Individuals, Institutions and Public Policy: Making the Linkages

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1 DRAFT Individuals, Institutions and Public Policy: Making the Linkages B. Guy Peters University of Pittsburgh How to link individuals and institutions has been one of the persistent questions in institutional theory. This question is in some ways a restatement of some aspects of the familiar structure versus agency debate in the social sciences, but has become more relevant as institutional theory has become one of the dominant approaches for studying political science and public policy. As Grafstein (1991) has pointed out, there is a fundamental paradox involved in this linkage: individuals create institutions but then are constrained by them. Indeed, in many cases individuals create institutions in order to be constrained by them. 1 The linkage between the institutions in the public sector is important for ordinary citizens, but it may be especially significant for the members of those institutions, given the involvement of politicians and public servants in making and implementing public policy. And again these linkages are reciprocal, as institutions constrain the actions of their members, but individuals also shape the institutions within which they function. And further the members of the institution can be conceptualized as linkages with external political and social forces that also want to shape the institution and the policies adopted through the institution. The linkage between individuals and institutions is to some degree a matter of conscious design, but also is a more subtle and indirect activity. Certainly the designers of major institutions in the public sector, such as the framers of constitutions (Sartori, 1997) have in mind constraining some behaviors of the individuals who will populate those institutions, and encouraging other behaviors by those institution members. To be effective in that framing these designers must have some hypotheses about the behavior of individuals 2, and a rather dark perspective about the venality of homus politicus tends to dominate this framing often accurately. 1 The obvious example is a constitution created in order that all political actors may constrain their own actions and the actions of their competitors for power. 2 One example would be the assumption of the framers of the constitution of the Fifth Republic in France that the parties (and individuals) on the political Left would never cooperate with one another and hence the two ballot system would guarantee dominance for the political Right. This assumption proved accurate until the election of 1981 when the Left coalesced and the Right had more of a split. -1-

2 Although framed in a certain manner, constitutions and other formal institutional arrangements evolve in part through the actions of their members attempting to cope with a changing environment and in part through the changing political ideas of the members. In organization theory the significance of informal organization has been a mainstay of theorizing (see for example Williamson, 1973), and in comparative politics there has been an increasing understanding of the role of informal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky, 2003). One way of understanding these linkages between individuals and institutions is to consider the fundamental social mechanisms that are at work in the dynamics of institutions. This interest in social mechanisms began primarily as a means of understanding causal processes in social and political life (Norkus, 2005; Mayntz, 2004; but see Gerring, 2010), and as an alternative to social science based on variables and correlation especially correlations at the macro -level. A mechanisms based conception of theory focuses on identifying the basic social tools, such as power, that generate behaviors and therefore involves methodologies such as process-tracing. While that role of understanding social processes remains the primary function for social mechanisms in the social sciences, it also has substantial utility for understanding the dynamics within institutions and organizations., 1998; Macey and Flache, 2009) has focused on the identification and analysis of these mechanisms, often within institutions. Most of this literature, however, has focused on social institutions rather than on institutions within the public sector. We can, however, consider the linkages between institutions such as the public bureaucracy and its members in much the same way. While the range of institutions and mechanisms may be broader among the social institutions, the logic is much the same within public sector institutions and organizations. For example, most bureaucratic organizations use a combination of Weberian authority, normative pressure, and remunerative incentives to gain compliance. The literature on formal structures within organizations, and on the informal organizations that may or may not support the formal structures, can provide the foundation for this analysis (see Page, 1992). Indeed, most of the organizational literature implicitly or explicitly emphasizes the linkages between individuals and organizations, and especially emphasizes the means of generating compliance within the organization. These interactions between institutions and individuals can be conceptualized in terms of possible stable combinations of patterns of internal control and patterns of individual v v. A E z 1961) f z through the discussion of matches and mismatches in compliance structures and motivations has been largely forgotten in the study of institutions.(see Table 1). Although his work was based on only three possible types of motivations and compliance patterns, the increased interest in social mechanisms will provide a wider range of options and should provide an even richer analysis of these linkages. -2-

3 Further, although the Etzioni framework emphasized stable patterns of compliance of individuals with the organization or institution, the mismatches may also say something about the capacity of individuals to influence the institutions, and may be a useful mechanism for explaining institutional change. For example, militaries had to alter somewhat their manner of dealing with troops (see Levy, 2007) when they switched from being based on a draft (alienative involvement) to an all volunteer force (remunerative or even moral). Likewise, the US federal prisons had to alter their internal practices when faced with an influx of violent as opposed to white collar criminals (Boin, 2001). We can extend this organizational literature on compliance and the role of informality to examine these comparative patterns among institutions. (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). Although conceptualized more as informal institutions, this analysis points to how formal public sector institutions interact with social institutions to produce policies, and variations among those policies. Perhaps most importantly, this analysis demonstrates the manner in which formal and informal structures can complement one another in the process of governing, rather like formal and informal organization. Control of members within institutions and organizations is rather well conceptualized. The upward linkages between individual members of the organization/institution tend to be less wellunderstood. Within public organizations the familiar literature on street-level bureaucracy provides some inklings about the manner in which lower echelon workers influence not only their clients but also their organizations (Meyer and Nielsen, 2012). In addition, the attitudes and values of lower echelon workers, and clients, may also influence the capacity of institutions to manage in certain ways, I. e. the ability to use authority may be limited if lower-echelon employees distrust the leadership of the organization. These capacities to govern through authority also vary as general acceptance of authority within the society also varies. For the public sector this change in the acceptance of authority is perhaps particularly crucial as the legitimacy of governments may influence overall acceptance of the dictates of leadership both within the institutions and among citizens. The recent (perceived) scandal in the Internal Revenue Service in the United States was discussed widely among the chattering classes as undermining even further public confidence in the federal government, and making it therefore more difficult for the IRS to perform its central task of collecting taxes. In addition, people constitute the raw materials for most institutions within the public sector they are characteristically people processing institutions. This is perhaps particularly evident in areas of social policy but also even in policy areas such as defense that depend upon large number of individuals being involved in the delivery of policies. While these institutions may have formal structures and rules, they are also dependent upon the compliance of those individuals, and tend to perform better if there is more than grudging acquiescence from their members and clients. The variety of possible mechanisms for linkages can be related to the varieties of institutional theory. For example, the sociological approach to institutionalism is associated with the use of norms, values, routines, myths, symbols, etc. (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; March and Olsen, 1985). The mechanisms at play here are obviously different from the utilitarian mechanisms at -3-

4 play in rational choice conceptions of institutions which assume that the manipulation of incentives and disincentives can produce the desired behaviors from individuals. Within historical institutionalism some scholars have assumed that positive feedback and learning maintain the path dependency that is central to that approach (Pierson, 2000). The Varieties of Linkages k p p v institutions is rather vague, especially given that institutions are not static and go through life cycles just as do their members. Therefore, we need to consider how individuals and institutions interact at various stages in those life cycles. Clearly individuals will be more relevant at some stages while the mechanisms within the institutions themselves may be dominant at other stages. A k z v v the environment. For the purposes of this paper can conceptualize institutions having at least three major stages or v in their lives that involve interactions between individuals and the institutions. The first is the formation of the institution, whether by conscious design or through evolution. Then institutions will have periods of maintenance in which they function in a relatively routine manner, And finally institutions change, whether in increments or through large-scale p, I, f p p k f extreme version of change. 3 To this point in the paper I also have been treating institutions and institutionalism as a relatively undifferentiated whole. If, however, we consider institutions through the several lenses in the literature (Peters, 2010; Hall and Taylor, 1993) we can identify a range of possible patterns of linkage and intermediation. These various forms of linkage between actors and institutions also involve the use of different instruments to secure those linkages, and also should expect differing degrees of success. Likewise, some versions place greater emphasis on individual decisions than on the role of structure (Scharpf, 1997). To understand the interaction of individuals and institutions we need to consider both the stage of action for the institution and the theoretical perspective on institutions. If we consider the three stages mentioned above and four versions of institutionalism already mentioned: normative, rational choice, historical and discursive then we have a twelve cell table. Unfortunately, not all cells in this table appears to be filled, given that the various versions of institutionalism are mute on some aspects of the life of institutions. That absence of conceptualization within the approach does, however, say a good deal about the approach and its utility for these purposes. Peters (1986). 3 For a version of this analysis concerning public sector organizations see Hogwood and -4-

5 The remainder of the paper will be organized around Table 1. I will go through each of the columns of the table, examining how well each of the approaches provides a linkage between the individual action and the institution at particular stage of the life cycle of the institution, The relationship, however, is not that simple and within each there is a question of how individuals shape the institution as well as how institutions shape the individual. In very few instances, however, is there a clear answer on both directions of linkage, with the role of institutions in shaping individuals being slightly better articulated in these approaches. Formation of Institutions and Policies The first observation to be made here is that the approaches to institutionalism do not do a very good job of explaining the formation of institutions. The only version of institutionalism that has a clear conception of formation is the rational choice approach. That said, this approach to institutions has its own internal variations, so that there are at least two different social mechanisms involved. For most conceptions of rational choice institutionalism there is an assumption (perhaps implicit) that institutions will be created through design and through hierarchy. For example, in the veto-point perspective associated with George Tsebelis (2000) the assumption is that institutions can, and will, be designed. The notion of veto points helps the designer understand how to design in order to produce the desired behaviors within the institution. In the principal-agent conception of rational choice institutionalism the role of the principal is not all that different from the designer in the veto-point approach. In this conception the institution is defined by a series of delegations of authority by the principals, with the agents assumed to follow the directives of the principals. The formation of the institution in this conception comes through making that delegation. The fundamental instrument at work then is hierarchy, with the assumption that principals will monitor the behaviors of their agents and punish malefactors (see Brehm and Gates, 2000). For the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) version of rational choice institutionalism associated with Elinor Ostrom (Araral, 2013) the formation of the institution is perhaps the central contribution of the theory. The argument is that actors can cooperate to form institutions to overcome collective action problems without the use of authority. Thus, in this model of institution bargaining and learning are central elements of formation, with individuals involved in those processes being central to the formation. Further, some scholars have also argued that principal-agent relationships are evolving, and are increasingly defined by bargaining rather than imposition (Miller, 2005; Marsh and Spies-Butcher, 2009). The other three versions of institutionalism are largely silent on the formation of institutions. The normative approach to institutions talks mor about the transition of organizations into institutions (see below) than about formation per se. Historical institutionalism talks about the f v, L, 1992) 2008) later emphasized the importance of social engineering in politics. Despite that, but there is little sense of agency expressed when that formative moment is mentioned, and agency appears irrelevant -5-

6 for the arguments being advanced in this approach. Discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2010) has a somewhat stronger sense of the role of individuals in the formation of institutions, although that role of agency is expressed primarily through the role of ideas in shaping institutions (see also Campbell, 2002). Even for the versions of institutionalism that do have some clear conception of the formation of institutions the mechanisms involved in that formation are often not discussed explicitly. In contrast to the IAD model that does have a clear idea about formation, the other versions of rational choice appear to assume authority, or perhaps the power of good ideas, but are still not very explicit about the mechanism,. And they are certainly not explicit in tracking through the process through which the mechanism is utilized in formulating and implementing the design. For all of these conceptions of institutions and institutional theory the concept of institutionalization is important for understanding formation. For example, the Selznick (1947) notion that institutions are created places a great deal of emphasis on the leaders of the structure v, z. p infusing the structure with values, much as Peters and Waterman (2004) argue that the principal task of leadership in organizations (especially firms) is creating the organizational culture. Through whatever mechanisms, institutionalization involves building an institutionalization through routinization, values, or perhaps power. Maintaining the Institution The second stage in the life-cycle of institutions and the second task for the leaders of institutions is to maintain those institutions once they have been created. The various theories contained within institutionalism tend to have more to say about the maintenance of institutions than they did about formation. Indeed, one of the problems with institutional theory has been that it tends to treat institutions as if they always were and always will be. In reality institutions are always in a process of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization and their maintenance is a crucial task for those involved with the institutions. The clearest explication of maintenance linkages is found in the normative institutionalism of March and Olsen (1989). This conception of institutions depends upon the capacity of the f v, f pp p. Learning constitutes the primary instrument for creating that internal logic, as members of the z f.,,... and all the other normative elements of the institution that guide decisions within that structure. Much of the analysis of this style of institutionalism is focused on the fundamental problem of maintaining the values of the institution. On the other hand, most versions of rational choice institutionalism do not focus on the maintenance of the institution, and are much more concerned with formation and change than with preservation. The underlying assumption is that if the appropriate mixture of incentives and disincentives is available within the institution it will be successful in maintaining its initial -6-

7 design and in achieving its goals. Although implicit, however, there is a clear conception of social mechanisms contained within these approaches, at least in the rather general sense of incentives and disincentives. 4 To some extent historical institutionalism is all about maintenance and little else, at least in its original formulation (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 1992). The emphasis on path dependence in this approach to institutionalism makes maintenance a defining element of the institution, and in this case also the policies associated with the institution. 5 Although there is a clear emphasis on maintaining the institution within the historical institutionalism the mechanisms are somewhat less clear, at least in the initial formulation of the approach. The assumption appeared to be simply that institutions and programs in the public sector are inertial and conservative. Later work in historical institutionalism has developed explanations for path dependence and maintenance in institutions. Pierson (2000), for example, emphasized the importance of positive feedbacks in maintaining the involvement of members of the institution. This would be true for both political elites and the clients of programs. And, analogous to the logic of economic versions of path dependency, the potential of the transaction costs involved in moving away from the status quo. In both of these cases the mechanisms involved are economic, either costs or benefits, rather than more social mechanisms such as authority or even power. Finally, the model of institutional maintenance involved in discursive institutionalism depends, f v., v much like institutions within the normative model) maintains itself through a set of norms and values that are expressed in an internal discourse. 6 This coordinative discourse is, however, less stable than the norms and values assumed within normative institutionalism so that maintenance of any institutional equilibrium is short-lived. Rather, in rather sharp contrast to the historical institutionalism significant internal change is assumed. And in terms of social mechanisms the institution appears to be defined by continuing negotiation over its discourses, perhaps especially the internal, coordinative discourse. Institutional Change 4 These incentives and disincentives tend to thought of in remunerative terms, although they could be no v. I f pp p f q. F, v v ) v, with individual members receiving punishments if they fail to comply with the stated preferences of the institution and/or its leadership. 5 Indeed, the historical institutionalism tends to define institutions around specific policies or in economic versions specific products (David, 1985). 6 v institution to the outside world. -7-

8 The third stage of institutional life, for the purposes of this paper, is change. Institutions are generally conceptualized in terms of stability rather than in terms of change, and in general institutional theories have been less successful in explaining change than in explaining stability. Indeed, the usual critique of institutionalism that it is static and can not cope adequately with change. That said, these approaches do have something to say about how institutions change, and particularly how they change in response to changes in their environments. For rational choice institutionalism change is to some extent formation redux. In most versions of institutionalism change is easy, as it simply involves some authoritative actor developing a new set of incentives and disincentives. As individual preferences are assumed to be exogenous and largely uniform changes in behavior will follow readily. The same mechanisms as were involved in formation will be involved in change, both for the actors imposing the change and for the actors responding to the change (including those for whom or on whom the policies are being imposed). The IAD version of rational choice institutionalism may pose greater difficulties for change. As the solutions to collective action problems contained in this approach represent the outcome of bargaining processes and thus may represent an equilibrium which upset may require extensive additional bargaining, and perhaps produce an inferior solution, change will be threatening. To the extent that it occurs, however, the change will be produced through the same mechanisms as the initial solutions to the problem. Change in the normative version of institutionalism appears to come about primarily through conflicts between the essential normative structure of the institution and its environment, or its own actions (Brunsson and Olsen, 1993). For example, if the normative structure of the surrounding society changes more rapidly than that within the institution then the institution must adapt or perhaps terminate. This is especially true for institutions, e.g. the military, that depend upon a particular social mechanism (authority) that becomes less prevalent in the surrounding society whose members are processed through the institution. 7 The notions of change within the normative version of institutionalism depend on the role of leadership and elites within the institution. It is they who are responsible for altering the normative structure of the institution and re-socializing members into a new set of values. For example, the numerous reforms of public administration implemented over the past several decades have required leaders in government and within the individual organizations to convince the workers within those organizations that the new, more market-driven ways of managing the public sector were superior to the traditional administrative system. This is not to deny that 7 This was, for example, true for the US military during the Vietnam War when draftees simply did not accept authority in the manner expected by officers, and by the institution as a whole. This change in the society produced a shift toward greater negotiation rather than the imposition of authority, especially in the field. -8-

9 change can be initiated from within the institution, requiring some negotiation across levels and some eventual acceptance by leadership. 8 As something of an aside, it should be noted that leadership comes up in several of these versions of institutionalism. This rather old-fashioned concept has been making a return to prominence in p, 2013). ff j p very much, especially from the perspective of social mechanisms (Helms and Peters, 2013). The literature on leadership points to a variety of methods and a variety of purposes for leadership, so as we consider how elites form institutions and promote change within those institutions, it is crucial to be specific about the mechanisms in use. The historical institutionalism poses the most important challenges for understanding change. The defining feature of this version of institutionalism is the commitment to path dependence. In 9 the original discussion of historical institutionalism change occurred primarily if not x v p q, p institutions. These changes are (presumably) more a function of environmental than internal factors. The agency associated with those changes is not apparent and likewise the social mechanism involved in change in this perspective is rather unclear. The numerous critiques of the concept of punctuated equilibrium led to the development of additional perspectives on change, focused more on gradual change (Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Mahoney and Thelen, 2009). The various types of change in these perspectives does include agency in the analysis. For example, and attempts to contextualize the types of change likely, but the mechanisms involved are still somewhat indistinct. But at least there is some movement away from the extremely simplistic conception of change as occurring only through large-scale interruptions of an existing equilibrium. Finally, change in discursive institutionalism tends to rely on the same sort of social mechanisms as are encountered at its creation. That is, if the institution is formed by reaching some equilibrium of discourse through bargaining and exchange (of ideas) then change occurs in much the same way. The primary difference would be that in the case of change there is (obviously) an existing coordinative discourse that must be addressed in change. The conflict between the existing dominant discourse and the prospective replacement discourse may resemble the dynamics in the advocacy-coalition framework of Sabatier (1988), with negotiation and reframing generating a compromise that does not threaten the stakeholders. Individuals, Institutions and Policy 8 This was to some extent true for the Gore Reforms in the United States. See Peters and Savoie (1994). 9 The environmental dependence of change does not contain any description of how environmental conditions are perceived -9-

10 The mechanisms for internal control within institutions mentioned above may also be extended to consider the manner in which the institutions make and implement policy. Much of the institutional literature has focused attention on the internal dynamics of those institutions rather than being concerned with the manner in which those institutions influence their environment. I p v f p compliance (Hartlapp and Falkner, 2009; See also Shafir, 2012), and more collective outcomes of policy. The linkage between policy and institutions can be done in two ways. One would be to refer k L 1971) p. While cause is perhaps too strong a word, the argument would be that the nature of the policy being implemented, and the mechanisms shaping the institution, would be related. For example, regulatory policies that rely heavily on formal legal compliance might also produce relatively similar styles of management and behavior within the institutions and organizations responsible for these polices. As noted above concerning people-processing institutions, the need to interact with individual clients will affect the internal structure and behavior of the institutions. There may also be intermediary linkages between the nature of policy and the institutions of governance, a linkage that may be seen most clearly in social policy. The linkage here depends upon the street-level bureaucrats mentioned above who deliver programs and have frequent contacts with members of the public, especially the less affluent members (see Dubois, 2010; Auyero, 2012). Thus, while institutions assign these individuals roles and expect certain types of behaviors defined largely through legal authority, those individuals also shape institutions through their willingness (at least at time to advocate for their clients). The alternative perspective on the linkage between policy and institutions is through policy instruments. Just as social mechanisms represent basic means of producing and organizing action, policy instruments represent fundamental means of influencing the economy and society (see Salamon, 2001; Le Gales, 2010). But those policy instruments are far from neutral in institutional or political terms and have real consequences for the internal dynamics of institutions (Howlett, 2000; Peters, 2000). Further, as governments have increasingly focused f p M, 2004) v v p depend less on power and authority and more on negotiation. This paper has been concerned with the linkages among individuals, institutions and policy. In so doing it has explored the complex interactions of micro and macro-level phenomena in policymaking, and attempted to illustrate the manner in which fundamental mechanisms (both social and instrumental) can shape those interactions. Although institutions are important in both political theory and in everyday discourse about governing, the multiple conceptions of institutions in the literature requires careful consideration of the several possible interpretations of these structures, and the implications of each. This analysis has focused perhaps more in the internal dynamics of the institutions than on the linkage with policy. This is because, to some extent, the linkages with policy are implied by the nature of the mechanisms assumed to be functioning internally. So, normative institutionalism -10-

11 assumes that policies will be driven by norms just as internal commitment of the members of institutions is driven by norms. And rational choice institutionalism assumes much of the same calculative logic for policy as is assumed to operate within the institution. Conclusion This paper has attempted to unpack some of the complexities, and the potential, of social mechanisms as they operate within political institutions. I have addressed these issues through examining the various approaches to institutionalism in the existing literature. For each of these approaches I have attempted to understand how institutions are created, change and maintain themselves. Although all allegedly components of a broad political science approach to institutions, these versions of institutionalism all have their own perspectives on what constitutes institutions, and on the mechanisms that make institutions function. To understand how these various versions of institutionalism function internally, and how they relate to public policies I have attempted to understand the fundamental social mechanisms in operation within each conception of institutions, and especially how they operate at various stages in the life cycles of those institutions. The difficulty in performing this analysis is that many of these theoretical approaches are not always clear how they function at all these stages of the lives of institutions. They may be very clear about some aspects of the lives of institutions, e.g. both normative and discursive institutionalism about maintenance, but then very opaque about other stages. And these approaches may be even less clear about how the institutions relate to public policies. One of the weaknesses of many approaches to institutions in the public sector is that although they may be defined by policies (especially historical institutionalism), they do not make explicit linkages between their internal performance and their activities directed at the external environment. This is contrast to the manner in which most economics and management versions of institutions function, with very clear concerns about their impact on the environment, and the impact of the environment (the market) on the internal functioning of the institution. Although the utilization of social mechanisms to understand the dynamics of institutions does provide insights into these structures, the lack of adequate specification of the theories in these terms makes the analysis less powerful than it could be. That said, however, the attempt to identify the fundamental mechanisms associated with these institutions and their functioning can begin to further elaborate the theories. The continued theoretical development of institutionalism can benefit from the consideration of these version of social theory, as well as greater specificity concerning the internal dynamics of these structures. References: -11-

12 Araral, E. (2013) The Ostrom Workshop and Its Contributions to a Second Generation Research Agenda in Policy Studies, Paper at ICPP, Grenoble, June. Auyero, J. (2012) Patients of the State: The Politics of Waiting in Argentina (Durham, NC: Duke University Press). Boin, A. (2001) Crafting Public Institutions: Leadership in two Prison Systems (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner). Brehm, J. and S. Gates (2000) Working, Shirking and Sabotage: Bureaucratic Responses to a Democratic Public (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press). Brunsson, N. And J. P. Olsen (1993) The Reforming Organization (London: Routledge). Campbell, J. (2002) Ideas, Politics and Public Policy, Annual Review of Sociology 28, David, Paul A. (1985). Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, The American Economic Review 75, Dubois, V. (2010) The Bureaucrat and the Poor: Encounters in a French Welfare Office (Aldershot: Ashgate). Etzioni, A. (1961) A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations: On Power, Involvement and their Correlates (New York: Free Press of Glencoe). Gerring, J. (2010) Causal mechanisms: Yes, But..., Comparative Political Studies 43, Grafstein, R. (1991) Institutional Realism: Social and Political Constraints on Rational Actors (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press). Hall, P. A and R. C. R. Taylor (1996) Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, Political Studies 44, Hartlapp, M. And G. Falkner (2009) Problems of Operationalization and Data in EU Compliance Research, European Union Politics 10, Hedström, P. and R. Swedborg (1998) Social Mechanisms: An Analytic Approach to Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Helmke, G. and S. Levitsky (2003) Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda, Perspectives on Politics Helms, L. (2013) The Handbook of Political Leadership (Basingstoke: Macmillan). Hogwood, B. W. And B. G. Peters (1986) Policy Dynamics (Brighton: Wheatsheaf). -12-

13 Howlett, M. (2000) Managing the Hollow State: Procedural Policy Instruments and Modern Governance, Canadian Public Administration 43, Le Gales, P. (2010) Policy Instruments, in M. Bevir, ed., Sage Handbook of Governance (London: Sage). Levy, Y. (2007) Soldiers as Laborers: A Theoretical Model, Theory and Society 36, Lowi, T. J. (1972) Four Systems of Politics, Policy and Choice, Public Administration Review 32, Macey, M. and A. Flache (2009) Social Dynamics from the Bottom-up. In P. Hedstrom and P. Bearman, eds., Oxford Handbook of Analytic Sociology (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Mahoney, J. and K. Thelen (2009) Explaining Institutional Change (New York: Cambridge University Press). March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P., (1989), Rediscovering institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics. New York, NY: Free Press. Marsh, I. And B. Spies-Butcher (2009) Pragmatist and Neo-Classical Policy Paradigms in Public Services: Which is the Better Template for Policy Design?, Australian Journal of Public Administration 68, Mayntz, R. (2004) Mechanisms in the Analysis of Social Macro-Phenomena, Philosophy of Social Science Meyer, J. W. And B. Rowan (1977) Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, American Journal of Sociology, 83, Meyer, M. K. and V. L. Nielsen (2012) Street Level Bureaucracy, In B. G. Peters and J. Pierre, eds., The Handbook of Public Administration, 2 nd ed. (London: Sage). Miller, G. J. (2005) The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models, Annual Review of Political Science 8, Mörth, U. (2004) Soft Law in Governance and Regulation: An Interdisciplinary Analysis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). Norkus, Z. (2005) Mechanisms as Miracle Makers: The Rise and Inconsistencies of the M App, History and Theory 44, Page, E. C. (1992) Political Authority and Bureaucratic Power, 2 nd ed. (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf). -13-

14 Peters, B. G. (2000) Policy Instruments and Public Management: Bridging the Gap, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 10, Peters, B. G. (2010) Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism 3 rd. Ed. (London: Continuum). Peters, B. G. (2013) Executive Leadership in Comparative Perspective: Politicians, Bureaucrats and Public Governance, in Helms, ed., The Handbook of Political Leadership (Basingstoke: Macmillan) Peters, B. G. And D. J. Savoie (1994) Civil Service Reform: Misdiagnosing the Patient, Public Administration Review 54, Peters, T. J. And R. H Waterman (2004) In Search of Excellence Lessons from America s Best- Run Companies, 2 nd ed. (New York: Harper-Collins). Pierson, P. (2000) Increasing Return, Path Dependence and the Study of Politics, American Political Science Review 94, Sabatier, P. A. (1988) The Advocacy Coalition Framework for Policy Change and the Role of Policy-oriented Learning Therein, Policy Sciences 21, Sartori, G. (1997) Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes (Washington Square, NY: New York University Press). Scharpf, F. W. (1997) Games Real Actors Play: Actor-centered Institutionalism in Policy Research (Boulder, CO: Westview Press). Schmidt, V. A. (2010) Taking Ideas and Discourse Seriously: Explaining Change through Discursive Institutionalism as the Fourth New Institutionalism. European Political Science Review 2, z k, P. 1996) I O N, Administrative Science Quarterly 41, Commentaire [Comment1]: Comme nty I I added this for Schmidt (2010) for p.4 in Chapter 6. There was only Schmidt (2008) here Shafir, E. (2012) The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Steinmo, S. (2008) Historical Institutionalism, in D. Della Porta and M. Keating, eds., Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Steinmo, S., K. Thelen and F. Longstreth (1992) Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). -14-

15 Streeck, W. and K. Thelen. (2005) Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Tsebelis, G. (2000) Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Williamson, O. E. (1973) Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary Considerations, American Economic Review 63,

16 Table 1 Etzioni Typology of Compliance Relations Kinds of Involvement Kind of Power Alienative Calculative Moral Coercive X Remunerative X Normative X X-Stable Patterns Source: Etzioni (1961, p. 12) -16-

17 Table 2 Stages of Institutions, Institutional Theories and Mechanisms Stages of Institution Formation Maintenance Change Types of Institutional Theory Normative Institutionalization Socialization Conflict; a la Selznick Rational Choice Design;???? Design; Evolution (IAD) Learning F v M P D p Punctuations Displacement, etc. Discursive Negotiation Coordinative Negotiation Discourse Conflict -17-