The evolution of the biological weapons threat and the BTWC

Transcription

1 Information Briefing on the Sixth Review Conference of the Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention The evolution of the biological weapons threat and the BTWC John Borrie A joint briefing by the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

2 The development of the prohibition on biological weapons has not been a smooth, linear process

3 Sliding into the abyss The Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 29 July 1899 it is especially prohibited to employ poison or poisoned arms Pre-World War I - scientific advance - increasing industrialization - colonial empire - nationalism & militarism

4 The First World War World War I saw chemical weapons used, and scientific and industrial application to developing biological weapons as well

5 CBW & Total War Total War an increasing feature of both World Wars. Inter-twined origins of CW and BW programmes. Early features of BW research were possible applications against animals and plants, as well as people.

6 Between wars PUBLIC REVULSION LEADS TO A NEW LEGAL NORM ICRC Appeal (8 February 1918) we wish to raise our voices against a barbarous innovation which science is in the course of perfecting, that is, making it more murderous and more refined in its cruelty. We are speaking of asphyxiant and poisonous gases, the use of which, it seems, is growing to a scale hitherto unsuspected. Geneva Protocol (17 June 1925) Bans the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare. But sporadic CW use continued for instance, in the conquest of Abyssinia (by Italy)

7 Barbarous innovations Nazi death camps Japanese BW experiments ( ) Allied BW activities Mass extermination, work to death and cruel experimentation. China attacked. Unit 731. Prisoners killed in their thousands in BW-related experiments. Both in United Kingdom and United States. Perhaps also in Soviet Union (information is limited).

8 The Cold War U.S., Soviet Union and other military powers developed BW programmes. Hints and allegations. November 1969: U.S. decides to renounce BW and CW first-use. February 1970: U.S. extends ban to toxins.

9 Pause for thought BW assessed as not essential for national security. Potential effects of BW were uncertain. Potential for blow back An interest in preventing the proliferation of a low-cost WMD.

10 Agreement of BTWC Agreement not to develop, produce, stockpile, of acquire biological agents or toxins of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes, as well as related weapons and means of delivery. Lacks a regime to ensure confidence in compliance. Doesn t prohibit all BW-related research.

11 Growing concerns Concern about continuing Soviet BW activities, especially in West. April 1979: Sverdlovsk incident Yellow rain in Laos Use of BW by non-state actors...advances in life sciences

12 The Gulf War & UNSCOM Threat of Iraq s CBW capabilities were a shock. Renewed international momentum on CBW. VEREX UNSCOM (and later UNMOVIC) Trilateral inspections (US, UK and Russian Federation)

13 Impasse or cross-roads? Historically, BW norms haven t developed in a smooth fashion, and have always been dominated by external context. Participation of major military powers, historically, has been important but not always crucial. States can change their minds and support later. Life sciences are diffusing and democratizing, which will change the rules of the non-proliferation game. Understanding hostile intent going to become more important than merely recognizing where capacity exists, because the latter will become widespread.

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15 And, furthermore... Traditional arms control processes aren t going to be sufficient on their own. Multi-disciplinary approaches will be needed.