coup attempts, but civilian governments prevailed and democratic elections were held uninterruptedly. In the years before 1973, there were a few military uprisings with limited consequences, including the 1969 tacnazo against President Eduardo Frei ( ). Thus, a military government as opposed to just the presence of military officers in a civilian government was a distant option for Chileans. In fact, many Chileans saw the involvement of the military as a guarantee for the survival and strength of democracy. Others perceived it as a way to constrain the revolutionary nature of the Allende government. In November of 1972, as a reaction to a strike by the private trucking sector, President Allende shuffled his cabinet, naming military officers to the ministries of Interior (chief of cabinet), public works and mining, and also appointing two labor union leaders as ministers. The inclusion of military officers was welcomed both by sympathizers and foes of the government. In a Hamuy poll conducted in December of 1972, 79% believed that the inclusion of military leaders in the cabinet offered more security to you and your family. Those in the left, center and right were similarly positive about military presence in Allende s cabinet. Support for military presence in the cabinet was widespread, 40% believed that military leaders should remain permanently in the cabinet. Among those identified with the left, the number was higher (49%). Support for military presence was highest among those who approved of Allende, while it was lowest but still high among those who disapproved of the president s performance. Military presence in the cabinet was associated with increased stability and fewer chances of a military coup. When asked about 8

9 the effects of the cabinet change, the top response (30%) among Santiago residents was that it would provide more security. Though people were in favor of having military leaders in a civilian government, three Hamuy polls conducted after Allende s inauguration showed low support for a military government. In June of 1972, only 16.7% believed that a military government is convenient for Chile. In December of 1972, the number increased to 23.7%. By February of 1973, it was 25.7%. Among those identified with the right, support for a military government was twice as high as among those identified with the left (35.4% to 19.8%), but one in every five leftists believed that a military government was convenient (presumably for different reasons than those identified with the right). Using a February 1973 poll, the last poll Hamuy conducted before the coup, we estimate a probit model. Our dependent variable is support for a military government ( do you believe a military government is convenient for Chile? ), which we have recoded as a dichotomous variable, those in favor (25.7%) and all other answers (68.2% who did not and 6.1% who did not answer). We use typical control variables, including sex, age and socio-economic status. We exclude education as it was highly correlated with socio-economic status. Since the military coup was supported by rightwing and centrist parties and opposed by leftwing parties, we also use political identification as an independent variable. Given the high polarization at the time, most respondents in the probabilistic sample in the Hamuy poll showed political identification. Those identified with the left were 42.8% and the rest identified with the center (26.8%), right (21.8%), or none (8.7%). We also use presidential approval as an independent variable. We expect that those who approved of Allende would be less inclined to support a military government. In addition, we include two questions that inquire about present socio-tropic evaluation and retrospective ego-tropic evaluation. We expect that those with a positive assessment would be less supportive of a military intervention. Following the standard procedure (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimpson 2002), those variables are coded from negative to positive (-1, 0 and 1). Figure 1 reports the findings. Those identified with the left were less likely than those identified with the right to support a military government. Those identified with the center were not less likely than rightists to do so. The more positive the socio-tropic evaluation, the less likely people were to support a military government. The effect of retrospective ego-tropic evaluations was not statistically significant. Women and older Chileans were also more likely to support a military government. When compared to those of low socio-economic status, those at mid socio-economic status were less likely to support a military government. Those with high socio-economic status were not different, in statistically significant terms, than the reference category in their likelihood of supporting a military government. The middle class, the left and those with a positive sociotropic evaluation were the least likely to support a military government in early

10 N=754 (for a methodological discussion of the Hamuy polls see Navia and Osorio (2015). Statistically significant at 0.05 level. The reference category for socio-economic status is low socio economic status The reference category for political identification is right Source: authors with data from Hamuy Poll #45 (February 1973). To better interpret the beta coefficients in the Probit model, we calculate the linear probabilities for each of the statistically significant independent variables, holding all the other variables at their mean. Figure 2 shows the predicted probabilities. The numbers reflect the actual probability that a person within that group supported a military government. Thus, holding other variables at their mean values, there was a 29% chance that a woman within the sample would support a military government. Conversely, there was an 18% chance that someone identified with the left, when compared to someone identified with the right, would oppose a military government. There was strong opposition to a military government among those identified with the left, when compared to those identified with the right, and among those in the middle class (when compared to those in the low middle class). Perceptions on the economy seemed to affect support for a military government. Those with a negative evaluation of the present economic situation were the strongest support base for a military government in 1973, whereas those with a positive view on the current economic situation had the lowest level of support for a military government. Also, support for a military government was stronger among women than among men. Given that Allende s vote in 1970 was higher among men than among women and that there is plenty of 10

11 evidence on how women led the protests against Allende (Power 2002), this finding should not be surprising. *-0.21 less than the reference category: low socio-economic status. ** 0.18 less than the reference category: political identification with the right. Source: authors with data from Hamuy Poll #45 (February 1973). Democratic Values under Military Rule ( ) There is limited information on how support for authoritarianism and democracy evolved under military rule ( ). A few scattered polls, conducted in the 1980s, reported low support for authoritarianism. Unfortunately, the datasets for those polls are not available and the wording of the questions is not always consistent. The Latin American School of Social Sciences (FLACSO) conducted a few national and Santiago polls in the period. A FLACSO national poll from 1985 reported that 13.3% believed that authoritarianism was sometimes desirable, while 57.5% believed that democracy should always be the preferable form of government (Baño 1993). Five additional FLACSO polls (some national and some in Santiago only) conducted between 1986 and 1989 showed stable low support for authoritarianism and high support for democracy (Baño 1993, 11). In 1987, FLACSO asked about what type of governments, authoritarian or democratic, would do a better job on several 11

12 dimensions. In the eyes of Chileans, democratic governments were better in all 11 dimensions. Democratic governments ranked highest in reducing unemployment (64%), improving Chile s image abroad (63.1%) reducing social inequalities (58.9%) and fostering economic development (57.7%). Authoritarian governments ranked highest but worse than democratic governments in eliminating terrorism (21.2%) and securing public order (21.7%). In that same poll, 66.5% believed that a democratically-elected government was superior to any other form of government (FLACSO 1987a). In a FLACSO poll from late 1989 weeks before the democratic election support for democracy had increased to 65.8% (Baño 1993, 11). Though human rights violations were always among the top popular concerns in those polls, economic issues were more important in explaining opposition to the military dictatorship. In the 1987 FLACSO poll, when asked about which of the criticisms against the military government were more truthful and important, 21.2% mentioned human rights violations while 43% mentioned unemployment. Only 10.1% mentioned lack of freedom and 4.5% mentioned the privatization of state companies (FLACSO 1988a, 13). The same poll asked about positive accomplishments of the military dictatorship. Alleviating extreme poverty was atop the rank (30.4). Among the other accomplishments mentioned, fighting communism (13.6%), modernization of the country (11.7%), security/order (9.8%) and economic freedom (4.8%) were also mentioned. The answer to that question also showed the high levels of polarization present in Chile as 26.2% said that the dictatorship had no accomplishments (FLACSO 1988a, 14). A 1986 poll from the Center for Studies of Contemporary Reality (CERC) an opposition thinktank also assessed support for a military government (Huneeus 1987). The poll asked Santiago residents to choose between democracy, dictatorship and the Pinochet government. Though the Pinochet government was a dictatorship, the poll probably wanted to avoid a spiral of silence problem (Noelle Neumann 1974) among those who did not want to publicly acknowledge support for a dictatorship. There was strong support for democracy (69.7%), low support for the continuation of a Pinochet government (13.2%) and even lower support for dictatorship (5.2%). Among those who supported authoritarianism, more people preferred to express support for Pinochet than for dictatorship (Huneeus 1987: 63). Not surprisingly, support for democracy was stronger among leftists (around 90%). Support for authoritarianism/pinochet was highest among those identified with the right, with values as high as 50% among those in the extreme right (Huneeus 1987, 64). One defining element of the dictatorship was the 1980 Constitution, custom-made for the Pinochet government to create a protected democracy framework. The 1986 CERC poll asked about support for the constitution: 11.4% had positive views, 31.6% had a neutral position, 37.2% had negative views and 14.4% did not know. When adding the 5.4% who did not respond, one in every five Chileans did not have views on the Pinochet constitution. In a 1987 FLACSO poll on political culture conducted in Santiago (FLACSO 1987b), people were asked on their views of the military government. 12.5% supported the government ( government partisans ) and 29.1% were opponents. Almost half of respondents (47.9%) identified as independents (FLACSO 1987b, 23). Though the country s political elite was polarized, the rest of the population was less so. When asked about their interest in politics, 20.6% said they had a 12

13 lot of interest, 37.3% said they had little interest and 41.1% declared to have no interest at all (FLACSO 1987b, 17). The 1987 FLACSO poll also asked about the current situation in Chile. 11.3% said that the country was good, while 31.7% believed that Chile can improve with small changes. Chile needs important reforms was chosen by 31.3% and Chile must radically change was selected by 23.7%. Though a majority wanted important or radical changes (55%), a sizable minority wanted no change or only small changes (43%). Interestingly, more than a year before the plebiscite that determined the transition to democracy with a 56-44% victory for Pinochet s opponent, this FLACSO poll reported a similar breakdown in political preferences. Before the October 5 th 1988 plebiscite, FLACSO conducted three polls on vote intention. Though he was only formally named a couple of months before, Pinochet was widely expected to be the candidate for the up or down vote. A FLACSO poll from October 1987 in Santiago reported that 18.6% would vote for Pinochet and 45.4% would vote against Pinochet (FLACSO 1987b). In a November 1987 poll in Santiago, FLACSO reported a 31.4% to 20.4% margin of victory for the No vote (FLACSO 1988a). A majority perceived that Pinochet was more likely to win (54.9%) while only 20.3% believed Pinochet would lose the plebiscite (FLACSO 1988a, 12). In April 1988, a FLACSO national poll reported a 33.8% to 22.2% advantage for the No vote (FLACSO 1988b). Finally, a poll from July 1988, in Santiago, reported a larger margin of victory (42.1% to 17.3%) for the No vote (FLACSO 1988c). In all polls conducted in the months before the plebiscite, there were more Chileans in favor of ending the military government than those who wanted Pinochet to stay in power. The July 1988 poll asked about restoring democracy. 62% believed that democracy was necessary for people to exercise their rights. Only 14.7% believed that the country would do better without politics and 18.5% believed that things would not change regardless of the type of government. The same poll reported that 66.3% were against banning political parties and only 24.7% were in favor of banning some parties. Towards the end of the military dictatorship, Chileans were overwhelming moderate when asked to place themselves on the ideological scale. 58.8% did not identify with a political party and only 33.2% did. But an overwhelming majority (76.9%) placed themselves on the left-right ideological scale. The largest group defined themselves as centrists (30.9%). Center-left (14.2%) and centerright (19.3%) also attracted significant support. The options left and right were selected by only 7.3% and 5.5% respectively. Thus, 64.4% defined themselves as close to the center. The military dictatorship unquestionably remains polarizing, but by the end of the dictatorship, a wide majority of Chileans had moderate political views. Despite the limited number of polls conducted under military rule and our limited access to the data there is sufficient evidence to claim that democratic values did not decrease in the period. Under military rule, a majority of Chileans preferred democracy over dictatorship. The low support for the dictatorship during the latter part of the period was associated more with the economy and high levels of unemployment than with negative assessments of human rights violations. Still, 13

14 there is sufficient evidence to claim that support for democracy was already strong in Chile before democracy was restored. Democratic Values after 1990 Latinobarómetro polls, conducted regularly since 1995, have reported stable support for democracy in Chile, as Figure 3 shows. Support for authoritarianism was already low in the early 90s, and has marginally decreased since then. In recent years, support for democracy has been above 60%, while support for authoritarianism remains below 20%. Other national polls have also reported consistently high levels of support for democracy. LAPOP has asked the question on support for democracy four times between 2006 and Three of every four Chileans believe that democracy is the most preferable form of government. In 2008 under the negative effects of the world economic crisis support for democracy fell to 59.9%. The effect of the crisis might explain that decline in LAPOP, although a similar decline was not present in Latinobarómetro. LAPOP also asks about support for having a strong leader not elected democratically. Less than 10% of Chileans agreed with that assessment between 2006 and 2012 with a small increase in 2008 (14.5%), the year of the crisis. Using similar questions with a different wording, the Universidad Diego Portales (ICSO-UDP), World Value Survey (WWS) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP, Auditoría a la democracia) polls report similar findings. Since shortly after democracy was restored, CERC began asking about views Chileans have of the September 11 th coup. Figure 4 shows the evolution, from 1995 to 2013, in how Chileans view the coup. A majority has consistently believed that the coup destroyed democracy. Positive views of the military coup have declined over time. In the mid-1990s, a third of respondents believed the coup liberated Chile from Marxism, but by 2013, less than 20% believed the same. In 1993, CERC asked about the feelings the September 11 th coup produced on people. Among the respondents, 30% associated it with pain, 12% with indignation, 18% with impotence, 16% with indifference and 18% with positive views such as security, satisfaction and happiness (Huneeus 2003: 37). In that same poll, CERC asked about the importance of the coup. Among respondents, 33% believed the coup belongs in the past and has lost importance in the present, but 49% disagreed with that assessment. In four occasions, between 1990 and 2003, CERC asked Chileans about their agreement with the assertion that there was a civil war in 1973 that forced the military to use a heavy hand. Those in agreement fluctuated from a high of 41% in 1990 to a low of 34% in In all polls, more than 50% disagreed with that assessment. 14

15 Source: authors with data from Latinobarómetro (Figure 1) and CERC polls (Figure 2) To assess support for authoritarianism in recent years, we use a LAPOP poll from 2012 that included a question on support for democracy and authoritarianism. Among respondents, 19% declared that it did not matter if the regime was democratic or non-democratic, while 72.7% believed that democracy is preferable to any other form of government. Only 8.3% declared that under some circumstances, an authoritarian government could be preferable. To account for what explains support for democracy, we estimated a probit model where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 when people declared that democracy is preferable to any other form of government and 0 for all other options. Our independent variables are the same as those used in the probit analysis for the 1973 poll though the polls are not fully comparable and the questions are not worded exactly in the same way. Figure 5 plots the coefficients and the standard errors for each independent variable. Those variables that cross the vertical line set at 0 are not statistically significant (at the 0.05 value). Support for democracy is higher among middle and higher income groups. Similarly, support for democracy is stronger among those identified with the center and even stronger among those identified with the left. Interestingly, support for democracy is lower among those who approve of the president s performance. Given that in 2012 the president was Sebastián Piñera, the first rightwing leader since the restoration of democracy and that he had very low approval that year (20.3%), we should not make much out of this finding. Perceptions on the economy were not statistically significant in explaining support for democracy at the 95% confidence level (but retrospective egotropic perception was significant at the 90% confidence level). 15

16 N=1032 Statistically significant at 0.05 level. The reference category for socio-economic status is low socio economic status The reference category for political identification is right Source: Authors with data from LAPOP From the Probit model in Figure 5, we calculated the linear predicted probabilities of supporting democracy for each category of statistically significant independent variables, holding the other variables at their mean. Since support for democracy was overall high, the predicted probabilities that someone would believe that democracy is preferable to other any form of government are high. The higher the socio-economic status, the higher the probability that someone would support democracy. The further away from the right a person would self-identify, the higher the support for democracy. A person that identifies with the left will have 82% more chances of supporting democracy than someone identified with the right. Those who disapproved of President Piñera in 2012 had 75% higher chances of supporting democracy. Not surprisingly, support for democracy was higher among those with a better retrospective socio-tropic evaluation. 16

17 Source: Authors with data from LAPOP Support for democracy in 2012 shows continuities with what we found for the period before the 1973 coup. Support for democracy is stronger among those identified with the left and among those in the middle class. Unlike 1973, when the upper class did not strongly support democracy, in 2012 the upper class was the strongest supporter of democracy. While in 1973 support for democracy was associated with the economic outlook, in 2012 it was independent of the economic outlook. The fact that the economic situation was dire in 1973 and the country was experiencing sustained growth in 2012 probably explains why the economic outlook was no longer relevant in explaining support for democracy in We have found that the authoritarian experience did not alter support for democracy, confirming our first hypothesis. For the most part, the determinants of democratic values were similar before 1973 and after 1990, thus showing that the authoritarian experience did not have an effect, except among the upper class which showed stronger democratic values in 2012 than in These findings are thus consistent with our second hypothesis. The fact that those in the left show stronger democratic values after the dictatorship than before the democratic breakdown is consistent with our third hypothesis that associates more negative views of the dictatorship among the left to the fact that the authoritarian government was rightwing. 17

18 Evolution in Views on the Dictator An alternative way of assessing democratic values is by inquiring on the views people have on the past authoritarian government. The military dictatorship ( ) has been personalized on the figure of Augusto Pinochet. Thus, the way Chileans view Pinochet is normally equated with their evaluation of the dictatorship. A 1988 FLACSO poll reported on the views on the military dictatorship and Pinochet. Asked to rank the Pinochet government on a 1-7 scale, Santiago residents showed their polarized views on the regime, 35.6% gave Pinochet the lowest scores (1-2), 28.5% gave him a 3-4 and 30.5% ranked Pinochet 5 or higher (FLACSO 1988a, 16). Figures 7 and 8 show the evolution overtime in how Chileans view the Pinochet dictatorship. CERC polls ask the question in two different ways. We report both series to show the increasingly negative views people have of the authoritarian period. While Figure 3 above shows consistent and stable support for democracy, Figures 7 and 8 show increasingly negative views of the Pinochet period. Negative views on Pinochet have worsened significantly in recent years. As the number of people that do not have memories of the military government increase and as the condemnation of human rights violations perpetrated by the regime become increasingly widespread, views on the Pinochet government have fallen to new lows. Thus, while democratic values have remained stable in the support for democracy dimension, they have strengthened in the dimension that assesses views on the past authoritarian regime. Source: authors with data from CERC Conclusion Though it is sensible to argue that past authoritarian experiences might affect democratic values and support for democracy in emerging democracies, the absence of data to assess democratic values before the authoritarian experience makes it difficult to identify long-held democratic values in emerging democracies and study their determinants. The case of Chile, a country with a history of democratic governments before its authoritarian experience ( ), offers a rare opportunity to assess democratic values before the dictatorship and to explore how past views on 18

19 democracy might have evolved under an authoritarian regime and survived after democracy has been restored. In assessing support for authoritarianism in Chile before the 1973 coup, under military rule and after democracy was restored in 1990, we find that the democratic values today have roots in the pre-1973 period. Today, Chile is among the Latin American countries with the highest levels of support for democracy. Though Chile s economic stability and democratic consolidation can help understand democratic values, support for authoritarianism has always been low in Chile, before the 1973 coup and under military rule. When democracy was restored, democratic values were already high in Chile. As democracy has consolidated, support for democracy has remained stable while views on military dictatorship have worsened. Those who view the dictatorship as good have marginally declined over time, but those who see it as negative have increased, with those with neutral views on Pinochet declining markedly as well. Democratic values in countries with a past authoritarian experience are affected by a number of variables. Studies on the determinants of democratic values would benefit from incorporating information from before and during the authoritarian experience. To better understand the evolution in democratic values in new democracies, we should not ignore what happened in those countries before their authoritarian experience. 19