Elections under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan. Ellen Lust-Okar Assistant Professor, Yale University

Transcription

1 Elections under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan Ellen Lust-Okar Assistant Professor, Yale University Visiting Professor, Graduate Institute for International Studies (HEI) Paper prepared for presentation at the ECPR Joint Session, Granada, Spain, April 14-19, Please do not cite or circulate without permission. 1

2 Because states in the Middle East and North Africa have had only fleeting experiences with democracy, most scholars have disregarded elections and electoral reform in the region. The Middle East is nearly absent from the most widely read literature on political liberalization and democratization (i.e. Diamond, Linz and Lipset, 1988; Linz and Stepan, 1996; O Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, 1987; Przeworski, 1991), in part because scholars tended to emphasize the experiences of successful democratization over those of stalled and stagnant transitions. At the same time, Middle East specialists tend to discount elections and electoral reforms in the region because they see them as windowdressing, giving only the illusion of change in unwavering, authoritarian states. This became particularly true as the 1990s wore on, and the initial hope that the ME may follow other regions of the world in instituting democracy withered. Scholars sought to understand if it was weak civil society, the influence of Islam, or external strategic rents and oil revenues that explained why democratic reforms have failed to take hold in Arab states (e.g., Diamond, Plattner and Brumberg, 2003 and Bellin, 2004 for a review). The topic of elections inevitably entered conversations particularly through debates about Islamists, elections and the prospects for democracy. Yet, scholars have paid little attention to the politics of authoritarian elections, variation in electoral institutions or debates over reforms. 1 1 Indeed, working within the paradigm provided by the democratization literature has limited the extent to which these scholars consider institutional variation. As scholars examining hybrid regimes have recently argued, there was a tendency among democratization theorists to consider authoritarian and democratic regimes as dichotomous (Levitsky and Way, 2002; Diamond, 2002.) This was clearly the case with influential, cross-regional work (e.g., Przeworski et al., 2000). It was true even of work examining the resilience of monarchies vis-à-vis dominantparty regimes in the Middle East (Kostiner, 2000). Although scholars recognized the importance of regime type on liberalization, they focused their explanations for this difference on the relationships between the states and social classes (Anderson, 2000), external forces (Gause, 2000), and leadership coalitions (Herb, 1999; Kostiner, 2000). Until only very recently, scholars 2

3 This is problematic. A closer look at the region and, indeed, at authoritarian regimes more generally -- finds that political elites take elections and electoral institutions very seriously, and that there is significant variation in electoral outcomes. Even where liberalization has been reversed, the vigor with which incumbents and opponents contest rules governing participation lends credence to the belief that these institutions are important. It is hard to imagine that such debates would exist if institutions were completely meaningless. Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile a wholesale dismissal of elections in authoritarian regimes with the increasing evidence that parliaments in authoritarian regimes seem to have important political significance. Gandhi and Przeworski (2001) have argued, for instance, that authoritarian regimes with parliamentary institutions tend to have longer life-spans than authoritarian regimes that lack these institutions. Similarly, Gandhi and Vreeland (2004) have found that parliamentary authoritarian regimes are less likely to experience civil conflict than their counterparts without parliaments. There is growing evidence that parliaments are significant, but the question of why this is so remains unanswered. Finally, until we understand the politics of authoritarian elections and the institutions which govern them, we cannot distinguish elections which create inertia toward democratization from those which reinforce the existing regime. Scholars working within new institutionalism have argued quite convincingly that institutions can both affect and reinforce the distribution of power across actors, affecting not only the ignored institutions governing participation in the Middle East, and even those studies that have emerged (e.g., Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg, 1999; Brown, 1997, 2002; Brownlee, 2003; Posusney, 1998, 2002; Lucas, 2003) have emphasized the outcomes of institutions rather than examining the politics of elections and debates over reforms. 3

4 present but options for the future as well (for reviews, see Thelen, 1999; Stark and Brustz, 1998). As March and Olsen (1989: 164) argued, [a]ctions taken within and by political institutions change the distribution of political interests, resources, and rules by creating new actors and identities, by providing actors with criteria of success and failure, by constructing rules for appropriate behavior, and by endowing some individuals, rather than others, with authority and other types of resources. Examining the politics of elections under authoritarianism will allow us to distinguish who gains and who loses through electoral politics, as well as when and how institutional structures help either to reinforce or undermine the current regime. This paper is a first step in a project aimed at demonstrating that the politics of authoritarian elections while fundamentally different from those of democratic regimes is both systematic and shaped by institutions. Focusing on Jordan, it begins with a discussion of the role of elections. It considers how the nature of elections, combined with institutional rules, both alters the outcomes of elections and shape candidate and voter behavior. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of debates over electoral reform and democratization. The Role of Elections Elections, and the parliaments they help form, provide a critical arena of competition in authoritarian regimes. In large part, they are not generally manipulated. The government 2 and the people certainly recognize the incumbents ability to step in when need be, either altering unacceptable outcomes or dismissing the parliament altogether, and in the process of elections, government and security forces may work to 2 I use government here to refer to the center of power, as opposed to the cabinet, and use regime to refer to the sets of rules. 4

5 strengthen pro-regime candidates against the opposition. Yet, in marked contrast to conventional wisdom that largely dismisses authoritarian elections as meaningless, staged events, there is a significant amount of competition in authoritarian elections. The competition is not over policy making. Many (and in some cases most) policy arenas are off-limits to parliamentarians, 3 a fact which is not lost on either parliamentarians or voters. Indeed, the 2004 democracy polls in Jordan found that only 7.34% believed the parliament played a major role in legislation in Jordan. In contrast, 28.29% believed the legislators did not have any effect on Jordan s policies. 4 It is also not primarily a competition over the boundaries of participation and the future for democratization. Elections are to some extent a two-level game: one about the competition at hand and another over the rules of participation. This is true for some participants and in some cases. Yet, it is not the only (or perhaps even the primary) importance of the electoral competition. In the 1997 Jordanian elections, when opposition to the 1993 electoral law was at its height and the retrenchment of democratization was hotly debated, less than 1/3 of candidates discussed strengthening democratic life in Jordan, and even fewer than 10% focused on such issues as the revision of the electoral law, strengthening of political parties or further democratization in Jordan. (See Tables A and B in the Appendix.) Rather, elections under authoritarianism provide an important competition over access to state resources. Parliament is a basis from which one can call upon ministers 3 One Syrian parliamentarian reportedly exclaimed, We re Members of Parliament. We don t make laws! 4 Respondents were asked To what extent do you believe that the party is able to influence the government on the matters that pertain to its goals? 7.34% believed it played a large role, 23.25% that it had some effect; 23.61% that it played a small role; 28.29% that it played no role in policymaking; 16.99% did not know; and.5% refused to answer or did not understand the question. CSS, University of Jordan, 2004 Democracy Survey, question

6 and bureaucrats to allocate jobs to constituents. Indeed, in Jordan government ministers have reportedly complained that parliamentarians are pushing them to supply jobs, 5 at times threatening state institutions of scandalizing them in parliament if they did not react positively to their requests. The result, according to one journalist, was that government institutions and ministries allocated an unofficial quota for parliamentarians relatives and acquaintances to avoid friction with deputies, and better still, to secure safe haven from the deputies comments and criticism. 6 At other times, deputies simply take advantage of the resources provided within parliament. Perhaps the most notable example of this occurred when Speaker of the Lower House, Abdul Hadi Majali, allegedly hired his friends and relatives, along with those of his close deputies, to serve as the 80 secretaries for parliamentarians, bypassing the recommendations of a committee which had specially formed to review the 400 applications. 7 Parliamentarians also have received discretionary funds which they can distribute as they see fit in responding to constituents (and their own) needs. Importantly, the distribution of the discretionary funds is also at the government s discretion, which puts enormous pressure on the parliamentarians to play by the regime s rules in the parliament. Deputies are also under pressure from their constituents to provide these services. A survey of 400 Jordanians in 2000 found, for example, that the majority believe that they need wasta to get business done at a government office, with 45.83% responding that they would seek wasta before beginning their task, and 19.16% looking for it after 5 See al-bilad, April 13, 2000 and al-shahed, September 6, 2000, cited in Kilani and Sakijha (2002): Kilani and Sakijha (2002): Kilani and Sakijha (2002). 6

7 beginning. Not surprisingly, some deputies thus complain that the public lacks an interest in public issues, turning to the deputies instead only to provide everything from university admissions to appointments as ambassadors and ministers. As Sa eda Kilani and Basam Sakijha conclude: parliament, whose main task is to monitor government s performance and legislate laws, is gradually becoming the haven for Wasta practices. Voluntarily or out of social pressure, parliamentarians role in mediating, or, in other words, using Wasta between the citizen and the state is becoming their main task. 8 It is important to note that this view of elections contrasts, to some extent, with the conventional wisdom that elections in authoritarian regimes add legitimacy to the regime, thereby promoting stability. Indeed, the logic underlying such arguments is not convincing. It suggests that individuals are somehow led to believe often for long periods at a time that their elections and parliaments give them greater input into decision-making than they do. Alternatively, the logic suggests that the electoral institutions cannot help to provide stability over the long run, as the added boost of legitimacy wears away. Abandoning a notion that elections provide legitimacy allows us both to understand the politics of these elections and to shed sometimes unwarranted anticipation that elections herald democratization. Voting for Wasta That elections are primarily an arena of patronage distribution has a significant impact on voting behavior. Most obviously, voters tend to cast their ballots for candidates whom they think will afford them wasta, not for reasons of ideology or policy preferences. They are also more likely to turn out the polls when they believe that their candidates are close enough to the government to deliver state resources. 8 Kilani and Sakijha (2002): 58. 7

8 Casting ballots. Jordanian voters seek representatives who will be willing and able to help them obtain patronage, rather than representatives who necessarily reflect their political views. When given the opportunity to do both, as we shall discuss shortly, they may be willing to cast ballots based on ideology. Yet, the foremost priority in voting is not policymaking, but gaining access to the state. Voters thus often seek candidates who have contacts with or can remain in good graces with the state. One voter who had approached his deputy seeking wasta explained: I came to seek a job from the deputy of our district. He told us that the government does not listen to them these days.. I wonder why the deputies oppose the government. They should comply with and obey the government s policies so that we can take our rights, because it is up to the government to pass anything. Frankly speaking, I will not elect anyone unless the government approves of him because we want to survive. 9 Another woman echoed these sentiments, saying that members of her tribe had decided not to elect their current candidate again, even though he was from their tribe. He had made waves in parliament and failed to distribute the discretionary funds he received to members of his district. In the next election, they would support someone else, even if he was of a different tribe. 10 The concern with voting for tribal members reflects a more general interest: voters not only want parliamentarians who can deliver, but they want representatives who will be willing to funnel these resources to them, personally. Indeed, the Jordanian democracy poll in 2003 found that more than one-third of voters voted for their candidate 9 Ayman Khaled in al-arab al-yawm, April 13, 2000 cited in Kilani and Sakijha (2002): Interview A with Author, Amman, Jordan, February

9 because he or she was a member of their tribe or family, and almost half (49%) voted for a candidate with whom they had close personal ties. 11 In contrast, voters do not vote for parties. Indeed, in the absence of significant policy-making power in parliaments, parties remain relatively unknown. Indeed, public opinion polls have consistently demonstrated that Jordanians pay little attention to the political parties. Only 1.3% were or planned to be a member of a political party. Over 88% were not, and 9.43% did not understand the question. 12 Not surprisingly, most voters do not cast their votes based upon party affiliation. Asked if membership in the IAF or any other party was a consideration in choosing their candidate, only 13.38% of Jordanians chose to vote because the candidate was in the IAF and 6.27% voted for their candidate because he/she was a member of another political party. 13 Not surprisingly, independent candidates win the majority of seats. In 1993 and 2003, candidates running on party labels won only and 33 seats (or 38.75% and 30% of the seats), respectively. In 1997, opposition parties including the Islamic Action Front boycotted elections, and party members share of the seats dropped to 6.25%. (See Table 1.) Table 1: Party Member Candidates and Winners, 1997 and Party Number of Candidates Number of Winners Number of Candidates Number of Winners Islamic Action Front National Constitutional Party Jordanian Leftist Party Islamic Central Party Popular Committee Movement Party CSS, University of Jordan, Democracy poll CSS, 2004 survey, q CSS, Jordanian Democracy Polls, Hourani (1994). 9

10 Welfare Party Communist Labor Party Arab Land Party Jordanian Arabic (Ba ath) 2 1 Socialist Party Arab Party Democratic National Movement Total Sources: Hani Hourani et al, Who s Who in the Jordanian Parliament: Amman, Jordan: Sindbad Publishing, June 2004): 201; Hani Hourani et al, Who s Who in the Jordanian Parliament: (Amman, Jordan: Al-Urdunn Al-Jadid Research Center, 1998): 215. This, in turn, affects the public s perception of political parties. Parties are seen as largely unsuccessful: unable to effectively field candidates or influence government, and instead as fragmented, personalistic cliques. Indeed, as seen in Table 2, less than onefifth of Jordanians believed their parties had been somewhat or very successful from 1992 (when Jordanian parties were legalized) until Table 2. To what degree do you think that the parties have been successful until now? Percentage To a great degree 1.66 Somewhat A little Not successful Not at all successful Don t know CSS, 2004 Jordanian Democracy polls, question 301. The contest for wasta and state resources also affects Jordanians attitudes toward their Members of Parliament. It is somewhat ironic that voters, who elect candidates based largely on their belief that the candidates can provide for them, then complain that parliamentarians are primarily interested in their own personal and family interests. Yet the perception and the complaints are widespread. As Table 3 demonstrates, in 2004 only 18% of Jordanians believed that the MPs were primarily interested in the concerns of society and the nation. Table 3. In your opinion, are MPs more interested in their own personal interests and those of their families, or in the interests of society and the nation? 10

11 Reason % Personal interests and family Societal and national interests Don t Know Refuse to Answer 0.43 Both 1.37 Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, Public Opinion Poll on Democracy in Jordan, 2004, question 412. Voter Turnout. Voting for Wasta also affects voter turnout: individuals who believe that their candidates are not well connected to deliver wasta will choose to not go to the polls. This is shown in Table 4. Once again, the percentage of candidates of Palestinian origin is used as a proxy for the district s demographics. Where more candidates are of Palestinian origin and thus less likely to be closely connected to the government, the voter turnout is low. Voters, believing that their candidates can deliver neither wasta nor policies, prefer to stay home. Table 4. Voter Turnout, 1997 and Electoral District Percentage of Palestinian Candidates Voter Turnout (Registered) Voter Turnout 2003 (Registered) Amman 2 nd Amman 1 st Zarqa Amman 4 th Amman 3 rd Aqaba Amman 5 th Balqa Irbid Jerash Ramtha and Bani Kinana Karak Qurrah and North Ghor Tafileh Ajloun Amman th /Madaba Central Badia S. Badia N. Badia

12 Ma an Amman 7 th Mafraq Sources: Who s Who in the Jordanian Parliament, , p. 207; Who s Who 2003: 196. Entering the Fray: Candidate Behavior in Authoritarian Elections The nature of elections in authoritarian regimes also affects candidates behavior. Most notably, candidates are not compelled to work with political parties. They do not seek the easy identification with political positions that such party labels invoke, given that voters seek access based on personal ties, not candidates with like-minded policy positions. Consequently, parties that exist tend to remain weak and are often personalistic. Candidates, as well as the voters, dismiss the utility, with the only exception among Jordanian parties being the Islamic Action Front. Indeed, some candidates and campaign organizers interviewed in Jordan have argued that candidates avoid running on party labels, even when they are members. Party candidacy is a liability. Weak political parties tend to make coordination among potential candidates difficult. This problem has been solved, to some extent, through tribal and family primaries. Yet, this has only provided a partial solution, and entry rates remain high. As shown in Table 5, an average of 7-8 candidates have contested each seat in all elections since Importantly, the rate remained high (and the parties remained weak) despite changes in electoral laws: the 1993 electoral law that created a more majoritarian system and the 2003 law which expanded the number of seats. Table 5. Candidate Entry in Jordanian Elections No. of Candidates No. of Candidates/Seat Source: Who s Who in the Jordanian Parliament, :198; 12

13 The cumulative result of weak parties, little coordination over entrance and patronage-based voting is that there is high turnover in parliament. For example, only 19 of the 110 members elected in 2003 returned from the 1997 parliament. 15 Similarly, only 20 of the deputies who won in 1997 elections were returning from the 1993 parliament. In short, there is little continuity across the parliaments. Structuring the Competition. Incumbents use institutions to manage the competition. Through districting and electoral laws, they grant greater access to parliament to those from the traditional bases of support for the regime. These measures were particularly evident in Jordan, through the 1993 and 2003 electoral laws. Gerrymandering. Districting in Jordan has clearly shifted political weight away from Jordanians of Palestinian origin and towards those of Transjordanian origin. This is evident in Table 6. Districts with more Jordanians of Palestinian origin, proxied by the percentage of candidates from Palestinian origin since census data is not available, are more likely to be underrepresented than districts with Transjordanian populations. The most extreme case is in Amman s second district, which had almost seven seats fewer in 1997 than it would have had if all Jordanians were represented equally. 15 Hani Hourani, Who s Who: 204. This is 23.75% of 1997 deputies, and 17.27% of 2003 deputies. 13

14 Table 6. Discrepancy between Seat Distribution and Proportional Representation, 1997 Constituency Population Percentage Seats Seats under Difference of Candidates from Palestinian Origin (1997) Allocated Proportional Representation Amman 2 nd 517, Amman 1 st 318, Zarqa 643, Amman 4 th 197, Amman 3 rd 160, Aqaba 68, Amman 5 th 361, Balqa 283, Irbid 464, Jerash 124, Ramtha and Bani 143, Kinana Karak 165, Qurrah and North 146, Ghor Tafileh 54, Ajloun 95, Madaba 104, Central Badia 44, S. Badia 49, N. Badia 62, Ma an 58, Mafraq 97, TOTAL 4,164, Source: Against All Odds, Table 6, p ; al-jadwal Raqam 4: Tawzi a al-murashahin al-urdunniyyin min Asal Filistin hasab al-dawa ir al-intikhabiyya, 1997 [Table 4: Distribution of Jordanian Candidates of Palestinian Background according to Electoral District, 1997], Dirasat fi al-intikhabat al-niyabiyah al-urdunniyah 1997, p. 24. A new electoral law in 2003 did not rectify the problem of under-representation, despite long-standing complaints by the opposition. As Table 7 shows, 30 new seats were added to the parliament, of which almost 16% went to Amman. Zarqa, which was also heavily underrepresented, also obtained new seats. The total increases, however, did not outweigh the previous deficits Amman gained 5 seats, but it had been under- 14

15 represented by 10 seats in the previous, smaller parliament; Zarqa gained 4 seats, but it had also been 6.4 seats short of equal representation in the 80-seat parliament of Table 7. Seat Gains in 2003 Electoral Law Governorate Difference from Proportionality, 1985 Law 2003 Law 1997 No. of No. No. of No. (No. of Seats) Districts of Districts of Seats Seats Increase in No. of Seats % of Seat Increase Granted to Governorate Amman Central Badia Zarqa Balqa Madaba Mafraq Northern Badia Irbid Ajloun Jerash Karak Tafila Ma an Southern Badia Aqaba TOTAL Additional Seats for Women Overall Total Source: Hani Hourani et al, Who s Who in the Jordanian Parliament, : p. 35. By gerrymandering, the government pushed seats, and the opportunity to gain access to state resources, toward traditional bases of support for the regime. Those districts in which the majority of the candidates (and the population) were of Transjordanian origin were granted more seats than districts of predominantly Palestinian origin, despite the fact that they contained the minority of the population. Electoral Rules. The government also uses electoral rules to shape outcomes. In Jordan, the electoral law been a consistent subject of debate and revision. Each time, the 15

16 election law was written by counsels outside of the parliament and when the parliament was not in session. Each time, as well, it has met with serious opposition. The focus of opposition has been the one-person, one-vote clause in the electoral law, put in place after The major change in the rule was to reduce the number of votes per person from the number of seats in the district to a single vote. Opposition forces, and particularly Islamists, have objected to a conservative bias in the law. In response, in 1997 they boycotted elections, returning the most conservative parliament to the Lower House. Although the law was revised before both the 1997 and 2003 elections, it has maintained this controversial clause. The impact of this law demonstrate important differences between elections over patronage distribution and those over policy-making. The conventional wisdom over such a change in established democracies, where policy outcomes are at stake, is that it should act to reduce the number of political parties. The more majoritarian the law, the more political tendencies coalesce. Smaller parties are eliminated, and a few stronger parties remain. Yet, the opposite effects are realized when patronage, not policymaking, is at stake. When granted multiple votes, individuals often cast some votes for candidates they expected could supply them with resources and other votes for those representing their ideologies. When restricted to one vote, however, they cast their ballot for their personal interests. The result was fragmentation. Political parties, and particularly the Islamic Action Front, were hurt by the change. The IAF dropped from being the single largest bloc, with more than 25% of the seats,in the 1989 elections to a minor force after At the same time, independents with traditional bases of support gained representation. 16

17 The electoral rules in authoritarian elections over patronage acted to further weaken political parties. Parliamentarians increasingly tended to be more interested in obtaining and distributing patronage than in policymaking and democracy. Debates over Reform. Debates over reform should be seen within this context. They are not insignificant: the palace s own promises of liberalization and talk of democratization opens the way for a continued dialogue and debate over how far Jordan is (or isn t) proceeding on the path of democracy. It sets democracy as an ideal to be obtained, a standard against which they can measure. Yet, there is a large set of political actors, increasingly become invested in using parliament as an arena of patronage distribution, for whom democracy and policymaking is not a priority. Indeed, for many of them a move away from patronage functions and toward policymaking roles could only serve to weaken their influence. The most recent debates over electoral reform in Jordan illustrate this well. On one side are the political parties, which have vocally opposed the electoral law since it was changed in Indeed, it is the ability to do so though conferences, books, speeches and editorials that is the change in liberalization. These parties are led by the IAF, who has clearly lost the most in the changed law. (Other parties are a bit more ambivalent. They dislike the law, but also some have appreciated the extent to which it minimizes the IAF s influence.) On the other side, somewhat less vocal, have been those who have benefited from this change. For the first time, mostly opposition parties have come together with the encouragement of the Prime Minister to draft an electoral law. The law is important for two reasons: first, the parties demonstrate a clear understanding that the ability of the 17

18 parties to become stronger is closely tied to both electoral and party laws. Thus, the committees have drafted both laws and vetted them at conferences. At the same time, a debate over the debates over reform has emerged, in which politicians outside of the parties are calling for the widening of the debate. That is, the inclusion of those not interested in strengthening the parties over the question of revisions. Some argue that the patronage-based nature of parliament is driving this debate, as well as a discussion by the palace over decentralization. Put simply, the parliament has become increasingly demanding and expensive putting a strain on the government itself. The cost of a conciliatory parliament, more interested in providing wasta and obtaining resources than making policy or pushing for democratization, is rising. In the attempt to reduce these demands, the government is opening the door for much weakened political parties (who are not only fragmented but have little public support) to debate openly the need to strengthen parliament. Toward Democracy? It should be clear that even open and relatively fair elections and parliamentary debates need not be a conduit for democracy. The limited space for policymaking in authoritarian regimes means that elections are more frequently contests over access to state resources than debates over policy. Voters recognize this, casting their ballots for those who can best deliver. Parliamentarians know this as well, seeking to meet constituents needs rather than to shake their relations with government. The result of such a situation is that parties are neutered, voters become cynical, and demands for democratization (as well as support for the forces intending to push for it) can drop. In this situation, the mere presence of elections need not bode well for democracy. This was once made clear in the mid-1990s and must be remembered today (despite 18

19 discussions of democratization, particularly in the Arab world.) This is not entirely surprising, given the evidence that electoral institutions in authoritarian regimes can help to stabilize these regimes. Yet, other events have suggested that elections may sometimes escalate tensions, create space, and bring an added push for democracy. This may be the case when the need for patronage and wasta declines, particularly with the development of a private sector. Not surprisingly, then, we understand the long-recognized relationship between capitalism and democracy. It may also be the case when state resources decline, making parliament an ineffective mechanism for wasta and patronage, even though alternative means do not exist. This is consistent with the relationship between economic crises and democratization. Ironically, it is unlikely to be brought about simply through institutional rules intended to strengthen parties either through electoral laws or political parties laws. Until parliament is a mechanism for policymaking, not for patronage distribution, parties will remain weak and democracy thwarted. 19

20 Appendix Table A. Social Issues in the Electoral Platforms of Candidates, 1997 Winning Candidates Losing Candidates # % # % 1. Strengthening democratic life in Jordan Strengthening the basis of social equality and justice 3. Guaranteeing equal opportunity for citizens Protecting human rights Paying attention to family as a social institution Attention to Youth Development of social organizations Concerns of special interests in society Improve health services Distribution of health insurance to all citizens Education Culture, arts and literature Media Environmental protection Reduce unemployment Fighting Poverty Fighting corruption (including Wasta) Widening basis of social security Adherence to Islam Judicial independence and (uncorrupt) Housing Freedom of the press Building civil society Support professional associations and unions Palestinian camps Helping returnees from Gulf War Revise press and publication law Source: Helmi Sari, Tahlil Mahtawi al-baramij al-intikhabiyyah li-marashahi al-intikhabat li aam 1997 fil-urdunn, in Hani Hourani, et al, Dirasat fi al-intikhabat al-niyabiyyah al- Urdunniyyah 1997 (Amman, Jordan; Sindbad Publishing House, 2002): Table 2, p

21 Table B. Political Issues in Electoral Platforms of Candidates, 1997 Winning Candidates Losing Candidates # % # % 1. Strengthening national unity Expanding basis of popular participation in political life Respecting public freedoms Activating parliament s role Establishing basis of political and party pluralism Reconsidering election law Improving Jordan s relationships with the Islamic and Arab world 8. Support Iraqi people and work to lift sanctions Support Palestinians in their struggle for their plan and establishing an independent state 10. Protecting Jerusalem Making decisions in accordance with international law Support Palestinians Support just peace support Oslo agreements oppose Oslo Agreements Normalization with Israel work to end Israeli settlements in West Bank Development and modernize Jordanian army Respect other opinions freedom of expression Source: Helmi Sari, Tahlil Mahtawi al-baramij al-intikhabiyyah li-marashahi al-intikhabat li aam 1997 fil-urdunn, in Hani Hourani, et al, Dirasat fi al-intikhabat al-niyabiyyah al- Urdunniyyah 1997 (Amman, Jordan; Sindbad Publishing House, 2002): Table 4, p. 74. Table C. Women s Issues in Electoral Platforms of Candidates, 1997 Winning Candidates Losing Candidates # % # % 1, Raise position of women Equality between men and women Opportunities for women employments Revise personal status laws regarding women Respect women s rights Women s participation in projects for resources and Women s participation in decision-making Improvements for children Raise women s awareness of their rights, and political and social responsibilities Source: Helmi Sari, Tahlil Mahtawi al-baramij al-intikhabiyyah li-marashahi al-intikhabat li aam 1997 fil-urdunn, in Hani Hourani, et al, Dirasat fi al-intikhabat al-niyabiyyah al- Urdunniyyah 1997 (Amman, Jordan; Sindbad Publishing House, 2002):

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