CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

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1 CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE CARNEGIE INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION CONFERENCE 11:00 A.M. 12:20 P.M. IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL MEASURES TO COMBAT NUCLEAR TERRORISM CHAIR: WILLIAM POTTER, CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AMBASSADOR PETER BURIAN, PERMANENT MISSION OF SLOVAKIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS IGOR KHRIPUNOV, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA WILLIAM TOBEY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY TUESDAY, JUNE 26, 2007 RONALD REAGAN BUILDING AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTER HORIZON WASHINGTON, D.C. Transcript by: Federal News Service Washington, D.C.

2 WILLIAM POTTER: Okay. I believe we ll get going promptly at 11:00. My name is Bill Potter. I direct the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. And as always, it s a pleasure and an honor to participate in the Carnegie Endowment International Nonproliferation Conference. I m also delighted to chair a panel of distinguished experts and practitioners who will address the vital issue of implementing international measures to combat nuclear terrorism. Before introducing our participants, I would like to set the stage for this morning s discussion by noting a few recent developments that highlight both the promise and the problems we face in combating nuclear terrorism. I will do so in the form of a short dialogue among three would-be nuclear terrorists. My intent is to be provocative, but hopefully in a constructive, albeit irreverent, fashion. So hopefully those who come in in the middle of my dialogue will appreciate the nature of my discourse here. Terrorist Number 1: We were naive to assume that Russian scientists would be so disloyal as to divulge their precious nuclear secrets. There probably were some rotten apples in the bunch, but not that many. We missed a golden opportunity in the 1990s when their nuclear complex was in shambles. Now economic conditions have improved and far more facilities have at least basic physical protection measures in place. If we are going to go after Russian material, we will either have to overwhelm their sites with superior force or rely on local criminal organizations to identify the right insiders to obtain the goods for us and move the material out of country once they acquire it. Terrorist Number 2: I don t think it s too late. The Russians still don t get it. The guards at nuclear sites may now have winter clothes and respond to intruder alarms in cold weather, but their bosses still are dismissive of the insider threat and only pretend the follow the security procedure insisted upon by the Americans. Although they may have acquiesced to U.S. pressure and put in place some physical protection and material control barriers, they have done little to improve their accounting practices and don t have a clue how much fissile material they actually have. They also are dismissive of our ability to make a primitive nuclear weapon and appear to be more concerned about recovering radioactive sources than protecting plutonium and HEU. Their real Achilles heel, though, is material in transport. They ve got fissile material on the move all the time, sometimes with little, if any, meaningful protection. Terrorist Number 3: You guys are both in a dreamworld. Forget the hundreds of tons of good stuff in Russia. It may not be protected like Fort Knox, but why take the risk? Beside, who knows who are the criminals and the good guys there? All we require is 50 kilos of HEU. The rest of the material we need to build a nuclear device we could

3 buy on ebay. In any case, why bother with Russian when we have a much better shot of getting our hands on the good stuff in Belarus and Ukraine or even Canada and South Africa for that matter. Terrorist Number 1: You ve got a point. What I wouldn t give for some of the Canadian or South African HEU targets. Terrorist Number 2: Personally, I would focus on our friends in Pakistan. A.Q. Khan may be under house arrest but I ll bet you it wouldn t take much to reactivate portions of his nuclear supply and procurement network. What a shame we missed the chance to buy the old Chinese bomb design when he was peddling it. Terrorist Number 1: I agree that we let a great opportunity slip by, but I m much less concerned with the bomb design than getting our hands on the HEU. We ve got plenty of options as long as Moscow and Washington keep creating more organizations to fight nuclear terrorism but spend little time on the ground actually doing it. I can t believe they ve spent almost a decade talking about the need to consolidate weapons useable material in Russia and yet among dozens of sites not a single one has actually parted with all of its material, even those that never use the stuff. Terrorist Number 2: It s as if they re following a game plan we devised for them. Hold lots of summits, launch new initiatives that don t fund them adequately, constant shift personnel around, invest little in training experts who speak the language and know anything about the countries of concern, focus on technical solutions to political problems, and avoid comparative analyses of actual illicit nuclear trafficking incidents. I know we can t expect this folly to continue indefinitely, but there are no signs that it will stop anytime soon. Most of their anti-nuclear terrorism initiatives have a half-life shorter than polonium 210. Terrorist Number 3: The Americans often may not know what we re doing, but at least you have to give them credit for trying. Most of their G8 partners appear more interested in promoting nuclear power than preventing nuclear proliferation or terrorism. And the rest of the international community couldn t care less about us. As far as they re concerned, the threat of nuclear terrorism is someone else s problem; maybe important in the abstract, but not a pressing local concern. Sure, more and more countries are joining the 1540 bandwagon, but how many prosecutions have there been anywhere for lax nuclear security, export control violations, or loss of sensitive nuclear material or technology? Do you really think the Russians and Americans share meaningful data about nuclear smuggling incidents with each other, much less with the IAEA? Get real. I wouldn t be surprised if some of those NGOs have more information on the 2006 HEU trafficking case in Georgia than does the U.S. government or the IAEA. Can you believe the U.S. Congress actually weakened export controls regarding HEU exports and Russian has yet to convert a single one of its own research reactors to run on LEU? And look what happens when the Norwegians and an NGO tried to mount a campaign to eliminate

4 HEU in the civilian nuclear sector the South Africans step in and try to block the initiative on grounds that it infringes upon their inalienable rights to nuclear energy. Terrorist Number 1: Okay, we get the picture. We have to act quickly before the international community wises up and gets its act together. You have your marching orders. Be sure to review the shopping list in the November/December 2006 article in Foreign Policy on the Bomb in the Backyard and get to it. Okay. I suspect I ve offended many parties in the audience and on my panel, but as I said, the idea was to be provocative. I ve obviously taken some literary license in targeting several of the very important, if imperfect, programs. Let me now give the panelists an opportunity to comment on the adequacy of current efforts to combat nuclear terrorism and what might be done practically to accelerate the implementation of some very important existing international measures. We have an exceptionally distinguished panel of speakers. I m going to introduce them all at this moment and then ask them to speak in the order in which they are introduced. Our first panelist is Dr. Peter Burian, the Slovak ambassador to the United Nations and the chair of the U.N Committee. Although our fictional terrorists may have been dismissive of U.N. Security Council resolution 1540, I must say that having observed Ambassador Burian in action in the field, I can attest to his extraordinary dedication to implementing the resolution in a very creative and practical way. Our second panelist is Mr. William Tobey, the deputy administrator for defense nuclear nonproliferation at the Department of Energy s National Nuclear Security Administration. Mr. Tobey who has responsibility for managing NNSA s 1.5 or so billion dollar nonproliferation and threat reduction programs previously served as director of counter-proliferation at the U.S. National Security Council. Our final panelist is Dr. Igor Khripunov, associate director of the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia. Dr. Khripunov is a former Soviet diplomat who has written widely on nuclear security and nonproliferation export controls. I ve asked all of the panelists to speak for no more than 15 minutes. And also just to alert you, I ve also asked Peter Zimmerman in the audience to lead off our Q&A with what the sponsors of this group have designated as a provocateur position, and I m sure Peter is well suited for that role. So with that, let me turn the podium over to Ambassador Burian. Peter? AMB. PETER BURIAN: Thank you, Bill. It was a wonderful introduction to our theme, but you do not have to underestimate the diplomats because they are very good at

5 not reacting to any provocations. But what I want to say in reaction to what you have said, really those three scenarios are showing that the threat of terrorists acquiring the nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is real. And in this regard, the community of nations finds itself in a race against time to contain and also probably eliminate this threat. What is important to say, the Security Council in 2004 recognized the threat, and in reaction also to the concrete events like the revelation of clandestine network of A.Q. Khan and other events showing that really there are some efforts by nonstate actors to acquire technologies and related materials enabling them to produce weapons of mass destruction, that really it s high time to do something on the international level and to adopt a concrete instrument to deal with this threat. Since also in your brief description of our theme in the booklet, which I was reading just before this discussion, you stated -- or organizers of this workshop stated that many countries have been slow to adopt voluntary measures to implement legally binding but poorly understood mandate of the 1540 resolution, let me first briefly describe some elements of the resolution 1540 and the mandate of the 1540 Committee also. As I mentioned, resolution 1540 is the first international instrument dealing with weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in a comprehensive manner. It places requirements on every U.N. member state to put in place broad-ranging laws and measures to deny proliferators and their supporters access to sensitive materials. Through 1540 resolution, the Security Council sent a strong message to the broad range of facilitators of proliferation in the wake of the revelation regarding the A.Q. Khan global nuclear network. And in this regard, special emphasis was given to stopping support for such proliferation-related trade by nonstate actors, including producers and manufactures, financiers, logistical supporters, and a range of individuals involved in the global supply chain. I do not want to, of course, hide that there are difficulties in the implementation of resolution 1540, but I am pleased to note that there is a growing awareness of the importance and also practical meaning of resolutions 1540 and later resolution 1673, which extended the mandate of my committee which I am chairing for global, regional, and national security. Since the adoption of resolution 1540, significant progress has been achieved in the implementation of its provisions in various regions. And today I am pleased to note that there are many states that have taken numerous steps towards fulfilling their obligations under resolution They have adopted new laws dealing with preventing of proliferations of weapons of mass destruction and the related materials. They have put in place new enforcement measures and mechanisms and designed, in many cases, tailored roadmaps or national plans to achieve a full implementation of resolution Many states, for example, established also coordinating mechanisms for full

6 implementation of resolution 1540 and also new inter-departmental channels to prepare their reports to the committee. In this respect, states and their experts have notified representatives of the committee either formally or informally that implementing 1540 resolution helped them to cross the bureaucratic divisions across their nuclear programs, as well as other weapons of mass destruction-related fields. And I am pleased to note that awareness of the importance of implementation of resolutions 1540 and 1673 is growing also in those countries, especially in Africa and in some other regions, which have had difficulties in preparing their national reports and which are saying and as also the program booklet is saying that nuclear terrorism is not their problem. Or there are countries which have different national priorities, and we have to say that really there are many of them facing problems, like fight against poverty, and small arms trafficking in Africa and Latin America. I can inform you that as of now, 136 member states and one organization have submitted reports on measures they have taken or plan to take to implement resolution 1540, and 85 of them have provided additional information in response to the committee s request for updates or adjustments. At the same time, as I mentioned in the beginning, there is no room for complacency and more needs to be done. There are still too many challenges and problems to be addressed to achieve a full implementation of all aspects of resolution 1540 worldwide to make the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction or related materials and their means of delivery for nonstate actors impossible. Let me now briefly summarize major gaps and challenges to this end. As you probably know, last year in April the committee agreed and submitted a comprehensive report to the Security Council on the work in its first two years. The report makes clear that virtually all states face significant gaps between the measures they have taken to prevent weapons of mass destruction proliferation and their binding obligations under the resolution. The report, among other observations and conclusions, identified several important gaps in the implementation of resolution 1540, especially in the areas of accountability, physical protection, border controls, law enforcement efforts, national expert and transshipment controls including controls on providing funds and services such as financing to such exports and transshipments. It is important to stress that states are obliged to implement Security Council resolution 1540 in full, and capacity-building to improve legislative and other controls as well as their enforcement is crucial to further success. The 1540 committee is intensifying its efforts to promote resolution 1540 and to advance the process of implementation of it worldwide. While the year of 2006 was devoted to examining the national reports and to increasing awareness of the significance of resolution 1540, especially in Africa, Caribbean and Asia Pacific, where the committee has organized several workshops to promote resolution 1540, and to explain actually that

7 it s relevant in any kind of circumstances, even in those areas where the countries might not have the capacity and capability to produce nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. But this year the committee is concentrating on further progress in implementation of all aspects of the resolution. And one way to do so we agreed is to define best practices to implement resolution 1540 fully. Even if there is no one model of implementation, and of course the implementation of resolution 1540 is a national responsibility where various institutional innovations may be necessary reflecting specifics of each country and is legal system, best way and practices in implementation of 1540 resolution might be used as a source of inspiration to help states move in the process of implementation faster and to achieve that goal by all states, even those who have problems and lack of administrative capacities. I would like to mention two recent examples by Russia and Mexico, and those examples highlight processes of states that contribute to full implementation of resolution First of all, Russia announced in June in the beginning of June that its national antiterrorism committee would establish a central authority over many departments that already deal with transportation of fissile and radioactive materials. In the case of Mexico, it was announced also that a special high-level committee is to be set up in its National Security Council to coordinate implementation of Mexico s international obligations on a national level related to disarmament of terrorism and national security. I would like to underline that both examples reflect a cross-departmental approach coordinated by a central authority, which is the key to an effective and comprehensive approach to implementation of all aspects of resolution And these two country examples are some of the new initiatives that reflect national or good practices which the 2007 G-8 summit statement on nonproliferation refers as best practices that states may employ to facilitate implementation of resolution Now, a few words about international action and assistance which might be needed to help countries in the implementation of resolution Resolution 1540 recognizes of course that not all states have the same capacity to implement the resolution, and thus the resolution also provides an avenue for states to offer and also request technical assistance to build a national capacity to enact and enforce the provision of the resolution. Efforts are being made through regional outreach activities to encourage and assist the 56 states that have not yet submitted a first report, especially, as I mentioned, in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific area to do so. The outreach activities conducted by the committee during 2005 and 2006 demonstrated that a major assistance effort is needed to ensure full implementation of resolution 1540 and to address difficulties of implementation connected with lack of administrative, technical, and expert capacities, as well as lack of financial and human resources in many countries. I have to stress here, and this is the conclusion also from our previous activities,

8 that the international community needs a coherent strategy to meet this end, and I am pleased to note in this regard that there are already some positive developments in this respect, like the U.S. action plan which was presented to the committee and which is now posted on its website. But what I wanted to stress that also other initiatives in this direction need to be put into a more coherent system globally to produce more concrete results. The committee has accorded high priority to this area and is developing its role as a clearinghouse for assistance, and now we are adopting some concrete decisions and some concrete tools to help countries to be better oriented, let s say, in which way to require the assistance. The committee has already identified and put together information concerning both needs and offers of assistance and will be updating this information. We ll also organize 11 of July a meeting with donors to discuss better interaction and possible coordination among various players in the area of assistance to really reach out to all regions. What I also wanted to stress, that the task of promoting and realizing the implementation of 1540 is enormous, and it s too complex to be fulfilled by a single U.N. Security Council subsidiary body. Hence I would like to stress that an increase of international cooperation among various players and organizations involved is necessary. Strengthening international cooperation and partnerships and creating a global and interlinked system for fighting the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery to nonstate actors is an imperative of today. I am pressed by time, so I will skip some of the parts of my presentation on concrete details where we are trying to focus our attention in increasing and strengthening the action of international community. But what I wanted to say, that the council in its debate on implementation of 1540 reiterated its determination to enhance committee s cooperation with international organizations and to develop preferred mechanisms for cooperating with them on a case-by-case basis, taking into account variations in each organization s capacity and mandate to assist states in implementation resolution There are concrete examples of how this cooperation is being developed between the committee and OPCW, and IAEA and also World Customs Organizations. And we are moving also to the area of cooperation and activities with some export controls regimes which have quite unique tools and experience in the measures which are required by the resolution. We can benefit from assistance programs of these organizations and arrangements to further the progress of implementation of resolution 1540 in all areas. What is also important to say, these IGOs also have a portfolio of good practices for delivering assistance and implementation efforts. We are also reaching out to nongovernmental organizations and regional organizations, and the committee is engaged in a useful dialogue in cooperation with the OSCE in Europe, with the Organization of American States, and ASEAN Regional Forum. And it will be soon establishing the contacts also with CARICOM, Mercosur,

9 African Union, and other regional organizations. Also, one piece of information which might be interesting to you on the cooperation with the NGOs the committee will organize a meeting with several NGOs on July 12 th engaged in various activities supporting the implementation of resolution 1540 to discuss possibilities for future cooperation and interaction. Through support of individual member states, donors and NGOs and international and regional organizations, we are now creating an important degree of momentum, which must be utilized now for strengthening the global response to the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through further practical measures. Yeah, I m just concluding. Really, in conclusion, I wish to underline that if 1540 is successfully implemented and enforced, it will have achieved both goals of this panel and the conference to make a difference by the end of the decade, if not before, and by representing not only one but a number of coordinated and innovative approaches to prevent the proliferation of nuclear and also chemical and biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials for terrorist purposes. Finally, I would like to mention that the committee will prepare a report to the Security Council by the end of the mandate, which expires in April next year, and will include the recommendations on the way forward and on the future of the committee. In my personal belief, and we haven t discussed it within the Security Council yet and within the committee, I believe that the committee will have to continue its work also beyond April, 2008, since there is an important business to do in the foreseeable future to complete the task for the committee, but the issue will have to be decided, as I mentioned, by the Security Council. But at the same time in parallel we ll have to think about some permanent structure or mechanism, possibly in the Secretariat, which will deal with the implementation of 1540 and possible other measures, let s say, in this area on a permanent basis. And we, I think, need to start the discussion on this matter rather sooner than later. So I thank you for your attention. I was a little bit longer than probably the chair would love to, but I consider it important to brief you on all the aspects of our work. Thank you. MR. POTTER: Thanks, Peter. I think had I revised my script in the dialogue among the terrorists, the last word would have been, terrorist Number 1, these diplomats don t know the meaning of a time limit. (Laughter.) But, nevertheless, I appreciate the very interesting remarks. Mr. Tobey, I look forward to your comments. WILLIAM TOBEY: Well, I m somewhat daunted by Bill Potter s terrorists. Not only are we up against people who might have access to fissile materials and weapons designs, but apparently they know the arcane details of nonproliferation policy. (Laughter.)

10 To their credit, the organizers of this conference have stressed the need to look forward and to talk about solutions for the future rather than past accomplishments, but I do believe that context is important. It s important to understand the past in order to decide which paths in the future make the most sense. I d like to offer two pieces of context for this discussion and then one example of further progress and concrete steps to implement measures to combat nuclear terrorism. With respect to U.N. Security Council resolution 1540, Ambassador Burian s excellent discussion of that measure and the steps that are being taken to implement it I think saves me a lot of time, and I hope to make up some of your schedule, Bill. But there are a couple points I wanted to add. And in terms of context, about exactly four years ago in the summer of 2003, when I was on the National Security Council staff I was being pressed by my bosses to deal with a confluence of developments, including obviously the attacks of September 11th, the Khan network which we were watching, and there would soon be disclosures regarding illicit trade with Libya, North Korea and Iran. Iran s secret enrichment program had already been discussed and was just coming to light in terms of an IAEA report. So we were thinking we were struggling with ways to block nuclear terrorism. And we initially within the U.S. government a colleague of mine, who was a legal expert on the NCS staff, and I floated the idea of resolution 1540 and we immediately united the United States interagency community. Unfortunately, it was against the idea. (Laughter.) The reaction from some of the departments was less than positive. But we struggled through that and took their comments and advice on how to craft a resolution and then took it to other members of the Security Council and a similar process was undertaken, and almost a year later in May of 2004, U.N. Security Council resolution 1540 was born. I really believe it was unprecedented in that it requires states to take executive action, effectively embodying international legislation. And as has been discussed, it requires states to enact and enforce effective export controls, criminalize proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by nonstate actors, and to secure proliferation-sensitive materials. This was, I believe, a very, very constructive development. And the important work that s gone on in New York and elsewhere to implement that resolution I think has made the world a great deal safer. At the same time, the United States, and this is the second bit of context that I d like to offer, had and has substantial programs to combat nuclear terrorism. We in the Department of Energy, and others can speak for other governments and other departments, have an approximately $1.7 billion budget devoted to preventing proliferation and nuclear terrorism. We work in or worth over 100 countries around the world through 18 different programmatic activities. Nothing that we do could be done without international cooperation, so that s the touchstone of all of our activities. And I would break them into six different areas.

11 First, securing civil nuclear and radiological materials worldwide. As an example, we ve committed or we ve converted 46 reactors in 26 countries from using highly-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium. As a result, we ve been able to return some 1,700 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium to their countries of origins, putting them out of the risk of diversion. We ve also recovered over 15,000 radiological sources and secured more than 520 vulnerable radiological sites worldwide. These contained millions of curies which could potentially have been used in dirty weapons. A second area of activity has been to help to secure Russian nuclear weapons material. We have completed work at roughly three-quarters of our sites, with the work underway at the balance of those sites and the objective of completing our work by the end of 2008 under the Bratislava initiative. The third thing that we have done is stepped up work to detect and to deter international illicit nuclear transfers. We ve completed work at over 80 land border crossings in Russia, equipping them with radiation detection equipment. Work is underway in eight other countries. We have just recently reached an agreement with the Russian government to complete the work at Russia s border crossings, effectively splitting the cost and work of the operation. We have also instituted a mega-ports program to deploy radiation detection equipment at eight ports now operational with testing underway at three others and work underway at some 16 other ports. The fourth major area of activity has been to strengthen international nonproliferation efforts. We work closely with the IAEA. We have engaged some 16,000 scientists at 180 institutes across the former Soviet Union and participated in the creation of some 5,000 sustainable jobs in the process. We have trained over 3,000 domestic and international customs and border inspectors. A further area of activity has been to eliminate weapons useable material. With Russia we ve participated in a program to down blend over 300 metric tons of HEU which is now used to fuel the American nuclear industry. Some 10 percent of U.S. power is generated by former Soviet weapons. And we intend to pursue a program to eliminate weapons-grade plutonium, 34 metric tons each, of U.S. and Russian plutonium. And then finally, we have a substantial research and development effort aimed at radiation detection, and we aim to deploy the benefits of this program through cooperation with others. So we had in place, I think, by 2004, substantial U.S. efforts in deep cooperation with many other countries, and an international legal framework to prevent proliferation by non-state actors and terrorists. We still felt more was necessary. And to answer that need, Presidents Bush and Putin, roughly a year ago at St. Petersburg, launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. It s an effort to provide additional practical means to implement the legal requirements of UN Security Council resolution It also is an effort to apply the

12 lessons that we ve learned and the best practices that we ve created in the form of Soviet Union worldwide, and finally it serves as a force multiplier for the international efforts that United States is already undertaking with other countries by bringing to bear the financial and personnel resources of other countries to secure nuclear material. Membership is open to all nations who publicly endorse the statement of principles and are committed to fighting nuclear terrorism. Right now, membership stands at some 52 countries. The first meeting was held in Rabat in October 2006 and involved the G8 countries plus Turkey, Kazakhstan, Australia and China. At that meeting, we adopted the statement of principles and to set a further agenda to adopt the work program which was done in Ankara in February, 2007, and membership was expanded to include all the countries that signed up to the statement of principles in a meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan in June, The statement of principles involves tangible action to prevent material from falling into the hands of terrorists and respond in ways should that threat materialize. The first is to develop an improved accounting control and physical protection systems for nuclear and other radioactive materials. The second is to enhance the security of civilian nuclear facilities. The third is to improve the ability to detect nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances. The fourth is to improve capabilities of participants to search for, confiscate and establish safe control over unlawfully held nuclear or radioactive materials. The fifth is to prevent the provision of safe haven to terrorists including denial of financial or economic resources. The sixth is to ensure adequate national legal and regulatory frameworks to provide for the implementation of appropriate criminal and if necessary civil liability for those who facilitate acts of nuclear terrorism. The seventh is to improve capabilities of participants for response, mitigation, investigation and in cases of terrorist attacks involving nuclear and radioactive materials, including the development of technical means to identify nuclear and radioactive material. And the eighth is to promote information-sharing pertaining to the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism and their facilitation. These are the principles that guide the now 52 participants that are members of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. We re encouraged by the rapid growth in the membership and we fully expect that it will grow more as the activities continue. The nations have set a robust work program, and I don t really have time to go through all of that, but I can give just a few examples joint exercises in radiological source recovery and render-safe. Morocco, for example, was hosting a meeting of its neighbors which I believe will be assisted by France to detect a radiological source and to deal with it. We re endeavoring to adopt standards for minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium. We re pursuing best practices for materials protection control and accountability. We re undertaking joint training of customs and border inspectors, and we just recently held an

13 international law enforcement conference in Miami with some 50 nation-state participants. So and I must further emphasize that this agenda is fairly flexible. New initiatives can be added where we see that there are gaps in our ability to take on the terrorists. What is most important is that we re beginning to unite the international community to take effective action against international terrorists. In conclusion, I just say that I believe this framework is in place for effective action. We will need careful implementation, but we re working hard to do something. MR. POTTER: Thank you very much, Will. You did indeed meet the time limit and I appreciate that. Our last speaker is Igor Khripunov who has a PowerPoint. IGOR KHRIPUNOV: Thank you. It s a pleasure and honor to be part of this distinguished panel. Since I have only 15 minutes, so what I am planning to share with you will be just a very sketchy outline. First of all, let s discuss the probability of a nuclear and radiological terrorism. This is a survey of over 100 top security and foreign policy experts released by the U.S. News and World Report last July. You see at the top of the list rated as 20 percent are attacks using dirty bombs followed by other categories of unconventional terrorism such as chemical weapons, biological agents and attacks on chemical plants. At the bottom is nuclear weapon and improvised nuclear device use. These two different acts of terrorism brought together under the heading of nuclear terrorism create semantic and linguistic difficulties, because the Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism covers both nuclear and radiological while the amended Physical Protection Convention is limited only to nuclear material. On the other hand, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism covers both nuclear and radiological. The terminology and the scope are quite clear for such a sophisticated audience as yours, but the general public is often confused. Also confused are some decision-makers. In reality, an improvised nuclear device is based by definition on an improvised untested design. So it s likely that it will fizzle rather than explode and just turn into a dirty bomb and contaminate the area. So something should be done really to introduce more clarity in this basic terminology. You may ask whether there has been any act of radiological terrorism. My answer is last November the death of former KGB Agent Alexander Litvinenko in London is an example of radiological terrorism that fits into the definitions of the Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Had the convention been in force in November with most key countries on board, it is likely that this case might have been treated in a more efficient way rather than a matter of bilateral dialogue between the UK and Russia. What are the basic five goals of international legal basis for counterterrorism? Besides dissuading people from resorting to or supporting terrorism, denying terrorists the means to carry out an attack, deterring states from supporting terrorist groups, and developing state capacity to prevent terrorism, it is important to emphasize in the overall

14 texture of the international legal basis, the goal of providing comprehensive assistance to and defending and human rights of victims of terrorism as well as those affected by in the context of terrorism and counterterrorism. In terms of the structure of the legal basis, it has two tiers consisting of a hard legal component and two soft legal components. Whether we wanted or not, this two-tier architecture has been taking shape as a result of the post-cold War period tectonic changes in the international arena. How to define the hard legal component? It has the following characteristics: considered binding under international law; negotiated by states through an established diplomatic process; obligations are typically specific; confers provisions for verification and enforcement; and may involve sanctions for violations. What is the soft legal component? It involves voluntary and non-binding policy commitment; developed by experts through informal consultations or proposed unilaterally; recommendations or guidance are discretionary; weak or non-existent verification or enforcement mechanisms; and no specific sanctions, but may review procedures. Let me demonstrate how these hard and softcore components interact throughout the international legal basis. This is the hard core component. At the top, we have NPT and safeguards agreements. I wouldn t discuss the additional protocol and the impediments in the way of moving ahead with additional protocol because other speakers have covered this subject. There is a problem, indeed. Let me give you just one illustration that the hardcore component is inadequate and risks to fail in its important functions. Though Africa is poised to jump the bandwagon of nuclear renaissance and seriously interested in benefiting from nuclear technologies, 23 countries on this continent are still to conclude the safeguards agreement with the IAEA. There are two nuclear-terrorism-focused conventions in the hardcore component. One is the Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. The international community owes much to Bangladesh to become the 22 nd country to ratify and to submit instrument of ratification. As a result, on July 7 th, the convention will come into force. But if you look through who are these 22 countries that have ratified, there are no G8 countries, no major players, except Russia. So how we expect the rest of the world to take our word? How do you expect to defend our credibility if the G8 countries continue urging others to promote effective measures against nuclear terrorism while delay the ratification and coming into effect of the convention? The second one is the amended Physical Protection Convention. The amendment was introduced exactly two years ago. As of now, there are only ten countries that have ratified the amendment which is of paramount importance for preventing nuclear terrorism. Who are these countries? Algeria, Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Libya, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, the Seychelles Islands, and Turkmenistan. You may be asking how many countries will be required for this amended convention to come into force: over 80 ratifications. So it s a long way till this key convention may come into force.

15 There are 11 other basic counterterrorism conventions in the hardcore component that are indirectly associated with the campaign against nuclear terrorism. Then come U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Most of them were adopted immediately after the September 11 th events, and it s quite understandable. These were time-sensitive measures to deal with the threats of terrorism that required extraordinary measures. One of the latest on this list is resolution 1540 and we have just listened to a comprehensive presentation about how this resolution evolved and what to expect in the future. But the question is: Should we continue to replace traditional conventions with Security Council resolutions for expedience and time saving? Is it becoming a convenient substitute for traditional conventions requiring negotiations and involvement of most countries that have a stake in the success of these documents? Will it stay as a routine shortcut to our strategic objectives? Regional agreements have a role to play but I will not amplify on this subject. Now about the two softcore componenets. One consists of the initiatives undertaken by select group of countries. These are the Global Initiative, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), G8 global partnership, G8 commitments, and many other informal arrangements. Let me make one small remark. When the Global Initiative was adopted last July by President Bush and President Putin, the text emphasized that one of its key objectives was to promote and support relevant international conventions, and specifically the Nuclear Terrorism Convention and Physical Protection Convention. If you review subsequent statements released on behalf of the initiative at its meetings in Morocco, Turkey, and Kazakhstan, this reference is not as explicit as it was in the original statement. So it looks like that the initiative is gaining a momentum of its own, and my message is that it shouldn t lose sight of its fundamental function to support and promote the hardcore component. The other softcore component is the United Nations framework. It contains General Assembly resolutions as well as resolutions, guidelines and standards adopted by U.N. agencies. We can sometimes observe their transition from the soft to the hard. For example, the Code of Conduct for Radioactive Sources which was originally just a recommendation. Now, the IAEA is requesting countries to express their political commitments to comply with this document. So it s on a transition track from the soft to the hard and will hopefully reach that stage. It would be useful to initiate a similar transition with regard to the Proliferation Security Initiative. It s a well recognized initiative which needs to be gradually moved to the hardcore component in order to place it on a more stable legal basis. Inside the soft components there are ongoing negotiations and drafting. For example, an international plutonium agreement which was initiated several years ago and then came to a halt. The Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty are still being negotiated. Also, regrettably the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, CTBT, and the amended Physical Protection Convention are still hanging in suspension between the soft and hardcore components. Let me move to several conclusions and recommendations.

16 One, a carefully managed combination of less formalized softcore legal components with the hardcore component has the potential to become the optimal legal structure to combat nuclear terrorism in the new threat environment of the 21 st century. Two, there is a need for better coordination of all elements and tiers of the counterterrorism legal basis in order to avoid inconsistent actions, reduce unnecessary duplication and more efficiently employ synergies. Three, softcore legal components must vigorously and consistently promote consolidation of the hardcore legal component, in particular, faster entry into force of new legal instruments and amendments to the existing ones through more intensive use of IAEA personnel; role model to be played by G8 and other key countries; and support for civil society organizations which would act as clearing houses of information and perform advocacy functions. Four, in order to speed up ratification of international instruments and facilitate their adequate implementation, relevant guidelines, model laws and regulations, reporting mechanisms, and best practices must be developed in advance and shared with prospective state parties at least much earlier than they are now. Five, specific counterterrorism provisions can be first tested in the less-formal softcore component and than transplanted, if necessary, to the hardcore component after sufficient capacity-building and maturation. Six, given the ripple effect of nuclear terrorism and far-reaching societal disruptions it can cause, there is an urgent need to introduce into the soft and hard legal components proposals for an international mechanism that would provide comprehensive assistance to victims of nuclear terrorism with a view to facilitating their transition back to dignified and fruitful lives. (Applause.) MR. POTTER: Thank you very much, Igor. That was really a very rich presentation. I apologize for being stringent about the time limits, but I can t very well call for enforcement of other rules and regulations if we don t set a model ourselves. As I indicated, I was going to give the floor first for two minutes to Peter Zimmerman. Let s shoot for two and if you need three, I ll allow you the extra minute, Peter. Please take the floor. You might further introduce yourself and then let s move forward. Those who also wish to line up for the Q&A, you may take a spot behind Peter. Thank you. Q: I m Peter Zimmerman. I m professor of science and security at King s College London. Bill has asked me to be a provocateur and, God knows, certainly all of you do, life can be provocative enough. Today, what I wanted to do is to provoke you into thinking about yet another international tool that we could use, one that even Will Tobey in his very long list did not mention. I think we have a perceived assumption that

17 nuclear terrorists, millennialist, ideologues, religious terrorists are not deterrable. They re not deterrable in the way that Soviet Union was deterred and the U.S. was deterred during the Cold War. Indeed, some of them will want to be martyrs, so it s quite the opposite of being deterred. They also have no targetable infrastructure for any kind of retaliation. However, it s highly probable that no such country is ever going to have no such terrorist group is ever going to have its own enrichment plant, and I think it is almost as unlikely, though not quite as unlikely, that they would ever be able to reprocess spent fuel into plutonium. That leaves us with a terrorist having to seek nuclear explosive material, NEM, from what I will call a donor state, though donor may not apply if the state simply had the material stolen from it. Nevertheless, in physics and chemistry it would be still a donor. I d like to find a way to deter those states because they are key, a way to make sure that the rogue state like well, I won t mention any rogue states today decide not to donate and it s a way to encourage other states to tighten their physical security to a much greater extent. Sam Nunn and others have suggested starting to look at the day after. I want to look a bit at the day before and I want to look at how we can reduce the probability of an event happening. With a certain amount of effort, nuclear explosive material can be traced right back to its source in a number of ways, largely because of the isotopes in the material, but also the presence and absence of certain kinds of impurities and contaminants. The science that leads to such attribution is called nuclear forensics, generally. The technology is quite highly evolved, in fact, because it was used during very much the same techniques were used during the era of nuclear testing to study the debris from nuclear events in other countries. We have reached, of course, a point where nuclear testing doesn t go on any longer and as a result the U.S. laboratories have been allowed to atrophy to the point where they re very thin on the ground, and one very critical group only has one person, and should have probably five or six. It s also true that attribution is enormously simplified if the analyzing laboratories around the world have samples of materials from various production runs of plutonium and uranium from many countries around the world. Samples MR. POTTER: Peter, we re going to have to close this. We have 15 minutes left in the session, so if you can wrap up your comment. Q: This leads me to suggest a new line of research to you, Bill, and for the non proliferation community in general, and that is to build a robust national and international program in nuclear attribution, a program which I hope only to a draft accord to establish certified laboratories and to call on all states with safeguarded materials to exchange samples. Now, there are certainly many problems, but I think a proved innocence treaty, or PIT, on which my colleagues in London and I are working now and some also in Washington, and elsewhere in the States.