Violent Phase of Sikh Assertions and State Response (Operation Blue Star and The Aftermath: )

Transcription

1 Chapter- 5 Violent Phase of Sikh Assertions and State Response (Operation Blue Star and The Aftermath: ) A dominant identity seeking subjugation, assimilation or submergence of other identities and self assertion of a non-dominant identity, seeking a share in the state power, controlled by the former is inherently imbued with the risk (and potential) of violence (Behra, 2000:29). In such a volatile situation, in the event of state power becoming increasingly ineffective to contain ethnicity politicaly, violence esclates (Phadnis and Ganguly, 2001:371). Such an esclation at many a times especially in South Asian states have witnessed an increasing use of sophisticated military hardware both by the state apparatus as well as by the ethnic insurgents, sidetracking the moderate leadership of the community (Phadnis and Ganguly, 2001:371). As long as neither side gives in, the inbuilt potential of violence endures. Much of this violence consists of the use of visible physical force. Violence by state and minority groups mutually reinforces each other in an extraordinary way. When the state unleashes its coersive power to suppress a political movement the entire community bears the brunt of state violence (Behra, 2000: 26). This strengthens the psychological bonds of the community and also vindicates its own use of violence against the state. Likewise an identities indiscriminate use of violence; particularly terrorism against the state as well as the general public, legitimizes the government s rationale to suppress the uprisings by force (Behra, 2000: 26). While violence comes into play it narrows down the space for political accommodation between the two. It makes an identity more exclusive which in turn makes the tone of its demands more strident and a political compromise becomes increasingly difficult. The state on the other hand loses political legitimacy by excessive reliance on coersive means (Behra, 2000: 27). Anthony D. Smith has accorded central role to the problem of legitimacy arising out of the institution of the scientific state. He argues that the displacement of the religiously sanctioned dynastic state by the scientific state lead to a moral crisis (Smith, 1981:78). Here Ishtiaq Ahmed argues that the conflicts at different scales taking place within a state need not be interpreted necessarily as destabilizing anti-national forces bent upon 199

2 destroying the country. On the contrary these should be considered as constituting the very stuff out of which a nation- state will get galvanized (Ahmed, 1995:28). In this chapter it has been analysed that how the state on its part had pursued a policy of resistance and confrontation in countering the violent Sikh assertions. Were the repressive and coercive tactics of state bureaucracy and para-military apparatus were responsible for suppression of movement or loss of people s support resulted in its decline? In what way the state was able to contain the movement in a short span of two or three years, which was hanging on for past so many years. It has been failure on the part of state institutions to contain and solve such issues which later had gone out of control. In order to cover-up its misadventures and incapacity the state had often responded in violent manner to reinforce its legitimacy. The state had responded by suppression through its ruthless state machinery: bureaucratic and military setup, law enforcing agencies, special forces and new laws, rules and regulations to cope with the situations. Inapt handling of these ethnic assertions by the state had kept the grievances festering and at the same time it had given a chance to foreign interests in fuming up of these ethnic assertions. Either external support has come by supporting their demands as legitimate ones or clandestine help through smuggling of weapons, money and even mercenaries. At the international level, human rights groups had often questioned the working of state authority countering these ethno-national upsurges as common masses are on target on both sides. Operation Blue Star: Its Repercussions In a late night address to the nation on June 2, 1984 over the electronic media, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi dwell at great length on the grim situation prevailing in Punjab. She held the Akali leaders responsible for the failure of long series of talks with the government. Already on June 2, 1984 the army was called in Punjab and was given the task of checking and controlling the Sikh militancy and ethnic violence. A thirty six hours curfew was imposed all over Punjab (Kumar, Suneel, 2007: 171). Publications and transmission of material which might had the adverse effect on ethnic passions was prohibited under the Punjab Press Special Power Act (Rai, 1986: 330). On June 3, 1984 the Indian army launched Operation Blue Star against the Sikh militants holding in the Golden Temple complex and thirty eight other gurudwaras throughout the state. 200

3 Troops equipped with tanks and heavy armour took up strategic positions around the Golden Temple. A large number of pilgrims had gathered on that day to pay obeisance and participate in the special program to mark the anniversary of martyrdom of Guru Arjan Dev. According to one estimate there were ten thousand pilgrims including a large jatha of thirteen hundred volunteers who had come to court arrest regarding Dharmyudh Morcha (Singh, Khuswant, 1991:336). In the first phase of Operation Blue Star the Akali leaders inside the Golden Temple were flushed out and detained. The impending military action in the bastion of Sikhism prompted the agitated Sikh peasantry. It converged upon Amritsar in large numbers. Army tanks blocked the movement of about 30,000 Sikhs near Amritsar and many were killed in the action (Singh and Nayar, 1984: 100). As such the government feared the outbreak of a Sikh uprising and decided to launch a full scale attack on Darbar Sahib. The army took control of the Golden Temple on June 6. A large number of innocent pilgrims including women and children, officially described as the enemy, were killed in the heavy gun-fire. The troops shot scores of young Sikh men with their hands tied back at point-blank range (Waraich, 2010:19-21). Government s White Paper on Punjab Agitation puts the figure at five hundred and fifty four civilians/militants killed and one hundred and twenty one injured in the Golden Temple area and other religious places. On the army side a total of four officers, four JCOs and eighty four other ranks died while fifteen officers, nineteen JCOs and two hundred and fifty three other ranks sustained injuries in the course of entire operation in the state (White Paper, Government of India: 1984). The exact figures are not avaliable as different soures give different amount of casualities. Most of the accounts put the number of civilian causalities around five thousand and seven hundred military personal were estimated to have lost their life duing the army action (Grewal, 1990:227). The bombs fired by the artillery and armour brought down the edifice of the Akal Takht ; the seat of Sikh temporal power. Bhindranwale got killed in the Operation Blue Star. The bodies of Bhindranwale, Shabegh Singh and Amrik Singh, ridden with bullets were found at the basement of the Akal Takht. Officers of the Indian army had commented that Bhindranwale and his followers had fought with courage and commitment (Punjabi, 1991:23). Even Sikh Reference Library situated in the premises of Golden Temple was deliberately set on fire by the Indian army troops (Pettigrew, 1995: 35) 201

4 The entire Sikh community was enraged not so much on the death of Bhindranwale but on the all out assault on the Golden Temple by the Indian army. On hearing of the army action Sikh troops deserted their regiments in several parts of the country and many Sikh soldiers tried to march towards Amritsar to defend their place of faith. They were intercepted by the authorities and scores of them were killed and large number of them were court martialed later. The actions of the central government gave credence to wide spread belief that Operation Blue Star was a deliberate attempt to humiliate the Sikhs. It was alleged that the Congress party had itself brought Bhindranwale to prominence and that the government could have chosen some other way to arrest Bhindranwale and his followers. The army action widened the gulf between the Hindus who had welcomed it, and the Sikhs who condemned it and gave the Khalistan movement its first martyr in Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale (Singh, Khuswant, 1991:378). It provoked a wave of deep anguish and resentment among the Sikhs. It constituted a watershed in Sikh history and it hurt deep the Sikh psyche. It also affected the other minorities who felt that if this can be done to Sikhs they could be the next targets (Singh, Sangat 2005: 409). In reaction to armed action prominent Sikh personalities like Khuswant Singh a renowned Sikh scholar and other Sikhs renounced their Padama Bhushan, Padama Shree and other prestigious awards given to them by the Indian state. The Congress Sikh parliamentarians like Amarinder Singh and Davinder Singh Garcha resigned from Lok Sabha (Singh, and Nayar, 1984: 109). Simranjeet Singh Mann resigned from Indian Police Service. Bhindranwale and his followers killed in Operation Blue Star had earned the status of martyr s by the Sikh masses and Sikhs relied that they died for the cause of Sikhism protecting the Golden Temple from the invasion of Indian Army. After the attack on the Golden temple between June and September, 1984 Operation Woodrose was conducted by the government. It was an attempt to prevent outbreak of widespread public protest in the province. It was a mopping up operation in the rural areas to capture the absconders. Through this operation whole villages were searched and combed to flush out the militants. Operation Woodrose completely alienated the Sikhs from the government and the security forces. Major Akali leaders were detained and ban was imposed on All India Sikh Student Federation. The army combed the whole countryside and thousands of Sikhs especially the young ones were 202

5 detained for interrogation and many were tortured and killed. The harassment of Sikh youth and fear of being killed made them to go underground. It was during this period that a substantial number of rural Sikh youths crossed over to neighboring Pakistan (Singh, Gopal, 1994:105). As a matter of fact this operation proved more instrumental in making more militants than capturing and containing them (Singh, Birinderpal, 2002: 136). With the Sikh anguish simmering, on October 31, 1984 Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her two Sikh bodyguards (Satwant Singh and Beant Singh). When her assassination was made public a segment of Hindu population led by some of the leaders of ruling party rioted against the Sikhs all over India (Kumar, Suneel: 173). Rajiv Gandhi when came out of AIIMS, after seeing the dead body of his mother was greeted with slogan khoon ka badla khoon (blood for blood) (Sharma, 1987:117). As such after Indira Gandhi s assassination, anti-sikh riots broke out in various parts of the country. Sikhs were singled out, lynched and burnt alive. Delhi was worst affected and Sikhs became the target of brutality of mob violence. Of the ten thousand Sikhs massacred in the pogrom, some six thousand to eight thousand Sikhs including thirty officers in uniform were killed in Delhi alone (Tambiah, 1996:109). Sikh property worth rupees three hundred crore was looted and burnt and in Delhi over fifty thousand Sikhs were rendered refugees (Singh, Khuswant, 1991:385). The police and other state agencies stood as mute spectators and even connived with the violent mobs against the Sikhs. The actions of the government helped in compounding alienation felt by the Sikhs and gave ample credence to the wide spread belief of an official conspiracy against the Sikhs (Deol, 2000: 109). Reference has been made of one hundred and nineteen incidents of violence, incendiarism, and killing of the Sikhs, including damage to thirteen Gurudwaras on October 31, 1984 before Justice Ranganath Mishra Commission (Report of Justice Ranganath Mishra Commission of Inquiry, Vol-1 p-11). This commission was constituted to enquire into the Delhi carnage of the Sikhs in Delhi, some ministers of Congress party themselves led the mob to massacre the Sikhs. Several meetings were held all over Delhi in the late hours of October 31, 1984, to give final touches to the plan with meticulous care with an eye over every minute detail that nothing was left out to successfully exterminate the Sikhs (Rao, 1985: X). Indira Gandhi was depicted as a martyr in the cause of Indian unity. The attitude of the leaders at the centre to the 203

6 Sikh carnage can be judged when in November, 1984 while addressing a rally Rajiv Gandhi said that when a big banyan tree falls, the earth below shakes, relating it to the carnage of Sikhs in India, after the assassination of Indira Gandhi (Singh, Patwant, 2004:193). The Congress (I) in its election campaign, sought to convert the anti-sikh pogrom into votes in Lok Sabha elections scheduled in December, One of the main themes of the campaign was the threat posed to the Indian unity by the Sikhs. Due to this electoral manipulation Rajiv Gandhi was able to win 401 out of 508 seats; the largest ever number of seats in the Lok Sabha by a party since independence (Singh, Khushwant, 1992: 101). H.K.L. Bhagat, who was accused of arousing the mob against the Sikhs and in whose constituency major destruction of life and property of the Sikhs was done, won the seat with very high margin of over five lakh votes (Sangat, 2005:403). The Sikhs felt that the majority community had given its verdict in support of brutal genocide of innocent Sikhs. Taking stock of the situation, Rajiv Gandhi as Prime Minister of India tried on the process of conflict management. In a nationwide broadcast he said that he gave top most priority to the settlement of Punjab problem (The Hindustan Times, January 6, 1985). On the other hand by Basant Panchmi in early February, 1985 which signified a change in season, the rising Sikh anger was reflected in the spread of Kesari (saffron) coloured turbans signifying the spirit of sacrifice at public meetings and functions all over Punjab (Ajit, February 6-9, 1985). It was more glaring at the hola-mohalla celebrations at Anandpur Sahib. Songs were sung eulogizing Bhindranwale, Beant Singh and Satwant Singh for their sacrifices. Through audio cassettes the strength of a war cry by committed ones was projected. Meanwhile ragis (minstrels) and Kaveeshars (ballad singers) went going around the villages praising Sant Bhindranwale, Beant Singh and Satwant Singh for their heroic deeds. They drew great response and gathering from the Sikhs. The government had honoured the army men for there role in Operation Blue Star. In response the radical Sikhs honoured the family members of Beant Singh and Satwant Singh. Even at the Kirtan Darbar broadcast from Jalandhar Radio Station the slogans Bhindranwale Amar Rahe and Khalistan Zindabad came through clearly (on March 22-23, 1985 as cited in Singh, Sangat, 2005: 405). This tradition of martyrdom and self-sacrifice made the militant ideology attractive to the Sikh youth. Due to prevailing situation the dividing line between the extremists and non-extremists got thinner. With the 204

7 hardening of attitudes Akali Dal and SGPC issued an ultimatum to the government, to institute a judicial enquiry into the anti-sikh carnage in November, 1984, and release their leaders by Baisakhi day i.e. April 13, 1985 or face an agitation named Genocide Week (Jaijee, 1999: 174). As a result of Sikh assertions the union government announced its willingness to institute a judicial enquiry into November, 1984, killings in Delhi. Justice Ranganath Mishra a sitting judge of Supreme Court was named to head the enquiry. The government lifted the ban on All India Sikh Student Federation (AISSF) and also agreed to review the cases of Sikh detainees. Rajiv Gandhi realizing the situation resorted to selective release of the Sikh leaders. As part of the policy, Arjun Singh was appointed as Governor of Punjab. He acted as a main advisor to Rajiv Gandhi on Punjab situation. Censorship on the press was relaxed and army control in certain districts was withdrawn. On his first visit to Punjab in March, 1985 Rajiv gave a sop to Punjab, announcing his decision to set up a Rail Coach Factory at Kapurthala to meet the employment and developmental needs of the province (Punjab Kesari, March 24, 1985). Rajiv- Longowal Accord: Its Implications Against the backdrop of Indira Gandhi s assassination, the election of Rajiv Gandhi as Congress (I) leader and his landmark victory in the 1984 elections, the Rajiv- Longowal Accord appeared a landmark development and centre s new departure in its Punjab policy. The demands that fuelled the Sikh agitation before 1984 and which were held to be non- negotiable by former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi were now recognized. For moderates (Akali Dal (L)) it provided a return to democratic politics. At the same time state terrorism was growing side by side with the growth of Sikh militancy. Some members of the ruling party at the centre, and police/intelligence setups had developed a vested interest in proliferation of acts of terrorism conveniently attributed to the Sikh militants (Singh, Sangat, 1985: 408). The police took to the methods of killing the Sikh youth in police encounters or during interrogation. There was sharp increase and rise in the cases of mysterious deaths of Sikh youth in police custody. Punjab had become a police state in real terms. The army, the para- military forces, and the Punjab police had converted an otherwise curable disease into a cancer (Gaur, 1985:32). The Sikhs celebrated the 205

8 Ghallughara (holocaust) week from June 1-7, 1985, marking the first anniversary of the Operation Blue Star. Various Ragis and Dhadis sang folksy songs, recalling the valiant fight put up by Bhindranwale and others. It tried to arouse the Khalsa martial spirit to unite and defend the faith, which was under attack (Thukral, 1985:41). Side by side, behind the growth of state terrorism and Sikh militancy, there was a series of secret meetings between Sant Harchand Singh Longowal and Arjun Singh. Arjun Singh the Governor of Punjab had a series of consecutive meetings with Akali leaders. These steps were precursors of the Rajiv and Longowal meeting and the two signed the memorandum of settlement. It came to be called as Rajiv- Longowal Accord or Punjab Accord of 1985 (The Indian Express, July 24-25, 1985). It made provisions for rehabilitation of the army deserters, enactment of All India Gurudwara Act, withdrawal of Armed Forces Special Powers Act, transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab by January 26, 1986, and the time bound adjudication of territorial and river water claims (Singh, Gopal (ed.), 1994:217). For executing the provisions of the accord the Union Home Ministry formed Mathew Commission under former Supreme Court judge K.K. Mathew. The commission was to determine the transfer of areas in the terms of references of the accord. In the meantime Harchand Singh Longowal was assassinated. Surjeet Singh Barnala emerged as Longowal s successor as acting President of Akali Dal. To find a solution through the ballot box, the centre made announcement of elections in Punjab. It was for the first time since independence that in the Assembly elections held in September, 1985 Akali Dal gained an absolute majority. It took seventy three out of a total of one hundred and seventeen seats (Singh, Khushwant, 1992: 145). Moderates Akalis were successful in securing more Hindu votes in this election than in the past. They were successful in projecting themselves as a regional, than a religious party (Dhami, 1985:292). The militants move to boycott the elections met half hearted response. Surjit Singh Barnala, as the leader of Akali Party took oath as the Chief Minister of Punjab. After coming to power the main issues that confronted Barnala government were; firstly, the release of Sikh army personal and their rehabilitation; the release of the youth and the innocent persons including women and children held in Jodhpur after the Operation Blue Star ; stoppage of false encounters and killing of the Sikh youth by the police and security forces and finally the settlement of Punjab 206

9 problem, or implementation of Rajiv-Longowal Accord in its true spirit, to the satisfaction of the people (Purewal, 2000:189). For it, Barnala was in a need of goodwill of the Central Government which was a party to the accord. But during his tenure, Barnala was seen wanting and he was not having a free hand to do his job. He set up a committee headed by Justice Ajit Singh Bains a retired judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court to enquire into the arrests made in the state during the past four years (The Tribune, October 2, 1985). The police during enquiry admitted that it had implicated innocent people to escape pressure from higher ups. It resulted in disclosing of many false encounters (Singh, Sangat, 2005:415). The committee recommended release of over two thousands detainees, including one hundred and fifty Hindu Suraksha Samiti workers. The committee was able to look into eighty percent of cases and found that ninety percent of police encounters were bogus (Singh, Tavleen, 1985: 130). Rajiv Gandhi charged the Barnala government of indiscriminate release of detainees (Kaur, 1992:138). Against it, Barnala set up a police committee to screen the recommendations of Bains committee itself. This led to a dispute between justice Bains and the state police, which was accused by him of indulging in state terrorism (Dhillon, 2006: 415). Barnala government s pusillanimity in not accepting the recommendations of its own committee further alienated the Sikh Youth (Thukral, 1986: 43). Mathew Commission also averred in giving any decision; reason being he was unable to recommended any area in Abohar and Fazilka to Haryana in lieu of Chandigarh. Result being whole process of Rajiv- Longowal Accord got subverted. On January 26, 1986 the transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab also got aborted. Barnala as Chief Minister of Punjab was in a miserable position. Two other commissions were also formed to transfer Chandigarh to Punjab. But they were unable to give any solid recommendations. The Punjab cabinet expressed a deep sense of anguish to find that commissions had made unwarranted recommendations. The Mathew Commission inspite of two extensions of tenure was not able to complete the task of identifying villages that were to be given to Haryana in lieu of Chandigarh. Reason being if Rajiv Gandhi had given Chandigarh to Punjab he would lose the Hindu vote in the scheduled Haryana elections in the same year (Singh, Khuswant, 2006: 305.). Barnala s experience with the Eradi Commission on river waters was no different. The commission was to give its report in six months on Ravi-Beas 207

10 waters. But to constitute the Commission itself it took six months (Mitra, The Times of India, May 27, 1987). Eradi commission also hoodwinked the Rajiv-Longowal Accord. As a course of Rajiv-Longowal Accord, Mishra Commission in April, 1985 was extended to enquire into the organized violence in Delhi, while also covering Kanpur and Bokaro and Chas tehsil in Bihar. Mishra placed the major part of responsibility for the riots on the police, besides anti-social elements and Congress (I) workers (Report of Justice Ranganath Mishra Commission of Inquiry, Vol I, p. 65). After a great deal of struggle, various Congress (I) leaders, including the then MP s, police officers, and other individuals were identified for their acts of omission and commission. But because of various pulls and pressures, with the involvement of judiciary, nothing much practical was achieved. Cry for justice remains unheard even now. One of the accussed Jagdish Tyteler has been acquited recently (The Tribune, May 4, 2010). In retrospect, the accord far from making a new departure in Punjab politics was a continuity of the centre s policy from independence itself of symbolic agreements accompanied by non implementation. It was formulated in a hurry by Rajiv Gandhi s advisors and the Akali Dal (L); party to the agreement was groomed by New Delhi along the familiar pattern of tactical concessions of political power at the state level (Gurharpal, 1996:412). Gurharpal while commenting on it says: This effort was a continuation of a process in which secular and Indian nationalist Sikh leaders have been regularly hailed by New Delhi only to be nailed when they had served their purpose. This role proved difficult for Akali Dal Longowal later on (Singh, Gurharpal, 1996:413). Overall a written Accord, signed in a most solemen ceremony was rendered useless. Not a single article was implemented in its true spirit. Barnala kept mum on the breach of trust. He accepted the Prime Ministers excuse that he had to take others along. Barnala also exposed himself to his critics as a puppet of the central government. The central government was obstructing the process of any healthy solution and was also trying to check Barnala s ability to handle the situation. As a result the extremists were gaining a upper hand. As the extremists took control of the Akal Takht, the central government got alarmed and decided to prepare itself for further action. The Akali government which came to power in September 1985, had 208

11 rapidly disintegrated as Rajiv s commitment to the accord waned and the Congress (I) government at the centre reverted to interference in the administration of Punjab for short term gains. During this time many Sikhs living in England, Canada and the United States were vocal in favour of Khalistan. The militant groups working in Punjab also openly made public their political objectives. The continuity was mainly provided by two important organizations; the AISSF and the other was Damdami Taksal. On the initiative of these organizations the meeting of Sarbat Khalsa was held in Golden Temple in January 26, A flag of Khalistan was hoisted and Akal Takht rebuild by the government was demolished (The Tribune, January 27, 1986). The moderate leaders also took a hardened stand and at the Sarbat Khalsa, held at Anandpur Sahib in February 26, 1986 Tohra announced his resignation and Badal warned against any move to send the police into the Golden Temple complex to arrest the extremists as it would inflame the Sikh opinion in Punjab (SGPC White Paper, 1996 also see The Tribune, Feburary 27, 1986). Barnala, who was under pressure from the centre, disagreed with them and asserted for police action. As a result there was spurt in incidents of violence in Punjab. Congress (I) leaders started harping on the growing violence in Punjab. Press also played its part. Even small incident of violence was splashed disproportionately in the newspapers and T.V. and other electronic media. The police sources, despite confessions about Pakistan s involvement in abetting the violent activities, blamed Damdami Taksal and the AISSF for the anti-national activities but was not having any concrete evidence against them. Damdami Taksal and AISSF in February-March, 1986 themselves had repeatedly condemned the killing of innocent persons. Now the question that came to the minds of simple folk was that apart from the hand of Pakistan, who was behind the violence in Punjab? It was being apprehended that even a central lobby which was against the present Akali government in Punjab could be backing the terrorists in this sinister move (Sunday, March 2, 1986: 50-52). Articulation in favour of Khalistan had become more pronounced after the death of Sant Bhindranwale. Many reasons like Operation Blue Star and anti-sikh riots in Delhi and other parts of India in the wake of assassination of Indira Gandhi were there. One of the main reasons was failure of Rajiv-Longowal Accord. The number of militant groups and number of young men who joined the violent 209

12 movement during seven years after the death of Bhindranwale appears to be far larger than their number during the seven years of Bhindranwale s own activity from 1977 to 1984 (Grewal, 2002; 74). After the assassination of Indira Gandhi, due to massacre of the Sikhs in Delhi and other parts of India, the Sikhs had started migrating in large numbers towards Punjab. The Congress (I) ruled states were more affected than others (Singh, Birinderpal, 2002:137). The phase from 1986 to 1992 was the most significant one; from the perpective of militant violence. The absconding militants gradually returned from across the border, well trained and fully armed. They also received aid from the Sikhs settled abroad; USA, Canada and England; who were also aspiring for a separate independent homeland especially after Operation Bluestar and massacre of the Sikhs in Delhi. This phase started with a bang. The five members Panthic Committee which led the violent struggle in the subsequent years was nominated in the Sarbat Khalsa held at Akal Takht on January 26, It adopted a gurmatta to adopt a strategy to tackle the problems faced by the whole Sikh world. It was a type of declaration for the liberation of Sikhs made on the republic day of India. Two important decisions were taken by it. One was that it rejected the Rajiv- Longowal Accord as it was no where near Anandpur Sahib Resolution. Secondly, it was decided to hand over the Kar Sewa of the Akal Takht to Damdami Taksal after the demolition of Akal Takht built by the government. The five members Panthic Committee constituted in the Sarbat Khalsa released a document for the declaration of Khalistan on April 29, 1986 at the Akal Takht. It was claimed to fulfill the most cherished dreams of the Sikhs. It was the realization of the statement of Bhindranwale that the foundation of Khalistan would be laid on the day army enters Harmandir Sahib. It was also announced that Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) under Hari Singh, would serve as the pivot of defence organization of Khalistan (Singh, Birinderpal, 2002:141). The militant violence picked up with the formal acceptance of Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) as an official militia for Khalistan. As militancy grew the militant groups also multiplied. New groups were raised while the older ones broke up into factions. Where as the centre increasingly viewed the Akali Dal administration in terms of containing militancy, the latter s capacity to do so was undermined by New Delhi s reluctance to implement the provisions of the Rajiv-Longowal accord. The transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab was delayed first, then postponed and eventually suspended for 210

13 indefinite period. Other provisions were either nullified or the outcomes were incompatiable with the original agreement. There was ultimate reversal of policy at the centre which was marked by the Congress (I) factional penetration of the Akali Dal government from April, 1986 onwards. There was appointment of a highly partisan Governer Sidharth Shanker Ray and the installation of Julio Francis Ribiero as DGP with a wide range of powers to undertake anti-terrorist operations (Singh, Gurharpal, 1996:412). In the end of March, 1986 the central government launched its new policy in Punjab. Julio Francis Ribeiro as Director General of Punjab Police was also to head BSF and CRPF forces in Punjab. Ribiero spoke of Bullet for Bullet policy for the militants. As the declaration of Khalistan was made at Golden Temple Amritsar, Rajiv Gandhi wanted Barnala to take police action or resign (Singh, Raminder, 1986: 30-31). Barnala took to the course of police action and police force entered the Golden Temple complex. It was an opportunity for the central government to justify Operation Blue Star, and secondly to split Akali Dal (Bhanwar in Ajit, May 14, 1986). On hearing about police action akali leaders Sukhjinder Singh, Amarinder Singh and Sucha Singh Chotepur resigned from the Barnala cabinet. Badal and Tohra resigned from Akali Dal working committee and Akali Dal got split. Governer Ray, as being dictated by the centre, rallied Congress (I) and other opposition parties to pledge their support to Barnala to remain power in case of split of Akali Dal (Singh, Khuswant, 1986: 12). As a result Barnala became a lameduck Chief Minister totally dependent on Congress (I) support. This period saw a various angled interplay of forces of Sikh militancy, Hindu revivalism and state terrorism. The militants obviously stepped up their activity. The militants sought to take on both the Hindus and Sikhs opposed to them and their ideology. The unrelated incidents of violence also were played up by the press. Violence in Punjab was actually overstated. Barnala was also aware of the linkage between Congress (I) s volte face and revival of terrorist acts in Punjab. He saw that if there were two incidents by militants, there were ten by others, complicating the situation (Panchnanda, 2002:154). Here no attempt was made to differentiate between extremists Sikhs and militants, and militants and terrorists. All the Sikhs were kept in the same category. The government didn t emphasize on caution and didn t try to differentiate between extremists and others. The authorities, particularly in Punjab did the opposite. There 211

14 was thoughtless use of force by the government. At the same time sharpened Trishul formed part of Hindu revivalism in all parts of India. It had its impact in Punjab also and it helped in creating a clear schism between Hindus and Sikhs in cities, where Hindus were in a majority. It resulted in communal clashes in Patiala, Ludhiana, Jalandhar, Nakodar, Batala and Amritsar. Curfew became a part of daily life in these areas. State terrorism with Ribero at its helm of affairs and getting instructions of Buta Singh as Union Home Minister took the prominent seat. Ribiero had prepared a hit list of thirty eight A category (top terrorists) and list of four hundred B category terrorists (Ribiero, 1998: 189). Districts of Amritsar and Gurdaspur were handed to CRPF and BSF, result being militants shifted their activity to Hoshiarpur, Ludhiana and Sangrur districts. With the stepping up of violence the Union Home Ministry brought in K.P.S. Gill an Assam cadre IPS officer, as Inspector General of CRPF to help the police in Punjab. With Ribiero assuring quick distribution of rewards held on militants, security agencies started gearing up for the offensive and even did innocent killing of the Sikhs in greed of awards. The reign of false encounters picked up. State terrorism started gearing up. As a part of strategy Operation Mand was started by security forces to clear the Mand (bushy area nearby the junction of river Sutlej and Beas) where the militants were thought to be taking shelter. It was termed as operation Pakhand (charade) by the populace as through it innocent Sikhs and women were harassed and tortured by the central security forces. People termed it as Police Raj (Chauhan, 1999:31). Besides Punjab Ministers, Prakash Singh Badal, Baba Joginder Singh and others leaders rallied the Sikh masses, against the oppressive machinery of state. They attended the Bhog ceremonies of those killed in false encounters by police and security agencies. It also gave a fillip to Amrit parchar (baptism). But those who took to baptism straightly came under police surveillance (Thukral, 1986 (May): 27). Overall the militant activity picked up. During this time even an attempt was made on the life of police chief Ribiero itself in Punjab Armed Police headquarters, Jalandhar (The Tribune, October 4, 1986). In August, 1986 militants had also killed General A.S. Vaidya chief of the Indian army during Operation Blue Star. Militants also met with a series of setbacks with more than a quarter of Ribiero s A and B hit lists being eliminated. But there was no letup in militant activities. On the eve of Diwali 1986, extremists of Damdami Taksal and AISSF honoured publicaly the 212

15 relatives of assassins of Indira Gandhi (The Indian Express, November 2, 1986). At the Sarbat Khalsa held on the same day an appeal was made to Amnesty International to expose the fake encounters, resorted to by the police and security agencies for eliminating the Sikh youths (Ajit, January 12, 1999). Professor Darshan Singh Ragi; the Jathedar (the head priest) of Akal Takht was in forefront in highlighting the atrocities of the CRPF in several areas. He had stated that Chief Minister Barnala was being controlled by a remote control from Delhi (Mitra, 1987: 24). During the Sarbat Khalsa saffron coloured flags with words of Khalistan Zindabad were raised on the top of Golden Temple complex in open defiance of central authority (Chima, 2009: 128). The government had got panicked over such activities and arrested about five hundred AISSF workers. It was followed by the arrest of Damdami Taksal men. Ribiero was working as sword arm of union government. In order to facilitate his extension of service, the central government dismissed Barnala government with a bundle of charges as Chief Minister Barnala was in no mood to extend his deputation. The Akali government was dismissed on the grounds that it was unable to control chaos and anarchy in Punjab. President s rule was imposed in Punjab in May, 1987 (The Tribune, May 13-14, 1987). Sidharath Shanker Ray; the person who had crushed the naxalites in Bengal was inducted as the governer of Punjab. As a result Ray-Ribero regime started. Even Barnala government s minister and head of Akali party s youth wing Prem Singh Chandumajra was arrested immediately after the dismissal of Barnala goverment and tortured hung upside down and beaten (Dhillon, 1992: 274). Anti-terrorism now became the main instrument in the state policy which succeeded without making major political concessions, either to militants or the moderate Akali leadership. Whole Punjab was soon subjected to criss-cross currents. The gun-trotting militants were pursued by gun-trotting policemen. In November, 1986 militants had massacred twenty four (Hindu) bus passengers on Jalandhar-Pathankot highway (Jag Bani, December 1, 1986). It had caused a furore among the Hindus sections. The militants again struck in a big way in Delhi and killed fourteen people (Punjab Kesari, June 14, 1987). A bus was waylaid at Lalru in Patiala district and thirty eight Hindu passengers were killed. Within next twenty four hours thirty two bus passengers were killed at Fatehabad in Haryana. On the other hand security forces also took to more hardcore methods. Besides the rise in state repression, there was widening of 213

16 infiltrators network by security forces into militant organizations. Due to such activities of the security forces, the unity of the militant groups started withering away. At the same time due to immoral acts of the infiltrators against the ideology of militant groups, it started defamation of the groups in general populace. It forced a reappraisal of militant s ranks by the respective group leaders. The Khalistan Commando Force, the Khalistan Liberation Force, the Akal Federation and two wings of AISSF took a unified stand to continue their activities against the state (Frontline, March 31, 1987:38). Professor Darshan Singh the Akal Takht Jathedar, even accused some elements in the Union Government for providing tacit support to some militant factions, to play havoc with established Sikh institutions and promote inter group rivalry, with a hidden intent to divide and weaken the Sikh Quam (India Today, October 15, 1987:77). This period also saw the emergence of social reform movement sponsored by militant group Khalistan Commando Force (KCF). They gave a thirteen point code of conduct, to be revered by the people in Punjab. It wanted baptized Sikhs to live upto the Guru s commandments; no intoxicants, no disrespect to hair, no dancing or filmy music at weddings, no marriage party of more than eleven persons, no dowry, no fraternization with Radhasoamis by the Sikhs, no school uniforms that are not saffron for boys, black and white for girls, no bribe; giving or taking. It warned all those who served as informers against the militants and indulged in looting of the Sikh houses at the instance of police and other malpractices. It had its immediate impact in both rural and urban areas of Punjab- especially Majha and Doaba areas (Judge, 2005:197). It was in this intense phase of the militancy that militants ruled the roost. They issued various diktats to various quarters of population for the implementation of various measures and socio-cultural reforms. They also dictated the realization of their politico-religious objectives (Punjabi Tribune, December 3, 1990). According to them these measures were necessary for formation of the state of Khalistan. It was during this phase that the militants held courts, open darbars and tried to implement their code of conduct. The defaulters were asked by them to explain their conduct or face punishment (Singh, Birinderpal, 2002:142). The militants were gaining a upper hand over police and state government. They were running a type of parrellel government especially at night in the 214

17 countryside (Singh, Gopal, 1994:102). Dipanker Gupta describing the reply of some of them writes: I asked him what a parallel government implied. I was told that the streets at night would be deserted. The Singhs then emerge with their AK-47 s, so it is best not to be caught in the crossfire between the Singhs and the police or the Singhs and the looteras (Gupta, 1992:233). The ordinary people; farmers, artisans, especially the rural middle class was caught between two extreme ends the militants and the state (police). The former came to them for hideouts and food during the night while the latter harassed them during daytime for giving shelter to the militants. The young Sikhs were often carried away for interrogation. But during later period, the police cats, the infiltrators, the looteras of all types in the garb of militants, with the connivance of police harassed people beyond limits. Regarding their ongoing struggle as a war against the Indian state, the militants attacked CRPF and BSF installations, police stations and variety of economic targets such as government transport vehicles and electricity generating stations, godowns of Food Corporation of India, petrol depots etc. The foremost item on the agenda of the militants to neutralize the state power was to terrorize the Punjab police and afterwards CRPF and other security forces including the army. In the later phase of militancy ( ) not only policemen but even their families and kins were kidnapped and many times killed. The militants created a set of parallel institutions like dissolving SGPC and creating five members Panthic Committee under the guidance of Akal Takht to challenge and supercede the traditional Akali leadership found in Akali Dal and SGPC (Chima, 2009:128). The Sikh extremists wanted to capture key political and religious institutes in order to gain increased authority over the Sikh community and give their renewed struggle added legitimacy (Chima, 2009:128). Identities are never constructed in vaccum, there is always need for the other (Singh, Birinderpal, 2002: 60). The self- perception of the Sikh militants was also constructed likewise. The Indian state provided them an other to define themselves. The official (state controlled) and allied media called them terrorists who indulged in random killing to spread anarchy. They were dubbed as criminals, smugglers and looteras (plunders), who carried out such activites at the instance of hostile 215

18 neighbors in the process posing threat to the unity and integrity of India. They were said to be causing a serious problem of law and order for the state. On the other hand militants disclaimed this characterization. They called themselves revolutionaries fight for a cause the liberation of the Sikhs. They termed their violence inerratic and meaningful. It was not an end in itself but a means to an end for the creation of an independent sovereign state of Khalistan, where the Sikhs could live with grace and dignity (Pettigrew 1996: 150). They also issued a code of conduct to the press and other media with a strong directive to address themselves as kharkus (militants) and not as attwadi (terrorists). They claimed that they were neither separatists nor vakhvadi (disintegarists) as often projected by the media (Singh, Birinderpal, 2002: 61). It was asserted by them that violence was not their creed but they had been coerced to take to arms by the Indian state (Mahmood, 1996: ). They were of the opinion that degenerated state could understand no language other than of violence. Operation Black Thunder By the end of 1987, Punjab was witnessing deterioration of civil rights, arrests, detentions, fake encounters. Gun and Lathi Raj was being discussed by all sections of the society. Police became corrupt to a great extent and even there were reports of widespread extortions from innocent persons arrested on false charges. The manpower pool from which the militants draw fresh recruits continued to get larger. Result being, from the beginning of 1988 there was spurt in violence in Punjab. It was noticed that higher degree of media gave much coverage to these incidents in a highlighted manner. The militants continued to get the blame in the media for all these subversive activities (Singh, Sangat, 2005: 439). A large number of people got killed daily and even the Sikhs from rural areas started migrating to towns and cities. As a show of friendly gesture in March, 1988 the government released a number of Jodhpur detainees; forty of them were released including Jasbir Singh Rode (Sant Bhindranwale s nephew) with three high priests. Rode was to be installed as Jathedar of Akal Takht (The Tribune, March 10, 1987). This installation ceremony of Rode was used by NSG officers (at the pickets) for watching every movement, counting heads, guns and identifying faces inside the Golden Temple. There were around eighty militants inside in the Golden Temple (Gupta and Mudgal, 216

19 1988: 78). From now onwards some officers started gathering information for conducting another surgical operation in and around Golden Temple i:e Operation Black Thunder (Gupta and Mudgal, 1988: 78 also see Sunday, May 22, 1988). In the meantime Rajiv Gandhi announced the union government s interest to initiate dialogue with all or anyone on Punjab, within the framework of Indian constitution (The Tribune, March 12, 1988). Side by side the centre decided to push in the parliament the Fifty Nineth Amendment Bill providing for the state of emergency in Punjab. The passage of bill got support of a major incident in which a Soviet built Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) was launched on CRPF post. Getting the support of such incidents the Bill was passed and Punjab was again kept under President s Rule. K.P.S. Gill was inducted as Director General of Punjab police to oversee the control of the prevailing scenario in Punjab (Gill, 1997:98). With the growing incidents of violence, government at the centre conducted Operation Black Thunder at Golden Temple at Amritsar. The media was asked to behave according to the whims of the centre or otherwise face the consequences (Jain, 1995:117). Special Action Group (SAG) of one thousand commandos of national security guards (NSG) was used in this operation. There was heavy exchange of firing. In response to the repeated appeals by Inspector General of police (Border range) Chaman Lal and Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar, Sarabjit Singh, one hundred and fifty one persons surrendered. These included some marked militants like Surjit Singh Penta. The Government of India especially the Home Ministry was directly monitoring the happenings in the Golden Temple (Singh, Sarabjit, 2002:192). As a backlash to the on-going in and around Golden Temple, militants of KCF killed thirty migrant labourers at a workplace on Sutlej-Yamuna canal in Ropar district. A note was left back by Labh Singh of KCF that other labourers from outside Punjab should leave, or they will meet a similar fate. As a result large amount of labour from Bihar, U.P., Rajasthan and other places fled back (Lal, in The Times of India, February 10, 1991). Again forty five persons were gunned down by militants in Punjab and Himachal Pradesh. Seven powerful blasts hit Pathankot and curfew was imposed on various ocassions. Many militants were also killed. Overall a couple of Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) units and splinter groups of militants got liquidated at the hands of security forces. Punjab continued to be a victim of lack of a clear cut policy. 217

20 Rajiv Gandhi in earlier times was reconciled to state terrorist setups and police using criminals and smugglers to fight against the militancy. He, as such, gave a nod to the police strategy of counter insurgency in which all type of violent incidents were accredited to the militants; either they had done it or not. In a major departure of his policy, later he desisted from attributing all violence to the militants (The Illustrated Weekly of India, March 31, 1989: 20-31). As a damage control measure he announced the release of all Jodhpur detenues, withdrawal of Punjab Disturbed Areas Act and Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act (except for Amritsar, Gurdaspur and Ferozpur Districts), removal of all restriction on entry of foreigners in Punjab, and withdrawal of special powers under NSA. But here also government was not sincere to chalk out any solution as it was silent on the fate of three hundred and nine Sikh army men who had been court martialled. Jodhpur detaines were released in March and eighty four of them were re-arrested, on the charges pending against them (The Indian Express, March 7, 1989). In the general elections held in November, 1989 in Punjab, Simranjeet Singh Mann a radical Sikh leader leading Akali Dal (Mann) won six out of thirteen seats, with another four going to candidates backed by it (The Indian Express, December 6, 1989). Akali Dal (Mann) having won six seats redefined its goals within the framework of united India. In one of its resolutions it demanded an autonomous Sikh region in North India comprising Punjab and some adjoining areas of Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan, with the right to frame its own internal constitution, having all powers, except foreign relations, defence, currency and general communications (Ajit, December 11, 1989 also see Singh, Sangat, 2005: 457 and The Indian Express, December 12, 1989). In the meantime an all party meeting was convened by Union Home Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed at Delhi. It adopted a consensus on Punjab. Its three main topics were; firstly, resolution of Punjab problem within the framework of the constitution without sacrificing the unity and integrity of the country. Secondly, steps to secure conviction of the guilty persons involved in 1984, in violence against the Sikhs, and thirdly, repeal of fifty ninth amendment of the constitution (The Indian Express, December 18, 1989). Congress (I) not being the part of consensus (Singh, Gurbhagat, 1994:360). Mann welcomed the steps evolving the national consensus and extended his support to Prime Minister V.P. Singh. He wanted the centre to announce 218