United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and the CBRN Security Culture

Transcription

1 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and the CBRN Security Culture Dana Perkins, PhD former member of the 1540 Committee Group of Experts Education for Peace: New Pathways for Securing Chemical Disarmament September 2014, The Hague, The Netherlands The views, opinions, findings, and conclusions expressed in this presentation are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views, official policy or position of the US Government or the 1540 Committee

2 Resolution 1540 (2004): A Response to Threats to Peace and Security Legally binding obligations on all States under Resolution 1540 (2004), to: Refrain from providing any form of support to non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery Adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws prohibiting activities involving the proliferation of such weapons and their means of delivery to non-state actors, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well any attempts to engage in such activities, assist or finance them Implement and enforce appropriate controls over related materials in order to: Account for and secure items in production, use, storage or transport; Physically protect; Detect, deter, prevent and combat the illicit trafficking and brokering through effective border controls an law enforcement efforts; Control the export, transit, trans-shipment shipment and re- export and the provision of funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment that would contribute to proliferation; Penalize violations.

3 Resolution 1540 (2004): A Comprehensive Foundation for WMD Non-Proliferation Education and Training Resolution 1540 (2004) applies to all States Resolution 1540 (2004) reinforces and complements existing nonproliferation regimes Resolution 1540 (2004) holistically covers nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery Resolution 1540 (2004) holistically covers related materials Promoting concerted outreach, education and and training activities in in the the areas areas covered by by resolution will will strengthen international WMD WMD non-proliferation efforts efforts and and effective control over over dual dual use use materials

4 Resolution 1540 (2004): Cross-Domain Themes for Education and Training Prohibited activities involving the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery Appropriate national controls over related materials Security Council definitions of means of delivery, non- State actor and related materials for the purpose of implementing resolution 1540 (2004) matrix matrix Synergy and convergence of resolution 1540 (2004) obligations with those of other treaties, conventions, international agreements or other resolutions Sharing of experiences, lessons learned, and effective practices, in the areas covered by resolution 1540 (2004)

5 Audiences and Opportunities for Education, Training & Awareness-Raising National leaders and decision makers Parliamentarians Law enforcement All national stakeholders involved in implementation and enforcement of appropriate domestic controls over related materials Prosecutors and other national stakeholders involved in penalizing violations Civil society and industry UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) Outreach events (conferences, workshops, etc.) Meetings of (NPT, CWC, BWC) States Parties Parliamentary assemblies sessions Training courses for CWC National Authorities Training courses for IHRs National Focal Points Diplomatic academies and foreign service training E-learning modules 1540 Compass journal

6 (Still) Underutilized Tool : UNODA Website on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education Only 3 references to UNSCR 1540 in the 2014 report of the Secretary General (from Iraq, DPI and ISS)

7 (submitted but not captured in the SG report)

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10 Other Resources not included on the UN Website

11 Be inspired

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13 The Human Factor Countering WMDs and CBRN terrorism is about people Governments use laws and regulations to affect people, to get them to do (or not do) something Governments may try to shape how the people think so they see certain issues in a new way Or a government may appeal to shared values and beliefs in hopes that people change how they feel toward certain issues And in some cases, governments may just direct action, relying on their authority In the end, what governments strive to achieve is mostly about changing behavior

14 WMD Proliferation and CBRN Terrorism are Multi-Faceted Problems requiring Multi-Factorial So Factorial Solutions Laws and regulations on their own are not sufficient to effectively address the human factor Education, training and awareness raising programs; voluntary codes of conduct; building a CBRN security culture and promoting responsible conduct of science are prerequisites to establishing an effective oversight framework over dual use materials In order to address the whole spectrum of risk, States may choose to holistically implement legislative/regulatory/enforcement measures AND other governance initiatives ( soft measures ) as appropriate controls over dual use materials (i.e. NCBW - related materials covered by UNSCR 1540) Education, training & awareness raising Societal vigilance & resilience CBRN security culture & responsible conduct of science Codes of conduct

15 Lessons Learned from the Nuclear Security Culture Domain CBRN CBRN CBRN

16 A roadmap to CBRN Security Culture Reference: The human dimension of security for radioactive sources,

17 Evaluation and Assessment of the CBRN Security Culture Basic (method is based on statistical methods and information derived mostly from document review, observations, and other sources); indicators focus on: Percentage of employees who have received security refresher training during the previous quarter or year. Percentage of security improvement proposals submitted, considered, or implemented during previous quarter or year. Percentage of employee communication briefs that included security information. etc Intermediate (based on managers own yes or no judgment regarding the evolving structure and functionality of the security component of the organization s management systems); areas assessed requiring a yes or no response include: A security policy is established and posted. Processes are in place to identify the mandatory requirements relating to security. Regularly held management meetings cover significant security items. Professional rewards or recognition are associated with the achievement of security goals. Roles and responsibilities for all security positions are clearly defined in relevant documents. Security related performance results are compared to targets and regularly communicated to staff. Feedback from staff is requested and analyzed. Training is provided to appropriate personnel to guide in identifying high-risk behavioral symptoms. An insider threat mitigation program is in place. etc. Comprehensive (multi-stage process comprising both non-interactive and interactive assessment tools focusing on management and behavior characteristics of CBRN Security Culture). An important initial step is drafting an assessment plan, paying due attention to the need to minimize the cost and avoid organizational disruptions. Methods to be included in the plan may include: 1) non-interactive methods (surveys, document review, and observations) and 2) interactive methods (individual interviews and focus-group discussions). Reference: The human dimension of security for radioactive sources,

18 Conclusions The importance of the human factor in security cannot be underestimated ( good security is 20% equipment and 80% people - Gen. Eugene Habiger (ret.); same can be said about safety IAEA has a leading role in facilitating the exchange of information and international collaboration as well as providing assistance and guidance in support of building a nuclear security culture Similar efforts in chemical and biological domains are missing, have no indicators defined or evaluated (for safety/security culture, risk management culture or responsible conduct of science) and they lack international leadership The potential exists for much more widespread and effective cooperation not only between countries, but also between organizations such as inter alia WHO, OIE, FAO, OPCW and the BWC ISU to provide guidance specific to the chemical and biological domains based on the rich experiences of the nuclear/radiological sector (including INSEN) in building a security culture Governments, international organizations, civil society and industry are essential actors in these efforts Innovative approaches to WMD non-proliferation education and training are needed (i.e. games, simulations, etc.) C R B N

19 BIO Working Group participants also acknowledged that security culture elements do exist in life sciences research, development or manufacturing but there is no holistic integration of safety, security, and responsible conduct of science (i.e. the elements of a biorisk management culture). Moreover, there is no international leadership and coordination of these issues as stovepipes exist in the WHO or BWC mandates while the UNSCR 1540 obligations or recommended activities fail to mention the importance of building a CBRN security culture BIO Working Group participants agreed that the generic radiological security model could be field tested in biological facilities for instance, in select high or maximum containment laboratories) and the concept of CBRN Security Culture should be promoted nationally (ideally to be integrated with UNSCR 1540 National Implementation Action Plans) and internationally (at the BWC Meetings of Experts and Meetings of States Parties) and in concert with applicable training and education programs in order to achieve a sustainable approach dedicated to CBRN Security Culture built on the current regulatory/legislative framework mandated internationally

20 Thank you, OPCW!