ONE YEAR SINCE THE START OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT IN COLOMBIA

Transcription

1 ONE YEAR SINCE THE START OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT IN COLOMBIA REPORT OF THE TAULA CATALANA PER LA PAU I ELS DRETS HUMANS A COLÒMBIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL OFFICE ON HUMAN RIGHTS ACTION COLOMBIA (OIDHACO) OCTOBER 2017

2 OIDHACO Asbl 11, rue de la Linière 1060, Saint Gilles Bélgica Taula Catalana per la Pau i els Drets Humans a Colòmbia Tàpies 1-3, Barcelona Editor: Oidhaco, ASBL. Photographs: Juan Pablo Bello y Jesús Abad Colorado (Presidencia de la Republica de Colombia), Javier Sule, Gert Steenssens, PBI-Colombia, Alejandro Gonzales Cover photo : Geert Steensses/EsperanzaProxima Design: Tomás Sol Liaño Jover Translation: Joanne Hutchinson The opinions in this publication are the responsibility of their authors. Where no author is mentioned, Oidhaco is the responsible author. This publication was produced with the financial assistance of: Institut Català Internacional per la Pau Agència Catalana de Cooperació al Desenvolupament Ajuntament de Barcelona Brussels, October 2017

3 CONTENTS Introduction Implementation of the normative framework of the agreement The end of the war? The bilateral ceasefire and laying down of weapons Persistence of socio-political violence: the situation of social leaders and human rights defenders Persistence of the paramilitary phenomenon. A threat to peace Effective participation of civil society in the implementation of the agreement The victims moment: the comprehensive system for truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition What should the role of the European Union be in the implementation of the peace agreement? 44 Conclusions. 45 Recommendations. 47 Notes and references. 49 3

4 INTRODUCTION On September 4, 2012, President Santos announced the beginning of the peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia People s Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia Ejército del Pueblo - FARC-EP) after 52 years of internal armed conflict that disproportionately affected the civilian population. According to the National Centre for Historical Memory (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica), between 1958 and 2012 this conflict caused 218,094 deaths, with civilians making up 81% of those affected, 8 million displaced persons, 50,000 victims of forced disappearance 1 and more than 20,000 registered cases of sexual violence 2 in addition to the victims of anti-personnel mines 3. Since 29 August 2016, the agreement for a bilateral ceasefire and the end of hostilities came into force. e negotiation process culminated in the signing of the final agreement for the end of the conflict and the construction of a stable and lasting peace 4 on November 24, Once the peace agreement was signed and endorsed by the Colombian Congress, implementation began on November 30, What do we mean by the implementation of the Peace Agreement? The start of the transformations needed to achieve the objectives, changes, proposals and reforms agreed between the FARC-EP and the Colombian government, through public policy and other actions by the government and the FARC-EP with the participation of civil society. 4

5 However, the commitment to the peace process by the government, the FARC-EP, and social organisations and movements, is not just about ceasefire, disarmament and transition of the FARC from guerrilla group to political party, in particular for the victims of the conflict. is commitment also represents a historic opportunity to overcome the causes of the armed and socio-political conflict in the country. e agreement includes numerous actions, initiatives and political reforms to reduce poverty, inequality, exclusion and impunity, recognising that these factors could lead to a repetition of violence, if they are not eliminated. rough the Peace Agreement, political reforms are sought to overcome social conflicts and historical problems that have affected the economic, social and political development of the country, its regions and citizenship. e implementation of the agreement must also create guarantees of non-repetition. Due to the significant effects that the armed conflict has had on the civilian population, including and listening to the victims was fundamental. e agreement would not be complete without a transitional justice system that can clarify the truth about what happened in the conflict, provide justice and reparations to the millions of victims and generate guarantees of non-repetition. Chapter 5 of the peace agreement contains agreements relating to the transitional justice system, which is appropriately entitled the agreement on victims of the conflict. Juan Pablo Bello (Presidencia de la Republica de Colombia) 5

6 6 e day after the signing of the Agreement, was considered by the Government to be D-Day: the day on which the implementation phase of the agreements began. It was the beginning of the demobilisation and disarmament of the FARC-EP 5. e demobilisation of the FARC-EP, the UN certification of the group s total disarmament, and the announcement of its re-creation as a new political party, have been historic milestones for Colombia. However, the culmination of the peace process is subject to the implementation of all that has been agreed upon and the construction of a durable and stable peace within Colombian society and throughout the national territory, guaranteeing the inclusion and participation of Colombian citizens. On 26 November 2017, the Peace Agreement is one year old and it is time to assess how its implementation has progressed and what has been the impact on Colombian people s lives. In this report we present our analysis of the implementation of the agreements, which have made progress in some points, and have also faced challenges and obstacles. e peace agreement must face up to future risks that could complicate its implementation and that, as a result, place at risk stable, lasting, participative and inclusive peace. For this reason it is important to monitor this implementation, and insist on the participation of Colombian civil society and the international community. e Catalan Roundtable for Peace and Human Rights in Colombia (Taula Catalana per la Pau i els Drets Humans a Colòmbia) and the International Office on Human Rights Action Colombia (OID- HACO) consider that the participation of the victims and civil society is crucial, in particular the participation of the most vulnerable groups that have been disproportionately affected by the conflict. is report therefore focuses on the implementation of the agreement in terms of guarantees for the security and participation of civil society. We also offer an analysis of the ways in which the implementation of the agreement could contribute to providing guarantees of non-repetition.

7 Javier Sulé e referendum6: Do you support the Final Agreement for the End of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace? At the international level, the signing of the first peace agreement in Colombia was welcomed with optimism and hope. e rejection of the agreement at the polls by Colombian citizens on October 2, 2016, therefore, produced astonishment. The Electoral Observation Mission (EOM) described the electoral campaign for the referendum vote as one of the most polarised in recent years in Colombia 7 and expressed concern about the high levels of violence and polarisation faced by the country in the period leading up to the vote.8 The Mission reported that by September 2016 there were already 223 victims of political violence in the country, that those affected were public officials, political and social leaders and members of Communal Action Boards (Juntas de Acción Comunal)9, and that support for the peace process was one of the factors that increased the risks for these groups. This conclusion was later shared by the Office of the Colombian Human Rights Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pue7

8 8 blo) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 10. e State Council ruled that there was widespread deception in the No campaign during the referendum 11. Even more disturbing was discriminatory discourse and hatred towards the LGBTI collective and organisations that work for the rights of women. One of the strongest arguments in the No campaign was the questioning of the gender approach in the agreements. e difference between the votes for and against was small, but had drastic consequences for the content of the Agreement. After the referendum, numerous adjustments were made to the text, to the disadvantage of the victims of the conflict and reducing their opportunities for participation and justice. e agreement on a gender differential approach was also weakened 12, in terms of the recognition that the armed conflict had a different impact on women and men and that they should therefore have access to different reparation. By including a gender approach, the Colombian agreement had, at the time, been celebrated by the international community as an example for other peace processes in the world 13. The negative result of the referendum put pressure on what was agreed in Havana and the support of the international community has been fundamental for the continuity of the process. Pamphlets left by neo-paramilitary groups in some areas 14, which used threats to pressure the population to vote against the Peace Agreement, suggest that after the No victory, these groups and the interests they represent have felt reaffirmed and strengthened 15. This situation creates new risks for people who want to support the construction of peace, or participate in the monitoring of the Agreement. Moreover, the Colombian President announced that the Bilateral Ceasefire and End of Hostilities would come to an end on 31 October 2016, after being in force since 29 August of the same year 16, in order to impose a deadline on the renegotiation process, thereby causing uncertainty and security risks for members of the FARC- EP who were already gathered in provisional areas known as Tem-

9 porary Gathering Points (Puntos de Preagrupamiento Transitorios - PPT). is situation also placed at risk communities in the areas where the PPTs were located. e decision to prolong the ceasefire until 31 December was fundamental, as was the issuance of Decree 1624 of 20 October 2016 which regulated the situation of the FARC-EP members 18. Javier Sulé 9

10 1. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK OF THE AGREEMENT Most of the changes proposed under the Peace Agreement have to be converted into legal norms, in order to become public policies implemented as concrete actions, so that they have a real impact. To this end, before the signing of the agreement the Government prepared a mechanism that enables all the necessary legislation for the implementation of the agreements to be quickly processed. e mechanism was approved in Congress through Legislative Act 01 of 2016 (LA ), which proposes reducing the number of debates necessary to approve (or reject) a bill (a fast-track mechanism). It also reduces the possibility of making changes to legislative bills and grants extraordinary powers to the President of the Republic to issue decrees. Without this special mechanism, there would be a risk that the implementation process would be delayed for too long. e Centro Democrático political party brought a legal challenge against LA before the Constitutional Court, claiming that it was unconstitutional 19. After studying this claim, the Court decided to declare unacceptable or unconstitutional some of the extraordinary procedures and powers granted to the President under LA is has raised concerns about the risk that this decision may entail for the implementation of the agreements, since it could lengthen the debates in Congress. e revision of the norms by the Constitutional Court is pending, in particular those that regulate the different components and aspects of the Integral System of Justice, Truth, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Repetition whose revision has been suspended until after the review of LA that creates this system 20. By the end of the first legislative period with the fast-track mechanism in force, 3 Legislative Acts, 2 Laws and 77 decrees had been issued. For the second period, at least 14 legislative initiatives 21 are pending approval, of which six are still pending revision and eight are currently being reviewed. By September 4, 2017, one of these eight had been approved, three are not moving forward in the pro-

11 cess, a further three are yet to reach the first of four compulsory debates and one has just passed the first compulsory debate 22. ere are other obstacles still to be faced along the way. In 2018, there are presidential and legislative elections in Colombia. Starting in September the parties and the candidates begin the electoral campaign during which certain proposals, including those expressed against the agreement in the referendum campaign, could become campaign themes. On the other hand, there have been complaints about gaps between what was agreed in Havana and what was reflected in the legislative texts. is is the case of Legislative Act 01 of 2017 on the Special Jurisdiction for Peace and the Bill for Comprehensive Rural Reform 23. ere have also been reports of the misuse of the fast-track system, since reforms that were not included in the Peace Agreement, such as the reform of the Public Prosecutor s Office (Fiscalía). e Decree 898 of 2017, changed the dependency of prosecutor units involved in the investigation of human rights violations, to the Delegate Prosecutor s Office against Organised Crime, which according to human rights and victims organisations, was not included in the Peace Agreement and could lead to a change of approach in investigations, in which state crimes are left to one side

12 Javier Sulé 2. THE END OF THE WAR? THE BILATERAL CEASEFIRE AND LAYING DOWN OF WEAPONS. The positive impacts of the bilateral and definitive ceasefire and end of hostilities e bilateral and definitive ceasefire and laying down of weapons (bilateral ceasefire) by the FARC-EP is one of the most visible, tangible and measureable positive results of the peace process. Some 6,893 members of the FARC-EP located in Transitory Zones (Zonas Veredales Transitorias de Normalización - ZVTN), handed over 7,132 individual weapons 25. is has had a significant impact for populations in the areas most affected by the armed conflict. During the ten months of the bilateral ceasefire, announced on 29 August 2016, it is estimated that the death of 2,796 people may have been avoided 26. In this time, no civilians were killed or injured as a result of actions carried out by the FARC-EP. 27 Temporary bilateral ceasefires and prior progressive de-escalation, had already had a positive impact. ere was also a decrease in other indicators of violence such as the homicide rate and the number of cases of forced displacement 28. Nevertheless, as will be described later in this report, in some areas this positive effect has been less evident. 12

13 Jesús Abad Colorado (Presidencia de la Republica de Colombia) Demobilisation, Laying down of Weapons and Reintegration: concentration and adaptation of the Transition and Normalisation Zones. Following the announcement of the ceasefire and the signing of the first agreement, on 26 September 2016, the FARC-EP began to move towards the Transitory Zones (Zonas Veredales de Transición y Normalización - ZVTN) and Transitory Points (Puntos Transitorios de Normalización - PTN) 29. After the outcome of the referendum, FARC-EP fighters on the way to the ZVNT and PTN were left uncertain about the future of the process, due to legal ambiguity and risk. During this period, an incident occurred in which two FARC-EP guerrillas were killed by the army during the bilateral ceasefire 30. The situation of uncertainty and insecurity also affected the safety of the populations in the areas adjacent to the Temporary Gathering Points, despite the presence of the monitoring and verification mechanism. This situation was even more risky in areas of FARC-EP control, with the presence of neoparamilitary groups. 13

14 Javier Sulé Persistence of non-state armed groups. In areas that the FARC-EP have left, for example Urabá, Bajo Cauca, Chocó, Valle del Cauca and Cauca, armed non-state groups have arrived, that were not previously present. is has happened for example in Chocó, where the ELN expanded its presence31 into new municipalities. In other areas, neo-paramilitary groups have arrived or increased their action and visibility to establish military and/or social control over territories formerly controlled by the FARC-EP and thereby take over their legal and illegal economic activities. is has led to armed confrontations between the ELN and the army and/or between the ELN and neo-paramilitary groups, as well as harassment of the civilian population that has led to an increase in the number of mass displacements affecting mainly rural populations, small-scale farmers, indigenous people and Afro-descendants. Between January and June 2017, there were 42 mass displacements in Colombia, the same number of displacements that 14

15 were registered throughout 2016, according to UNHCR 32. e region of Chocó, with its predominantly Afro-descendant and indigenous population, has been especially affected 33. In these areas where non-state armed groups maintain a presence, the population has also reported other types of violence and harassment: confinement, extortion, threats, murders and violations of the principle of distinction under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 34. In 218 municipalities prioritised for the post-conflict 35, areas strongly affected by the conflict between the FARC-EP and the Colombian government and which were largely territorial and social control areas of the FARC, there has been a decrease in the number of homicides in urban areas, but this figure has increased in rural areas 36. Some municipalities fall outside of this trend and there is an increase in homicide rates also in urban areas, such as Tumaco and Tibú 37. e presence of non-state armed groups and clashes between them represent a risk for the civilian population in these areas. is also implies a specific risk for community leaders and human rights defenders, in particular those who defend the right to land and territory and environmentalists, among others. Mechanism for Monitoring and Verification I and II e United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia I (MVM I) carries out monitoring and verification of the process of the laying down of weapons and demobilisation of the FARC-EP and is part of the tripartite mechanism for monitoring the bilateral and definitive ceasefire and end of hostilities within the framework of the peace process. It is composed of international observers 38. Since the start of MVM I, civil society organisations have emphasised the need to include a human rights component to allow the mechanism to take a broader view and to receive allegations of human rights violations in the context of the increased aggression against social leaders and the risks of the presence of paramilitary groups in areas left by the FARC-EP and in the areas where the ZVTN/PTN are located. Since this approach was not included in MVM I, important 15

16 Presidencia de la Republica de Colombia monitoring has been carried out on the human rights situation by social organisations in areas left by the FARC-EP and in the areas surrounding the ZVTN/PTN, and these organisations have produced reports on the situation from a human rights perspective. e Final Peace Agreement included a request for a second Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM II), which was approved by the UN Security Council through Resolution 2366 of 2017 and will last for one year, renewable for up to three years, starting on September 26 when the first mission ended. MVM II is civil in nature and will verify security guarantees both for the reintegration of the FARC-EP and the communities that have historically been most affected by the armed conflict. Human rights organisations have made 16

17 concrete proposals for coordination between MVM II and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). e creation of MVM II and its greater focus on human rights can not be a reason for not continuing to support the fundamental work of the OHCHR in Colombia. It is important that there is smooth communication between MVM II and the civil society organisations that have to date monitored the situation for communities and organisations in territories most affected by the conflict as well as the presence of paramilitary groups and MVM II. Transition and Normalisation Zones (Zonas Veredales de Transición y Normalización - ZVTN) and Transition Points (Puntos Transitorios de Normalización - PTN) e FARC-EP mobilised definitively between January and February of 2017 to the 20 Transition Zones and the 7 Transition Points, where they were to remain while the disarmament and demobilisation process was being carried out. e procedures were set out in Chapter 3 of the Peace Agreement and additional protocols. e ZVTN/PTN were established through presidential decrees, within the special fasttrack normative mechanism. Since the beginning of this process, the Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM I), highlighted the need to improve the logistics and sanitation of the Temporary Gathering Points and later, of the ZVTN/PTN, as well as access to health care in these areas. e MVM I reported shortcomings at these points until after July 5, 2017, when the FARC-EP had completed the process of laying down their individual weapons 39. Insecurity was also reported by the communities living in the areas surrounding the ZVTN 40. e assassination of Cecilia Cocue, who had made her farm available as a ZVTN 41, proved that the risk to people who support the peace process, or are perceived to do so, is real. e FARC-EP have also expressed concerns about the security situation in areas where neo-paramilitary structures persist. According to a report by the Patriotic March movement (Marcha Patriótica) and the NGO Indepaz, between April and August 2017, 12 former FARC-EP combatants and 11 family members of former combatants were killed

18 Risk factors Rural lands Presence of illegal armed groups Opposition to economic projects and interests with legal and illegal investment Special territorial circumscriptions and elections Especially vulnerable groups Small farming, Afro-descendants and indigenous peoples Leaders who defend the right to land and territory Former FARC-EP combatants and their maily members Neighbourhood and community leaders LGBTI activists Trade unionists Journalists 18

19 Gert Steenssens 3. PERSISTENCE OF SOCIOPOLITICAL VIOLENCE: SITUATION OF SOCIAL LEADERS AND HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS. Since the signing of the Peace Agreement and until July 5, 2017 there have been 186 murders of social leaders, according to the Human Rights Ombudsman s Office (Defensoría del Pueblo) 43. e victims of these murders are mainly community and neighbourhood leaders, indigenous people, Afro-descendants and small-scale farmers. e We Are Defenders Program (Programa Somos Defensores) reported that the murder rate increased in the first half of 2017: there was a 30% increase compared to the same period in the previous year 44. Although different figures have been reported on the number of aggressions 45, the increase is undeniable 46. e victims are mostly people who defend rights to land and territory and oppose legal and illegal economic interests. It should also be mentioned that in the Peace Agreement there are multiple opportunities for participation by organisations and social 19

20 Gert Steenssens movements. However, in the current context of high levels of threats and risks for those involved in the implementation of the Peace Agreement and in the new political scenario, there are no guarantees for this participation. e Colombian State has developed protection programs for human rights defenders and others; however, these have not been able to prevent the significant increase in murders and other aggressions in recent years. Social organisations have insisted on the need for preventive measures such as reducing impunity for attacks, investigating those who plan and carry out crimes and dismantling the illegal and corrupt structures behind them, as well as dismantling paramilitarism. Some of these proposals were included in Chapter 2 of the Peace Agreement on political participation and in Chapter 3.4 on security guarantees. e Peace Agreement proposes new measures and mechanisms for the protection of human rights defenders (apart from mechanisms to combat paramilitarism). e Comprehensive Security System for the Exercise of Politics (Sistema Integral de Seguridad para el Ejercicio de la Política - SISEP), created by decree 895 of 2017, integrates several of these mechanisms. We will now go into more detail on the state of implementation of these measures and mechanisms 20

21 Comprehensive Security System for the Exercise of Politics (Sistema Integral de Seguridad para el Ejercicio de la Política - SISEP) 47. is System created by Decree 895 of 2017 includes several institutions: the National Commission for Security Guarantees (Comisión Nacional de Garantías de Seguridad); the SISEP Level Body (Instancia de Alto Nivel del SISEP); the Presidential Delegate (Delegado Presidencial); the SISEP Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (Comisión de Seguimiento y Evaluación del SISEP); and the Committee for the Promotion of Investigations (Comité de Impulso a las Investigaciones). It also creates several protection programs: the protection program for the opposition; the protection program for members of the FARC-EP; and the protection program for communities and organisations in rural areas. Moreover, it includes a prevention and early warning system for rapid reaction. Below, we go into more detail about some of the measures that have already been implemented. Security guarantees for leaders of social organisations and movements and human rights defenders. Section proposes a series of general measures to adapt relevant norms and institutions, as well as measures for prevention, protection, monitoring and evaluation. With regards to evaluation, this section emphasises in particular the creation of an information and monitoring system to evaluate the measures for security guarantees. Decree 895 of May 29, states that this system will be in charge of the Monitoring and Evaluation Commission on the Performance of the Comprehensive Protection System but this has not yet been created. It will be a key instrument to verify compliance with the Peace Agreement on this point and the effectiveness of its provisions. 21

22 Progress has been made due to an increase in investigative capacity, through the Special Investigation Unit into paramilitary successor groups, but the functioning and independence of this Unit found no support in the Public Prosecutor s Office (Fiscalía) 49. On the other hand, there has been a delay in the Law on Guarantees for Citizen Participation, which was announced in May 2017, but has not yet been implemented. Nor has the new Early Warning System been implemented. e Human Rights Ombudsman issued a risk report 50, and these figures and analyses have become an important benchmark for monitoring the situation. ere are no specific regulations to improve the visibility of the work of social organisations and human rights defenders. The Peace, Coexistence and Reconciliation Council Stigmatisation against left-wing political movements, human rights defenders including defenders of women s rights and LGBTI rights, male and female community leaders, and indigenous and Afro-descendant leaders has been a serious risk factor for members of these groups. In many cases, stigmatisation has been used to delegitimise political demands and has also facilitated prosecution and/or aggression. Decree Law 885 of May 27, 2017, creates the Peace, Coexistence and Reconciliation Council (Consejo de Paz, Convivencia y Reconciliación - CPCR). This body will assume the functions of the National Peace Council, which already existed (Law 434 of 1998) and the functions of the National Council for Reconciliation and Coexistence agreed in section of the Peace Agreement. Executive, legislative and supervisory authorities at the national, regional and local levels participate in this council as well as representatives from civil society. Social organisations welcomed the increase in participation, as compared to the former Natio-

23 nal Peace Council 51, since this will reduce the stigmatisation of vulnerable groups. Joining together the Council for Reconciliation and Coexistence and the Peace Council, removes the need to create a multitude of fora and institutions for the implementation of the agreement and to create parallel spaces with the same functions, a risk that also applies to other aspects of the Peace Agreement. However, it is difficult to understand how a space involving such a multiplicity of actors, as stipulated for the CPCR, can be operative and meet the goals established in the Agreement (such as designing a program for reconciliation, coexistence and the prevention of stigmatisation). Committee for the promotion of investigations into crimes against those who exercise politics 52. Before the Peace Agreement, numerous investigation groups, high-level commissions and research groups existed to promote investigations into killings of leaders and human rights defenders. Under the administration of former Public Prosecutor Eduardo Montealegre, an investigations group was set up under Plan Esperanza which, in dialogue and coordination with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) ) and with human rights NGO coordination groups, listed 729 cases of human rights killings (committed since 2015) to be investigated 53. In March 2016, Interior Minister Fernando Cristo also announced the creation of a special group, with 5 representatives from human rights organisations and political parties, to investigate the murders of leaders and human rights defenders 54. Given that the National Commission for Security Guarantees and the Public Prosecutor s Special Investigation Unit are both investigating cases of murders of human rights defen- 23

24 ders, it is unclear whether this other Promotion Committee will be created and how it would be coordinated with the other institutions. ere are also other spaces which seek to promote the investigations of these murders, in coordination with civil society. ese are the National Roundtable on Guarantees (Mesa Nacional de Garantías) and the Human Rights Commission of the Roundtable for Agrarian Dialogue (Mesa Única de Interlocución Agraria), where progress has been made on some cases. Despite the numerous institutions, commissions and committees, the increase in homicide rates continues its upward trend. e results presented to date by the Prosecutor s Office are limited to investigations into those who committed these crimes and do not provide answers about the structural causes and criminal structures behind these crimes. Comprehensive Program for Security and Protection for communities and organisations in rural territories. During the peace process, human rights organisations made progress on a proposal for protection protocols for human rights defenders in rural areas, which was brought to the notice of the Ministry of the Interior 55. e Program under the Peace Agreement consists of: comprehensive security and protection measures, community promotion of peace and coexistence, a protocol for the protection of rural territories and support for the activity of reporting for human rights organisations in rural territories. Taking into account the precarious security situation for social leaders, human rights defenders and communities in the territories with the presence of non-state armed actors, it is worrying that the normative and practical implementation of this security and protection measure has not been prioritised. 24

25 PBI-Colombia 4. PERSISTENCE OF THE PARAMILTARY PHENOMENON. A THREAT TO PEACE High levels of aggression, patterns among vulnerable groups and perpetrators, and geographical and time patterns, indicate that there is persistent systematic persecution against certain groups and collectives in Colombia and that the peace agreement has not improved this situation. It is worrying that the Government does not recognise the systematic nature of this persecution 56, despite analysis carried out by the Human Rights Ombudsman 57. is attitude could be an obstacle in taking action against the causes of this violence and the dynamics and mechanisms that perpetuate it. In the first half of 2017, according to the We Are Defenders Program (Programa Somos Defensores), 59 per cent of the attacks against human rights defenders were committed by neo-paramili- 25

26 tary groups 58. e government continues to deny the existence of the paramilitary phenomenon despite the fact that the persistence of these groups has been recognised in the peace agreement itself, which calls them criminal organisations successor of paramilitarism (organizaciones criminales sucesoras del paramilitarismo), and also recognises the threat they pose to leaders and social leaders, former FARC members and, in general, to the implementation of the Peace Agreement. Section 3.4 of the peace agreement 59 establishes a series of comprehensive measures to combat paramilitarism because it poses a risk to both social leaders and ex-farc-ep members. e paramilitary successor criminal organisations are also described in the Peace Agreement as the greatest risk to the implementation of the agreements and the construction of peace 60. Below we detail some of the measures agreed to confront the phenomenon of paramilitarism 61. The creation of a National Commission on Security Guarantees (Comisión Nacional de Garantías de Seguridad - CNGS). What is this? A high-level commission chaired by the President of the Republic, with the participation of the Ministers of the Interior, Defence and Justice, the Public Prosecutor and the Director of the Special Investigation Unit into paramilitary groups, the Procurator General (Procurador General) the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Commander of the Armed Forces and the Director of the National Police. It is also made up of 3 recognised experts in the field and 2 delegates from human rights platforms. e Technical Secretariat of the Commission is managed by the President of the Republic s Director of Security. Its role is to design and monitor public and criminal policy in the matter of dismantling any organisation or conduct dealt with in the aforementioned Agreement that threatens its implementation and the construction of peace

27 Neo-paramilitary groups: paramilitarism or common crime? Between 2002 and 2006, under the Government of Álvaro Uribe Vélez, 31,000 members of the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia - AUC), were demobilised. The AUC was a paramilitary group active throughout Colombia and responsible for massacres, assassinations, forced displacements and other acts that left hundreds of thousands of civilian victims. The paramilitary groups coordinated with the state security forces to commit serious violations of human rights and war crimes. Under the pretext of the counterinsurgent struggle they attacked the left-wing political opposition and social leaders. The demobilisation process was criticised by human rights organisations for inconsistencies in the number of paramilitaries who demobilised, the number of weapons handed over, the lack of investigation into the economic and political structures behind this phenomenon - there are 15,000 requests for information in the Public Prosecutor s Office which have not been investigated based on the statements of the demobilised paramilitaries which incriminate third parties - and the lack of collaboration with historical truth by the demobilised. Some paramilitary structures did not participate in the demobilisation. This has prevented the eradication of the paramilitary phenomenon, and its armed, economic and political structures. Current armed groups continue to attack social leaders, with the involvement of the state security forces through action or omission in several areas of the country 63, and new groups have also emerged. It is a matter of concern that these groups continue to perpetrate acts of socio-political violence. After the demobilisation process, the Colombian government has maintained a political position that paramilitarism no longer exists. It recognises the existence of criminal groups and attacks against social leaders but does not recognise the systematic nature of these killings, or the socio-political nature of violence, nor does it recognise the links between the state security forces and the armed groups. This has led to a lack of commitment to the dismantling of structures and a comprehensive strategy to confront the multidimensional nature of the phenomenon. 27

28 Progress: the Commission was created by Decree 154 of 2017 of February 3, 2017 and held its first meeting on March 22, 2017 in Popayán 64. Buenaventura and Tumaco were identified as priority cases 65. In February and March the CNGS met with social and academic leaders. e Commission made progress in the creation of an Elite Corps in the Police and a Special Unit in the Prosecutor s Office. Different subcommittees were set up to meet weekly 66. Challenges: to present concrete proposals for public policies and results in investigations. To clarify the mandate of the CNGS, after worrying statements from the President s Office in which it is suggested that the Commission should not focus on defining and implementing protection and prevention measures 67 for social leaders and former FARC members. Given the situation, it is important to provide protection to these groups, but if the objective of the CNGS is different and does not include structural actions aimed at dismantling paramilitarism at all levels, it will not be possible to prevent aggression against leaders and former FARC members. The creation of an Elite Corps in the Police. What is this? A body within the National Police with selected members. Its main mission is to contain the actions of the paramilitary successor organisations and thus prevent attacks against social leaders and former FARC members who are in the process of reintegration into civilian life. Progress: this corps was launched in late June It consists of 1,088 police officers: 120 experts in criminal investigation and 40 analysts, 150 members of an Immediate Response Group and members of different units and special operations. It coordinates with existing operations against or- 28

29 ganised crime 68. e Elite Corps intervened in the case of an imminent paramilitary takeover in Puerto López (municipality of El Bagre) 69 and is expected to intervene in two pilot cases prioritised by the CNGS - Buenaventura and Tumaco 70. Challenges: the Elite Corps has only been functioning for a short time so it is difficult to evaluate its effectiveness and ability to act. Although it may be an important measure, it is unlikely that sustainable results will be achieved through military and police action alone, so it is important that it is part of a comprehensive policy to dismantle paramilitarism and that its achievements are not only measured in numbers of captures and seizures of assets but in terms of impact on the safety of population groups affected by their violence. The creation of a Special Investigations Unit (Unidad Especial de Investigación UEI) in the Public Prosecutor s Office to investigate these groups. What is this? An autonomous entity both at the financial level and in the definition of its lines of investigation - for the dismantling of criminal organisations, including organisations called paramilitary successor groups and their support networks 71, responsible for killings and assassinations against human rights defenders, social or political movements, or that threaten or attack those who participate in the implementation of agreements and peacebuilding. Progress: e UEI was created one day after the end of the negotiations, on August 24, 2016 by Decree 2903 issued by the Public Prosecutor s Office 72, its director was appointed and it has 300 million pesos of funding from the European Union. One of the modifications to the agreement following the referendum implied that the leadership of the Unit should be appointed by the Public Prosecutor from candidates cho- 29

30 sen by an Election Committee 73. As a result of this change, the director of the Unit resigned. e Public Prosecutor also expressed regrets to the UEI 74, raising fears that there is not enough support within the Office of the Prosecutor to run the UEI and give it the autonomy and resources it needs. On May 29, the President issued a new decree, Decree 898 of May 29, 2017, which introduces changes that according to several victims organisations and their representatives, could seriously affect the autonomy 75 of the UEI. Challenges: the Constitutional Court could deliberate on the feasibility of the changes that were introduced to the agreement through Decree 898. A new director could be appointed to head the unit so that the investigation team begins to function. e political and financial independence of this unit is considered fundamental but it is not clear if there are guarantees for it to be so at this moment. Article 1 of Decree 898 of 2017 makes a minor modification to the mandate of this Unit that could convert it into the body that investigates crimes against human rights defenders and social leaders. However, the Human Rights Unit in the Public Prosecutor s Office is already in charge of investigating these killings and this may affect the ability of the UEI to carry out its first task, i.e. the dismantling of the aforementioned organisations and actions, the results of which will be indispensable to prevent further murders of human rights defenders, leaders and people. e National Political Pact (Pacto Político Nacional PPN) and the incorporation of the prohibition of paramilitarism to the constitutional corpus What is this? e National Political Pact (Pacto Político Nacional - PPN) is a commitment between the parties to promote a political agreement in which Colombian citizens commit to never resort to weapons in politics, or promote 30

31 violent organisations such as paramilitaries. e government is responsible for including the Constitution the prohibition of paramilitary structures and practices. Social organisations have insisted on the implementation of this to ensure the non-repetition of paramilitarism 76, facilitated by laws and policies 77. Progress: legislation act has been approved to include the prohibition of paramilitarism within the Constitution. Challenges: the necessary rules for the application of this prohibition have to be developed, for example a policy of criminal prosecution, administrative and disciplinary sanctions. Policy for the submission of groups to the justice system. e Procurator General has called for the implementation of this part of the agreement, in order to reduce the impact of the persistence of these groups on the security of human rights defenders 78. For some years, the group calling themselves the Gaitanista Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia - AGC), also called Clan del Golfo, has expressed interest in an agreement to submit to justice. Following the death of one of its top leaders at the beginning of September 2016, and on the initiative of the group itself, the discussion for its dismantling is once again on the table 79. However, it is necessary to point out that these agreements can only have a real impact on the security of communities, social organisations and neighbourhood leaders, depending on the paramilitaries collaboration with the dismantling of their entire economic and political structure based on their contributions to the truth and respect for human rights 80. Some organisations have also highlighted the importance of conditioning this group s submission on them providing reparations to their victims

32 Instrument for the prevention and monitoring of criminal organisations in this agreement. is monitoring instrument is part of the Comprehensive Security System for the Exercise of Politics (Sistema Integral de Seguridad para el Ejercicio de la Política - SISEP) and will issue autonomous alerts on the presence of criminal groups. e rapid response of the state and the actions of SISEP should be joined up with the preventive and protection mechanisms described in this Decree. An Early Warning System (Sistema de Alertas Tempranas - SAT) already exists within the Human Rights Ombudsman s Office, so strengthening and reforming the SAT would be the most appropriate way to implement this instrument. e current SAT issues early warnings that allow rapid reaction, and in this sense what is being proposed is not new, but reforms will be needed so that the new mechanism, or the newly strengthened SAT, does not encounter the same obstacles as the current mechanism in order to be effective. Considering the consequences of the presence and actions of these groups on the population, it is urgent that this measure included in the peace agreement is regulated and implemented. So far no progress has been made in the implementation of mechanisms to control and monitor private security companies. 32

33 5. EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENTS. Guarantees for citizen participation. ere are some 50 mechanisms for citizen and civil society participation in the peace agreement, for example, civil society delegates participate in the following ways: in building the National Political Pact and the National Peace, Coexistence and Reconciliation Council; in the National Commission of Dialogue for the construction of the law on guarantees for participation, in the Commission for Follow Up, Implementation and Oversight (CSIVI), in the National Commission for Security Guarantees, in the High Level Body in the Comprehensive Security System for the Exercise of Politics, in the construction of the Comprehensive Security and Protection Program for communities and organisations in the territories, in the Dialogue Commission on citizen participation, in community participation in the creation of Development Plans with a Territorial Approach, etc. e Peace Agreement recognises the importance of participation and control and citizen oversight: control by citizens is even more necessary in an end-of-conflict and peace-building scenario where significant investment is needed to meet the objectives of this Agreement 82. e aim of the peace process is not only to disarm the FARC-EP, but also to build a more inclusive society and country. erefore, the participation of sectors who have until now been excluded is fundamental. e reparation of the victims begins with the recognition of their right to participation and of their need to play a major role in the process. Ethnic minorities, women and LGBTI groups have been disproportionately affected and victimised. 33

34 PBI-Colombia Participation of ethnic groups (indigenous and Afrodescendant) in the process and implementation Both during the process and in the implementation of the agreement, ethnic minorities, their communities and organisations have denounced the lack of opportunities and mechanisms for participation. is is despite the fact that most decisions affect them directly or indirectly. It was only at the end of the peace negotiations that the Ethnic Commission for Peace and the Defence of Territorial Rights (Comisión Étnica para la Paz y la Defensa de los Derechos Territoriales) was formally invited to the negotiating table. For this reason ethnic issues were included in a separate section to chapter 6 (6.2) of the Peace Agreement. is paragraph includes mention of a differential approach for the different points of the agreement and its implementation, for example in the Development Plans with a Territorial 34

35 Approach (Planes de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial - PDET), Protection Programs for Rural Communities, Special Territorial Circumscriptions, etc. It is important that this approach was included a posteriori; however, the Peace Agreement could have been more inclusive if the structural participation of ethnic minorities had been included from the outset. In terms of monitoring the implementation phase, the Commission for Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Final Agreement established the High Commission with Ethnic Peoples (Alta Instancia con Pueblos Étnicos) 83. Eight delegates from regional and national indigenous organisations will participate and monitor the implementation of the differential approach. e fast-track mechanism has not provided for a way to fulfil communities right to prior consultation 84. Organisations have also reported that the proposals they made through the High Commission with Ethnic Peoples during the implementation have remained unanswered and were not taken into account 85. e gender approach was excluded in the construction of the Implementation Plan developed by the government 86. Organisations have also reported their lack of inclusion in the first phase of implementation of the PDET 87 and the National Comprehensive Plan for Illegal Crop Substitution (Plan Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos - PNIS). Decree 896 of 2017 that regulates the PNIS was not subject to a prior consultation process. In different regions (Catatumbo, Tumaco, Cauca, Chocó, etc.), forced eradication processes have been initiated, failing to comply with the substitution road map and consultation with communities 88. Participation of women and gender focus. Women play a fundamental role in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in the construction of peace. However, the participation of women and the inclusion of a gender approach in the agreement would not have been possible without the work carried out by Colombian women s organisations through their participation at the negotiating table and in other fora. anks to their work, a Gender Subcommittee was established at the nego- 35

36 36 tiating table with three women plenipotentiaries 89. At the 1st and 2nd National Women s Summit, women s organisations across the country made concrete proposals regarding the inclusion of their issues in the Peace Agreement and its implementation 90. Although limited, direct participation in the negotiating table led to important achievements. e gender perspective in the Agreement (in points relating to victims, political participation, comprehensive rural reform and solution to the problem of illicit drugs) recognises that women have been affected differently. According to the Single Victims Registry (Registro Único de Víctimas), 51% of victims of forced displacement, 47% of homicide victims and 82% of sexual violence victims are women. In addition, women make up approximately 40% of the members of the FARC-EP 91. Some conservative political and religious sectors promoted the No vote before the referendum on the first agreement, falsely claiming that the gender approach was intended to impose a so-called gender ideology. Due to the influence of these sectors, numerous changes were made to the agreements after the referendum 92. Most of these changes, appear at first glance to be related to terminology, however they imply a deterioration of rights and guarantees for women and the LGBTI population. In order to monitor the gender approach and guarantee the rights of women during the implementation, a Special Body was created with seven representatives from women s organisations 93. is Body was finally created at the end of July. In general, the formal participation of women in the implementation of the agreement is rather limited: only 13% of the people in the bodies created for the implementation of the Peace Agreement are women 94. On the other hand, there have also been some achievements. According to the Tripartite Verification Mechanism, which involves 120 women, the peacekeeping mission with the greatest participation of women in the world, the express prohibition of gender-based violence in the protocol that governs the bilateral ceasefire, has managed to limit this violence. ere are two (reported) cases, lower than in similar contexts in other parts of the world 95.

37 Leonardo Villamizar Commitment to the promotion, respect and guarantee of human rights. In the chapter on victims there is a specific paragraph that refers to the promotion, respect and guarantee of human rights. is chapter has not been implemented at the policy level. It nevertheless includes a commitment to strengthening mechanisms for the promotion, protection and prevention of human rights, and the people who defend them. ere has been no concrete progress in implementation but the key is, above all, to strengthen existing mechanisms and policies. It is therefore important that in the future implementation phase, existing spaces for consultation and dialogue and existing processes, such as the National Guarantees Roundtable and the process of building the National Human Rights Plan (Plan Nacional de Derechos Humanos), are respected and strengthened before creating new mechanisms, processes and bodies. 37

38 Law on Guarantees for citizen participation. e government is drafting a bill with civil society participation via regional fora that took place at the end of March 96. e bill has not yet been presented to Congress. In May and June there were protests in the departments of Chocó, Valle del Cauca and in the mining area of Antioquia and serious violations of the right to free protest occurred at the hands of the state security forces. It is important that, within the framework of the implementation of agreements that call for citizen participation, there are guarantees for the participation of civil society in protests. For years, social organisations have insisted on the need for a protocol regulating the actions of the state security forces in demonstrations but this has still not occurred. e law will also include other issues such as strengthening and promoting social organisations and guarantees for participation. 38

39 6. THE VICTIMS MOMENT: COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM FOR TRUTH, JUSTICE, REPARATION AND NON-REPETITION (SIVJRNR). Chapter 5 of the peace agreement regarding victims of the conflict is the result of their widespread participation in the negotiation process. A total of 60 delegated victims travelled to Havana and in Colombia regional forums were organised for their participation. Some of the mechanisms would not have been included in the agreement were it not for this participation, as in the case of the new Unit to Search for Persons given to be Disappeared. However, in contradiction to the principle of centrality of the victims in the agreement, in the first legislative period priority was given to implementation that would provide legal security to members of the FARC and the state security forces 97. After the negative result in the referendum and after debates in the Congress on the draft legislative bill to regulate the SIVJRNR, changes were made 98 to what had been agreed at the negotiating table. ese changes led to risks of impunity that could affect the degree of clarification of the truth and, therefore, guarantees for non-repetition 99. A reference to article 28 of the Rome Statute in the Agreement was deleted. is article defines the concept of international criminal law on command responsibility. e new agreement uses a definition that violates international standards 100, as the International Criminal Court has warned, since it limits this responsibility to effective control of a respective conduct when the international norm speaks of effective control of the forces under their responsibility 101. On the other hand, another point of concern is the inclusion of the term differential treatment for state agents. The Legislative Act does not define what this is and opens the door to privileged treatment

40 Amnesty Law and evasion of criminal prosecution. e Amnesty Law allows for the transitional release of state agents convicted of serious crimes 103 if they commit to contribute to transitional justice, and provided they have served five years in prison. e victims, however, have not been consulted about this norm and will not be able to intervene at any moment in these decisions 104, even though the centrality of the victims is supposed to be a guiding principle of the peace agreement. Moreover, in cases of serious crimes, detention also provides protection for the victims 105. e Supreme Court has granted this measure to persons prosecuted or convicted of extrajudicial killings, thus confirming that according to the Court, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace may apply in these cases 106. ere are no deadlines for appearing before the JEP or criteria for noncompliance and/or loss of benefits, including some important benefits such as parole 107. is provision goes hand in hand with decree 706 of 2017 that suspends arrest warrants for agents from the state security forces 108, even for those who have failed to appear in criminal proceedings 109. Case of General Uscátegui. General Uscátegui is one of the few high-ranking members of the state security forces convicted of war crimes: in the case of the Mapiripán Massacre (1997). He was released from prison in May 2017 under the Amnesty Law, insisting that he had not been involved in the crime for which he was convicted. For the victims this implies that he has not committed to telling the truth one of the conditions to be able to benefit from this measure and as such he should not be able to apply to be covered by the Law

41 Alejandro Gonzales Civil society organisations have also argued that Decree 706 of 2017 discourages investigation work by prosecutors. Todd Howland, the OHCHR representative in Colombia, has expressed concern that political considerations and legal benefits for perpetrators now occupy public attention and are given higher priority in debates, rather than attention being paid to the reality faced by the eight million victims [...] 111. e Statutory Law established in Congress in August 2017 to regulate the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) under which people held responsible for serious human rights violations in the context of the conflict will be tried, has caused concern regarding the possibility that false positive killings - extrajudicial killings of civilians by the state security forces could fall under the JEP, as confirmed indirectly in the 41

42 Supreme Court ruling mentioned above. In addition, the European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights considers that the law in its current form does not comply with international standards regarding the definition of command responsibility. 112 Commission to Clarify the Truth, Coexistence and Non- Repetition (Comisión de Esclarecimiento de la Verdad, la Convivencia y la no Repetición - CEVCR). e elections of both the Commission to Clarify the Truth, Coexistence and Non-Repetition, and the UBPD, are pending decision by the members of the Election Committee. is Committee will choose between nominations postulated by the victims among others. e Commission will be implemented by its members. e CEVCR has been regulated but is still not functioning. Special Unit to Search for Persons given to be Disappeared in the context of and due to the armed conflict (Unidad Especial para la Búsqueda de Personas dadas por Desaparecidas - UBPD). e inclusion of the UBPD in the peace agreement was an important achievement for the victims and human rights organisations that had called for its creation through their participation in the peace process in Havana and through a process of developing 200 recommendations on how the UBPD should operate, delivered to the negotiating parties. In Colombia, although figures differ for lack of a single and differentiated registry, according to data from the Single Victims Registry on 1 July 2017, there were 46,887 direct victims and 120,083 indirect victims of forced disappearance in the context of the conflict 113. e UBPD was created by Decree 589 of May e fact that is was created quickly has been seen as positive and human rights organisations have supported its constitutionality 114, but have also expressed concern about the following issues: the UBPD will not be a high-level, autonomous and independent institution but rather 42

43 a body attached to the Ministry of Justice and Law, which is contrary to what was agreed at the negotiating table. In addition, the National Commission to Search for Missing Persons (CNBPD) 115 has not been eliminated. e proposal for the UBPD and the recommendations for its creation were made because the CNBPD had not managed until then to respond to the victims demands, for example, to obtain a rapid response in cases of forced disappearance, to implement procedures that do not revictimise the families of disappeared persons, to create a unique registry and make progress in identifying the thousands of remains stored in the Forensics Department (Medicina Legal). In addition, the UBPD will only investigate disappeared persons in the context of the conflict. e victims request that all cases be investigated 116. Third parties in the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz - JEP). Another of the changes that were incorporated in the Peace Agreement after its renegotiation and in subsequent debates in the Congress is the judging of third parties under the JEP. For victims organisations this is an important guarantee for non-repetition: not only to clarify the identities of the perpetrators of serious war crimes and mass violations of human rights, but also those who benefited from them, those who ordered them with this objective or who facilitated them, through omission. In Legislative Act 01 of 2017 (LA ) establishing the JEP, the obligation to attend hearings is limited to active or determining participation, contrary to the concept of guilt in International Criminal Law 117. LA added the criterion of close links with systematic breaches of IHL. If it is considered that this close link does not exist, participation is voluntary. In general, for victims and human rights organisations such as the Colombia-Europe-United States Coordination Group (Coordinación Colombia-Europa-Estados Unidos - CCEEU), the implementation of the agreement on transitional justice implies a reduction in guarantees for the victims and an excessive increase in benefits for the perpetrators

44 7. WHAT SHOULD THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION BE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENTS? Chapter 6 on the implementation of the agreements establishes the role of several international entities, including the European Union (EU). e EU has an accompanying role in the implementation of the Agreement for Comprehensive Rural Reform (Chapter 1), the reincorporation of former FARC-EP combatants (chapter 3.3), and the Special Investigation Unit into paramilitary groups (3.4). As part of this support, the European Union will support post-conflict Colombia with almost 600 million Euros 119. e Trust Fund of some 95 million Euros will mainly support the implementation of the agreement with a focus on Chapter 1 and in particular the Comprehensive Rural Reform (Reforma Rural Integral - RRI). e agreement on RRI recognises the importance of citizen participation in its implementation. ere is no clarity, however, as to how the European Union will ensure this participation of civil society in the implementation points that the EU will accompany. e FARC-EP have denounced the lack of transparency in the use of funds for the post-conflict 120. Colombia has a history of major corruption scandals in public procurement 121 and the government has recognised the problem and prioritised the fight against corruption in the post-agreement. Control and citizen oversight will also play a key role. e EU needs to ensure transparency and the participation of social organisations in the implementation of the Trust Fund and other funding mechanisms. e lack of money expected for small civil society organisations in the funds of the different donors and the Colombian State is a general concern. 44

45 CONCLUSIONS One year into the implementation of the Peace Agreement, important progress has been made, including the demobilisation and laying down of weapons by the FARC-EP and their conversion into a political party and the creation of various bodies for the dismantling of paramilitarism. In addition, civil society involvement and participation has been achieved in a number of areas. e signing of the peace agreement with the FARC-EP has led to a decrease in civilian victims of armed confrontation between this group and the state security forces, however, still to be overcome are the violence caused by the persistence of the armed conflict between the ELN and the government, violence between the ELN and neo-paramilitary groups, and socio-political violence. e bilateral ceasefire between the government and the ELN is an important step towards reducing victims from the civilian population; nevertheless it is also necessary to work on dismantling of paramilitary successor groups and/or their submission to justice. e high rate of killings and other attacks in Colombia shows that the signing of the Peace Agreement is not a guarantee per se of the non-repetition of political violence. In some cases, participation in the peace process has been the very motive behind attacks. Violence creates an environment of fear and risk that is an obstacle to the participation of social movements and leaders and human rights defenders in the process. However, there are important measures in the agreement that can serve as a first step forward. It s important therefor that they are implemented as soon as possible. 45

46 ere are also worrying delays in policy development that may jeopardise implementation in the upcoming electoral context. It is a pity that, despite the centrality of the victims in the agreement, granting legal benefits to the perpetrators has been prioritised. Despite the commitment to the principle of the centrality of the victims in the agreement, changes have been made during the renegotiation of the agreement and in its normative implementation that have affected this principle and the possibility of participation by the victims, and have led to risks of impunity, compromising the victims right to the truth. Failure to make this right a reality would weaken guarantees of non-repetition and would jeopardise the achievement of a lasting and sustainable peace. Continued international accompaniment is important to support the participation of civil society in the implementation and peacebuilding process, and to monitor the fulfilment of the agreement, in particular to support guarantees for the victims participation and centrality in the process. 46

47 RECOMMENDATIONS at the European Union, its Member States, Switzerland and Norway monitor and support the speedy implementation of the Peace Agreement through the fast-track mechanism, while respecting the spirit and content of the Final Peace Agreement. is should include guarantees for civil society participation, in particular indigenous and Afro-descendant minorities, and women through the mechanisms provided for in the Agreement. at the European Union applies the EU s Policy Framework on support to transitional justice, to support the process and monitor the centrality of the victims in the implementation of chapter 5 of the Agreement and in all norms affecting the right of the victims to guarantees of non-repetition. at the European Union, its Member States, Switzerland and Norway show their support for the search for a negotiated solution to the armed conflict with the National Liberation Army (ELN) and urge respect for both sides in the recent bilateral ceasefire. at the European Union, its Member States, Switzerland and Norway urge the Colombian government to fully implement measures for the dismantling of neo-paramilitary groups and the paramilitary phenomenon. In particular, the EU must support independence and autonomy in the investigations into paramilitary structures and successor groups, through its accompaniment to the Special Investigation Unit. is should occur in order to comply with the agreed upon 47

48 mandate for the investigations not only of individual cases but also with respect to paramilitary structures and their conduct in all dimensions, to eradicate these groups and to prevent aggression against social leaders and human rights defenders. at the European Union, its Member States, Switzerland and Norway request that the Colombian government regulates and implements as soon as possible the prevention and protection measures in the Comprehensive Security System for the Exercise of Politics and the Law on Guarantees for Citizen Participation. at progress be made in the implementation of the measures envisaged in the SISEP and in other parts of the Agreement, not only through the implementation of the agreement, but also through the actions of existing institutions that have the same purpose. 48

49 NOTES AND REFERENCES 1 Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. Basta ya! Colombia: Memorias de guerra y dignidad, National Centre for Historical Memory (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica). Basta ya! Colombia: Memorias de guerra y dignidad, Caracol Radio, Conflicto armado ha dejado 20 mil víctimas de violencia sexual en Colombia, 20 June Dirección para la Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal - Descontamina Colombia, Víctimas de Minas Antipersonal, Fecha de corte: 31 DE AGOSTO DE Full text of the agreement available at: Final Agreement to end the armed conflict and build a stable and lasting peace. The FARC-EP and the Colombian government signed a first peace agreement on September 26, 2016 but this was rejected by Colombian citizens through a plebiscite held on October 2. This first agreement was renegotiated and gave rise to the second and final agreement referred to in this report. 5 Agreed in Chapter 3 of the Agreement on the end of the conflict and protocols I and II. 6 Colombian President s Office (Presidencia de la República de Colombia), Decreto 1391 del 30 de agosto de This process was regulated by the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral) through resolution 1733 of August 31, 2016, and in the logistical aspects by the National Registry of Civil Status (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil) by resolution 8124 of the same date. 7 Misión de Observación Electoral, Mapas de riesgo electoral 2016, September 2016, p.9. 8 La Opinión, En 2016 van 15 líderes sociales asesinados en áreas de concentración de Farc, 14 September El País, "Preocupan la polarización y la intolerancia de esta campaña": Alejandra Barrios, directora de la MOE. 21 September Human Rights Ombudsman s Office (Defensoría del Pueblo), Informe de Riesgo N A.I, 18 March Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Annual Report on the situation of human rights in Colombia in March Semana, Consejo de Estado dice que hubo "engaño generalizado" en campaña del No en el Plebiscito, 19 December Mazzoldi Díaz, Génica; y Cuesta, Irina, Acuerdo de paz, debates en torno al enfoque de género, 13 February El Espectador, Porqué es tan importante el enfoque de género en los acuerdos de paz?, 24 July Radio Macondo, Panfletos de los paramilitares amenazan a los que voten por el SÍ en el Magdalena Medio, 20 September Caracol Radio, Amenazan a directivas de la CGT en Antioquia por apoyar el proceso de paz, 15 October Programa Somos Defensores, Contra las Cuerdas. Informe anual 2017, February El Espectador, "Cese al fuego bilateral con las Farc-EP va hasta el 31 de octubre": Santos, 4 October El Espectador, Santos prorroga cese bilateral al fuego con las Farc-EP hasta el 31 de diciembre, 13 October Colombian President s Office (Presidencia de la República de Colombia), Decreto 1624 del 20 de octubre de Decree 1624 of October 20, 2016 which establishes the Temporary Gathering Points and Temporary Location Zones and other provisions. 19 El Tiempo, Centro Democrático defendió demanda contra el fast track, 6 April La Opinión, Por estudio de la JEP, Corte suspende revisión de otro decreto de paz, 21 August Caracol Radio, Lo que está pendiente para la implementación del acuerdo de paz, 18 May Viva la Ciudadanía, Análisis del comportamiento parlamentario en la implementación del Acuerdo Final Julio- 20/ Agosto 31 de 2017, 11 September

50 50 23 Medina C., María Alejandra, Proyecto de ley de tierras contradice el Acuerdo de Paz?, EL Espectador, 20 April Codhes, Intervención Ciudadana en el proceso de revisión de constitucionalidad del Decreto Ley 898 de 2017, June 2017 Cajar, Reforma a Fiscalía podría significar impunidad para crímenes de agentes estatales, 10 July Semana, ONU certificó el desarme total de las Farc-Ep, 26 June Centro de recursos para el análisis de conflictos (CERAC), Monitor del Cese el Fuego Bilateral y de Hostilidades Reporte final, 30 July Ibid. 28 Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas, Víctimas del conflicto armado. Desplazamiento Personas, date consulted: 1 September El Colombiano, Farc-Ep ya se mueve hacia zonas de concentración: Sergio Jaramillo, 26 August El Espectador, Los detalles de la muerte de dos guerrilleros de las Farc en el Sur de Bolívar, 16 November El Colombiano, Estamos viviendo la expansión del Eln en el país: Carlos Negret, 22 August El Espectador, Este año van tantos desplazamientos como en 2016 : Alto Comisionado para los Refugiados en Colombia, 19 June of the 42 mass displacements occurred in the department of Chocó. El Espectador. Este año van tantos desplazamientos como en 2016 : Alto Comisionado para los Refugiados en Colombia. 19 June Human Rights Watch, Colombia: nuevos asesinatos y desapariciones en Buenaventura, 4 March Europa Press, Cientos de desplazados en un pueblo de Colombia por el acoso de los grupos paramilitares, según AI, 7 March Resumen Latinoamericano, Colombia: Paramilitares asedian a población de Catatumbo / Aguilas Negras entorpecen desplazamiento de columna de las FARC, 10 February Durango Domingo, H., Colombia: Accionar paramilitar en Antioquia, Chocó y Córdoba amenaza el proceso de paz con las FARC, in Resumen Latinoamericano, 11 September Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz (Indepaz), 322 serán los municipios priorizados para el postconflicto, 7 February In 2016, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the Ministry of Post- Conflict, Human Rights and Security agreed that the Project for Supporting Productive Partnerships (Proyecto Apoyo a Alianzas Productivas - PAAP) will be a rapid response tool for post-conflict. This project focused on the 322 municipalities that the Ministry of Post-Conflict considered as priorities. 36 This was caused by a number of factors. Some of these are mentioned in the following examples: Garzón, Juan Carlos, Sin las Farc aumenta el homicidio en las zonas cocaleras, 7 September El Tiempo, El homicidio se disparó en las regiones, según el Fiscal General, 26 May Copyright: 37 Fundación Paz y Reconciliación, Informe No 2: Cómo va la paz Segundo informe de la iniciativa Unión por la Paz, 18 July United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2261 of 25 January Mecanismo de Monitoreo y Verificación, Octavo informe mensual del mecanismo de monitoreo y verificación (Includes the period between 7 June to 7 July 2017). 40 Contagio Radio, Zonas veredales bajo la sombra paramilitar, 11 January El Espectador, Asesinada propietaria de predio donde se concentrarán las Farc en Cauca, 8 September 2016.

51 42 Gómez Polo, Germán, Se recrudece la violencia contra excombatientes de las Farc y sus familias, in El Espectador, 24 August Caracol Radio, Van 186 líderes sociales asesinados en Colombia, 13 July Programa Somos Defensores, Agúzate! Informe Semestral enero-junio 2017, August The figures, depending on the definition of human rights defender, vary: The We are Defenders Program (Programa Somos Defensores) reported 80 murders of activists during the year See Programa Somos Defensores, Contra las Cuerdas. Annual Report 2017, February According to the Cumbre Agraria, there were 94 murders. See Cumbre Agraria: Informe de Derechos Humanos y Vulneración al Derecho Internacional Humanitario 2016, 9 November 2016, p. 2. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR): 63 killings in 2016 in comparison with 25 killings in See OHCHR, Informe anual sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en Colombia, 14 March 2017, pp. 10 and 11. The Human Rights Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo) has registered, 156 killings, 33 attempted killings and at least 500 threats against leaders and human rights defenders between 1 January 2016 and 5 March See Defensoría del Pueblo, Informe Especial de Riesgo: Violencia y amenazas contra los líderes sociales y los defensores de derechos Humanos, 31 March 2017, pp. 23, 24 and 28. Indepaz recorded 117 killings in See Indepaz, Informe Anual 2016, 3 February The different organisations figures coincide with the fact that the increase in killings against social leaders and human rights defenders is undeniable. 46 Programa Somos Defensores, Informes anuales: D de Defensa (2013); La Divina Comedia (2014); El Cambio (2015); Contra las cuerdas (2016). Year Total aggressions Killings Attacks Gender % male 23% female % male 35% female % male 39% female % male 32% female % male 24% female 51

52 52 47 For a full explanation of the structure of the SISEP, see Forjando Paz, Pazografías: Sistema Integral de Seguridad para el Ejercicio de la Política I, II y III. 48 Presidency of the Republic of Colombia, Decree 895 of May 29, 2017, Decreto 895 de 29 de mayo de 2017,, which creates the Comprehensive Security System for the Exercise of Politics. 49 Verdad Abierta, Está la Fiscalía preparada para investigar asesinatos de líderes sociales?, 28 February Defensoría del Pueblo, Informe Especial de Riesgo: "Violencia y amenazas contra los líderes sociales y los defensores de derechos humanos", 30 March Caribe Afirmativo, Personas LGBTI participarán en los Consejos de Paz, Reconciliación y Convivencia, 5 July The creation of this Promotion Committee is included in Article 11 of Decree 895 of May 29, 2017 that creates the SISEP. 53 Verdad Abierta, Está la Fiscalía preparada para investigar asesinatos de líderes sociales?, 28 February El Tiempo, Crearán grupo especial para investigar asesinatos de líderes sociales, 22 March Molano Jimeno, Alfredo, Protocolo de protección para defensores de derechos humanos en áreas rurales, 17 February In this respect, see, for example Verdad Abierta, Gaitanistas avanzan en Chocó sin freno de la Fuerza Pública?, 27 April El Espectador, Mininterior sostiene que no existe "sistematicidad" en los ataques contra líderes sociales y campesinos, 28 December La Razón, Defensoría del Pueblo de Colombia denuncia 120 asesinatos de defensores DDHH, 3 March Programa Somos Defensores, Agúzate, July Security guarantees and the fight against the organisations and criminal conducts responsible for homicides and massacres, which attack human rights defenders, social movements or political movements or that threaten or attack those who participate in the implementation of the agreements and peacebuilding, including criminal organisations that have been designated as successors to paramilitaries and their support networks. [Unofficial translation] 61 Peace Agreement, p The measures set out here are not all that was agreed in the peace agreement. The following additional measures are not discussed in this report since a more specific approach is required; however, they are also part of the agreement: Basic guarantees for the exercise of the function of prosecutor, judges and other public servants; Integral Security System for the Exercise of the Politics; Measures of protection, personal and collective security; High Level Body in the Comprehensive Security System for the Exercise of Politics; Presidential Delegate; Program of Comprehensive Protection for the members of the new movement or political party that arises from the transition of the FARC-EP; Specialised unit on security and protection in the UNP; Roundtable on Security and protection techniques; Security and Protection Body; Measures on selfprotection (for FARC-EP); Implementation of a national supervisory and territorial inspection mechanism for private security and surveillance services; Measures to prevent and combat corruption. 63 Presidency of the Republic of Colombia, Decree 154 of 2017 of February 3, 2017, which created the National Commission for Security Guarantees under the Final Peace Agreement, signed between the National Government and the FARC-EP, November El Tiempo, Arranca Comisión Nacional de Garantías de Seguridad, 22 March Consejería de Derechos Humanos de la Presidencia de la República. "Todo el Estado está comprometido con la consolidación de la paz y darle plenas garantías de seguridad a todos los colombianos": Presidente Juan Manuel Santos. 3 May 2017.

53 66 Ibid. 67 Presidencia de la República de Colombia, Comisión Nacional de Garantías de Seguridad escucha a voceros de organizaciones sociales, 21 March Programa Somos Defensores, Agúzate, July 2017, p El Nuevo Siglo, Policía pone en marcha Cuerpo Élite para la paz, 6 September Hacemos Memoria, Erradicar el paramilitarismo: una labor de la Comisión Nacional de Garantías de Seguridad, 12 July Semana, El cuerpo élite para la paz, 16 June Peace Agreement, p Public Prosecutor s Office (Fiscalía General de la Nación), Resolución 2903 del 24 de agosto de Peace Agreement, Chapter Verdad Abierta, Está la Fiscalía preparada para investigar asesinatos de líderes sociales?, 28 February Movement of Victims of State Crimes (Movimiento de Víctimas de Crímenes de Estado - MOVICE), En intervención ciudadana sobre la Unidad Especial de Investigación de la Fiscalía, el Movice pide que no se acepte la totalidad del decreto, 29 June Colombia-Europe-United States Coordination Group (Coordinación Colombia- Europa-Estados Unidos), La prohibición del paramilitarismo es garantía de no repetición, 28 August See for example Decree 3398 of 1965 (which enabled the founding of civilian selfdefence groups); Law 48 of 1968, or Decree 356 of El Espectador, "Urge definir estrategia de sometimiento para grupos paramilitares": Procuraduría, 14 June El Heraldo, Muerte de Gavilán, el gran golpe para el sometimiento del Clan del Golfo, 5 de September Contagio Radio, Sometimiento de AGC debe garantizar la verdad a las víctimas, 6 September La FM, Víctimas del Clan del Golfo en Antioquia exigen reparación por posible sometimiento, 5 September Contagio Radio, Sometimiento de AGC debe garantizar la verdad a las víctimas, 6 September Peace Agreement, p Contagio Radio, Se creará instancia con pueblos étnicos para la implementación de los acuerdos de paz, 16 March Contagio Radio, Comunidades étnicas denuncia exclusión en la implementación de acuerdos de paz, 7 September Coordinación Étnica de Paz, Incumplimientos reiterados del Gobierno a la implementación de los Acuerdos de la Habana, in Las 2 Orillas, 8 September Ibid. 87 Coordinación Étnica Nacional de Paz CENPAZ, Comunicado Nro. 001, en sus capítulos territoriales Antioquia Chocó, 5 September Coordinación Étnica de Paz, Incumplimientos reiterados del Gobierno a la implementación de los Acuerdos de la Habana, in Las 2 Orillas, 8 September El Espectador, Las mujeres que negociaron los procesos de paz en Colombia desde los márgenes, 6 April El Heraldo, La participación de las mujeres en los Acuerdos de la Habana, 29 September El Espectador, Las mujeres que negociaron los procesos de paz en Colombia desde los márgenes, 6 April Regarding the replacement of terms, it is important to highlight the change from gender equality to the expression equal opportunities or equality between men and women, as well as the replacement of sexual diversity and gender identity with 53

54 54 groups in vulnerable conditions, gender approach with specific and differentiated measures and gender perspective with affirmative action. Fundación Ideas para la Paz, Acuerdo de paz, debates en torno al enfoque de género, 13 February El Espectador, Mujeres harán seguimiento al enfoque de género en el acuerdo de paz, 11 April El Colombiano, El enfoque de género sigue esperando el acuerdo con las Farc, 4 July Ibid. 96 President s Office (Presidencia de la República de Colombia), Gobierno elabora proyecto de ley de garantías y promoción de participación ciudadana con aportes del Consejo Nacional de Participación y de la Comisión de Diálogo, 13 May Fundación Paz y Reconciliación, Informe No 2: Cómo va la paz Segundo informe de la iniciativa Unión por la Paz, 18 July Semana, Doce puntos claves que le cambiaron a la JEP en el Congreso, 14 March Contagio Radio, Cambios en los acuerdos de paz no garantizan derechos de las víctimas: Amnistía, 21 de febrero de Vivanco, José Miguel (Human Rights Watch), Letter to Colombian Congressman Telésforo Pedraza Ortega, 25 January The Prosecutor from the International Criminal Court (ICC), Fatou Bensouda, has expressed concerns. See Semana, El acuerdo de paz de Colombia demanda respeto, pero también responsabilidad, 21 January Article 28 of the Rome Statute. Colombia is a State Party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 102 As guarantors of constitutional order. 103 The decision on transitional freedom is taken in the meantime by the Executive Secretary of the JEP and a Court for Enforcement of Sentences. 104 One example is the release of General (r) Uscátegui, who announced that the JEP does not want to review his case, which implies that he will not provide truth, one of the requirements of the JEP. Corporación Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo (CCAJAR) and Humanidad Vigente: Libertad de Uscátegui atenta contra derechos de las víctimas, 8 May MOVICE, Decreto que suspende órdenes de captura a fuerza pública es inconstitucional, 6 August Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de la Justicia), JEP aplica en expedientes de ejecuciones extrajudiciales, 28 September CCAJAR, CCEEU, MOVICE, Concepto ante Corte Constitucional sobre la Ley 1820 de 2016 por medio de la cual se dictan disposiciones sobre amnistía, indulto y tratamientos penales especiales y otras disposiciones., 24 March See also CCAJAR. Libertades transitorias deben incluir compromisos verificables con los derechos de las víctimas, 29 March Presidency of the Republic of Colombia (Presidencia de la República de Colombia), Decree Law 706 of May 3, 2017 (Decreto ley 706 de 3 de mayo 2017), por el cual se aplica un trato especial a los miembros de la Fuerza Pública en desarrollo de los principios de prevalencia e inescindibilidad del Sistema Integral de Verdad, Justicia, Reparación y se dictan otras disposiciones. Este decreto ley se refiere a aspectos de implementación del AL 01 y la Ley de Amnistía. This decree law refers to aspects related to the implementation of LA 01 and the Amnesty Law. 109 In addition to offering arbitrary benefits for these people, they contradict what is established in the Amnesty Law that only provides for freedom after five years of deprivation of liberty in case of serious crimes. CCAJAR et al., Intervención ciudadana ante Corte Constitucional sobre Decreto Ley 706 del 3 de mayo de 2017, 2 June 2017.

55 110 CCAJAR and Humanidad Vigente, Libertad de Uscátegui atenta contra derechos de las víctimas, 8 May Howland, Todd, Víctimas y la no repetición de violaciones: el centro del proceso de paz con las FARC, in Semana magazine, 1 March European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights, Amicus Curiae sobre responsabilidad de mando dentro de la Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz de Colombia. 113 Single Register of Victims. 114 CCEEU, Para lograr una Paz sin desaparecidos es necesaria una Unidad de Búsqueda con autonomía e independencia, 28 July Colombia Plural, La Comisión de Búsqueda de Personas Desaparecidas no quiere desaparecer, 28 February Hacemos Memoria, Qué le exigen las víctimas a la Unidad de Búsqueda de Personas Dadas por Desaparecidas?, 5 September Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 25 c) defines as criminally responsible those who For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission [ ]. 118 MOVICE, Decreto que suspende órdenes de captura a fuerza pública es inconstitucional, 6 August European Commission, Ayuda de la Unión Europea de casi 600 millones EUR a la consolidación de la paz en Colombia, 12 December Resumen Latinoamericano, Colombia: Exigimos transparencia en el manejo de los fondos de la paz, 10 March El Tiempo, Los escándalos de corrupción que más han robado a los colombianos, 1 May

56 The International Office for Human Rights Action on Colombia (OIDHACO) represents a network of 35 European and International organizations. From its headquarters in Brussels, OIDHACO supports Colombian social initiatives which work towards the respect of human rights and international humanitarian law, and a negotiated solution to the armed conflict. Since 2012, OIDHACO has held special consultative status within the United Nations Economic and Social Council. OIDHACO 11 rue de la Linière, B-1060 Bruselas, (Bélgica) Tel , oidhaco@oidhaco.org The Catalan Roundtable for Peace and Human Rights in Colombia is a coordination space in Catalonia of NGOs, unions and public administrations that has existed for over 15 years. The main goals of the Roundtable are the promotion and protection of human rights in Colombia, as well as support to negotiated outcome of the conflict, within the framework of the recommendations of the United Nations and other international organisms. With the financial assistance of: