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1 amnesty international COLOMBIA A DEEPENING HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS Amnesty International January 1996 AI Index: AMR 23/02/96

2 2 Colombia: A Deepening Human Rights Crisis International Amnesty 1 Easton Street London WC1X 9DJ United Kingdom COLOMBIA A DEEPENING HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS The long-running human rights crisis in Colombia deepened during 1995 as the civil conflict, characterized by blatant disregard for human rights and international humanitarian standards, reached alarming proportions in several regions of the country. The optimism and expectation initially generated by President Samper s human rights policies have not been borne out and the political will of his government to end enduring and systematic violations is increasingly open to doubt. At least 2500 people were victims of politically motivated killings in Torture was widespread and over 150 people disappeared. Several hundred people were killed in armed confrontations between the armed forces, their paramilitary allies and armed opposition groups. The vast majority of victims, however, continued to be non-combatant civilians targeted for their real or perceived political allegiances. Tens of thousands of people were internally displaced from their homes, swelling the ranks of the estimated displaced by political violence in the previous ten years.

3 Colombia: A Deepening Human Rights Crisis 3 Government proposals to initiate peace talks with the main armed opposition groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), and the National Liberation Army (ELN), were suspended in July following opposition from the military high command and the resignation of the government s High Commissioner for Peace, who was not replaced. 1 The FARC, EPL and ELN continued their campaigns of armed opposition throughout the year. The government responded to the failure of its peace initiative by increasing military expenditure and by introducing measures by executive decree under states of emergency designed to augment the armed forces counter-insurgency capacity by easing judicial controls over their operations. The government twice declared states of emergency. The first, in August, coincided with a severe political crisis triggered by investigations into alleged financial support from drug-trafficking organizations in President Samper s 1994 election campaign. Although the state of emergency was overturned by the Constitutional Court which considered it was unjustified, the government again resorted to declaring a state of internal commotion in November after the murder of a leading member of the conservative party, Alvaro Gómez Hurtado, in the capital Bogotá. Under both states of exception the government introduced authoritarian emergency measures by executive decree, many of which were later presented to Congress for conversion into permanent law. Among the measures introduced were house searches without warrant, the reduction of the age of criminal liability to fourteen, limited press censorship and authorization for military and civilian authorities to forcibly evacuate civilians from areas undergoing counter-insurgency operations. In January the Constitutional Court upheld the decree whereby President Samper declared the state of emergency which was then extended by the government for a further 90 days. President Samper said that events such as the escape from prison of an alleged drug-trafficker are enough to merit extending the state of emergency. The long-standing civil conflict escalated in several areas of the country as paramilitary forces, in many cases backed by sectors of the Colombian army, launched military offensives aimed at extending their control of territory. Guerrilla forces are also believed to have significantly increased their military capacity during the past year and have been responsible for numerous violations of international humanitarian law, including scores 1 Talks began in October 1995 between government representatives and the Jaime Bateman command, a small dissident wing of the former M-19 guerrilla organization which demobilized in No agreement had been reached by the end of the year. February 1996 AI Index: AMR 23/02/96 Distr: CO INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, 1 EASTON STREET, LONDON WC1X 8DJ, UNITED KINGDOM

4 Colombia: A Deepening Human Rights Crisis 3 of deliberate and arbitrary killings of perceived opponents and the taking and holding of hundreds of hostages. All the main guerrilla groups in Colombia have been responsible for deliberate and arbitrary killings of civilians. The victims include people killed while resisting kidnap attempts, deserters from guerrilla organizations, local government officials suspected of corruption, people accused of collaborating with the military, petty thieves and drug dealers in urban areas and members of the EPL guerrilla group which disbanded after reaching a peace settlement with the government. The taking and holding of hostages has become increasingly widespread as ransom money has become one of the principal sources of income for guerrilla groups. Other kidnap victims are held hostage for political motives, either to pressure the authorities to accede to guerrilla proposals or to demand publicity for their policies. Some victims have been killed when ransom demands are not met. Paramilitary groups, declared illegal in 1989, have continued to carry out widespread human rights violations including hundreds of politically motivated killings of civilians they considered to be subversive or guerrilla collaborators. Victims included community leaders, teachers, trade unionists and human rights defenders. The government failed to take action to fulfil its commitment to dismantle paramilitary groups or to bring those responsible for gross and systematic abuses to justice. Although a small number of members of paramilitary groups were arrested, recognized leaders remained at large under the protection of armed forces commanders. The paramilitary offensive intensified after a summit meeting of self-styled self-defence groups in late 1994 agreed a coordinated national strategy to combat subversion. Among the conclusions of the summit it was agreed to continue to consider as legitimate targets left-wing political and union activists and to demand that the government acknowledge the political status of the paramilitary organizations. Evidence of continued armed forces support for paramilitary organizations emerged in official and independent investigations. Several areas of the country were particularly affected by the combined military, paramilitary offensive including the central Magdalena Medio region and the departments of the Meta, North Santander, Cesar and the Urabá region of Antioquia. Military operations conducted by the regular armed forces were directly responsible for serious human rights violations as civilians were victims of targeted and indiscriminate killings. The expansion and consolidation of illegal paramilitary activity has notoriously accelerated during the government of President Samper, despite his pledges to dismantle such groups. Indeed, not only has the government failed to fulfil its commitment to eradicate paramilitary organizations but certain policy decisions implemented by the government of President Samper have undoubtedly encouraged their proliferation. There is, in particular, growing concern about the Colombian Government s program of creating civilian vigilante

5 4 Colombia: A Deepening Human Rights Crisis groups, Asociaciones Comunitarias de Vigilancia Rural, (CONVIVIR 2 ), ostensibly designed to assist the armed and security forces in counter-insurgency intelligence tasks. According to government officials, over 100 such groups are now operating in the country, the majority in rural areas, under the direct control of the regional army commanders. Civilian controls over the creation and operations of the CONVIVIR are totally inadequate. Amnesty International is seriously concerned that these civilian vigilante groups could be used by elements within the armed and security forces to develop new paramilitary structures in order to perpetuate and expand illegal counter-insurgency practices, including extrajudicial executions and disappearances. Impunity continued to prevail in cases of human rights violations. In the vast majority of cases of extrajudicial execution, disappearance and torture, those responsible were not brought to justice. In some cases disciplinary investigations conducted by the Procurator General s office resulted in sanctions, including dismissals, of members of the armed forces responsible for serious human rights violations. Following an unprecedented decision by the Procurator Delegate for Human Rights, in September 1995 an army brigadier-general in active service was dismissed from the armed forces for responsibility in the abduction, torture and murder of a political activist in The dismissal of Brigadier-General Alvaro Velandia Hurtado was strongly opposed by senior military commanders and sectors of Colombian Congress who attempted, unsuccessfully, to reinstate him. Following the Procurator Delegate s initial call for his dismissal, General Velandia was decorated by the commander of the armed forces, on the order of President Samper. The Procurator Delegate for Human Rights resigned and left the country after receiving repeated death threats. Amid this climate of obstruction and intimidation, disciplinary sanctions remained the exception and impunity in criminal investigations was virtually total as military courts, which continued to claim jurisdiction, failed to hold members of the armed and security forces accountable before the law for human rights violations. Even in cases in which members of the armed forces were found responsible for grave human rights violations in disciplinary procedures, military courts routinely dropped charges or acquitted those responsible. In February 1996 the Procurator General released his report for the period covering July 1994 to July According to the report Members of the security forces, the military and National Police, are the people most often linked to investigations involving human rights violations. Nearly two thousand investigations had been opened during the 12-month period. The most common cases of human rights violations under investigation included personal injury, torture, including sexual abuse, and attacks against the civilian population. The Procurator General called for a purge of the armed forces. The Colombian Government has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to improving respect for human rights. However, little effective action has been taken towards the 2 The acronym CONVIVIR means Living together.

6 Colombia: A Deepening Human Rights Crisis 5 fulfilment of commitments announced when President Samper assumed office in The government s political will to implement its human rights program appears to have been severely eroded by the political crisis which threatened its continuance in power in Faced with a serious and prolonged challenge to its legitimacy and credibility, the government has chosen to give absolute priority to its own survival at the cost of many of its own original priority programs, including its commitments to end human rights abuses. The government s political will to take effective action to end gross and systematic abuses has been further thrown into doubt by measures and policies introduced in 1995 which are clearly incompatible with its human rights program. Moreover, recommendations made by UN Special Rapporteurs after visits to Colombia in 1994, have not been implemented. In view of the Colombian Government s unwillingness to take effective action to end the continuing human rights crisis, Amnesty International believes the United Nations Commission on Human Rights should, in line with recommendations made by the Special Rapporteurs on torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary killings, appoint a Special Rapporteur under item 10 of its agenda.

7 6 Colombia: A Deepening Human Rights Crisis URABÁ: A REGION IN CRISIS The region most severely affected by the escalating military conflict in recent months is Urabá in north-west Antioquia department where a complex spiral of violence has led to a severe and ongoing human rights crisis. The region of Urabá, which is the centre of Colombia s banana industry, has long been a focus of bitter political conflict in which many hundreds of people have died. The three major armed opposition groups, FARC, EPL and ELN, established a strong presence in the region during the 1970's and effectively dominated the region both militarily and politically for a number of years. Increased militarization of the area in the mid-1980's and the growing strength of army-backed paramilitary groups triggered an escalation of political violence; widespread human rights violations ensued. In the late 1980s, the Colombian armed forces and their paramilitary allies were responsible for a series of massacres of unionized banana plantation workers, political and community activists suspected of supporting subversive organizations. Although the peace agreement with the majority sector of the EPL in 1990 initially led to a period of reduced political violence, since 1992 the number of politically motivated deaths has been growing steadily. Of the approximately 600 EPL members who demobilized in Urabá and joined the new political party Esperanza, Paz y Libertad (Hope, Peace and Freedom), nearly half have since been killed. Many of the killings have been attributed to the faction of the EPL which continued in armed opposition and to the V front of the FARC. Others have been killed by the Colombian armed forces and paramilitary groups. Members of the Communist and the Patriotic Union parties have also been targets of a systematic campaign of elimination by the armed forces, paramilitary groups and by the Comandos Populares, a clandestine military wing of Esperanza, Paz y Libertad. Political violence in the region further escalated following the launch of a paramilitary offensive in 1994 aimed at establishing military and political control over the region. The resulting spiral of violence has led to an almost complete breakdown of law and order resulting from the government s failure to maintain control in the area or to prevent paramilitary organizations and guerrilla groups from attacking civilians. The civilian population was caught between several fires as the paramilitary groups and the FARC and EPL guerrilla organizations fought for control of territory. Clashes between armed groups were rare. In the majority of cases paramilitary forces and FARC V front directed their attacks against sectors of the civilian population believed to support rival armed groups. The struggle for control of territory resulted in the deaths of over 600 people in 1995 alone, the vast majority of whom were non-combatant civilians. At least fifteen thousand people, the majority women and children, fled their homes to escape the paramilitary onslaught and FARC retaliation.

8 Colombia: A Deepening Human Rights Crisis 7 Although the region of Urabá is heavily militarized (XVII, XI and IV army Brigades), little or no action was taken by the armed and security forces to protect the civilian population or to combat the paramilitary and armed opposition groups. Consistent and compelling reports were received by official human rights bodies such as the Defensoría del Pueblo and local Personeros (Ombudsmen), that the regular armed forces have not only tolerated paramilitary activity in the region but have, on numerous occasions, directly supported them and have co-operated in joint actions. The findings of an investigation conducted by the official Verification Commission 3 produced in September 1995, confirms the alliance between paramilitary and regular armed forces in the region. Referring to the actions of the paramilitary forces the Commission considered that: In assuming a position of confrontation with the armed opposition groups, they contributed to actions of a counter-insurgency nature with ample collaboration and participation of the Army and National Police deployed in the region...the actions of the paramilitary self-defence groups in the last three years in the north of Urabá, with sporadic confrontations with the guerrillas, the destruction hamlets and small human settlements and the murder of presumed collaborators of the guerrilla, without once combatting the Army, show in practice the links between the two, links which can be verified by testimonies which indicate joint operations... A series of massacres in August and September left scores of civilians dead. Eighteen people, including four women and two minors, were killed on 12 August by paramilitary forces who burst into El Aracatazzo bar in El Bosque neighbourhood of Chigorodó in Urabá. The gunmen reportedly said they had come to finish off the guerrillas. Many of the inhabitants of El Bosque are members and supporters of the legal left-wing Patriotic Union party. The killings were attributed to the paramilitary Comandos de Alternativa Popular, Popular Alternative Command, who claimed the attack was in reprisal for the killing of three soldiers and three civilians in the town of Apartadó hours earlier, presumably by FARC urban militias. In a series of apparent retaliatory attacks, the FARC killed dozens of supporters of Esperanza, Paz y Libertad, whose members are accused by the FARC of supporting paramilitary attacks against the communist party and the UP. Many of the victims of FARC attacks were demobilized EPL guerrillas who had been recruited by the security forces as agents or informants. Others were banana plantation workers, including women, who were not known to be militarily or politically active. In addition to the well-publicized tit-for-tat massacres, scores of people were individually targeted for assassination, particularly in the poor neighbourhoods in urban areas. Responsibility for individual killings is difficult to 3 The Verification Commission was created in March 1995 with a mandate to analyse and establish responsibilities for the escalation in political violence in Urabá and to recommend a program of action to the government. The commission was integrated by representatives of the People s Defender (Defensor del Pueblo), Procurator General s office (Procuraduría General de la Nación), Attorney General s office (Fiscalía General de la Nación), the Catholic Church, the departmental government and a national human rights organization, CINEP.

9 8 Colombia: A Deepening Human Rights Crisis establish. However, many of the victims were believed to be members of guerrilla-backed urban militia groups or informants of the security forces or paramilitary collaborators. 4 While the military struggle for supremacy and control of territory in the region has been the direct cause of many of the human rights violations, the armed conflict has been exacerbated by the political struggle for control of the regions local councils between the UP, Esperanza, Paz y Libertad and paramilitary-backed candidates. International Observer Mission for Urabá: Numerous civic and political organizations, including the official Verification Commission, consider that national initiatives to resolve the conflict in Urabá have proved inadequate and have called for the presence of international human rights observers. In October 1995, an official delegation headed by the Governor of Antioquia, the Mayoress of Apartadó and a representative of the national government, formally requested the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and a number of European non-governmental organizations to establish a permanent mission of international observers in Urabá. According to the proposal, the purpose of the international observer mission in Urabá would be to explore ways to establish an agreement on the application of international humanitarian law between all armed groups in the region and to observe compliance with international humanitarian standards. Amnesty International believes that the deployment of international civilian monitors in Urabá could make an important contribution to an improvement in respect for human rights in the region. HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS Members of non-governmental organizations and others who seek to promote respect for human rights have increasingly been subjected to threats and intimidation and attacks on their lives. Several human rights organizations, including the Comité de Solidaridad con Presos Políticos, (CSPP), Solidarity Committee with Political Prisoners, Asociación de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos, (ASFADDES), Association of Relatives of Disappeared, and the Comité Cívico de Derechos Humanos del Meta, The Meta Civic Committee for Human Rights, have been forced to close offices in different areas of the country because of sustained threats and, in some cases attacks, against their members. Officials of state agencies such as the Procuraduría General de la Nación have also been 4 The pattern of individual, apparently politically motivated killings, was repeated in urban areas throughout the country, most notably in Barrancabermeja, Medellín and Bogotá, where urban militia forces have established a stronghold.

10 Colombia: A Deepening Human Rights Crisis 9 subject to threats and intimidations as a direct result of their attempts to identify and sanction state agents responsible for human rights violations. Several human rights defenders have left the country because of the lack of guarantees to carry out their legitimate activities. Human rights lawyer Javier Barriga Vergel was shot dead by two gunmen outside his home in Cúcuta, North Santander department in June Javier Barriga, who worked with the CSPP and the Colectivo de Abogados, Lawyers Collective, had previously been threatened with death by a paramilitary group Colombia Sin Guerrilla, Colombia without Guerrilla, for his work in defence of political prisoners. The Meta Civic Committee for Human Rights has been subject to numerous attacks since its creation in At the beginning of 1995 threats against its members intensified and an anonymous warning was received that an attack was being prepared against Sister Nohemy Palencia, a Catholic nun and prominent member of the Committee. In April 1995 the Committee closed its office in the departmental capital Villavicencio, and continued its human rights work from the capital, Bogotá. However, threats against its members continued. In August, a commission composed of representatives of the government and non-governmental human rights organizations, was established under the auspices of the German Government in order to document violations of human rights and humanitarian law in Meta department since 1985; to analyse the causes of the political violence in the region and, within a period of three months, to make recommendations to the relevant judicial and governmental institutions on ways to overcome impunity in the investigations. With the exception of the Meta Commission, little action was taken by the government to investigate the pattern of threats, harassment and attacks against human rights defenders or to introduce effective mechanisms of protection for those under threat. The Colombian Government should reiterate publicly its recognition of the legitimacy of the defence of human rights and should ensure that all members of the armed and security forces respect and protect the physical integrity of human rights defenders. INTERNATIONAL ACTION: During the last decade international concern about the escalating human rights crisis in Colombia has steadily increased. Numerous international non-governmental delegations have visited the country and have produced reports severely critical of successive governments failure to address widespread human rights violations. The situation in Colombia has also been the object of increasing concern within the United Nations human rights system. The reports of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (E/CN.4/1989/18/add.1) and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions (E/CN.4/1990/22/add.1) following visits to Colombia in

11 10 Colombia: A Deepening Human Rights Crisis 1989 and 1990 respectively, expressed serious concern and made a series of pertinent recommendations for measures to halt the abuses. In November 1994, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions again visited Colombia in a joint mission with the Special Rapporteur on torture. The joint report of their visit (E/CN.4/1995/111) which was presented to the 51st session of the Commission on Human Rights warns that the level of violence, both politically motivated and due to common crime, has risen steadily in the recent past and has reached alarming proportions, despite legislative reforms and other initiatives taken by the successive administrations. The vast majority of recommendations made by the representatives of various United Nations human rights mechanisms that visited Colombia in 1987, 1988 and 1989 have not been implemented. Military jurisdiction over human rights violations committed by members of the armed forces continues. The Special Rapporteurs made a number of key recommendations in their report, including: The exclusion of extrajudicial executions, disappearances and torture from the ambit of military justice. The exclusion should be clearly spelled out in law. The need to strengthen the civilian justice system. Removal of the defence of obedience to superior orders in respect of crimes under international law such as extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, torture and enforced disappearances. Suspension from active duty of members of the security forces when a formal disciplinary or criminal investigation in cases involving human rights violations has been opened against them by the Procuraduría General de la Nación or the Fiscalía General de la Nación. Measures to protect human rights groups, displaced persons, street children, trade unionists and indigenous groups. The armed forces must be required to accept as a priority the taking of effective action to disarm and dismantle armed groups, especially paramilitary groups, many of which they have set up and/or cooperated with. In recognition of the gravity of the human rights situation in Colombia, the Rapporteurs conclude that the Commission on Human Rights should keep the human rights situation in Colombia under particular close scrutiny, with a view to the appointment, unless the situation improves radically in the near future, of a Special Rapporteur who could ensure permanent monitoring of and reporting on the human

12 Colombia: A Deepening Human Rights Crisis 11 rights situation and who could cooperate closely with the technical assistance programme. 5 The High Commissioner for Human Rights visited Colombia in December In his report 6 to the 51st Commission the High Commissioner said he had stressed with the Colombian Government the need to combat impunity, to improve the human rights infrastructure and to prevent human rights violations. In August 1995, the High Commissioner for Human Rights sent a delegation to Colombia in order to assess and report on the human rights situation and to make recommendations for the establishment of a permanent office in the country. No report of that visit has been made public and Amnesty International is unaware of any decision the High Commissioner for Human Rights may have taken on the basis of the recommendations made. The UN Committee against Torture considered Colombia s second periodic report in November The Committee expressed grave concern about the persistence of a significant number of violent deaths, torture and ill-treatment, attributed to members of the army and police on a scale which would appear to indicate a systematic practice in some regions of the country. Among its recommendations the Committee urged the Colombian Government to adopt the necessary legislative and administrative amendments to ensure that military courts only judge violations of military regulations and to make a declaration under article 22 of the Convention against Torture recognizing the competence of the Committee to receive and consider individual communications. The Colombian Government has repeatedly declared its willingness to accept international monitoring and, in a letter sent in February 1995 to the head of special procedures of the UN Centre for Human Rights the government renewed its invitation to the thematic mechanisms to visit Colombia and suggested that these visits should be regularized. The invitation was extended to the special rapporteurs who visited Colombia in 1994, namely the special rapporteurs on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and on torture and the representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons as well as to the special rapporteurs who are invited this year, in particular the special rapporteur on the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. No visits by thematic mechanisms have, however, taken place during 1995 and the first three months of E/CN.4/1995/111, paras 131, E/CNC.4/1995/98, para 26

13 12 Colombia: A Deepening Human Rights Crisis In July the government established by decree law an inter-ministerial commission to analyse and advise on the application of recommendations made by international human rights bodies. However, by the end of 1995 no information had been made available by the Colombian Government on what action had been taken to implement recommendations made by the thematic mechanisms. In a visit to Colombia in October 1995 an Amnesty International delegation was able to verify that no meaningful progress had been made on the implementation of the key recommendations outlined above. A resolution of the 47th Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities also expressed serious concern about the human rights situation in Colombia and the failure of successive Colombian governments to implement recommendations made by the various United Nations human rights mechanisms that visited Colombia since The resolution called on the Government of Colombia to implement the recommendations made by the thematic rapporteurs and the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, and to report to the Commission on Human Rights at its 52nd session on the measures taken. It recommended that the Commission on Human Rights consider at its 52nd session developments in Colombia by examining the measures taken by the government to implement the recommendations made by the thematic rapporteurs and the Working Group. 7 FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT KEY RECOMMENDATIONS Military Jurisdiction: the Cornerstone of Impunity The government of President Samper has repeatedly acknowledged the key role of impunity in perpetuating human rights violations. In his human rights program announced in September 1994 President Samper said: Impunity in Colombia has become a cause of the multiplication and expansion of human rights violations and, in consequence, it should be energetically tackled. A number of measures were announced in the program specifically designed to tackle impunity, including the creation of special human rights units within the Fiscalía General and the reform of the military penal code. 7 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/51 Resol. 1995/6

14 Colombia: A Deepening Human Rights Crisis 13 The human rights unit within the Fiscalía General began operating in September 1995 with the purpose of concentrating resources on the investigation of a small number of serious human rights violations. The ability of the unit to try and convict perpetrators of extrajudicial executions and other serious human rights violations is, however, severely limited by the practice of the military justice system of automatically claiming jurisdiction over investigations in which members of the armed forces are implicated in politically motivated crimes. The military justice system is the cornerstone of impunity in Colombia. Military courts have persistently failed to hold those responsible for serious and widespread human rights violations accountable before the law. Military courts are not known to be inefficient when enforcing military discipline over offences and infractions unrelated to counter-insurgency operations and have acted quickly and effectively to investigate and punish non-political crimes committed by armed forces personnel. However, those responsible for politically motivated killings and other human rights violations committed in the context of the civil conflict, have been systematically shielded from justice. Inter-governmental bodies, including the United Nations, as well as numerous national and international non-governmental human rights organizations have all coincided in recommending to the Colombian Government that because of the military justice system s systematic failure to bring perpetrators to justice, human rights violations should be investigated by civilian courts. In their report of their visit to Colombia the Special Rapporteurs on Torture and on Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions considered that: While initiatives to raise awareness of human rights among members of the security forces and the population in general through educational and other measures are to be welcomed as a necessary step, the Special Rapporteurs wish to emphasize that respect for, and thus enjoyment of, human rights, can only be improved if impunity is effectively fought. The present system of military justice ensures impunity for acts such as summary execution, torture and enforced disappearances... Therefore, the only appropriate step would be to remove such acts from the ambit of military justice. This should be clearly spelled out in the law. 8 In February 1995 the Colombian Government established by executive decree a drafting commission to reform the military penal code (Comisión Redactora del Código Penal Militar). The commission, which was composed of eight civilians and 8 E/CN.4/1995/111 paras. 115, 116

15 14 Colombia: A Deepening Human Rights Crisis eight members of the Colombian armed and security forces, presented its proposals to the government in October. Many of the proposals for reform of the military penal code were agreed by consensus including the inclusion of a supervisory role for the Public Ministry and the acceptance of civil representation (parte civil). However, several areas of dissent emerged between the civilian and military members and the Commission failed to reach agreement on key issues directly related to the implementation of the recommendations of the Special Rapporteurs including the exclusion of human rights violations from military jurisdiction and the question of due obedience. Civilian members of the commission argued that serious human rights violations such as extrajudicial executions, torture and disappearances, could not be considered to be acts of service or to have been committed in relation to military service and therefore proposed that the Military Penal Code should specifically exclude such crimes from military jurisdiction. This proposal would be in line with the recommendation made by the Special Rapporteurs on torture and on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. Military members of the commission, however, considered the exclusion of human rights violations would be unconstitutional. On the question of due obedience, the civilian members of the commission maintained the concept should not apply in cases of serious human rights violations. The military members disagreed, again basing their argument on the alleged unconstitutionality of including such a provision in the Military Penal Code 9. At the time of writing (January 1996), the government had yet to disclose whether it intended ceding to military pressure to retain jurisdiction over all crimes committed by members of the armed forces, or whether it would accept the proposal of civilian members of the drafting commission and the recommendation of the UN special rapporteurs and other international bodies that crimes such as extrajudicial executions, torture and disappearances cannot be considered acts of service and should be specifically excluded from military jurisdiction. However, an indication of the government s apparent change of policy with regard to the need to tackle impunity can be found in public statements President Samper made when he formally received the results of the drafting commission s deliberations in October 1995: As President and commander in chief of the Armed Forces I prefer to see the military fighting the subversives in the mountains and not in the country s courts responding to groundless charges presented by their enemies. 9 The Constitutional Court ruled in November 1995 that members of the armed forces have a right and the obligation to refuse to carry out orders to violate fundamental human rights.

16 Colombia: A Deepening Human Rights Crisis 15 Suspensions of Armed Forces Personnel Implicated in Human Rights Violations: Amnesty International is unaware of a single instance in which members of the armed forces who are under formal investigation by the Procuraduría General de la Nación or the Fiscalía General de la Nación for alleged human rights violations have been suspended from active duty. On the contrary, many have been promoted or decorated while under investigation even, in some cases, when disciplinary investigations have already established their responsibility for extrajudicial executions and other serious abuses. The blatant failure to implement the recommendation of the UN special rapporteurs is even more incomprehensible in view of the fact that armed forces and police personnel suspected of involvement with drug-trafficking or other non-political crimes have been immediately suspended while investigations determine responsibility. The startling contrast in official policy towards armed forces personnel suspected of human rights violations and those suspected of non-political offences can only be understood as a clear illustration of the Colombian authorities lack of political will to move beyond mere rhetoric and to take effective action to end the human rights crisis. RECOMMENDATIONS TO UN MEMBER STATES Amnesty International believes that the Commission on Human Rights has a responsibility to address the continuing human rights crisis and the failure of the government to implement UN thematic mechanism recommendations by the appointment of a Special Rapporteur under item 10 of its agenda. The Special Rapporteur should have a specific mandate to: Monitor and report on the human rights situation in Colombia to the Commission. In monitoring and reporting on human rights developments, special attention should be given to the region of Urabá, Antioquia department, and other regions most severely affected by the civil conflict. Monitor the application of recommendations made by the thematic mechanisms and report to the Commission on their implementation.

17 16 Colombia: A Deepening Human Rights Crisis Give particular attention to the abiding problems of impunity and the need to eradicate paramilitary organizations. Give advice to the government authorities on the development of measures and programs to improve respect for human rights and to ensure effective consultation with and the participation of non-governmental human rights organizations in such programs. Amnesty International also calls on the Commission to urge the government of Colombia to fully implement all recommendations made by the thematic mechanisms of the Commission, in particular: fulfil its commitment to end impunity by excluding the investigation of human rights violations and prosecution of perpetrators of human rights violations from the military justice system; suspend members of the security forces implicated in investigations into extrajudicial executions, disappearances or torture from their posts until responsibilities are established; take all necessary measures to protect the security of relatives, witnesses, lawyers and other collaborating with investigations of human rights violations; fulfil its commitment to eradicate illegal paramilitary forces and to bring to justice members of such forces responsible for political killings, torture, disappearances, or other human rights violations; take all necessary steps to ensure respect for the fundamental human rights of persons who have been internally displaced by conflict

18 Colombia: A Deepening Human Rights Crisis 17 Appendix I : Amnesty International documents on Colombia, 1995 Political violence in Norte de Santander and south of Cesar Department escalates (AMR 23/37/95, August 1995) Women in Colombia: Breaking the Silence (AMR 23/41/95, September 1995)

19 18 Colombia: A Deepening Human Rights Crisis Appendix II : Ratification by Colombia of major international human rights treaties The following lists reflect information available to Amnesty International as of December 1995 Colombia Signature X= Date Unknown Date of : Ratification, Accession, Succession, Declaration Status: Ratification, Accession, Succession or Declaration International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocols International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights R R Convention on the Rights of the Child R Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination R R R Geneva Conventions I, II, III & IV (1949) R Protocol Additionals to Geneva Conventions: Protocol 1 (1977) A OAS: American Convention on Human Rights (1969) R OAS: American Convention on Human Rights: Declaration under Article 45 (Inter-American Commission) OAS: American Convention on Human Rights: Declaration under Article 62 (Inter-American Court) D D OAS: Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture

20 Colombia: A Deepening Human Rights Crisis 19 Appendix III: Action by UN human rights bodies on Colombia The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/L.11/Add.2) Guided by the principles embodies in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International covenants on Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, Disturbed by continuing allegations of severe violations of human rights in Colombia, Disturbed also by allegations of continued violations of humanitarian standards by armed opposition groups, Taking note of the statement made by the Chairman of the Commission of Human Rights at its fifty-first session acknowledging the receipt of a written communication from the Permanent Representative of Colombia, pledging the cooperation of his Government with the thematic special procedures of the Commission and with the officer of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (E/1995/23-E/CN.4/1995/176, para. 595), Acknowledging with appreciation the ratification by Colombia of Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the efforts by the Government of Colombia to reform the military justice system, as well as the existence in the 1991 Constitution of a broad catalogue of rights and fundamental freedoms and mechanisms for their protection, Noting with appreciation that the High Commissioner for Human Rights, in cooperation with the Government of Colombia, has adopted Mr. Philip Texier to evaluate the needs of Colombia in terms of advisory services, with a view to establishing an office for that purpose in Colombia, Recognizing the public acceptance by the President of Colombia of the conclusions of the special commission created to investigate the violent events which occurred in the municipality of Trujillo, Valle del Cauca, in 1990, in which State responsibility was established for the torture, enforced disappearances and execution of more than 100 rural workers, and the President's announcement that he would adopt the recommendations of the commission directed at repairing the damage suffered by the families of the victims of the commission directed at repairing the damage suffered by the families of the victims and at bringing to justice the persons responsible, Concerned, however, by statements of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances according to which there are 713 unresolved cases of enforced disappearance, and by the fact that the Government in July 1994 vetoed a draft law proscribing the enforced disappearance of persons, which motivated the Working Group to express its concern about the

21 20 Colombia: A Deepening Human Rights Crisis situation in two separate letters addressed to the Government, with no response (E/CN.4/1194/36, para.135), Noting with appreciation, however, that the President of Colombia has taken steps to obtain ratification without reservation of the Inter-American Convention on Enforced Disappearances, Concerned by the observations made in the joint report of the Special Rapporteurs on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and on the question of torture, prepared after their visit to Colombia in October 1994 and presented to the Commission on Human Rights at its fifty-first session, that the vast majority of recommendations made by the representatives of the various United Nations human rights mechanisms that visited Colombia in 1987, 1988 and 1989 have not been implemented (E/CN.4/1995/111, para. 131), Recalling that the Special Rapporteurs in their joint report recommended that the Commission should keep the human rights situation in Colombia under particularly close scrutiny, with a view to the appointment, unless the situation improved radically in the near future, of a special rapporteur who could ensure permanent monitoring of and reporting on the human rights situation and who could cooperate closely with the technical assistance programme (E/CN.4/ 1995/111, para.132), 1. Expresses its thanks to the Government of Colombia for allowing access by the thematic rapporteurs and other agencies and bodies of the United Nations, and for its cooperation with the High Commissioner for Human Rights; 2. Expresses its appreciation for the steps taken by the Government which intended to curb violations committed by some elements of the security forces and by paramilitary groups, but deeply disturbed that serious violations nevertheless still continue; 3. Calls on the Government of Colombia to implement the recommendations made by the thematic rapporteurs and the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, and to report to the Commission on Human Rights at its fifty-second session on the measures taken; 4. Recommends that the Commission on Human Rights consider at its fifty-second session the developments in Colombia by examining the measures taken by the Government to implement the recommendations made by the thematic rapporteurs and the Working Group. 18 August 1995 [Adopted without a vote]

22 Colombia: A Deepening Human Rights Crisis 21 Appendix IV: Extracts from relevant reports of the UN Thematic Mechanisms Recommendations made in a joint report by the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture, Mr Nigel S. Rodley, and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions - Mr Bacre Waly N diaye, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolutions 1994/37 and 1994/82 (E/CN.4/1995/111) Visit by the Special Rapporteurs to the Republic of Colombia from October 1994 The Commission on Human Rights should keep the human rights situation in Colombia under particular close scrutiny, with a view to the appointment, unless the situation improves radically in the near future, of a Special Rapporteur who could ensure permanent monitoring of and reporting on the human rights situation and who could cooperate closely with the technical assistance programme. The Special Rapporteurs also made several specific recommendations, including that the government should: take into account that the enjoyment of human rights can only be improved if impunity is effectively sought and thus call on the Government to fulfil its obligation under international law to conduct exhaustive and impartial investigations into all allegations of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and torture, to identify, prosecute and punish those responsible, grant adequate compensation to the victims or their families and take all appropriate measures to prevent the recurrence of such acts. (para 115) take the necessary steps with a view to strengthening the ordinary justice system so as to make it more efficient in all circumstances, thus making unnecessary the use of special justice systems, such as the Regional Justice System, for example by recommending allocation of the necessary human and material resources, especially at the investigative stages of the judicial proceedings. ensure that the necessary forensic expertise and ballistic analysis are made available throughout the country with a view to maintaining maximum evidence in each case under investigation. (para 118) make sure that acts, which include arrests and gathering of evidence for prosecution, be carried out exclusively by civilian judicial police, in which case there would be no need for these special offices to continue functioning. (para 119)

23 22 Colombia: A Deepening Human Rights Crisis An important step forward would be a substantial reform in the code of military justice., along the lines suggested, inter alia by the Procuraduría General In any event, members of the security forces should be suspended from active duty when a formal disciplinary or criminal investigation in cases involving human rights violations has been opened against them by the Procuraduría General de la Nación or the Fiscalía General de la Nación. In addition, respect for human rights should be among the criteria applied when evaluating the conduct of security forces personnel with a view to promotion. (para 122) Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (E/CN.4/1995/36) During 1994, the Working Group transmitted 21 newly reported cases of disappearance to the Government of Colombia, 19 of them under the urgent action procedure. During the same period it clarified eight cases, in which six persons were found dead and two had been released. The majority of the 916 reported cases of disappearance in Colombia have occurred since 1981, especially in Bogota and regions where the level of violence is highest. The number of cases in the Working Group s files is much lower than the figures handled by the national non-governmental organizations. This is due, to a large extent, to the fact that in many cases the persons are found dead a few days after the disappearance. With regard to other cases, it has not been possible for the relatives or acquaintances of the missing persons to establish a link between the disappearance and the activities of government forces or groups associated with them. The Group also received from non-governmental sources abundant information about the draft law whereby enforced disappearance of persons is classed as an offence. As approved by the Congress of the Republic in early June 1994, the draft establishes that proceedings could be brought for this offence against State officials, not only the principals but also persons who plan, promote or direct, without directly intervening in, the acts, as well as individuals acting with their assistance, protection or acquiescence. In addition, the perpetrators can not benefit from an amnesty or pardon or suspension or suppression of proceedings in which they are being investigated. The supervisory authorities would be required to order and carry out inspections at military, police and other premises in which there are believed to be missing detainees. The draft also allows for the establishment of search commissions with broad powers of inspection and specifies that disappearance can not be regarded as a service related act nor can it be adduced as exempting liability as a result of superior orders.