Key Words: Nationalism, Secession, Catalonia, Ideology, Framing Analysis.

Transcription

1 Changes and Continuity in Catalan Nationalism. The Sovereignty Process from an Ideological Perspective. Author: Sebastián Zambelli. C.V.: Sebastian Zambelli was awarded a FPI Fellowship (Research Personnel Training Fellowship) for the Department of Political Science and the Administration of the Faculty of Political Science and Sociology at UNED (National University of Distance Education), where he is preparing his doctoral dissertation about Catalan nationalism. He holds a degree on Political Science from the University of Buenos Aires and a Master s Degree in Politics and Democracy from UNED. In 2009 he was awarded as Best Master s Degree Final Project by the Faculty of Political Science and Sociology at UNED. Abstract: This paper will study the discursive production of the nationalist conservative elite of Catalonia through an analysis of collective action frames and their connection to the nationalist ideology, particularly to the secessionist process started in It shall describe the mechanisms used in those action frames and propose an interpretation of the way such frames affect the modes of ideological interpellation, and change their pattern of meaning. Key Words: Nationalism, Secession, Catalonia, Ideology, Framing Analysis. I. Purpose The aim of this paper is twofold: the central line of work is the analysis of the discursive and ideological mechanisms used by the political elites specifically the political nationalist conservative elite of Catalonia, to gain the support of the constituency, focusing particularly on the shifts of these mechanisms in the nationalist ideology from a moderate position towards secessionism. For such purpose, this paper will examine the ways in which the Catalan conservative nationalism, mainly represented by the political party CiU Convergencia i Unió (Convergence and Union) 1, frames its discourse production through framing analysis. Thus, the focus will be on the cognitive and emotional aspects of the action (Máiz, 2003), in their connection to identity (Klandermans, 1994; Della Porta and Diani, 2011) and to the nationalist ideology. When analyzing the distinctive features within the framing of discourse a series of new components will be identified with the introduction of grievance and agency (Gamson, 1992; Della Porta and Diani, 2011; Giuliano, 2011, Chihu, 2002; Chihu and López, 2004) as the two essential, distinguishing elements for expanding the social base of Catalan nationalism. 1 For more details see Santamaría, A. (2011): Els orígens de Convergencia Democràtica de Catalunya. La reconstrucció del catalanisme conservador. ( ). El viejo topo, Barcelona. 1

2 The second aim of this paper, embedded in a way in the former, is partly methodological: the purpose is to link the analysis of collective action frames to an analysis of ideology based on Göran Therborn s developments (1978; 1987). To that end, an interpretation will be proposed of the way the changes made in the collective action frames by the nationalist conservative elite modify the forms of ideological interpellation of Catalan nationalism. II. Introduction In the history of constitutional Spain, the traditional approach of Catalonia to nationalism has been pact-based. In other words, during this period, the strategy of the nationalist elites (specially the conservative political elite) was negotiation and agreement. Usually, the pragmatic political Catalan elites negotiated more autonomy with the central Spanish State in exchange for legislative support at the national level. So it was during the González, the Aznar and (in part) the Rodríguez Zapatero administrations (Dowling, 2013), when a series of transfers and devolutions gave the autonomous community of Catalonia a high level of self-government. In this scenario, the social support to Catalan nationalism in favour of independence was never above 23% (Miley, 2006). Notwithstanding, from the moment CiU won the elections for the Generalitat (Government of Catalonia) in 2010, after the experience of the tripartite government 2 and the arrival of the Popular Party to the Central State, such traditional pact-based approach has gradually been shifting towards secessionism. The social support to the independence cause has increased despite that its intensity may vary depending on the entity or institution investigating the matter, driven or stirred by the radicalization of the nationalist political elites from the government of the Generalitat. Regardless of the divergent numbers revealed by the various statistical entities studying the behaviour of the social support to the secession movement, there is no doubt that the increasing social support in Catalonia (unlike the rest of Spain) to the nationalist cause in favour of independence is closely related, as argued by Blas Guerrero, to the fact that *t+he Government of the Generalitat has mounted a process of social framing, of control from power, that hinders the possibility of knowing the different views in the problem (Blas Guerrero, 2013). The Catalan sub-state government, lead by CiU, has developed an active mobilization campaign in terms of what is known as the sovereignty process. This process entangles a clear sequence of events including the Catalan parliamentary declaration of Catalonia as political and legal sovereign 3 and an agreement with the political parties supporting the secession movement ERC (Republican Left of Catalonia), CUP (Popular Unity Candidates) and ICV-EUiA (Initiative for Catalonia Greens-United and Alternative Left), by virtue of which the Generalitat is to hold a referendum (not contemplated in Spanish constitutional law) to decide on the secession of Catalonia 2 Tripartito was the coalition government of left-wing parties (PSC, ERC and ICV-EUiA) headed by Pasqual Maragall ( ). The same coalition, but José Montilla renamed to: Govern d'entesa ( ). 3 For more details see the declarations of sovereignty by the Parliament of Catalonia: 2

3 from Spain, scheduled for November 9, In a similar note, an Advisory Council for the National Transition has been summoned, and the Draft Law on the State's Foreign Service and Action (Projecte de llei de l'acció Exterior) and the declarations of sovereignty by the Parliament of Catalonia have been passed, among many other political actions aimed at the secession of the Autonomous Community of Catalonia from Spain. The actor this paper will concentrate on, although it is clearly not the sole actor, is CiU. CiU is the political party that has won every regional election in Catalonia and except for the years of coalition among left wing parties from 2003 through , has ruled Catalonia from In order to gauge exactly the weight of this bourgeois party and the success of CiU in Catalan politics, both in the past and the present, a quote from José Luis Álvarez on the representation of the dominant class will serve as an example: Catalanism is the platform of hegemony for the Catalan bourgeoisie, and CiU is its political party. The tactics adopted by CiU in order to sustain the political initiative and hegemony without a demographic majority or a stable constituency and to achieve its goals to the greatest extent possible, rendering the opposing parties into a passive, if not subordinated, attitude are a great political lesson. 5 Because of this long tradition of conservative governments started in 1980 and continuing to this day, it is fair to say that democratic Catalonia has been built upon, to a considerable extent, and customized to fit, the CiU political elite. Furthermore, its government has been key in safeguarding the interest of the dominant classes and is responsible for the shift towards the radicalization of the Government of the Generalitat and of a great part of the constituency and the population. The former describes a close interpersonal, material and ideological relationship between the political elite, embodied by CiU, and the Catalan dominant class it represents (Fradera, 2006; Miley, 2006, 2013a; Santamaría, 2008, 2011; Ovejero Lucas, 2006, 2012a). However, CiU s shift towards secessionism with the support of ERC, CUP and ICV-EUiA, has opened up a gap between CiU and the very dominant class it directly represents. The Catalan haute bourgeoisie as well as the international bourgeoisie with an interest in Catalonia 6 have clearly expressed their scepticism, if not their outright rejection, to the so-called sovereignty process. Furthermore, they have advocated a negotiation between the Spanish Government and the Government of the Generalitat 7. It is inherent to the logic of capital that the haute bourgeoisie refuses to support projects 4 CiU won two elections in 2003 and 2006, but failed to form a government. 5 For more details see José Luis Álvarez: La lucha final de la burguesía catalana 6 For more details see 7 For more details see

4 that may bring about uncertainty or political and institutional instability, as would a process of this nature. This gap between the interest of the bourgeoisie and that of the political elite has brought to light the relative degree of autonomy gained from the State by the Catalan political elite, most likely due to two factors: the institutional dynamics of devolutions to the Spanish autonomous communities and the economic crisis. III. Theoretical approaches to Catalan Nationalism. Proposed Analysis. In the realm of political science and sociology, there are two main approaches to the study of Catalan nationalism: the one oriented to a certain cultural or perennialist conception and the one adopting a modernist view of nationalism (Smith, 2000; De Blas, 1984, 1994, 2007; Máiz, 2004). Within the culturalist theories, with great development in Catalan historiography, sociology and political science, are a series of arguments akin to the modernist tradition 8 that analyze the phenomenon of Catalan nationalism offering innovative perspectives. This paper will concentrate, due to length limitations, on this modernist conception of nation in politological and sociological studies 9 about Catalan nationalism. Within this modernist approach, the focus will be on those studies that follow the tracks of J. Linz and approach their analysis mostly from a quantitative perspective, mainly developed by J. T. Miley (2006; 2008, 2013a) and E. Martínez Herrera, (2002; 2005). These authors explain the strength of Catalan nationalism (and the secessionist movement), particularly though not exclusively, in terms of an overrepresentation of the dominant classes in the Catalan political elites 10. In other words, they argue and prove the existence of a high incidence of individuals that belong to the bourgeoisie (in its different strata) in the political elite 11. Miley (2006, 2008 and 2013a), De la Calle and Miley (2012); Gaviria and Miley (2013); Martínez Herrera (2002), Ovejero Lucas, (2006, 2012a), Etherington (2003) and 8 In the study of Catalan nationalism can be described two approaches: those related to cultural or perennnialista conception (perennialism), and those related to a modernist conception of nationalism (Smith, 2000; De Blas, 1984, 1994, 2007, Máiz, 2004). The categorization presented in two types of nationalism (modern or political vs. cultural or perennialist) has been criticized by several authors (Máiz, Miley, Conversi, etc.) but I think the reviews have not been fair with heuristic capacity distinctions proposed as a first question; besides that has not been adequately assessed the importance of analytical distinctions may have to clarify important elements in the case studythat is why, it is assumed here, this distinction based on the value that is believed to still can brings. 9 This clarification is due to the existence of excellent studies of historical perspective such as: Vicens- Vives, (1969); J. Fontana (2007); Anguera (1994); Borja de Riquer, (2001); Fradera, (1992; 2003); Marfany, (2001), Ucelay la Cal, (2003), S. Balfour y A. Quiroga (2007) y Etherintong (2003). 10 As a working hypothesis it is assumed here that there is a civic political hegemony of the Catalan bourgeoisie that allows us to talk about links between CiU as bourgeois party as conservative political and administrative elite. As demonstrated by the work of Miley (2006) and Matas (2001) there is a close correlation between the ruling class and the Catalan political and administrative elite in the first; and "clear the transfer of party elites to elite positions within the administration" (Matas, 2001: ) in the second. 11 Here is appreciated the influence tied to conceptions "instrumentals" of R. Miliband. 4

5 Santamaría (2008, 2011), among other authors, argue that the phenomenon of social class in Catalan nationalism is in consonance with a linguistic cleavage. In other words, there is a link between Catalan nationalism, the use of the Catalan language and the upper-middle and upper classes of Catalan society. In the words of Miley (2006), Ovejero Lucas; (2006, 2012a) and de Martínez Herrera (2002), there is an elite-led top-down nationalization process. These authors show that such process is achieved by means of an over-representation in the bourgeoisie and in the political and educational elites. This ascendancy or over-representation of the dominant class is clearly illustrated by the wide gap between the conceptions of that dominant class about politics, ideology, linguistics, origin and class, and those of the general population, among other elements (Miley, 2006, 2013; De la Calle and Miley, 2012; Gaviria and Miley 2013; and Ovejero Lucas, 2006, 2012a). Unlike other cases, like the Scottish case (Leith, 2006), the Catalan example is peculiar because of its internal diversity. Linguistically speaking, it is fair to say that Spanish prevails slightly over Catalan at the social level (albeit not in public administration and sub-state institutions in general). From the point of view of ancestry, surname distribution and patterns of behaviour and consumption, Catalonia is virtually similar to the rest of Spain (Ovejero Lucas, 2012a). This can be explained in terms of the migration waves in the 1960 s and 1970 s, as a result of which there is no specific majority in Catalonia, as compared to the rest of Spain, in either ethnicity, linguistics, or in any other aspect. However, as described in the literature on the subject, there are peculiarities that co-relate to different elements, such as class cleavage and language use. For example, the mid-lower and lower sectors of Catalan society are mostly Spanish speakers, blue-collar workers born, or descending from people who were born, outside Catalonia. The middle and upper-middle sectors, however, are mostly Catalan speakers, white-collar workers, liberal professionals or public administration workers who were born in Catalonia. (Miley, 2006, 2013a; Shafir, 1995; Ovejero Lucas, 2012a; Etherington, 2003; Santamaría, 2008, 2011). In the light of such a significant gap between the conceptions of the elites and those of the rest of the population about issues such as social and linguistic origin, nation, etc., the support of the population, not only to nationalism but also to the shift of that nationalism towards secessionism, is rather difficult to explain. Therefore: What are the discourse mechanisms used by the nationalist conservative political elite of Catalonia which has become more radical, and how do they operate in order to gain the support of the population in favour of the secession process? What are the ideological consequences of using those mechanisms? In part, the answer to this question lies in the way the discourse of hegemonic nationalism gains the support of and mobilizes the population of Catalonia. In order to understand the operation of such consensus and mobilization processes, as stated above, this paper provides an analysis of the discursive production of the hegemonic political elite based on the frames of social mobilization and their link to the nationalist ideology. Within the theory of framing analysis, and following the research made by Giuliano (2011), Gamson (1992), Della Porta and Diani (2011), Chihu (2002), Klandermans, 5

6 (1994) and (Hunt, S., et al, 1994), a key explanatory element is hereby proposed in an attempt to account for the support in favour of Catalan nationalism, even of its radicalization towards secession. Such an explanation will be offered as a supplement to the one developed and proposed in Miley s (2006) 12 over-representation theory. The contribution herein set forth aims at explaining how that social support stems from a change in the elements of agency and grievance, as well as from an intensification of the element of identity. IV. Collective Action Frame Analysis. To begin the framing analysis, this paper will describe the definitions adopted for the frames, their different logic patterns and components and their application to the discourse of the Catalan nationalist elite. Subsequently, this paper will show the relationship between frames and ideology and the way in which the frames can modify the three modes of ideological interpellation. In general terms, in the words of McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, (1999) *f+rames are the specific metaphors, symbolic representations and cognitive cues used to render or cast behaviour and events in an evaluative mode and suggest alternative modes of action. Analyzing that statement more in depth, and following Gamson (1992) and Chihu and López (2004), it can be concluded that the frames of reference for collective action serve as a guide for the actors to assess a problem and predict the outcome of the mobilization around the conflict. The idea of collective action frames of meaning refers to a schema of interpretation that simplifies and synthesizes reality through the selection, identification and codification of situations, events, experiences and action sequences related to the present or the past of the social movement. (Chihu and López, 2004). Gamson (1992) stresses two central features of the frames: their nature as builders of meaning and their orientation to social mobilization. Besides these two characteristics, the frames put forward three components, which have already been identified: grievance, agency and identity. An analysis of the latter will be tackled first, since it is through identity that the discourse of Catalan conservative nationalism is organized. V. Frame Components 12 Following the explanation given by Miley and Martínez Herrera, it is difficult understand the current sovereigntist process in Catalonia. This because the secession of Catalonia, seriously affect the reproduction of capital, while, break the unit market, probably let Catalonia outside the EU, at least for a while, without ruled out scenarios legal and financial instability and insecurity. The paradox arises when we see that who encourages and pulls the sovereignty process is the political elite, who are presumed to be linked to the ruling class. The relative autonomy of the state, following the terms of Miliband (1969), assumed by the explanation by Miley and Herrera cannot probe beyond the interpersonal relationships of the elite and the bourgeoisie. By contrast, the structural perspective Therborn, allows us a deeper analysis of autonomy of state, and the processes of representation that link and relate the elite social structures and the nationalist ideology. 6

7 a. Identity: The component of identity in the collective action frame can be defined as the process followed to structure a collective subject. This is the way in which the identity that will evolve into the building of an us and them takes shape. In the words of Chihu the component of identity calls for the definition of concrete agents with opposing interests and values, and which can be influenced through collective action. (Chihu and López, 2004) In the framing process, and at the instance of that process, the identities of the actors involved in the conflict posed by the frame are established and built up. There are three classic fields of identity: 1) protagonist, 2) antagonist and 3) audience (Chihu and López, 2004). Protagonist: The protagonist is the one taking action, that is to say, the actor proposing the frame of interpretation; in this case, the frame of identity. Catalan conservative nationalism sets out to establish a clear identification of Catalonia as the protagonist, and succeeds in doing so. The above not only shows in the constant references found in the discourse of the political elites (mainly CiU), but is also a proposal that has penetrated the imaginary of the population. When expressing its preference about the management of the interests of the autonomous community, the population prefers forms that pursue interests different from and opposing those of Spain. The discourse of the hegemonic political elite, as is the case of CiU, constantly refers to that semantic and ideological identification between CiU=Catalonia=Government of the Generalitat=President of the Generalitat. 13 Even though such mechanism is not novel (it was already used rather frequently during Jordi Pujol s administration) it is used once more to define the conception of us itself, through a unification of voices. In other words, the aim is the homogenization of the us and the subordination of the different sensibilities existing in Catalonia, all in the face of the description of the other, clearly associated, using the same basic formula with: PP=Spain=Madrid=State (PP for Popular Party). As argued by Santamaría (2011), CiU s attainment of hegemony is accomplished, among other factors, due to the supremacy of the national cleavage over the class cleavage in terms of representatives and demography. Furthermore, and more importantly, CiU has imposed its concept of nation at the social level, and by using the term social, it refers both to the representatives and the people they represent. As regards the representatives, the research on the over-representation of the bourgeoisie in the political elite has already been quoted (Miley, 2006, 2013; Santamaría, 2011). As regards the people they represent, namely the general population, they have accepted that hegemonic position of the Catalan elite, particularly the political elite, and have also embraced (to a great extent) the vision, that is to say, the frame proposed by this political elite in terms of identity and nation. Antagonist: The antagonist is the actor opposing the frame and is the one responsible (or more accurately) the one to blame, as defined by Giuliano (2011), for the existing 13 It is very common in Catalan nationalist leaders used the metonymic trope: "pars pro toto". 7

8 problems. In this frame, the component of identity proposes a clear antagonist that is linked, as mentioned above, to a series of relationships that have succeeded in the past in drawing that cognitive map the frames are part of. The antagonist, the other, is Spain=Madrid=State, and if that chain of identities is further expanded, a series of concepts or ideas will add up that refer to clearly negative, if not authoritarian, impressions that linger in the collective imaginary: Centralism=homogenization=monarchy. An example is the case of the Minister of Culture of the Generalitat who established a linear relationship between the Bourbon absolutist State and the current State of the autonomous communities which institutions are incapable of thinking of the interest of the citizens and which consider themselves owners of the sovereignty of the Catalan people. 14 The antagonist will be held responsible for what will be discussed below: the blame inherent to grievance. Another element worth noting is that the concept of us has no shades of gray. The whole of the Catalan population is framed based on an us that follows the intention of the hegemonic discourse. Faced with the possibility of different shades, there is a demand for alignment in a single voice and internal cohesion. The Sovereignty declaration passed by the Parliament of Catalonia on January 23, 2013 reads: The social and territorial cohesion of the country and the will expressed on many occasions by Catalan society to maintain Catalonia as a single people shall be guaranteed 15. This us faces the problem posed by the demographic reality of Catalonia which, as stated above, is very similar to the Spanish reality in terms of a great part of its population. (Miley, 2006 and 2013; Ovejero Lucas, 2006 and 2012) Audience: The audience is the part of the population to which the frame is addressed. One of the keys in patterning the frame is the presence of the components of grievance and agency, which have been modified, as will be shown below, with the clear purpose of extending the social base of nationalism in favour of the fight for independence to social sectors that have remained, in a sense, untouched by the national building policies implemented by the Generalitat, and to make those sectors aware of the actual possibility of secession. Before the changes to be studied herein took place, the secessionist strategy, historically speaking, had not reached support figures significantly higher than 26% (Miley, 2006). Therefore, such changes and continuity in the framing processes and in ideological interpellation are of utmost interest. b. Agency: The component of agency refers to the concept whereby the actors themselves are able to modify a certain problematic situation. In the words of Chihu and López, agency allows the individuals to define themselves as agents of their own history. (Chihu and López, 2004) This conception of change will be influenced by the us ; that is to say, an alteration of the state of affairs is only possible through collective action Full text of the Declaration of Sovereignty adopted by the Catalan Parliament 8

9 This is one of the two crucial elements that have changed in Catalan nationalism. The action frames of meaning have shifted towards proposing the actual scenario of the Catalan secession from Spain, and even the need for such secession. Moreover, that actual possibility of secession becomes more real with every single political and institutional action performed in that direction, either the summons of the Advisory Council for National Transition (Consell Assessor per a la Transició Nacional), the passing of the Draft Law on the State's Foreign Service and Action (Projecte de llei de l'acció Exterior), or the declarations of Sovereignty by the Parliament of Catalonia, etc. The latter is extremely revealing since in one of the relevant parts the text reads: the Catalan public has, by reason of democratic legitimacy, political and legal sovereignty 16. This clearly shows the change in the tone with regards to pact-based nationalism as represented by the element of agency. The characteristic of agency present in the idea of secession is even set, as mentioned above, as a necessity. An argumentative pamphlet published by CDC (Democratic Convergence of Catalonia) 17 reads: we need a state to preserve our identity. Such publication was issued immediately after the statement that The economic viability of a sovereign Catalonia and of assuring that and that our state is the guarantee of the welfare state. At this point, change is not only possible but necessary in order to guarantee the welfare State and preserve the identity of the Catalan population. c. Grievance: Grievance is defined by Giuliano (2011:145) as a feeling of having been wronged, and that feeling may be the object of construction, and that construction may be highly mobilizing from the standpoint of social action. Giuliano considers that in the task of building up the grievance *n+ationalist entrepreneurs in particular play a key role in constructing grievance swiftly as part of a contingent process of political mobilization. Nationalist leaders are interested in establishing a nation-state; thus they try to convince ordinary people that they should challenge the existing order. * + Nationalist leaders try to create that sense by convincing ordinary people that they form a group or a nation and that their nation has been deeply wronged. (Giuliano, 2011:145) This grievance can take many forms. This paper will expound two different but supplementary trends that group the different grievances aired by the supporters of the Catalan secessionist process. These two trends are: the economic grievance and the democratic grievance. In both cases, and following Giuliano (2011), Gamson (1992), Della Porta and Diani (2011) and Chihu and López (2004), three elements can be identified as contributors to the success in the strategy of constructing the grievance: the way in which the discourse of the elites (3) establishes a clear relationship between the political and economic structures (1) and the ordinary experience of the population (2). 1. Political and Economic Structures: The economic grievance. Spain is robbing us : 16 For more details see 17 See "El Periodico", the print edition Thursday, August 29, 2013, p. 18 9

10 The problem presented by the economic grievance as central is Catalonia s tax loss. This tax loss, incurred by the Generalitat, has been attributed by the CiU Government of the Generalitat to the spread between the taxes paid by Catalonia to the central State and the devolution of those taxes in the form of services. Such spread has been called fiscal plundering and has been amounted to 16,000 million Euros 18. The claim itself and the terms of the claim, as well as its amount and calculation formula 19 should be studied in a separate analysis, which exceeds the scope and purpose of this paper. Beyond the nature of the so-called tax loss, it is fair to say that the discourse of the Government of the Generalitat makes Spain responsible for the leakage of resources in the form of taxes that corresponds to Catalonia. In other words, it lays the blame on Spain and on the set of identities Spain is identified with for the grievance caused to Catalonia. An example is the statement made by Artur Mas in connection with the deficit budget for 2013 "Catalonia must know that through this deficit the Spanish government is forcing us to make further budget cuts in health, education and social services * + The Spanish government has withheld a great deal of the deficit in order to avoid the political cost of budget cuts and transfers the hardest part to the autonomic governments, and the bottom line is that it s damaging social policies" 20. The structure of the economic grievance, as held by Klandermans (1994), becomes a claim through the hypothesis that the secession would prevent the budget cuts made by the Generalitat. Likewise, and taking into consideration the extremely high unemployment rates in Catalonia and Spain, the Minister of Business and Labour of the Generalitat, Felip Puig, has stated that *t+he tragedy in the effort of the country is the fiscal drag: nowadays, two out of five Euros paid as income tax are gone, never to return * + Catalonia could clearly have its own Social Security system, which could afford all its pension plans, all its unemployment benefits, and with better payments too, with higher amounts * + Catalonia s labour, industrial and economic system generates more benefits and more reserve funds and, therefore, we would be in a position to increase the amounts of unemployment benefits and retirement pensions 21. The Democratic Grievance. The Right to Decide : At the other end of the construction of grievance is the democratic grievance, based upon the claim of the Generalitat (Government and Parliament) that a referendum (the term non-binding is generally used to tone it down) be held regarding the independence of Catalonia from Spain. The main idea behind the referendum is the right to decide, that appeals to a democratic radicalization. 22 The cause or For more details see: See 21 See 22 See López, J Del dret a l autodeterminació al dret a decidir. Quaderns de Recerca, n. 4,

11 unchaining factor is the judgment rendered by the Constitutional Court of Spain, contrary to certain sections of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia amended in This judgment, that amends some of the sections of that Statute of Autonomy, is the central element used by the secessionist movement to ground both the democratic grievance and the right to decide, alleging that such judgment has hampered the development of the self-government desired by Catalonia. It is not the aim of this paper to study the subject any further. However, leaving aside an analysis on the relevance of defining concepts like right to decide or democratic radicalism, what should be highlighted is the fact that there is a breach in the nationalist movement with the pact-based strategy. A clear example is the similarity of the position assumed by the two CiU presidents of Catalonia Jordi Pujol 2324 and Artur Mas 25. They both state that due to the grievance caused by the aforementioned Judgment their position shifted in favour of the independence movement. This strategic shift away from a pact-based approach towards the pursuit of secession is evidenced, with respect to the democratic grievance, by the fact that the Spanish Government is accused of having a democratic deficit by hampering a referendum that is prohibited by the constitution currently in force. The democratic grievance ends up introducing two concepts that are closely related as conflicting elements: the vote, on the one hand, and the democratic procedure, on the other. It is highly illuminating that the members of the Catalan parliament representing political parties that favour the referendum, and who were interviewed by this author for the purpose of this paper, have given an affirmative answer when asked whether there is a democratic deficit in the Spanish State because it hides behind legal issues to obstruct the exercise of democracy. In a similar note, President Artur Mas, presents the democratic legitimacy of the secessionist process as opposed to the Spanish law 26 and claims that "the Spanish democracy is still too young to have acquired that deep-rooted democratic culture that would prepare it to face the problems the as they arise". 27 In this case, the democratic grievance is very effective, since it describes Catalonia s democratic legitimacy as countered by the immobility of Spanish law that hinders the exercise of the democratic free vote of the Catalan people, because there is a lack of political will aiming at blocking the referendum and precluding Catalonia s legitimate right to decide. 2. The Ordinary Experience of the Population: 23 See df 24 See 25 See 26 See 27 See 11

12 The ordinary experience of the population as taken by the element of grievance is embodied by the severe economic, political and institutional crisis. In this way, the acuteness of the crisis, its length and the sense that the economic cycle is ending, has had enormous impact on the Spanish society in general, and the Catalan society in particular. The latter is of peculiar interest since Catalonia and the Basque Country are the autonomous communities which have shown economic and industrial development rates higher than those in the rest of Spain, which resulted in a migration phenomenon of the Spanish population. The other element is the perception of a political and institutional crisis, which in a way feeds on the advance of secessionism. This becomes evident after looking at four key data obtained from the CIS barometer (CIS for Centre of Sociological Research) 28, concerning the worries of the citizens. In the first and second place of that report are unemployment and the economic problems respectively, followed by corruption in the third place, and politicians in general, the political parties and politics in the fourth place. Corruption, political parties and politics in general are considered problematic by the vast majority of the population, an example of which is the monarchy itself 29, involved in corruption and mismanagement scandals, along with the two major national political parties and the party ruling the government of Catalonia, CiU, which have also been affected by similar facts. In short, two inter-related trends can be identified: the economic crisis and the political and institutional crisis, which seriously affect, the former more than the latter, the everyday affairs of the population. Such is the foundation for the social perceptions used by the element of grievance to link the two components: the economic grievance and the democratic grievance. 3. Discourse of the Elites It is the discourse of the elites, both production and reproduction, that links together and is at the heart of the two points mentioned above, namely the political and economic structure and the ordinary experience of the population (Giuliano, 2011). It is from the discourse of the elites that the population, as audience, is interpellated by means of a frame of interpretation that poses a specific metaphor, aligning certain feelings originated by an economic crisis (mostly focused on the issue of unemployment, which particularly affects the economy of the lower and mid sectors of the population), by the institutional crisis and by democratic deficits, all of which is then related to a specific interpretation of the political and economic conditions. In this interpretation proposed by the frame, no co-relation exists between one factor and the other, as would be the case in an act of God or an accident. The relationship herein proposed is that of causality between the political and economic situation and the daily life of the population. The frame establishes a relationship of cause and effect: an actor causes a grievance. The situation leading to the ordinary experience of 28 See Archivos/Indicadores/documentos_html/TresProblemas.html 29 The author acknowledges the contributions of Antonio Santamaria. 12

13 the population is originated by the grievance caused by the antagonist to the collective, namely Catalonia. This is the central piece in the framing of grievance. The element that stands out and turns grievance so peculiar with respect to other frames of interpretation, like identity, is the attribution of blame assigned by the grievance. It is the attribution of blame present in the discourse of the elites that turns the grievance into a claim (Klandermans, 1994, Giuliano, 2011) by connecting people s material experience to the fate of their ethnic community (Giuliano, 2011:148). In other words, *n+ationalist leaders, then, attracted popular support not simply by picking up on pre-existing attitudes among aggrieved ethnic populations but by actively creating grievance that interpreted economic information in ethnic terms (Giuliano, 2011). The attribution of blame mobilizes that feeling described as moral indignation (Chihu and López, 2004), and for such a feeling to exist it is necessary that the individuals become aware that there are motivated human actors in society that intentionally create and sustain a situation of harm and suffering over other actors. (Chihu and López, 2004). That moral indignation highlights the emotional dimension of the action, an element successfully exploited by Catalan nationalism, as held by Ovejero Lucas 30. This feeling of fraternal relative deprivation 31, is related to that feeling of indignation described by Gamson (1992) as anger, stating that: it "puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul". In the case under study, the argument set forth by the frame is the following: the grievance caused by Spain to Catalonia at the economic level, and embodied by the socalled fiscal plundering, forces the Government of the Generalitat to make economic and social budget cuts because it lacks the resources to provide solutions. From the perspective of the democratic grievance, the frame prevents Catalonia from exercising free speech by precluding the vote on secession. There are several innovations with respect to other similar interpretations, such as the ERC speeches in the late 80 s: - The ordinary experience of the population has dramatically worsened. - The element of grievance is adopted by CiU, a political party which position has been, historically, pact-based rather than radical, and which is the hegemonic political force in Catalonia. - The interpretation of the economic grievance attempts at extending the social base of support to Catalan nationalism to sectors that have traditionally been either hostile of indifferent to the cause and that have historically shown a dual character. - This introduction of the element of grievance is supported by a reinforcement of the element of identity, which intensifies the ethno-cultural strategy of Catalan nationalism. 30 See Emociones y rezones, of Félix Ovejero, available on line 31 For the concept of fraternal relative deprivation see Gurr, TR (1974). 13

14 The solution proposed by the frame is secession. The secession carried out by this protagonist addresses with a single action both the conflict and the grievances. It provides a simple solution to a problem presented in a simple way. Naturally, reality is rather more complex than the interpretations proposed by the frames in general and the grievance in particular. One of the main effects of the frame is homogenization through the identity fields proposed. The frame standardizes and homogenizes the different identities in its vision of reality (Klandermans, 1994). In the Catalan case, the frame interpellates the citizens in terms of the element of identity and forces them to take a stand in accordance with that interpellation. One of the most significant effects of a successful framing is the patterning of a demos, that is to say, of a people, that relates to that national collective entity whether it is Catalonia or Spain is indifferent, and that subsumes and subordinates the individual identities, operating as an empty signifier by blending the different identities into a single one. Some distinctive characteristics of the grievance: Continuous action: The hegemonic political elite mostly represented by CiU (although because of that hegemony that discourse can be found in other political parties as well) never stops the production and reproduction of the grievance in its discourse. This work is symbolic and unceasing, and so far no challenger has been able to respond with a frame equally effective, neither within Catalonia nor in the rest of Spain. Permanent tension: There is permanent tension in connection with the problem posed in the frame (which proves its effectiveness). As a result, all the political and institutional reality is seen through the glass of secession, whether because of the grievances or because of the supplementary frame of identity. Change in legitimacy: The frames establish a change in the dynamics of institutional legitimacy. The demands for decision are established in terms of Catalonia s feelings of estrangement from Spain, and of a feeling of lack of understanding and fitting. Even the grievances relate to the emotional aspect, regardless of the objective data, since the argument is that the Catalan people feel unfairly treated 32. All of the above insofar as the frames operate as symbolic constructions aiming at the cognitive and emotional dimensions of the action (Máiz, 2003). Internal hegemony: An issue that should not be disregarded about the way the element of identity operates and the role played by the nationalist parties in Catalonia from the transition onwards, is the hegemonic political position of Catalan nationalism. That nationalism (that is not a true reflection of the sensibilities of the population 33 ) as argued by José Luis Álvarez is the platform of hegemony for the Catalan bourgeoisie, and CiU is its political party See Emociones y razones, of Félix Ovejero, available on line 33 See Miley, 2006; 2011 y 2013; Martínez Herrera, 2002; Ovejero Lucas, 2006 y 2012; y Santamaría, See note 5. 14

15 VI. Frame Resonance Resonance is a concept developed by Snow and Bendford (1988) and refers to the process whereby the frames resonate through cultural stories and traditional tales. The purpose of resonance is to increase the impact of the frame since it appears natural and familiar because it has the same sonority (Chihu and López, 2004). In this case, frame resonance aims at linking the frames of the secessionist discourse with packages of cultural ideas or stories that offer a vision composed of two identity fields. On the one hand is the imago of Spain as traditional, conservative, reactionary and closely linked to Franquism with the ideological burden it entails. On the other hand, a vision of a modern, European, democratic Catalonia that mobilizes democratically to face the historic oppressor for grievances it has been suffering since These resonances are extremely powerful since they set in motion series of images that reminisce 35 a past (not very distant when it comes to Franquism) that has scarred Spain in a terrible, tragic way. VII. Frames and Ideology. Contributions to an Explanatory Model. The analysis of frames and the analysis of ideology are concepts that have been interrelated since the beginnings of frame analysis. A clear example is the work of Snow and Benford (2000), and their controversy with Oliver and Johnston (2000a and 2000b) regarding the relationship between frames and ideology. So are the works by B. Jessop (2006) and McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, (1999), Chihu and López (2004), and of course the classic work by Laraña and Gusfield (1994). In such sense, and as argued by McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, (1999) the framing processes are the interpretations and meanings that give shape to the ideology, the group s discourse. However, even those authors are extremely meticulous when describing the relationship between the ideology and the frames: Ideology is the set of beliefs that are used to justify or challenge a given social-political order and are used to interpret the political world. Frames are the specific metaphors, symbolic representations and cognitive cues used to render behaviour and events in an evaluation mode and to suggest alternative modes of action. * + Ideologies tend to be more complex and logical systems of beliefs than frames, though frames may be embedded in ideologies (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1999: 371). This section will argue that the frames constitute a discursive process within the ideologies. The frames are processes within processes, namely the ideologies, which comprise them and to which they affix. The frames appeal to a very specific aspect of the social reality while the ideology, through interpellation, provides us with a means to act according to our conscience, that struggles to understand the political world; and the relationship between the two is of dialectical nature. In some cases, the ideological elements are used in the framing process; and in some other cases, as the 35 Following Lacán (1979) "The function of language is not to inform but to evoke." 15

16 one under study, the frames modify the modes of ideological interpellation. Chihu (2002), explains it as follows: The frames that build up social movements operate as a conceptual platform on which the ideology of the movement is erected. Therefore, framing analysis provides significant cues as to the ideology of the movement and allows us to identify under which circumstances the social cohesion necessary for the success of the collective actions exists. (Chihu and López, 2004) Ideology means that aspect of human condition under which human beings live their lives as conscious actors in a world that makes sense to them to varying degrees. Ideology is the medium through which this consciousness and meaningfulness operate. The consciousness of every new-born human being is formed through largely unconscious psychodynamic processes, and it functions in and through a symbolic order of language codes. Ideology, however, is not reducible to either of these. (Therborn, 1987:1-2) In this way, ideology is conceived more as a process rather than crystallization, different from culture, and it also sets forth the unbreakable bond between base and superstructure, although each term can be analyzed in isolation. Understanding ideology as a process, in Althusserian terms, means to see it as a form of human subjectification and a form of interpellation among individuals. Therefore, ideology operates as a discourse addressing or in the words of Althusser, interpellating individuals as subjects (Therborn, 1987:13). That interpellation of individuals as subjects also brings forth the concepts of subjection and qualification in the dialectical relationship of interpellation, meaning there is a dual relationship between subject and ideology. Thus, *q+ualified by ideological interpellations, subjects also become qualified to qualify these in return, in the sense of specifying them and modifying their range of application (Therborn, 1987:15). This double subjection-qualification process involves an interpellation by, and recognition in, the central Subject (State, Nation, God, etc.) Such interpellation, according to Therborn, involves three fundamental modes of ideological interpellation. Ideologies subject and qualify subjects by telling them, relating them to and making them recognize: (Therborn, 1987:15) what exists, what is good and what is possible. To sum up, ideology is understood herein as a process of permanent dialectical tension through which men give meaning to the world and voice their conscience and that, as a complex social process, has three fundamental defining characteristics: 1) they are of dialectical nature, 2) they are social processes of interpellation and 3) they involve material (ultimately, of course) determination. Three Ideological Concepts: What Exists, What is Good and What is Possible. This paper shall focus on the three possible modes of ideological interpellation that operate in the subjection-qualification process, and analyze the ideological positioning of the discourse of Catalan conservative nationalism. Following Therborn, it is fair to say that there are three questions or modes of interpellation: 16