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1 Evaluating the democratic peace thesis using the case of the Iraq war Evaluating the democratic peace thesis (DPT) using the example of the Iraq War is a hopeless task. A theory can only strife to explain a current event but it will never grasp all the levels of analysis necessary to predict an event, or to understand how the current event will develop. It is in the nature of every theory to simplify. Therefore, one can always argue against the theory due to its simplification. Evaluating the DPT using the example of the Iraq War can just partly explain the theory itself. Thus, this work is divided into three parts. Firstly, this paper will state the definition of the DPT and the definition of democracy. Secondly, this essay will argue that the DPT is a highly disputed theory which is insufficient in terms of explaining the world of today. By showing the advantages and the disadvantages of this theory, one will see that it touches on a core feature of liberal democracies but generally fails to predict or explain. Finally, this work will try to use the DPT in order to explain events regarding the Iraq War. By doing so one will understand that the theory in itself does not really account for all the possible reasons and actions in this conflict. The Iraq War can be evaluated without the DPT, but this would fail to explain some features of the conflict. The first part just touches upon the thesis itself and in the second part this paper will try to evaluate the thesis using the example of the Iraq War. However, due to the word limit is it impossible to illustrate all the different theories regarding the DPT. Page 1

2 The definition of democracy and the DPT In order to discuss the DPT we need to gain a common understanding what a democracy is. Dahl definition states that a democracy consist of elected representatives, institutions which provide free fair and frequent elections, the freedom of expression, the provision of alternatives sources of information, the associational autonomy and an inclusive concept of citizenship (Dahl 2000: 92). Russett defines the DPT in terms of democracies that do not fight wars with each other (Russett 1993a: 59). Furthermore, he asserts that democracies are more aggressive towards autocracies than towards other democracies (Russett 1993b: 33). Russett limits the DPT by saying that there is no perfect democracy (Russett & O Neal 2001: 45) and by stating that it is not conclusive to say that democracies never fight each other (Russett, Layne, Spiro & Doyle 1995: 169). This argument is very important since the power of the DBT is limited by its definition. If this paper were to define the DPT as a law which states that democracies never fight each other, this would result in an endless analysis of case studies rather than an analysis of why democracies do not tend to fight each other and what the DPT can predict or explain. DPT and International relations There is a big dispute over the question of how all-encompassing the DPT actually is. Schultz argues that there are hardly any cases in which democracies fight each other, and the number of cases which exists tends to go towards zero (Schultz 2001: 10). This depends on the definition of what a democratic state is and when a conflict erupts into war. Spiro assumes that whoever wants to prove the DPT is correct is highly selective in his or her definitions (Spiro 1994: 203; Russett, Layne, Spiro & Doyle 1995: 177). A good example for this highly selective process of defining is Russett s definition of war. Russett uses the international definition of war which states that there should be at least 1000 fatalities in a Page 2

3 battle. Moreover, he mentions exceptions for the definition of war such as grow out of accidents, deliberate actions by local commanders without authorization, local authorized military intervention which is not aimed at provoking a full-scale war but rather to improve the bargaining power, big deliberate military actions which were met without resisted by a much weaker adversary (Russett 1993a: 69). By excluding all these possibilities, the amount of cases studies is naturally smaller than another definition which is broader and includes more possible cases. A case study which is within the realm of this definition is the American civil war, where two democracies fought against each other over their national identity; this case refutes the DPT as argued by Spiro (Spiro 1994: 211). Therefore, we can see that even when there are highly restricted definitions of democracy and war, single cases can be put forward and used to argue in favour or against the DPT. Russett also excludes covert operations (Russett 1993a: 71) although they are considered to be illegitimate by the population of the intervening power (Russett & O Neal 2001: 62). This is not coherent since most of the times covert operations are involved in violent coups which result in a regime change. If there are less than 1000 fatalities in a covert operation which leads to a military coup is not an actual war but rather an act of war. Russett argues against this interpretation: While powerful democratic states have sometimes intervened in weaker democratic or semi democratic states, it has not been common, and in most instances, the action was taken either to protect the intervention s citizens or their property or to support the government. (Russett& O Neal 2001: 63). The nature of covert operations is secretive. Therefore the argument that they are not common is inconsistent. Furthermore, a democracy illegitimately and violently interfering in the sphere of another democracy is not always in the interests of the majority of the population. The cover operation against the democratically elected government in Guatemala which was executed out of American business interests is an example for that (Rabe 1988: 45-47). This is just one of many examples of covert operations which were directed against democracies. To exclude covert Page 3

4 operations in the DPT is therefore not correct because it is part of international relations and demonstrates that even democracies engage in illegitimate and undemocratic military interventions. This goes against the assumption, that modern democratic states are governed by their people. Gilbert argues that in a democracy the business interests of a small rich minority are sometimes stronger than the interests of the majority of the population (Gilbert 1999: 73). This economical interest argument is also used by advocates of the DPT. This conclusion is also related to the normative explanation of the DPT. Schultz argues that there exist two sets of norms which constrain democracies to go to war with each other: First of all, democracies do not usually consider the use of force or the threat of force as a legitimate tool in foreign relations. Moreover, democratic governments always seek legitimacy and therefore do not want to engage into any violent foreign relations which other states (Schultz 2001: 12-13). However, it is disputed whether the threat of force is illegitimate or not. Hoffman, for example, argues that the threat of force but not the use of force is legitimate in the eyes of a democratic society (Hoffman 1995: 90). Realists, on the other hand, argue that public opinion does not really have such a high influence on the foreign policy of a country. Layne agrees to that view, asserting that if democratic public opinion really had the effect ascribed to it, democracies would be peaceful in their relations with all states, whether democratic or not (Layne 1994: 12). In the case studies of Layne, the realist ideology is better at explaining the outcome of a conflict between democratic states than the DPT (Layne 1994: 38). The normative explanation argues that the government is constrained by the public but it fails to explain why a liberal society is automatically a pacifistic society. The institutional explanation is another attempt to prove the DPT. Schultz and Layne contend that in a institutional decision making process in which the power is shared, the decision process is open to the public. Moreover, the power is separated and there are checks and balances to make sure that the state power is not abused, which leads to a democracy which is unlikely to engage in war with other democracies (Schultz 2001: 13; Layne 1994: 9). Furthermore, the state leaders of democratic states are taking a higher risk than non democratic leaders when they engage into a conflict because Page 4

5 they are accountable to the people (Russett 2001: 54; Russett 1993c: 102; Layne 1994: 13). However, this understanding of domestic interaction with foreign relations goes against the neorealist assumption that these two spheres are separated. Layne also argues that the institutional explanation is insufficient in explaining why there are no wars between democracies. For, the fact that a state is democratic does not state anything about the war proneness of democratic societies (Layne 1994: 6, 12). Doyle argues that it is impossible to determine if a liberal leader is more peaceful than a non-democratic leader (Doyle 1994: 17). This explanation is also supported by rational choice theorists (Russett & O Neal 1999: 5). Consequently, the institutional explanation is surely a factor as to why democracies do not fight each other. The explanation just fails to address the fact that if the public is ready to go to war with another democracy than they will not be stopped by institutional restrains. Furthermore, leaders of a democracy want to go to war with another democracy because their personal gain would be greater than the gain of re-election. Another level of explanation for the DPT is based on wealth and the interdependence of democratic states. Russett argues that the wealthier a democracy is as the more unlikely it is to engage in a conflict with small economical gain (Russett 1993c: 87). This economical perspective is also supported by the argument that democracies are more engaged in a high level of interstate trade and security cooperation than non-democratic states. The willingness to cooperate is based on the positive perception of other democracies as Layne explains: Democratic states assume both that other democracies also subscribe to pacific methods of regulating political competition and resolving disputes and that others will apply these norms in their external relations with fellow democracies (Layne 1994: 9). He further argues that this perception can also be seen as a self-fulfilling prophecy (Russett, Layne, Spiro & Doyle 1995: 177). On the contrary, Russett claims that states work together because a peaceful cooperation is in their self interest (Russett 1993c: 86, 88) which would support a realist point of view. This is, from Russett s and O Neil s perspective, also supported by Kant s assumption Page 5

6 that peace and cooperation is in the self-interest of every state actor (Russett & O Neil 1999: 1). However, this explanation fails to explain why democracies do protect their markets. If they were actually to think that it would be in their best interest to have free trade everywhere there would not be a struggle between democratic states about their partly closed economies. Nonetheless, there is wide economical and military cooperation between democratic states which therefore supports the argument that democracies tend to engage in military and economical cooperation because they all gain an advantage. This explanation fails to explain, why cooperation between democratic states sometimes give their participants a disadvantage instead of an advantage (Schultz 2001: 16). Moreover, it can be argued that that it is impossible to distinguish between the neorealist assumption that the state just engages in cooperation because of self-interest and the fact that they actually cooperate because of their internal political norms and liberal values (Schultz 2001: 11). This argument is valid since the DPT and its explanations fail to establish a causal link between domestic liberal values and the actions on the inter-state level. This seems to promote a realists point of view rather than a DPT perspective because the latter does not explain the relationship between inter-state and domestic level (Layne 1994: 8, 38). Schultz supports this argument by stating that anarchy in the international system is a permanent feature (Schultz 2001: 236). There are also statistical reasons which can explain the absence of war between democracies. Two statistical reasons for the absence of war are the factor of time and the factor of capability. Russett argues that there are just 12% of possible dyads in the international system between which war is actually possible (Russett, Layne, Spiro & Doyle 1995: 169). Therefore, the empirical prove for the DPT is a coincidence because the DPT argues in a way, which suggest that there would be the same empirical outcome if 100% of states had the possibility to go to war with each other. Spiro agrees that the war between democracies is a matter of chance and there is no empirical evidence for the liberal theory (Russett, Layne, Spiro & Doyle 1995: 177). Another statistical explanation for the absence of war is the fact that there were not many democracies in the history of international Page 6

7 relations (Russett 1993c: 228) and that war is a relatively rare occurrence (Layne 1994: 39). These two factors, together with the proximity and the technological evolvement, are good arguments for the assumption that the absence of war between democracies is a case of chance and is not based on liberal values inside the states. DPT and the Iraq War First of all, it should be stated that the DPT is very weak in explaining specific foreign relations decisions (Panke & Risse 2007: 102). The main focus of the theory is on the interaction between democracies. The only other aspects of the DPT related to the war in Iraq are that non-democratic leaders are not as constrained and therefore take bigger risks (Russett 1993c: 103), that democracies are more violent towards autocracies than they are towards democracies (Russett 1993a: 68) and that they fight more wars than other states (Schultz 2001: 11) which are likely to be shorter (Russett 1993b: 83), that democracies win their wars (Russet& O Neil 2001: 67), and that states, which are in the phase of democratization, are violent (Russet& O Neil 2001: 51; Mansfield & Snyder 1995: 301). It is right to argue that nondemocratic leaders take bigger risks than democratic leaders. On one hand, one could argue that Hussein was a risk taker. He provoked a confrontation with the UN by restricting the work of UN inspectors. On the other hand, one could also consider Georg W. Bush a risk taker because he pushed for a pre-emptive War against the will of the international community with prove of an imminent risk against the USA. There never was credible evidence which would have justifed a pre-emptive War (Roth 2004: 126). Furthermore, Bush did not have any institutional constrains which are normally in place as argued by democratic peace theorist, since Congress gave Bush a carte blanche (Panke & Risse 2007: 102). Therefore, the argument that a democratic leader is not as big a risk taker as an undemocratic leader does not seem to be sustainable with respect to the Iraq war. Page 7

8 The argument that democracies are more violent towards autocracies than they are towards democracies (Russett 1993a: 68) cannot be proven by the example of the Iraq war alone. Nevertheless, the weapons used by the US could be seen as proof for the willingness of a democracy to use extreme violence against an autocracy. A good example for this is the use of cluster bombs in civilian areas (Forythe 2004: 86). Another argument for the extreme use of force is the estimated death toll of 1.2 million casualties (Beaumont & Walters 2007). Using the example of the Iraq war, one can therefore argue that democratic states acted in a very violent way against nondemocratic states. Another conclusion of the DPT is that democracies fight more wars than other states (Schultz 2001: 11). Unfortunately, this argument is not provable or falsifiable using the example of the Iraq war alone. Nonetheless, the behavior of the USA since 9/11 was extremely aggressive towards the aces of evil which could be at least used as an example that democracies are more aggressive and willing to engage in war with non-democracies. The War against terror was not merely one war but a series against at least a couple of states, namely Afghanistan and Iraq. This shows that the US actually engages in more wars at the moment than any other state. Democratic peace theorists also claim that the wars democracies engage in are shorter than other wars (Russett 1993b: 83). By using the Iraq war as an example we can clearly show that this is not the case. The Iraq war lasts much longer than the US involvement in the Second World War. Looking at the situation today makes clear that the end of the war is not in sight. Disregarding the fact Georg W. Bush already declared the end of the War standing in front of a mission accomplished sign by May first Also, an end of all the military operations in Iraq is not in sight. The case of the Iraq war therefore shows that the wars fought by democracies are not necessarily shorter. Another claim by democratic peace theorist is that democracies win the wars they engage in (Russet & O Neil 2001: 67). The example of Iraq clearly refutes this statement. Former Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said in 2006 that the US is loosing the war in Iraq (DeYoung 2006). A further indication Page 8

9 is the diminishing number of the coalition of the willing. More and more countries get their troops out of the Iraq because of internal pressure and a lack of success. Additional indicators that the US is loosing the war in Iraq are the low approval rates and the high disapproval rates of their president which are without doubt related to the bad performance in Iraq. On the contrary, Russett and O Neil argue that soldiers fighting for democracies have a moral advantage which motivates them (Russett & O Neil 2001: 67). Another argument, supporting the assumption that democracies tend to win the wars they engage in, is the fact that improved military technology, which the USA certainly possesses, can improve their payoff with respect to the prisoner s dilemma (Mansfield & Snyder 1995: 17). Nevertheless, it is reasonable to say that the example of the Iraq war shows that democracies do not win every war they engage in. Democratic peace theorists also argue that states which are in the transition period to become a democracy can be violent towards other states (Russet & O Neil 2001: 51; Mansfield & Snyder 1995: 301). This argument explains and takes into account a lot of cases studies which are used to argue against the DPT. Iraq can be regarded as such a state. Kant also argues that states tend to promote their ideology because that would foster peace between states in the long run (Doyle 1994: 22). This theory can be adapted to US foreign policy as Layne argues that policymakers who have embraced democratic peace theory see a crucial link between America's security and the spread of democracy, which is viewed as the antidote that will prevent future wars (Layne 1994: 5). This reflects the historic American agenda to seek absolute security (Layne 1994: 46). This policy is also a key element of Bush s approach for the War against terror. The question is whether, in the case of Iraq, the violence is the travail of a begging democracy or just civil war. This question cannot be answered until the Iraq war has ended. What the rationalist DPT accounts for, is the behavior of war critics like Germany (Panke & Risse 2007: 102). The institutional constrains prevented a German involvement in the Iraq war. The Constructivist DPT, on the other hand, which focuses on identity creation and the process of public communication, explains the willingness of the American people to be in favor of the war as argued Page 9

10 by Panke and Risse: If Hussein is Hitler, if he is linked with Al Qaeda, and if the USA is on war against terrorism, the constrains on a liberal democracy to wage war against such an enemy are all removed (Panke & Risse 2007: 103). As shown above, the DPT might be partly valid in the case of the Iraq war if it were not for the question of the legitimacy of the US government. As Gilbert argues, the majority of the poor people does not vote (Gilbert 1999: 186) and the people, representing the American population, do not consist of the lower or middle class but in case of the Congress just of the elites (Gilbert 1999: 9). That is why, together with human rights violations in Guantanamo, the status of democracy in the USA is subject to debate Conclusion The DPT is a thesis, not a law. It is an explanatory attempt by the liberal political scientists to explain the absence of war between democracies. DPT scholars are divided over the definitions of war and democracy. This work argues that a special emphasis on covert operations is necessary because usually they are not included in the definitions of war. However, an emphasis on covert operations is crucial since they can lead to dramatic changes in the government of a country. The normative explanation of the DPT accounts for the values and norms of the population. Inherent in this conception is the fact that democratic leaders cannot go to war with other democracies because they are restrained by the voters. It is disputed how well the normative explanation accounts for the relative power of the people and for the possibility that a democratic leader might go to war with another democracy without paying attention to the wishes of the people. Moreover, it does not take into account that the people might be prone to war and would therefore want to engage in a conflict with other democracies. Page 10

11 The institutional explanation argues that wars between democracies are unlikely due to the set up of the democratic system. This explanation fails to include the risks and the sensitive balance of the institutions as well as the possibility that democratically elected leaders cannot always assess the situation of risk gain. Finally, it can be argued that, just because a leader is elected in a democratic country, this does not mean that he is automatically a pacifist. Further goes the argument of the critics of the DPT that there is an absence of war between democratic states because of their ability to go to war with each other and the fact that democracy is a new regime type. Evaluating the existence of the DPT in international relations using the example of Iraq is difficult because the DPT does neither explain not predict anything, and does only partly help to understand decision making processes. Especially when in a case such as the Iraq war there is no war between two democracies but between a democracy and an autocracy. This work tried to show that Bush is as big a risk taker as Sadam Hussein for the former started a preemptive war against the wishes of the international community based on false evidence. The assertion of the DPT that democracies fight more wars than other states cannot be evaluated by using the Iraq war alone. Nevertheless, the foreign policy of the USA since 9/11 of who is not with us is against us can be judged as a very aggressive foreign policy which could potentially lead to the USA engaging in further conflicts. The fact that democratic states fight shorter wars and win their wars is clearly a false statement when compared against the example of the Iraq war. The latter took longer than the defeat of fascism in the Second World War and the chance of winning it diminishes as shown above. On one hand, this work agrees with the statement that future democracies are more violent in their transitional phases. On the other hand, it argues that the Iraq is in a transitional phase towards democracy or in a phase of widespread civil and international war. Page 11

12 To conclude, the DPT does account for certain aspects of the decision making process of democratic states because of its emphasis on liberal values in democratic states. Nonetheless, the Iraq war and the newest development regarding the involvement of Turkish military inside Iraq is a clear sign that the DPT fails to account for the complexity of international relations and for the interactions between democratic states. Page 12

13 Bibliography Beaumont, Peter and Walters (September 16, 2007) Greenspan admits Iraq was about oil, as deaths put at 1.2m, retrieved at November 30, 2007 from Bruce Russett; Christopher Layne; David E. Spiro; Michael W. Doyle (1995) Letters, International Security 19: Dahl, Robert A. (2000) On democracy (USA: Yale University Press). DeYoung, Karen (December 18, 2006) Powell Says U.S. Losing in Iraq, Calls for Drawdown by Mid-2007 retrieved at November 29, 2007 from Doyle, Michael W. (1994) Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs in Brown, Michael E., Lynn- Jones, Sean M. and Miller, Steven E. (eds) Debating the Democratic peace (USA: MIT Press Cambridge). Forythe, David (2004) (2004) U.S. foreign policy and human rights in an era of insecurity: the Bush administration and human rights after September 11, in Weiss, Thomas G., Crahan, Margaret E., and Goering John(eds), Wars on terrorism and Iraq: human rights, unilateralism, and U.S. foreign policy (New York : Routledge), pp Gilbert, Alan (1999) Must global politics constrain democracy? (USA: Princeton University Press). Hoffman, John (1995) Beyond the state: An Introductionary Critique (UK: Polity Press). Kenneth Roth (2004) The fight against terrorism: the Bush administration s dangerous neglect of human rights, in Weiss, Thomas G., Crahan, Margaret E., and Goering John(eds), Wars on terrorism and Iraq: human rights, unilateralism, and U.S. foreign policy (New York : Routledge), pp Page 13

14 Layne, C. (1994) Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace, International Security 19: Mansfield, Edward D. and Snyder, Jack (1995) Democratisation and the danger of war, in Brown, Michael E., Lynn-Jones, Sean M. and Miller, Steven E. (eds) Debating the Democratic peace (USA: MIT Press Cambridge), pp Panke D. and Risse T. (2007) Liberalism, in Dunne Timm, Kurki Milja and Smith Steve(eds), International relations Theories: Discipline and diversity (UK: Oxford University Press), pp O Neal, John R. and Russett B. (1999b) The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, , World Politics 52: Rabe, Stephen G. (1988) Eisenhower and Latin America: the foreign policy of anticommunism (USA: University of North Carolina Press). Russett, Bruce and O Neal, John (2001) Triangulating peace: democracy, interdependence, and international Organizations (USA: W. W. Northon & Company). Russett, Bruce (1993a) The fact of democratic peace, in Brown, Michael E., Lynn-Jones, Sean M. and Miller, Steven E. (eds) Debating the Democratic peace (USA: MIT Press Cambridge) ), pp Russett, Bruce (1993b) Grasping the democratic peace: principles for a post-cold War world (N.Y.: Princeton University Press). Russett, Bruce (1993c) Why democratic peace?, in Brown, Michael E., Lynn-Jones, Sean M. and Miller, Steven E. (eds) Debating the Democratic peace (USA: MIT Press Cambridge), pp Schultz, Kenneth A. (2001) Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy (USA: Cambridge University Press). Page 14

15 Spiro David E. (1994) The insignificance of the liberal democratic peace, in Brown, Michael E., Lynn- Jones, Sean M. and Miller, Steven E. (eds) Debating the Democratic peace (USA: MIT Press Cambridge), pp Page 15