The United Nations General Assembly (DISEC)

Transcription

1 The United Nations General Assembly (DISEC) Letter from the Executive Board As members of the Executive Board of the United Nations General Assembly (DISEC), it gives us great pleasure to welcome all delegates to THSMUN 15. I, Shivish Soni, will be presiding over the committee as Chairperson along with Shubhi Vadehra as the Vice-Chairperson. As the main deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the United Nations, the General Assembly acts as a forum where all 193-member nations of the UN can express their views on an International stage. It is one of the five principal organs of the UN and the only one in which all member nations has equal representation. Thus, it serves as embodiment of one of the major founding principles of the UN- Equality among nations, a principle that delegates are expected to uphold by aiming to resolve agenda specific grievances of the international community at THSMUN 15. This year s General Assembly agendas: 1. The Threat of Transnational Organized Crime to International Security 2. Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling of Biological and Toxin Weapons on their Destruction Are heavily research oriented. Conducive debate on these agendas is an eventuality that will only come to pass if delegates have researched thoroughly and are aware of the questions that they need to answer in their resolutions. Being aware of the daunting task that this might seem to most delegates, we have made an attempt at preparing a comprehensive, yet unintimidating background guide that we hope shall serve to guide you through your research.

2 Before you go ahead and study this guide, please keep in mind that this is merely to facilitate your research and not the entire research in itself. The background guide will have a basic outline of the agenda to help your understanding and express our expectations from you as a delegate. We hope to see confident leaders, skilled orators and well-researched delegates coming together to form an amalgam of fruitful discussions. Remember to speak up, and please do enjoy yourselves while what we hope shall be an enriching learning experience lasts. Do feel free to contact the executive board in case of any doubts or discrepancies. All the Best! Anuj Gandhi Chairperson Shubhi Vadehra Vice-Chairperson

3 Introduction to DISEC The Disarmament and International Security Committee was established in1993. It is the First and one of the main committees of the General Assembly. The role of DISEC is outlined in Chapter IV, Article 11 of the United Nations Charter, which states, The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both. As per this article, the mandate of DISEC is highlighted as, to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources. History of the Committee In 1945, the General Assembly was created with the ratification of the Charter of the United Nations. Including all 193 members of the United Nations, the General Assembly is the main deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the United Nations. As such, it is a medium for multilateral deliberation on global issues specified by the UN Charter. In the General Assembly, each member state has a vote and a simple majority decides each resolution. However, votes taken on designated important issues, such as recommendations on peace and security and the election of Security Council members, require a two-thirds majority of Member States. 1 Specifically, the first committee in the General Assembly, the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) was established to serve as a forum to debate issues pertaining to 1 Functions and Powers of the General Assembly June 2011 < shtml>

4 disarmament and the maintenance of global peace and security in an environment of equality. 2 This committee takes measures necessary for the prevention or the reduction of international hostilities and conflict on matters that are not already being discussed by the United Nations Security Council. While the Disarmament and International Security Committee has the authority to initiate studies and to pass resolutions to promote international political cooperation and the development and codification of international law, unlike the Security Council, DISEC does not have the power to impose sanctions or to authorize armed interventions. 3 As a preliminary organ, DISEC serves as the first level of discussion for issues within the scope of disarmament and international security. This allows all member states to fully develop their positions and engage in multilateral discussion. Instead of having binding authority, DISEC s resolutions function as recommendations to the Secretariat or the Security Council. More specifically, these recommendations are for establishing the general principles of cooperation for maintaining international peace and security, including disarmament and for the peaceful settlement of any situation that might impair friendly relations among nations. 4 Since its inception in 1945, the Disarmament and International Security Committee has played a critical role in promoting the global effort for disarmament of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction and in facilitating international peace and security. While the various studies initiated by DISEC have been invaluable to the Security Council for its continued operations, DISEC s main contribution to preserving and creating global security is its numerous recommendations for peacekeeping missions to the UNSC. Starting in 1948, the first peacekeeping effort in Israel and the Middle East has worked to monitor ceasefires, supervise armistice agreements, and prevent isolated incidents from escalating within the region. 5 Since then, the Security Council has authorized over sixty 2 Charter of the United Nations June 2011 < 3 Functions and Powers of the General Assembly June Charter of the United Nations June United Nations Truce Supervision Organization June <

5 peacekeeping missions, the majority of them having first been recommended by DISEC. Moreover, DISEC has convened numerous times to resolve issues when the Security Council has failed to exercise its primary responsibility to act to resolve crises. In these instances, the Disarmament and International Security Committee is charged with the duty to consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. 6 Notable examples of the emergency sessions include, the 1960 session, which called for the immediate intervention in the Congo and the 1980 session for the situation in Afghanistan, which called for the peaceful ceasefire between the Soviet Union and the Afghani Nationalists. 7 Recently, the General Assembly has approved the landmark Millennium Declaration, adopted in 2000, and the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document which reestablish the commitment of Member States to reach specific goals to attain peace, security and disarmament and strengthen the United Nations as the world s primary international institution. These documents are reflections of the international community s commitment to the standards and objectives of the UN Charter. untso/>. 6 Charter of the United Nations June Emergency Special Sessions June 2011 <

6 TOPIC 2: Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling of Biological and Toxin Weapons on their Destruction "BE BOLD. THINK BIG, FOR IT YIELDS BIG RESULTS. And that is why; again, we need people like you. People who understand that the world is over-armed and that peace are underfunded. People who understand that the time for change is now." - 3 May 2010, BAN Ki-moon, Secretary-General Definition of Biological Weapons and Toxins In order to discuss the disarmament of biological weapons, it is important to understand exactly what they are. As such, below follows a brief explanation of biological weapons and their capabilities to better understand bioterrorism. Biological weapons use microorganisms and natural toxins to produce disease in humans, animals, or plants, derived from bacteria (anthrax, plague, tularemia); viruses (smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers); rickettsia(q fever and epidemic typhus); biological toxins (botulinum toxin, staphylococcus enterotoxin B); and fungi (San Joaquin Valley fever, mycotoxins). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) categorizes biological agents according to several variables. This categorization helps provide beneficial information to health agencies that consult with first responders and public health personnel to identify which biological agents pose higher risks and threats for use in bioterrorism. The categories include the ease of dissemination or transmission from person to person, the degree to which they result in high mortality rates and have the potential for major public health impact, and the degree to which they might cause public panic and social disruption, and require special action for public health preparedness. Pathogens and other diverse agents can be utilized as biological weapons if paired with a form of a delivery system such as missiles or aerosol devices. This is how agents can be enhanced for the purposes of bioterrorism. Bioterrorism is defined as the use by non-state actors of microorganisms (pathogens) or the products of living organisms

7 (toxins) to inflict harm on a wider population. Toxins are toxic chemical compounds synthesized in nature by living organisms. Classifiable by molecular weight, source, preferred targets in the body, and mechanism of action, they include the most potent poisons on the planet, although considerations of production, weaponization, delivery, environmental stability, and the host factors place practical limits on their use as Weapons of Mass Destruction. AN OVERVIEW OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS Biological Weapons refer to biological (natural) agents used in a harmful way. Infectious diseases as well as toxic agents can be manipulated to form a weapon that can be spread to many different populations. Once these biological weapons spread they can cause harm on a massive scale. Often, biological weapons result in death or severe damage to the immune system. There is a list of different biological agents, which can be used as a biological weapon included below: 1. BACTERIA: Bacteria are small organisms that mostly live on solid or liquid environments. They often result in diseases that require the use of antibiotics, such as penicillin. 2. VIRUSES: These are organisms that form diseases that do not respond to antibiotics. Unlike bacteria, they are not easily cured. There are, however, antiviral compounds that may fight off viruses. 3. RICKETTSIAE: these are microorganisms that are similar to bacteria and viruses. They have a similar structure to bacteria and live in the same conditions as viruses. 4. CHLAMYDIA: these are parasites that must use other living cells for survival 5. FUNGI: these are plants (however they do not undergo photosynthesis) instead they get their nutrition from other decaying matter. Diseases that result from fungi may respond to antimicrobial organisms 6. TOXINS: These are poisonous substances that are made from living

8 plants, animals and microorganisms. International and Regional Framework The initial framework banning the use of biological weapons is grounded in the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, which is also referred to as the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The Protocol prohibits the use of biological and chemical weapons in war, and was the first to do so. It was signed on 17 June 1925 during a Geneva conference by the League of Nations, the precursor of the United Nations, and entered into force on 8 February However, events during and after World War II were clouded by charges and countercharges of experimentation with biological warfare agents. The Japanese were accused of using biological agents against the Soviet Union and Mongolia in 1939, against Chinese civilians from 1940 to 1944, and against Chinese troops in Following the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, also called the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) or Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), entered into force on 26 March According to the convention, the States had agreed the following: ARTICLE I Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstance to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. ARTICLE II Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to

9 divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. In implementing the provisions of this article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environment. ARTICLE III Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention. ARTICLE IV Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, takes any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. ARTICLE V The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems, which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and cooperation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. ARTICLE VI (1) Any State Party to this Convention that finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions

10 of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council. (2) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation. ARTICLE VII Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention. ARTICLE VIII Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, ARTICLE IX Each State Party to this Convention affirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes.

11 ARTICLE X (1) The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organizations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes. (2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. ARTICLE XI Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it. ARTICLE XII Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of the Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review

12 shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. ARTICLE XIII (1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration. (2) Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its natural sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. ARTICLE XIV (1) This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph (3) of this Article may accede to it at any time. (2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which is hereby, designated the Depositary Governments. (3) This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of the Convention. (4) For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instrument of ratification or accession. (5) The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit

13 of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices. (6) This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. ARTICLE XV This Convention, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. The Depositary Governments of the signatory and acceding States shall transmit duly certified copies of the Convention. Upon signing on 10 April 1972, this legally binding treaty encourages Member States to exemplify proper behavior in regards to biological weapons. The updated version includes 165 States Parties and 12 Signatory States. The Convention is the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning the development, production and stockpiling of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. The Convention serves as an international guideline for all Member States to restrict the development and production of any biological weapons, banning the development, stockpiling, acquisition, retention, and production of biological agents and toxins of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. To oversee the compliance with the terms of the Convention, the Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention established in September 1994 an Ad Hoc Group open to all States Parties to consider the development of verification measures. At the 1996 Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention, States Parties recognized again the importance of effective verification. The most recent Review Conference, held in January 2012, reiterated its call to enforce the Convention through confidence-building measures (CBMs) to promote biosafety, as agreed at the Second and Third Review Conferences. This will help promote transparency and promote biological science and technology transfer for peaceful purposes

14 through cooperation and technology transfer. Such measures include a code of conduct to prevent the misuse of bioscience and biotechnology. Despite progress made, no legally binding system has the capacity to inspect compliance with the terms of the Convention, which limits the effectiveness of these measures. According to the United States Department of State, China, Iran, North Korea, Russia and Syria are suspected of continued offensive biological warfare programs in violation of the BWC, and this does not account for considerable uncertainty for the potential of other programs. In looking forward to the Eighth Review Conference in 2016, the Chair for the 2014 Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of Experts, Ambassador Urs Schmidt, highlighted the necessity for promoting effective action to improve implementation in practical terms. BLOC POSITIONS AFRICAN BLOC: With the largest population of non-signatories to the BWC, the African Bloc does not appear to have a unified opinion. In line with other issues that can potentially interfere with national sovereignty, the African Bloc is likely supportive of measures to eliminate these weapons, but with severe reservations about the method of doing so that vary even between otherwise closely aligned states ASIAN BLOC: Though nations like China and India have declared stockpiles of weapons, efforts in this bloc have largely been aimed at cooperating with the treaties in place. With potentially growing antagonism in the region and knowledge of such weapons, however, it is unlikely that many potentially threatened nations would accede to more powerful measures. EASTERN BLOC: With few declared weapons stockpiles, these nations likely support international regulatory methods as long as they are in line with national interests and rights. Potential issues can arise from those nations who do control such facilities, as East-West antagonism could potentially alienate these nations. LATIN BLOC: With no nations having declared chemical weapons programs and a nearly complete list of countries participating in the

15 BWC, Latin Bloc countries likely encourage measures to eliminate stockpiles of these weapons and have little to no reservation about the current state of affairs. MIDDLE EAST BLOC: With a bleak history of chemical weapons usage in the area, opinions are likely to be strong on either the side of regulation or deregulation. Though nuclear issues have overshadowed these, the bloc must be aware that other nations often harbor suspicions about compliance. WESTERN BLOC: These nations also tend to hold a variety of views on regulation, with the United States often refusing to implement any concrete verification or regulation procedures. With these nations on the cutting edge of technological advances in many cases, it is likely that they would like to maintain the ability to develop such technology for at least defensive purposes. Drawbacks Members of the BTWC have long recognized the problems created by the treaty s absence of mechanisms to provide reassurance of compliance or to respond effectively to accusations of noncompliance. These weaknesses came sharply in 1980 s, when United States accused Soviet Union of violating the treaty. Its accusations centered on two separate phenomena. First, the US government suspected that an outbreak of anthrax in Soviet Union of Soverdlovsk was caused by illicit activities. Second, US claimed that the so-called Yellow Rain in Southeast Asia was a deliberated toxin supplied by Soviet Union. The events following these public accusations vividly demonstrated the weaknesses of the BTWC. A 1995 report stated that the Russian program continued to exist after the 1979 incident and had temporarily increased during the 1980s. In 1995, the program was still in existence and employed 25,000 to 30,000 people. At the same time, several high-ranking officials in the former Soviet military and Biopreparat had defected to Western countries. The information provided by these former employees gave further insight into the biological weapons program of the former Soviet Union. After the anthrax incident in Sverdlovsk,

16 the research was continued at a remote military facility in the isolated city of Stepnogorsk in Kazakhstan, producing an even more virulent strain of anthrax. In 1980, the former Soviet Union expanded its bioweapons research program and was eventually able to weaponize smallpox. This research was conducted at remote facilities in Siberia, and very little information is available about the extent and outcome of this research and where it was conducted. During Operation Desert Shield, the build-up phase of the Persian Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm) after Iraq had invaded and occupied Kuwait in the fall and winter of 1990, the USA and the coalition of allied countries faced the threat of biological and chemical warfare. The experience gained from observations during the first Persian Gulf War in the late 1980s supported the information on biological and chemical weapons available to the Western intelligence community. In fact, Iraq had used chemical warfare against its own people on many occasions in the 1980s. Intelligence reports from that time suggested that the Iraqi regime had sponsored a very ambitious biological and chemical warfare program. Coalition forces prepared in for potential biological and chemical warfare by training in protective masks and equipment, exercising decontamination procedures, receiving extensive education on possible detection procedures, and immunizing troops against potential biological warfare threats. Approximately 150,000 US troops received a Food and Drug Administration licensed toxoid vaccine against anthrax, and 8000 received a new botulinum toxoid vaccine. For further protection against anthrax spores, 30 million 500-mg oral doses of ciprofloxacin were stockpiled to provide a 1- month course of chemoprophylaxis for the 500,000 US troops that were involved in the operation. At the end of the Persian Gulf War in August 1991, the first UN inspection of Iraq's biological warfare capabilities was carried out. Representatives of the Iraqi government announced to representatives from the UN Special Commissions Team 7 that Iraq had conducted research into the offensive use of B. anthracis,

17 botulinum toxins, and Clostridium perfringens. Iraq had extensive and redundant research facilities at Salman Pak, Al Hakam, and other sites, only some of which were destroyed during the war. Despite these elaborate efforts by the UN, the struggle with enforcement of the BWC continued throughout the late 1990s and into the 21st century. As the recent developments in Iraq have shown, development of biological and chemical weapons is a real threat, and efforts to control its proliferation are limited by logistical and political problems. As long as there are no concrete provisions for enforcement, the BWC will remain a toothless instrument in the hands of the UN Security Council. In addition to these state-sponsored and military-related bio warfare programs, private and civilian groups have attempted to develop, distribute, and use biological and chemical weapons. One incident was the intentional contamination of salad bars in restaurants in Oregon by the Rajneesh cult during late September A total of 751 cases of severe enteritis were reported, and Salmonella typhimurium was identified as the causative organism. Forty-five victims were hospitalized during this outbreak. Although the Rajneeshees were suspected, the extensive research and investigation conducted by the Oregon Health Department and the Centers for Disease Control could not conclusively identify the origin of the epidemic. However, in 1985, a member of the cult confirmed the attack and identified the epidemic as a deliberate biological attack. Unfortunately, recent examples of the intentional use of biological weapons are not difficult to find. In the mid 1990s, large amounts of botulinum toxin were found in a laboratory in a safe house of the Red Army Faction in Paris, France. Apparently, the toxin was never used. The bioterrorism threat resurfaced then on March 18, 1995, after the Aum Shinrikyo attacked the Tokyo subway system with sarin gas. The investigations after this incident disclosed evidence of a rudimentary biological weapons program. Allegedly before March 1995, the cult had attempted 3 unsuccessful biological attacks in Japan using anthrax and botulinum toxin. In addition, cult members had attempted to acquire Ebola virus in Zaire during However,

18 only Japanese police and intelligence discovered a small portion of the entire program, and only fragments of evidence have been made available to the public. These drawbacks of BTWC were tried overcome by Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). The international response to the politically binding CBMs has been disappointing. The majority of the BTWC members have not devoted sufficient resources to recurring and timely completion of CBM forms. Bioweapons and Terrorism Bioterrorism receives widespread attention because one of the international community s greatest fears is having biological weapons in the hands of terrorists groups. A terrorist s capacity to use biological weapons depends on their ability to access them. Up until the past decade, the deployment of biological weapons was considered difficult and only possible with the capable hands of bio warfare experts. However, with improvements in science and networks in the field, it now is becoming easier to obtain such weapons. Two examples in the last 25 years demonstrate the potential for bioweapons to be used for bioterrorism. In 1995, sarin was inflicted on the Tokyo subway system by the Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo. This event brought the dangers of bio-weaponry to the attention of policymakers and counterterrorism experts as they began to examine the possibilities of other terrorist attacks executed in this manner. In 2001, a bioterrorist attack was carried out in the United States, when violent non-state actors used biological agents as a scare tactic, when weapons-grade Bacillus anthracis (the organism that causes anthrax) was sent through the mail to two US Senators. This occurred shortly after the events of 11 September 2001; media outlets covered this news as 22 people became infected with anthrax and five fatalities occurred. Hundreds of millions of people were befallen with anxiety as letters sent to Senators Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy promising more attacks were quoted, You cannot stop us. We have this anthrax. No attacks followed as many months and years passed. In 2008, the FBI concluded that the anthrax letters served as a method to prompt fear, rather than kill on large-scale

19 using biological weapons. This inference shows how vulnerable the public is to potential threats that can cause instability. Priorities for Action Ultimately, international conflicts and the potential for biological terror continue to beg certain key questions and illustrate where further action is needed. In particular, the main question is whether it is necessary to verify on a regular basis the development and production of biological agents and toxins for hostile purposes. It is important to highlight the lack of compliance with the BWC and its limitations. No specific measures have been set forth for restricting the development, production, stockpiling, or the acquisition of biological agents or toxins for hostile purposes in the BWC. Therefore, the largest issue with enforcing the BWC lies in the definition given to hostile activities. The Convention is not legally binding and therefore any Member State could violate it with little repercussion. Member States are also not required to be transparent about their stock of banned weapons prior to joining the Convention, or to provide proof of their destruction. Further developing verification measures and CBMs can change how the use of biological agents is monitored and managed. The ways in which the Convention can be broken attest to why it should be reformed to enhance peace in the international community. In order to address these issues, the BWC Review Conference (RevCon) is mandated by article XII of the treaty and plays a critical role in reviewing the treaty and charting next steps. The purpose of the RevCons is to review the operation of the BWC. Delegates consider scientific and technological developments that have taken place along with progress in the negotiation of the Convention itself. Annual inter-sessional meetings of States Parties and Meetings of Experts are held between RevCons to review a varying set of diplomatic and technical topics before dealing with them more formally at the RevCons. In regards to the Eighth Review Conference, focus needs to shift towards oversight mechanisms and ensuring State Parties adherence to BWC. With the increasing volume of text related to the BWC, tools should be developed for future conferences that foster common understanding;

20 this would align with the goals of simplifying commitment to the principles of the Convention. Conclusions In today s modern era, bio warfare is not too far removed from reality. Although the BWC can provide assistance to Member States who have been victimized by biological weapons use, only preparedness can help during these unfolding and unthinkable scenarios. Increasingly, preparedness must address concerns around the dual-use dilemma of biological weapons, which highlights the complex debate in which scientific innovation and knowledge can also lead to misuse of scientific agents as lethally weapons. Specifically, scientific research has the dual-use of being used for harmful purposes, possibly causing large amounts of destruction to mankind, but also of gearing Scientific knowledge towards the development of new vaccines or possible treatments. Currently much work is being conducted in the fields of biology and biotechnology without any association to the military. Activities intended to detect biological warfare agents can further enhance defense programs against them. This also creates a market for developing new pharmaceuticals and responses to vaccine-preventable diseases. Biological weapons deterrence needs to be carefully outlined, as a gray area exists between distinguishing offensive and defensive research. Addressing existing and future biological warfare agents requires differentiating defensive and offensive characteristics, which can require evaluating genetically modified variants.

21 Questions a Resolution must answer 1. What is the definition of the peaceful-use of the weapons? 2. How to improve the weaknesses of BWC? 3. How can we effectively regulate the use of biological and chemical weapons from non-sponsored countries? 4. What are the possibilities of chemical weapons falling into the hands of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), terrorist organizations, or rogue states? What can be done about this? 5. What are ways to make the mechanism under the conventions more transparent and effective? 6. How to cooperate with diverse bodies when facing the threats of toxin weapons? 7. Can UN intervention not contravene a country s sovereign right? 8. Would it be better for each country to dismantle its own weapons or turn them over to a re-invigorated Military Staff Committee or some other, new UN agency? If the latter, how should that agency be organized, and what should its responsibilities and capabilities be? 9. Would it be easier for disarmament to occur first at the regional level and then internationally, or would it be necessary for all states to disarm at the same time? 10. Is there any foolproof way of ensuring the production of Biological Weapons ceases?