Gramsci in Taksim: A Critical Appraisal of Dualist Approaches to the Gezi Uprising --

Transcription

1 Gramsci in Taksim: A Critical Appraisal of Dualist Approaches to the Gezi Uprising -- Paper submitted to AAG Annual Meeting 2015 in Chicago, Session 'A World without Change? Gramscian Perspectives on Protest and Passive Revolution' Please do not cite or circulate without author s permission -- Gorkem Altinors PhD Candidate University of Nottingham ldxga5@nottingham.ac.uk -- Abstract This paper mainly focuses on the development of the Gramscian critique of the dualist approaches to the Gezi Uprising. Gezi can safely be accepted as the greatest civil uprising in recent Turkish history. In the meanwhile, the protests have been portrayed as middle class, petty-bourgeois, and a white Turks uprising based on an assumed antagonism between secularist people and an Islamist government. This understanding of the unrest brings us to a position where the underlying political economic aspects of the issue are overlooked, for a secularist versus Islamist dichotomy would prevent us from comprehending the heterogeneous composition of demonstrators. The main argument in this paper is that the dualist reading of Gezi is based on the centre-periphery relations approach which considers the state and civil society as autonomous entities. In order to overcome the shortcomings of dualist reading, the Gramscian notion of the integral state is going to be utilised to understand Gezi. Therefore, it is argued in this paper that rather than an exclusively secular and middle class activism, the Gezi movement should be understood as a counter-hegemonic uprising based on different class fractions and ideological groups against the AKP s authoritarian neoliberal hegemony which, in the words of Gramsci, is fast losing the unstable equilibrium between coercion and consent. Keywords: Gezi Uprising, Antonio Gramsci, Integral State, Centre-Periphery Relations 1 G ramsci in Taksim

2 Introduction In June 2013 Turkey witnessed probably the biggest civil uprising in its history. Gezi has started as a small-scale environmentalist movement but turned into a nation-wide antigovernmental uprising very rapidly. Not surprisingly Gezi has been interpreted in various ways. This paper s major aim is to develop a Gramscian critique of dualist approaches, which analyse Gezi from centre-periphery perspective. In the paper, first a general overview of dualist approaches is given with two strands: state-centric and society-centric approaches. Then the integral state is provided as an alternative approach. Following the integral state, urbanisation in Turkey and Gezi uprising is analysed as a case to maintain the accuracy of integral state. The Uses and Abuses of Antonio Gramsci One of the vice presidents of AKP 1, Ömer Çelik attended a conference in London in December 2012 and he made an analogy between the AKP and Antonio Gramsci during the Q&A. According to Çelik, the AKP represents the cultural government therefore it is Gramscian, whereas early republican governments 2 were Hegelian because of their statist policies and multi-party period governments 3 were Marxian because of the importance of economic development 4. Regardless the overall absurdity of this conceptualisation, the analogy is extremely suggestive in regards to demonstrate the abuse of Gramsci and his concepts among Turkish academia as well as Turkish politics in order to raise civil society against the state and highlight this dichotomy. 1 Justice and Development Party. 2 The Kemalist period. 3 Democratic Party government, ruled by Adnan Menderes. This party won the elections in 1950 and occupied the majority of parliament first time in the history of Turkish democracy. It was the first defeat of CHP (the founder party) since the proclamation of the Republic 4 marx- gramsci- and- turkeys- akp/ 2 G ramsci in Taksim

3 The triple victory of AKP 5 brought the revival of debates about the state and its relation with civil society in Turkey. Although those debates have been vibrant before the AKP, the clear victory of a pro-islamic party first time in the history of Turkish political life raised the importance of discussions. Moreover, the increasing significance of political Islam in Arab world in recent years accompanied numerous comparative studies between Turkey and other Islam-dominated countries (Atabaki 2007; Tezcür 2010; Tuğal 2012; Zubaida 2000). In this study, political Islam is considered as a set of ideologies which should guide the social and political as well as personal life (Berman 2003). Briefly, although there are different levels in different countries, political Islam refers to a way of political life where Islamist thought and norms derive from Quran influence individuals life entirely. Considerations over political Islam will be limited to Turkish case in this thesis. There are studies engaged with Gramsci and Islam (Boothman 2012; Butko 2004; Öncü 2003; Pasha 2005; Simms 2002), and Gramsci and Turkey (Dikici-Bilgin 2009; Öncü 2003; Yalman 2009). Studies in the first part, they consider Islam as a whole rather than spliting specific cases. In this study Turkish case will be seen as historically specific because of its own sui generis features, especially its early and relatively high level of industrialisation, and its early but profound class contradictions and conflicts within it. Especially the rise of so called Islamic capital and assumed rivalry between secular and Islamic capital will be highlighted in this context. Therefore this paper will be primarily focussed on Turkish case and discussions among political Islam will be limited within the literature on Turkey. Thus, no comparison will be carried out throughout the research. Hereby, I argue that the existing mainstream approaches to political Islam in Turkey are not sufficient to demonstrate changes within the social relations of production underneath the fact and there is a gap in the literature to engage rise of political Islam and neoliberal restructuring. 5 In % (363 MPs), in % (341 MPs) and in % (327 MPs). 3 G ramsci in Taksim

4 In this paper, different approaches to Political Islam in Turkey will be critically evaluated within the context of state civil society relations. The state civil society relations would be the general framework to understand the Islamic influence on Turkish politics. There are several studies (Dinler 2003; Güngen and Erten 2005; Yalman 2002; Yashin 1998) highlight the shortcomings of mainstream approach to state - civil society relations. Four key shortcomings of existing literature will be demonstrated in the paper as follows. First, the separation between state and civil society and the assumed antagonism between them rise from the literature as the major feature. Secondly, the market, the political and the economic are considered as separated from both the state and civil society. It is plausible to maintain that the dualist understanding for the state and civil society relations limits our observation towards the society as a whole. Society should be seen as a whole in order to comprehend contradictions of society and how those contradictions are acquiesced or objected. Thirdly, civil society is identified as automatically progressive in the literature therefore civil society should be strengthened and conditions should be set in civil society s favour. But, on the other hand civil society is the space where the acquiescence to the contradictions in society is formed thus civil society is not necessarily seen as progressive. Finally, social relations of production which refers to class structure is disregarded in their analyses. In order to diagnose contradictions in society and its material conditions, social relations of production should be put in the first place. The Gramscian Historical Materialism (henceforth GHM) account is going to be utilised in this research in order to contribute to the literature. GHM helps to avoid, first, the pitfalls of economism, regarding ideas merely as a reflection of a material structure, and, second, the problems of constructivism, regarding ideas as an equal explanatory factor alongside material social conditions (Bieler and Morton 2008: 122). Dialectical relationship between the state and civil society is going to be considered with a holistic perspective in respect to the integrity. Due to the fact that they are 4 G ramsci in Taksim

5 not going to be seen as antagonistic entities and emphasis is going to be made on class antagonism. Hereby, it should be asserted that the basis of class structure in the society is given by the structure of production and its relations (Cox 1987: 6). Social relations of production are very crucial in this context and rise of political Islam will be researched within it because as Cox points out, Production creates the material basis for all forms of social existence, and the ways in which human efforts are combined in productive processes affect all other aspects of life, including polity (Cox 1987: 1). This starting point, however, does not serve to establish a distinction between the economic and the political realms in an ahistorical way (Bieler and Morton 2008: 116). State-centric approaches Centre periphery relations and strong state tradition thesis could be accepted as the most influential ones among academics and they have become quite prominent in this context. Centre and periphery relations approach has been used as a key to Turkish politics for the last quarter century. Edward Shils starts to his oft-quoted work with a certain claim: Society has a centre (Shils 1975: 3) 6. He also points out the central zone is a phenomenon of the realm of values, beliefs and action in society. According to Serif Mardin, there has been a sharp division between centre and periphery in both Ottoman Empire and Turkey and this phenomenon can be accepted the most vital feature of the Turkish political environment (Mardin 1973: 169). He compiles two major reasons for this separation as follows: first, the incompatibility of urban dwellers with the large amount of nomads in Anatolia, and second, the suspicion of Ottoman dynasty towards the remaining pre-ottoman nobility of powerful families in the provinces (1973: ). He considers the modernisation process of Ottoman Empire as the Westernisation of the bureaucracy (1973: 179). Basically, he asserts 6 Originally published in Michael. Polanyi, The Logic of Personal Knowledge : Essays Presented to Michael Polanyi on His 70. Birthday 11th March 1961 (London: Routledge & Paul, 1961). 5 G ramsci in Taksim

6 that the state, which is the centre, imposed Westernisation process towards the society that is the periphery. He applies the same analogy to the Republic as well. For instance he claims the coup d état of 27 th May deepened the split between centre and periphery (1973: 186). He eventually points out the resistance in Turkey is not rooted in organised labour movements since they are not the part of periphery, but the periphery itself is the core of the counter-official culture (1973: 187). The problematic of this claim appears from not only the dualist understanding of the state and the society, also from the consideration of statesmen as a social class. First of all as it was mentioned above the centre periphery metaphor therefore dualist understanding obstructs to comprehend the tensions and contraventions of the society in the context of class struggle. Thus, within the metaphor of centre-periphery, it would be troublesome to analyse the material conditions of capitalist development in Ottoman Empire. In order to examine it one should start with the social relations of production in the Empire. Secondly one can hardly say the Ottoman bureaucracy was a surplus receiving class therefore it could be considered as an independent actor. Statesmen should be seen within the state apparatus. Same principle should be considered or modern Turkey as well. Positing the Turkish bureaucracy as a social class and postulating it as the leitmotiv of Turkish modernisation would be methodologically misdirection because it would lead us to the separatism of state, market, political and economic. Therefore centre-periphery analysis excludes the dialectical relations of production and leads us to a superficial analysis of society. In relation with centre periphery relations approach, Migdal s state-in-society approach should be highlighted. He aims to present a new definition of the state in place of the Weberian understanding of the state. In the Weberian theory, the modern state is seen as a compulsory association that organises domination. In other words, the state is a relation of 7 He calls it a revolution, rather than a coup d état. 6 G ramsci in Taksim

7 men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate violence and it claims the monopoly of legitimate physical force within a given territory (Migdal 2001: 13). He provides a new definition within image and practices of the state (Migdal 2001: 16). The image represents the centre. Migdal derives the definition of image from Shils: the image amalgamates the numerous institutions of which the performers are members and on behalf of which they exercise authority, into an image of a dominant and single center of society (Shils 1975: 74). Practices can be denoted as the routine of performance of state actors and agencies, their practices, may reinforce the image of the state or weaken it; they may bolster the notion of the territorial and public-private boundaries or neutralize them (Migdal 2001: 18). Apart from new definition of the state, Migdal explains state-in-society perspective as going beyond bringing the state back in 8. In order to accomplish this, four points should be highlighted: resituating the study of states in their social setting, disaggregate states as objects of study, rethinking the categories used to conceptualise the evolving nature of social forces and being continually to the mutually transforming quality of state society relations (Migdal et al. 1994: 1). Basically, it can be summarised from his point of view that states are parts of society. Additionally, four claims were discussed: states vary in their effectiveness based on their ties to society, states must be disaggregated, social forces, like states, are contingent on specific empirical conditions and, states and other social forces may be mutually empowering (Migdal et al. 1994: 2-4). Morton raises several problems with this theorising of the state. Firstly, the state is considered as a discrete institutional category and its relationship with society is external. Secondly, even though there is an emphasis on their mutual interaction, the state and society are taken as two separate entities. Within this type of state theorising the separation of political (the state) and economic (society) obstructs the problematizing and critically understanding of capitalism. There is an apparent failure to perceive the state as a 8 Bringing the state back in refers to Theda Skocpol s book. 7 G ramsci in Taksim

8 form of capitalist social relations, as an aspect of the social relations of production, predicated upon the reproduction of antagonisms and exploitation (A. D. Morton 2004: ). Therefore, regarding the Turkish case, this sort of modelling of the state would mislead us to a point where underlying economic aspect of the state may be neglected. Strong state tradition appears as another prominent understanding of Turkish politics. Before going with the Turkish case let me continue with Migdal s conceptualisations of the strong state. Migdal s book 9 describes the definition of state from the perception of bureaucratic authoritarianism and corporatism theories as it is characterised by strong and relatively autonomous governmental structures (Migdal 1988: 6). He points out the dual nature of the state in the Third World is at the heart of the understanding (Migdal 1988: 8). He continues in a more metaphorical way. States are like big rocks thrown into small ponds: they make waves from end to end, but they rarely catch any fish (Migdal 1988: 9). He explains his central concern in the book is that the duality of states which he describes as the strengths of states in penetrating societies and their weaknesses in effecting goal-oriented social changes (Migdal 1988: 9). He mentions we accept the rightness of a state s having high capabilities to extract, penetrate, regulate, and appropriate; briefly the strong state (Migdal 1988: 15). He uses an ideal-type definition which he derived from Max Weber to conceptualise the state. The state is an organisation, composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state s leadership that has the ability or authority to make implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rulemaking for other social organisations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way (Migdal 1988: 19). Before he starts defining his model, he criticises Daniel Lerner s traditional modern, Walt Rostow s stages of growth, and Edward Shils s centre periphery modelling of state civil society relations by composing their models dichotomically (Migdal 1988: 24). Therefore he 9 The name of the book emerges from the other way around; Strong Societies and Weak States. 8 G ramsci in Taksim

9 seeks for a sort of model would interpret society as a melange of social organisations, rather than the dichotomous structure that practically all past models of macro level change have used (Migdal 1988: 28). On the table, he asserts strong state and weak society refers to a pyramidal model and it could be observed in France and Israel, whereas weak state and strong society models a diffused one such as Sierra Leone, and finally both weak states and societies represents anarchical situations and he gives China between and Mexico between as two examples (Migdal 1988: 35). The major feature of his study is that the dualist character of the state civil society relations therefore it covers the apparent problems of dualist understanding. Moreover, the disregard of class relations appears as another shortcoming of his study. In order to understand the state and its relations with civil society, the nature of production and its social relations should be considered as the major factors. Migdal s study (Migdal 1988) regarding the strong state tradition, also covers the some similarities with Heper s studies. Returning to Turkish case, Metin Heper appears as the most dominant figure for the strong state tradition where he seeks for answers to the dilemma of strong state versus weak society in Turkey. He points out the difficulties of democracy in Turkey which are manifested in two interconnected ways. First, the state elites are sensitive to the crisis of integration and second, thus they are not sympathetic towards the periphery (Heper 1985: 98). He claims that political parties in Turkey have been emerged in an environment where there was the absence of an aristocracy and entrepreneurial middle class with political influence therefore there is a gap of institutions linking political and social structures (1985: 98). The reason here is that it brings the absence of a middle-class ethic by itself. Eventually, political parties in Turkey developed as a means of elite conflict (1985: 99). He continues by asserting the state initially helped the middle class, then assumed as an arbitrator state, and finally became a positive state, additionally no bourgeois politics has been flourished due to the absence of a 9 G ramsci in Taksim

10 politically influential civil society (1985: 100). In this context, it can be said that the claim assumes the state civil society relations in a separatist way of reading, civil society is considered as a sphere of liberty and its understandings on its reasons are Eurocentric since it seeks them within European concepts such as aristocracy and middle class ethics, also it ignores Turkey s own contingent installation of capitalism as a peripheral country. Also the private sector is considered as a non-influential and effective pressure group in the Turkish case context in his writings (1985: 102). On the other hand, as Boratav reports, TUSIAD played a leading role in the making of fall of Ecevit (CHP) government 10 in 1979 (Boratav 2005: 73). Moreover, it can be said that after the falling of CHP, TUSIAD ensured 24 th January 1980 regulations 11 to be passed. Boratav also reports, bourgeoisie had become a monolith during the first half of the 1980s when they integrated with the military government and when they supported ANAP 12 government (Boratav 2005: 72). Due to the fact that, Heper s claims on the non-effectiveness of the private sector do not match with the actual fact. The reason he claims TUSIAD is not influential over Turkish politics is that the assumed separation of state and civil society. Considering the strong state tradition in the first place, and putting the state with civil society in a conflicting place, the analysis would bring the result of weakness of civil society. On the other hand in reality, TUSIAD is quite influential. Therefore it could be said that, in order to carry out an analysis of capitalist development, rather than the antagonistic relations of state and civil society, the social relations of production should be the starting point. Moreover, the progressiveness of the TUSIAD therefore civil society is taken for granted in Heper s analysis. But as a profit-seeking actor the TUSIAD could not be progressive automatically. 10 CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Republican People Party) can be considered as an overarching left party of Turkey during the 1970s. 11 These regulations can be accepted as the manifestation of neo- liberalism in Turkey. 12 This government was a single- party government and ruled the country throughout the 1980s when neoliberalism became the major phenomenon of Turkey. 10 G ramsci in Taksim

11 A very similar approach can be seen in Caglar Keyder s works as well. It is safe to argue that he considers the history of late Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic as a class struggle between two classes which are the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie (Keyder 1987: 2). Furthermore, as Korkut Boratav points out in his well-known critique on this book, the main problematic of the book launches with the lack of anatomy of social classes and, connectedly with this fact, the consideration of bureaucracy as a dominant class (Boratav 1993: 130). Keyder claims that, bureaucracy s manoeuvres tended to favour a model of capitalist integration promising to uphold the claims of state functionaries as a surplusreceiving class 13 (Keyder 1987: 29). As Boratav illuminates, Nobody can dispute the fact that the 20 th century bureaucracy is a salaried group within a modernized state structure. As public finance becomes less and less dependent upon the taxes imposed on agriculture during the century, one can hardly speak of the bureaucracy as a social class directly extracting a surplus from the peasantry within primary relations of production (Boratav 1993: 132). Keyder s reading on the history of classes in Turkey which can be summarised as an antagonism between bureaucracy and bourgeoisie, brings us to the consideration of history throughout ruptures. For instance, he considers the electoral victory of DP 14 in 1950 as a fundamental break in Turkish history and a victory against the several centuries old state tradition (1987: 124). This reading of history can also observed in considerations on the AKP. The mainstream academia and liberal leftist assumptions accept 2002 as a break in history in terms of civil society the state relations and a victory of civil society against the state. Therefore as well as the dualist reading of state-society relations, the progressiveness of civil society automatically appears hereby. State versus society dichotomy can also be observed on the works of Hakan Yavuz. He points out, the Turkish secular reforms not only hyphenated state and society but defined 13 Emphasis is mine. 14 Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party). 11 G ramsci in Taksim

12 the Republican state against traditional society (Yavuz 2005: 7). He accepts a separatist understanding of state and society, and he asserts there has been a historical interference between Kemalist state elites and traditional Islamic society. Conceptually, this framework can be found on centre-periphery dichotomy. He claims, Westernisation policy represents a state-controlled and top-down process against Islamic bottom-up emancipation process, and history of Turkish republic can be accepted as history of this dichotomy (2003: 5). The AKP s role and its victory demonstrate us a new social contract over this antagonism (2003: 256). His perspective assists us to consider the role of the AKP with democracy aspect and its democratic feature during its first ruling period is accepted as given. However, this understanding is not sufficient to explain the AKP s raising authoritarian and oppressive characteristic. According to Hakan Yavuz, Islamist movement in Turkey challenges not only with state ideology (Kemalism) and a secular bloc consists of military, bureaucracy and capitalist but also with traditional Islamic way of doing and thinking. He points out Islamic movement in Turkey has been engaged with capitalism and it is entrepreneurial. The rise of an Islamic capitalist class can be seen as a challenge to Orientalist thesis of Islam and capitalism are incompatible and antagonistic which is found in Weberian reading of the relationship between capitalism and Islam (Yavuz 2006: 4). In this context, he asserts the prime agent of the AKP s silent revolution is the new emerging bourgeoisie rooted in Anatolia (2006: 1). Also, he claims the dominant reading of Kemalist state versus Islamic society ignores the symbiotic relationship between them (2006: 8). However, he neglects social relations of production in this analysis and he focusses on identity based issues. For instance on page 3 and 4, he points out there is still a high likelihood that Turkish voters will return to the identity-based parties they have voted for in the past (2006: 3-4). On the other hand, this understanding on Turkish politics ignores class-based relations of the system. Putting an end to the class-based politics as a strategy is not employed as a means to 12 G ramsci in Taksim

13 eliminate class politics rather as Yalman points out it is employed to marginalise class-based political opposition (Yalman 2012: 23). Elsewhere he focusses on the AKP s identity, ideology and institutional features elsewhere. Firstly he questions the AKP whether it is an Islamic party or not (Yavuz 2009: 1) and then he compiles its historical and ideological background (2009: 14). Thereafter, he makes an analysis of the AKP s ideology, leadership and party organisation (2009: 79). In this analysis one point can be highlighted, that is Islamic political movement in Turkey has evolved to a position that it has ceased to be Islamic due to three factors as follows: political participation, neo-liberal economic policies and expansion of market (2009: xii). As he points out, Islamic parties in Turkey have been constrained by the systemic restrictions such as constitution, laws regulating political parties, the military establishment and the requirements of international organizations (2009: 11). On the other hand, this assumption does not explain why the AKP is not in favour of making amendments on these restrictions (such as election threshold 15 ). It should be noted that these restrictions have started to play a contributing role on the AKP s mobilisation to politics since these restrictions are regulated for the protection of stability (Boyraz 2011: 156). Society-centric Approaches Some perspectives could be accepted as more society centric than state. Cihan Tugal s recent book Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism occupies a major space in this paper because of the importance of the book. The importance of the book appears from not only its attempt to apply Gramscian concepts also its failure to do so. Cihan Tuğal merges the rising political Islam with neoliberalism and he explains the transition with Gramscian terminology. His main argument is that, although there is increasing unemployment rates and poverty, and sharp cuts in social welfare expenditures, Islamic politics succeeded a demobilization among people against neo-liberal policies via 15 There is 10% election threshold in Turkey since G ramsci in Taksim

14 establishment of religious charity mechanisms, community-based solidarity networks and patronage relations (Boyraz 2011: ). Tuğal gives a revision of hegemony in the first chapter of his book. He starts with a definition of Islamic mobilization and hegemony. Islamic mobilization is the reconstitution of hegemony as a response to organic crises. Hegemony operates by linking society and state (Tuğal 2009: 24). His redefinition of hegemony is slightly problematic from a Gramscian perspective. Firstly, Gramsci defines hegemony as a phenomenon that its function is exercised via society by the dominant group (Gramsci 1971: 12). In Tuğal s definition society and state are taken as two different, also autonomous entities and hegemony performs by connecting them. On the other hand, in Gramsci s definition there is no such separation of state and society, but he emphasises the role of dominant group in the society throughout the hegemony. Secondly (interconnected with the first one), the state should not be considered as an autonomous and ontological entity. This point has become a common mistake among the liberal-leftist academia that focuses on the making of modern Turkish state. The mistake derives a major problem on the analysis of state: a misunderstanding of the nature of state. In order to understand the dialectical process of the modern Turkish state, it should be considered as an aspect of social relations of production and capitalist social relations which is based on the reproduction of class-relevant antagonisms and exploitation (A. D. Morton 2013b: 142). Tuğal failed to apply this understanding of state, and recognised state and civil society as two antagonistic entities. Tuğal underlines the importance of the political society in his analysis. He redefines it as the sphere where society organizes to shape state policies but also to define the nature of the state and political unity. At the same page, he continues by mentioning without political society, the state is an abstract entity, a body of armed men (and occasionally women) 14 G ramsci in Taksim

15 accompanied by some people in robes (judges, professors, bureaucrats) (Tuğal 2009: 25) 16. From this point of view, state is assumed as an independent entity, as well as fragments of society. In Tuğal s analysis political and civil societies are taken as different and almost autonomous fractions in the society. On the other hand, there is no mention on these fragments with a class antagonism. In his conceptualisation, even though he applies passive revolution to the AKP period of Turkey, he did not use Caesarism and trasformismo in his analysis. Caesarism can be said to express a situation in which the forces in conflict balance each other in a catastrophic manner; that is to say, they balance each other in such a way that a continuation of the conflict can only terminate in their reciprocal destruction (Gramsci 1971: 219). This point makes his analysis more problematic because those two accompany to the passive revolution. Without them a passive revolution analysis will be deficient. Without accompaniment of Caesarism, the rising tide of authoritarianism in the AKP s passive revolution would not be understood. Thus, both concepts should have been used by referring to Gramsci. Those concepts will be explained in the following sections. On one hand, the AKP is recognised as the follower of neoliberal paradigm, Tuğal s outlook over the Islamic movements in Turkey is somehow problematic and overreductionist. First of all, he considers the pre-akp Islamic movements as unique and homogeneous. He accepts almost entire pre-akp Islamic movements as anti-capitalist (Tuğal 2009: 42-51). However, the engagement of Islamic groups and capitalism in Turkey can be traced back to the 1990s. For instance, 1994 booklet of Refah Partisi 17 could be given as an example in which essays in favour of market economy could be found. Although the 16 Emphasis is mine. 17 Refah Partisi was a pro- Islamic political party established in 1993 and dissolved in Their popular vote increased over the years until they became the largest party under Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan in The coalition government of Erbakan was forced out of power by the Turkish military in 1997, due to being suspected of having an Islamist agenda. This military intervention is called post- modern coup. The party was closed by The Constitutional Court in 1998 because of being focus of anti- secular movement. 15 G ramsci in Taksim

16 discourse of party was established upon the anti-western therefore anti-capitalist narrative, this booklet shows us how he party was engaged capitalism (Refah 1994). Reducing the image of Turkish bourgeoisie in the pre-1980 period to a homogeneous secular characteristic would be another mistake. One of the significant outcomes of the 1980 coup can be accepted as the increasing religious emphasis of the state, and undoubtedly it was the ideological strategy of the state control by the bourgeoisie. Therefore making an ideological distinction between secular and Islamic bourgeoisie would be very schematic. As Erol claims the main source of the fractioning of capital at the time between highly globalised large capital, represented by the TUSIAD, and medium-sized and small capital, mainly concentrated on the domestic market and represented by the MUSIAD (Independent Industrialists and Businessman s Association) was more material than ideological (Erol 2010: 538) 18. Additionally, considering 2002 elections as a rupture on the Islamic politics in terms of a shift from anti-capitalist to market-oriented policies will be extremely reductionist. Islamist movements considerations on the economy cannot be accepted as anti-capitalist in Turkey. However, as a popular mass party, Refah Party s rhetoric includes anti-capitalist discourse, this can be accepted an objection against Western system. On the other hand, in the Refah Party s election bulletin of 1994, it can be observed that they grasped neo-liberal discourse as well. Therefore, an engagement between capitalism and Islamic actions can be seen even in the pre-akp Islamic parties. Although Tugal claims Islamic rhetoric or religion is not the cement of the broader coalition of the AKP, but neoliberal principles, those principles could be accepted as the main norms of the Turkish politics since the 1980s (Erol 2010: 538). Tuğal s analysis includes a common mistake on civil society. He borrows the concept of civil society from Gramsci, but he considers it as an environment of freedom. For Tuğal, 18 Emphasis is mine. 16 G ramsci in Taksim

17 civil society is an agent against the state and he perceives it should be strengthened. On the other hand, Buttigieg argues that civil society appears as a sphere of hegemony from Gramsci s reading of it (Buttigieg 1995: 6-7) therefore he would not affirm its strengthening. One can also argue that within the Gramscian notion of integral state which will be discussed in the next section, consists of civil society and political society thus on this terrain of integral state, civil society groups can be either side of those hegemonic struggles. The problem of Tuğal s analysis occurs here because if the state is put as a target that should be weakened and if it is done without a historical materialist approach, it would give a progressive role to the AKP. But from a critical perspective, if the Islamic resistance is absorbed to neoliberalism by the AKP, it could not be accepted as progressive. Therefore, what I argue is that civil society is not necessarily progressive. Cihan Tuğal s perspective can be accepted as a very eclectic one since his aspect includes different accounts such as Weberian notion of the state and Gramscian term passive revolution. He asserts the rise of political Islam as a passive revolution and he makes a revision of Gramsci s concept hegemony. He employs a separatist approach to the secularist hegemony in Turkey, as he formulates political society + civil society + the state + economy (A. D. Morton 2013b: 143). He propounds radical Islamic movements in Turkey have been absorbed by neo-liberalism since the AKP came in power. His separatist approach to understand the hegemonic relations is too far to enlighten class-based relations in the post era. For example he asserts the transitions process as a passive revolution but he does not mention the active subject of it. He does not highlight the role of authentic bourgeoisie (İnsel 2011) on the passive revolution. Even though it is heavily vital, he does not include the change during the AKP period on the social relations of production. He does not mention the degree of relation between capital and state. As Erol points out it is impossible to give a meaningful account of passive revolution and hegemony in Turkey a peripheral capitalist 17 G ramsci in Taksim

18 social formation without addressing the transformation of the capitalist mode of production after the 1980s and in order to achieve this aim, one could start on the basis of appreciating the peripheral character of capitalist development in Turkey and its position shaped by national and transnational forces of capital and labour in the global economy (Erol 2010: 539). One other problem is he employs a separatist understanding of state rather than Gramscian integral state. The realms of political and civil society within modern states were inseparable so that, taken together, they combine to produce a notion of the integral state (Bieler and Morton 2003: 482) 19. His perspective cannot be accepted as relative autonomist understanding of state as well. He claims state, civil society, political society, and economy as different ontological entities. All in all, four shortcomings as they were given in the introduction could be observed in Cihan Tugal s study. First, the dualist understanding of state society relations appears as the major feature. His failure derives from his separatist method of understanding the society. As Demet Dinler argues in her well-known article, there are problems of considering state as a rational actor and distinct from the society. Although state-led approach accepts the transformation in the 1980s, it does not focus on reasons of the transformation and tries to explain what is blocked by the state. The approach accepts institutional transformations and claims there are still a dominance of state among the institutions (Dinler 2003: 45). Second, the separatism between market and state rises in his revision of hegemony. Third, the overaffirmative narrative of his book on Islamist groups therefore the civil society brings the automatic progressiveness of the civil society. Finally, the disregard of class relations and consideration of class as a mere sociological unit and his analysis built around this ontology neglects the social relations of production. This perspective cannot explain the underlying 19 Citation taken from p. 12 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971). 18 G ramsci in Taksim

19 characteristics and dynamics of the rise of AKP. In order to do it, class struggles 20, hegemonic crisis of (Ozan 2011: 22) and the early 2000s should be posited to the centre of analysis and changes in the social relations of production should be highlighted. In his book (Tuğal 2009), he attempted to revise Gramscian concepts such as hegemony and match them with liberal-leftist approaches. But unfortunately and inevitably, this attempt failed because it derives erosion on Gramsci s ideas when it excludes class from the analysis. Yildiz Atasoy questions how the AKP (or Islamic movement in Turkey) constructs an Islamic culture which is connected to Turkey s EU membership intersect with neo-liberal restructuring of the state and economy (Atasoy 2009: 11) and transnationalisation process (2009: 12). She intends to connect the structural and discursive factors that assist to comprehend how a neoliberal market economy model and liberal principles of democracy are embraced in the reshaping of Islamic political agenda in Turkey within the transformation of the Turkish state (2009: 27). According to Atasoy, the lack of strong leftist movement in Turkey has brought a fact in which the intersection between material and cultural tension has made Islam as a raising political project (2009: 108). In this context, the AKP has been appeared as becoming the leading organisation that incorporates broad fragments of society (2009: 109). She asserts that while considering the entire history of Turkey from late Ottoman Empire to the present, Islam s marriage with neo-liberalism today 21 undermines the state s power (against civil society) (2009: 240). Atasoy claims that the Islamic movement in Turkey maintains to articulate a horizontal integration of the social and the cultural as a bottom-up state-making project (2009: 251) and connectedly with that, there is a challenge comes from the fact that Islamic politics is embedded in liberal-democratic and neo-liberal capitalist ideas emanating from the EU and the IMF WB (2009: 250). Her assumptions can 20 Hereby, it should be noted that class struggles are not considered as only struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie. It is plural and it includes struggles between different fractions of bourgeoisie as well - Sungur Savran, Türkiye'de Sınıf Mücadeleleri (Cilt: ) [Class Struggles in Turkey (Volume ] (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2010) at Original emphasis. 19 G ramsci in Taksim

20 be summarised as different agendas of political orientations, normative standards and cultural practices are penetrated under the supervision of neo-liberal form of capitalism and the AKP attempts to reshape the society via neo-liberal discursive synthesis between Islamic cultural orientation and European Union norms (Boyraz 2011: 158). Briefly, the AKP s success can be found in three major developments: neo-liberalism, globalisation and transformation on Turkey s social structure (such as the emergence of Anatolian capital). AKP penetrated the EU discourse (liberal democracy, human rights) and Islamic discourse in order to embrace wider range of people. Therefore the AKP s structure can be seen as an inter-class coalition. Moreover, the AKP s attempt to reshape the state can be considered as a transformation of the Kemalist republic within the EU perspective with the hands of Anatolian middle-class, religious groups, intellectuals and Kurds. This assumption brings us to the centre periphery relations approach. Basically, it can be said that in this context, the periphery is reshaping the centre. Class relations are considered within an identity-based perspective in the analysis. Furthermore, it can be claimed that her analysis fails within three main reasons. Firstly, her conception of capitalism can be accepted as ahistorical. Secondly, she considers the historical differentiation of economic political spaces as given. Thirdly, her assumption accepts capitalism appears from the political struggle (Duzgun 2012: 181). Overall, her assertions on the capitalist development in Turkey and her inferences on the rise of political Islam are methodologically problematic within particular points given above and they are not quite adequate to understand the social relations of production behind the rise. Bringing Gramsci Back In In the previous section it is argued that existing perspectives on political Islam in Turkey have four main shortcomings. This section will introduce the Gramscian historical materialism (GHM), which is constructed around the notion of integral state and will provide an alternative for each shortcoming points. First, it is given that the state civil society 20 G ramsci in Taksim

21 relations are understood dialectically in GHM. Second, as well as the state civil society, relations between the market the state and the economic the political are conceptualised as symbiotic relations in GHM. Therefore, rather than dualism, a monolithic and holistic understanding is developed in this study. Third, as it is already highlighted by Gramsci, civil society is the hegemonic sphere, rather than sphere of freedom, thus it is argued that civil society is not necessarily progressive. Fourth, social relations of production which refers to class struggle, is the main dynamic of the superstructural conflicts, therefore in order to comprehend the social base of political Islam in Turkey, this study starts with social relations of production. The concepts of civil society and the state and also their relation have become important themes in political economy. Recently, the relation between them is redefined by emphasising the dichotomic characteristic of this relation. There is a tendency to explain social phenomena with respect to the dichotomic relation between the state and civil society. In general terms, while the state is considered as a realm of authority or force, civil society is identified with democracy and freedom. Existing literature on the rise of political Islam in Turkey does not provide us sufficient environment to analyse the fact within class struggle. Gramsci s concept of hegemony derived from his historical-empirical studies may be a concept which makes the relationality and totality of the social reality more precise. Gramsci's theoretical concepts such as hegemony, historical bloc, or integral state all indicate the totality, historicity and relationality of the social reality. To do so, one should put the social relations of production in the first place and should consider the state and civil society as holistic. The notion of historical bloc aids this endeavour by directing attention to which social forces may have been crucial in the formation of an historical bloc or particular state; what contradictions may be contained within an historical bloc upon which a form of state is 21 G ramsci in Taksim

22 founded; and what potential might exist for the formation of a rival historical bloc that may transform a particular form of state (Bieler and Morton 2004: 91) 22. As Peter Thomas argues Gramsci attempted to explain the transition between civil society and the state by introducing the concept of political society or State as a superstructural level alongside that of civil society within the integral state 23 (Thomas 2009: 186). Gramsci went beyond Marx and he put more emphasis on superstructure. In his analysis, the state appears as much more than the coercive apparatus of the bourgeoisie, it also includes the hegemony of the bourgeoisie in the superstructure. Hegemony would be very beneficial and encompassing us to the critical reading of the state, not only to point out the supremacy of ruling class but also to understand the development of consent and coercion in Turkey. In order to highlight the importance of hegemony, Gramsci s theory of state, commonly associated with hegemony, is going to be used in the study. As Gramsci claims, [t]he State is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules (1971: 244). For Gramsci, the actual subject of history is the real, empirical subject, not ideas. The concepts he employs such as hegemony, relations of production, passive revolution are conceived as theoretical concepts derived from historical reality and reflecting real social entities. From this perspective, it is hard to say that Gramsci is an idealist. His materialism and following Morera his realism is a more comprehensive conceptualisation of the social reality, which does not exclude material and ideal dimensions of it (Morera 1990: 61). Gramsci 24 also drew attention to such state-impelled practices and designations, which he regarded as linked to the wider class realization of a hegemonic apparatus in four main ways. First, he referred to the overarching importance of the 22 Citation taken from p. 419 Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order : Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987). 23 Original emphasis. 24 Citation taken from p. 365 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks. 22 G ramsci in Taksim

23 material structure of ideology which included issues such as architecture alongside street lay-outs (as well as street names), and the social function performed by libraries, schools, publishing houses, newspapers, and journals, down to the local parish newsletter. Second, these social condensations of hegemony are the means by which a diffused and capillary form of indirect pressure becomes mediated through various organizations or capillary intellectual meatuses to exercise hegemonic class relations 25. Third, according to Gramsci, ideology was neither artificial nor something mechanically superimposed. Rather, ideologies were viewed as historically produced through ceaseless struggle, taking on substance through practical activity bound up with systems of meaning embedded in the economy 26. Fourth, it is here, in the struggle over hegemony between different class fractions, that Gramsci attributed an important role to intellectuals (Bieler and Morton 2008: ). As Bieler and Morton illustrate here, in Gramscian terms, the hegemony appears as an expression of broadly based consent, manifested in the acceptance of ideas and supported by material resources and institutions, which is initially established by social forces occupying a leading role within a state, but is then projected outwards on a world scale (Bieler and Morton 2004: 87). Gramsci emphasises the importance of intellectuals role among the hegemonic struggles between different class fractions, in terms of capillary power (Bieler and Morton 2008: 120). This point will be utilised in the paper. For Gramsci, in politics the errors occur as a result of an inaccurate understanding of what the State (in its integral meaning: dictatorship + hegemony) really is (1971: 239). Identification of the state only with coercion is an inadequate conception of the state, since it neglects hegemony and consent as functions of the state or civil society as a moment of the State. Gramsci s extended state concept that incorporates hegemony and consent, which are generally considered as only belonging to the realm of civil society, is strikingly different 25 Citation taken from p. 110 ibid. 26 Citation taken from p. 56 Gramsci G ramsci in Taksim