The Nexus between Korea s Regional Security Options and Domestic Politics

Transcription

1 International Institutions and Global Governance Program Japan Studies Program The Nexus between Korea s Regional Security Options and Domestic Politics Geun Lee, Seoul National University December 2009 This paper is based on New Regional Security Architecture for Asia, a CFR project directed by Senior Fellow Sheila A. Smith.

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3 1 Introduction Though the combination of concepts may sound contradictory, this paper is about a portfolio of a country s loyalty. To be more specific, this paper investigates the conditions under which countries attempt to reduce the risks of overinvestment in bilateral relationships by spreading their loyalties or allegiances to diverse countries or a wider region. The scope of this paper, however, is rather limited. It does not aim at general theory about loyalty portfolios, but at a conceptual analysis of South Korea s (hereafter, Korea) domestic factors explaining its possible shift toward the option of a portfolio of loyalty. Of course, in the age of globalization, domestic politics (particularly of open economies like Korea) cannot be isolated as an arena of independent action. Domestic factors constantly interact with external factors. In that sense, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the intermestic political processes of Korea to understand its gradual tendency toward diversifying loyalties in the form of regional or multilateral arrangements in both economic and security areas since the end of the Cold War. The research questions of this paper are three-fold: (1) What intermestic factors explain the absence of regional multilateral arrangements from Korea s loyalty portfolio until quite recently?; (2) What explains the recent and gradual tendency of Korea to diversify its loyalties to wider options such as East Asian regionalism or a Northeast Asian multilateral security framework?; (3) Will this trend of a loyalty portfolio continue? What (intermestic) conditions facilitate the transition, and what conditions hinder such shift? In order to answer these questions, this paper will offer a conceptual framework to analyze Korea s choice along the spectrum of single and multiple loyalties in the next sections. The focus of the analysis will be the interplay of exit, voice, and loyalty options to Korea s political actors, which is borrowed from Albert Hirschman s conceptual framework. 1 A Puzzle and a Conceptual Framework A risk-averse, rational person would not invest all of her resources into just one option unless that option is believed to remain perfectly safe for her entire life time. Such a full loyalty can hardly be observed in the real world. Particularly, in a world of anarchy that is commonly believed to characterize the structure of international system, it is almost impossible for one country to be loyal forever because it never knows when its ally will betray it or becoming unwilling (or incapable) of helping it. In addition, being loyal to only one country excludes other possibly more attractive options in the future. But from the premodern to modern eras, Korea has been locked in rigid bilateral relations. In the premodern era, Korea invested most of its loyalties in China. When Japan colonized Korea, Korea was forced to invest its full loyalty in Japan. After liberation from Japan, South Korea quickly established yet another rigid bilateral relationship, this time with the United States. Korea s relationships with China and the United States did yield benefits, including military support, economic aid, and political legitimization. But the rigidity of the partnerships precluded Korea from developing other relationships simultaneously. As Korea modernized and democratized around the late 1980s, more Koreans began to challenge such

4 2 a rigid loyalty relations. These challenges were fueled by democratization movements in the 1980s, the Hyosoon/Misun armored vehicle accident in June 2002, the U.S.-led war in Iraq (and U.S. demands for Korean troop contributions) in 2003, and the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement in Many Korean activists consider the United States indifferent to Korea s democratic values, domestic political and legal processes, and sovereignty. Korea s recent participation in regional projects, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus Three and East Asian Summit (EAS), or interregional projects, such as the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), can be seen as attempts to diversify its loyalty-benefit exchange relations. This shift raises three important questions: (1) Will Korea eventually opt for regional alternatives to its current bilateral relationship with the United States?; (2) Why has Korea been so reluctant to diversify its loyalties?; and (3) What are the domestic or intermestic political factors that explain Korea s choices for either bilateral relations or a loyalty portfolio in the form of regional arrangements? To answer these questions, this author borrows the concepts developed by Albert Hirschman in his seminal book, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. 3 This paper proposes that Korea will opt for a multilateral regional choice under two conditions: (1) The United States does not (or cannot) respond to the voices of Korea, particularly in times of economic and security crises; and (2) The regional arrangements are already being formed. As the two conditions slowly come to fruition, Korea may mix regional initiatives and bilateral loyalties, and domestic politics in Korea will naturally reflect struggles between regionalists (or risk-reducers) and inertia-driven Americanists. In other words, Korea will reluctantly opt for multilateral regional arrangements that still include the United States in them. But as the two conditions mature, the voices of regionalists may become more influential. If Korea feels it can play a leading role in East Asia and believes that the region can provide economic and security safety nets, Korea will support regional alternatives to U.S.-Korea bilateral relations. Korea s Choices: Past and Present Interestingly, Korea s diplomatic history shows a somewhat consistent pattern of loyalty relations with superpowers. In the premodern era, China exchanged protection, economic benefits, and legitimization for Korea s loyalty. As Asia opened to modernity, Japan colonized Korea, forcing Korean loyalty to the empire. With the end of the Korean War in 1953, Korea invested its full loyalty in the United States, which yielded military and economic gains. But as the international context changed, the exclusive U.S.-Korea relationship became more flexible. When the bipolar system collapsed at the end of the Cold War, former enemies began transforming their own identities, which allowed Korea to consider new diplomatic relationships. This new pattern of engagement resulted in issue-oriented balancing, or issue-specific coalitions among different groups of countries. 4 For example, South Korea joined North Korea and China in criticizing Japan on the textbook issue and the Yasukuni Shrine, pitting Korea with two Cold War enemies against its Cold War friend. At

5 3 the Six Party Talks, the views of the Roh Moo-hyun administration were more similar to those of China and Russia than those of the United States and Japan. After the Cold War, Korea was able to spread risks through a more symmetrical loyalty portfolio. Korea seems increasingly inclined to explore exit options in the U.S.-Korea alliance because its voice has been repeatedly ignored in the United States. When the Clinton administration discussed preemptive strikes against North Korea, it failed to consult with the Korean government in advance. During the 1997 financial crisis, the Clinton administration was reluctant in arranging quick rescue funds to Korea. 5 In June 2002, the United States hurriedly released its soldiers who were involved in a vehicle accident that killed two middle-school girls in Korea. In 2008, the U.S. ambassador made a careless comment that Koreans should learn the science about mad cow disease. And the United States has been reluctant to pay for the environmental pollution and damage committed by the U.S. army in the Yongsan military base. Based on these experiences, many South Koreans believe there is an asymmetry between their loyalty and voice in the U.S.-Korea relationship, and they are turning their eyes toward possible exit options. Korea s Option of Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia The idea of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia is not a recent one. Since 1988, Korea has advocated regional security cooperation, and in 1994, Korea officially proposed the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASED) at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Serious discussion of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia started in 2005 during the Six Party Talks to resolve the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. In fact, the Six Party Talks have been an important generator of innovative ideas, and participants in the Six Party Talks have gradually realized the importance of a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia, even if they do not share identical interests in such a mechanism. 6 From Korea s perspective, a semi-regional arrangement like the Six Party Talks produces five main benefits. 7 First, a multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia composed of the United States, China, Japan, Russia, North Korea, and South Korea will provide insurance to the concerned parties that the agreements struck at the Six Party Talks will not be violated by the participants. Cheating and lack of trust are among the fundamental problems in solving the Korean nuclear crisis, and a multilateral binding of agreements can help solve the problems by increasing transparency and the transaction costs of violating the agreements. Second, a multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia is fundamentally a global security arrangement, as it includes all the global powers except the European Union. The United States and China unofficially form the Group of Two (G2), Japan is an economic superpower, and Russia used to be the leader of the Eastern bloc. The high concentration of superpowers in Northeast Asia poses a threat to Korea because an outbreak of great-power conflict in the region will definitely devastate Korea, if not the world. Therefore, Korea has reason to promote a multilateral security mechanism that increases transparency among global powers and functions as a confidence-building measure.

6 4 Third, voluntary or involuntary betrayal by the United States has preoccupied many Koreans and security experts. Some Koreans felt betrayed when the United States agreed to the division of the Korean peninsula. The Park Chung-hee government felt abandoned when the United States withdrew a significant portion of U.S. soldiers from Korea, and was taken aback by rapprochement between the United States and China. Many Koreans got upset when the United States supported the authoritarian Korean government and kept silent during the Kwangju massacre in They again felt betrayed when it was rumored that the Clinton administration planned air strikes against North Korea without informing South Korea. And they were upset with the unilateral foreign policy stance of the George W. Bush administration, including its decision to pull the second infantry division out of Korea. A multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia will mitigate the security concern of Korea when the United States either voluntarily or involuntarily defects from its commitment to Korea. Fourth, multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia is necessary to establish a peace system on the Korean peninsula and ultimately unify Korea. Many Korean people doubt that the major powers, including the United States, want the unification of the Korean peninsula. Korea wants to deal with these powers transparently through a multilateral security cooperation mechanism. Fifth, seeing the latest global financial crisis and the rise of China, many Koreans recognize the need to adjust Korea s external strategy to the changing geoeconomic world. Making exclusive ties with the United States may be a high-risk investment in a past hegemon, while exclusive ties with China would be a highrisk investment in an uncertain future. In this transitional period for geoeconomics, multilateral security cooperation is an attractive partial exit option for Korea. A multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia appeals to Korea, so if voice and loyalty in the U.S.-Korea relationship do not reveal positive correlations, then Korea will pay more attention to multilateral regional options. Moreover, if the U.S. capability and credibility in delivering its security promises to alliance partners are questioned, there will be fewer veto powers in Korean politics against a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia, particularly when such an option still maintains a loose form of the U.S.-Korea alliance. Domestic Politics of Loyalty Portfolio When international politics create an opportunity for a democratic country to revise its loyalty portfolio, then national policy changes need to be justified through domestic political processes. During the Cold War, Korea was not as free as it is now, and Korean people were not supposed to think about changing Korea s loyalty portfolio. Full investment in the United States paid off in terms of security and Korea had no exit options. Therefore, until Korea became a full-fledged democracy in the 1990s, domestic politics with regard to Korea s foreign and regional policies were almost invisible. As Koreans witness the decreasing will and capacity of the United States to serve as a benevolent hegemon, more and more of them doubt Korea s current loyalty portfolio. In addition, the breakdown of the

7 5 Cold War system in the early 1990s and the emergence of regional options have changed the previous payoff matrix for Korea. Since these changes in international affairs coincided perfectly with democratization in Korea, Korea has already reshuffled its loyalty investment at a rate that has been dazzling for people accustomed to the Cold War setup. The tendency toward a more symmetrical loyalty portfolio can be seen in public opinion surveys about Koreans perceptions of other countries. In a Korean survey from 2006, 42.1 percent responded that Korea needs to either distance itself from the United States or depart from U.S.-centered diplomacy, while 56.4 percent answered in favor of either maintaining U.S.-Korea relations or strengthening them. Since 2002, Koreans attitudes toward the United States and other major powers, such as China and Japan, have been mixed. 8 Korean ambivalence toward the United States was manifest during negotiations for the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). The Korean government tried to expedite negotiations, in part, because the U.S. Trade Promotion Act (TPA) was set to expire by June Both countries had only one year to finalize the negotiations, achieve interagency coordination, and persuade fragile sectors to participate. Preparation for the negotiations was sparse, feasibility studies were in short supply, public hearings were never held, and democratic procedures were not upheld. The Korean government made concessions with regard to the so-called four preconditions (beef imports, screen quotas, automobile standards, and the pricing of insured medications) before starting the negotiations. The agreement was comprehensive and opened most sectors, specifying a no reverse clause in the agreement. Many Koreans protested the sudden, undemocratic, unilateral action by the Korean government. The protests started as an expression of conflicts of interests but evolved into ideological protests chanting anti- American slogans. Many Koreans were particularly concerned by the prospect of importing U.S. beef, which was rumored to carry mad cow disease. The Korean government was partly at fault for making it seem like the United States was behind the hasty and undemocratic actions of the Korean government. The Korean government criticized the protestors as left, dependencia, and anti-u.s. activists. In the meantime, the Korean government started negotiations with the European Union for a Korea-EU FTA, for which there were few visible protests. It seems that the Korean people were less worried about narrowing the distance between the European Union and Korea than with seemingly full and inescapable loyalty investment in the United States. Korean s mixed attitudes toward the United States were also manifest when Korea dispatched its troops to Iraq. The dispatch was a sensitive issue in Korea because domestic public opinion was against it, and the Korean government took more time than the United States anticipated before making a final decision. The decision was made outside the formal U.S.-Korea alliance, but many people believed that Korea was entrapped because of the alliance. Despite agreeing to the dispatch, the Korean government was not able to achieve a louder voice in the United States with regard to the Six Party Talks, and U.S. president George W. Bush failed to even mention Korea when he expressed gratitude to those countries that sent troops to Iraq

8 6 during his State of the Union address in Many Koreans consider a multilateral security framework the best way of avoiding entrapment with the United States. Even if a majority of Koreans recognize the need for the U.S.-Korea alliance, they are wary of being completely tied to U.S. policy, particularly if that policy invites a conflict with China. To avoid entrapment, the Roh Moo-hyun administration began discussing a multilateral security framework that would allow Korea to pursue a more diverse loyalty portfolio. Discussion of a multilateral security framework or a cooperative mechanism was largely dominated by the so-called progressive experts. 9 As discussed earlier, a multilateral security cooperation mechanism in Northeast Asia has many advantages for Korea in terms of resolving the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, weakening security dilemmas in the region, and avoiding entrapment in global conflicts. Progressive experts had these advantages in mind when they were advancing support for a multilateral security framework in Northeast Asia. Increasingly, Koreans perceive an unequal exchange of loyalty and voice in the U.S.-Korea relationship and have begun to reconsider their country s loyalty portfolio. Since Korea became more democratized, U.S.-Korea relations have been more transparent, and progressive forces within Korea have openly criticized the disproportionate loyalty that Korea has demonstrated toward the United States. Declining credibility and capability of the United States, particularly during the Bush administration, has accelerated the search for exit option in Korea. Prospect: Exit, Voice, Loyalties, and Korea Korea will likely be attracted to multilateral regional options as they will reduce risks by diversifying its loyalty investment. The probability of Korea rapidly leaning toward regional multilateralism, however, depends on several factors that Korea cannot control by itself. First, U.S. soft power can prevent Korea from drifting away to a multilateral mechanism in Northeast Asia. Soft power breeds the loyalty of other countries by creating the perception that a leader is open-minded. If the United States can exercise such soft power over Korea, Korea might not pursue an exit option. Alliance formation in the post Cold War era will depend more on the balance of soft powers rather than the balance of threats as countries will move toward more appealing partners. Second, the role of Japan is important. Japan has been playing the role of intermediary state bridging the United States and Asia. 10 In fact, Japan has been an effective U.S. weapon in preventing the emergence of a powerful and independent East Asia composed solely of East Asian countries. However, if Japan starts to move in a more Asia-friendly direction, Korea will certainly think about reshuffling its loyalty portfolio together with Japan. Currently, both of these factors are working slightly in favor of creating a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia, as Koreans are learning more about the risks of full loyalty investment in the United States and Japan seems to be redirecting its foreign policy focus to Asia. Third, China s own soft power is gradually increasing in the region as it positions itself as a responsible stakeholder by participating in global governance with other industrialized countries. The size of the

9 7 Chinese economy attracts many countries in the world, let alone countries in the region. If China s soft power continues to grow, and U.S. soft (and hard) power continues to decline, an Asian regional identity is likely to emerge. Similarly, if the United States decides to pull out of Asia, moves toward Asian regionalism would accelerate. In the meantime, regional multilateral security arrangements might remain as the most reliable and probable alternative, and there is no reason why Korea will not take that option seriously.

10 8 Endnotes 1. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Harvard University Press, 1970). 2. In the case of the Korea-U.S. FTA, anti-american sentiment was not a big issue at first, but as the Korean government rushed to sign the agreement without transparently revealing necessary information about the deal, many ideologically oriented groups started to provoke anti- American sentiment at the later stage. See Geun Lee, Political Economy of the Korea-US FTA, Segye Jeongchi, December, Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. 4. Geun Lee, Economic Interdependence, Identity Change, and Issue-Oriented Balancing in Northeast Asia, in Taehyo Kim and Brad Glosserman, eds., The Future of US-Korea-Japan Relations (CSIS Press, 2004). 5. New York Times, February 17, Through the February 13, 2007, agreement, the six parties agreed to establish a working group on multilateral peace and security mechanism in Northeast Asia. 7. The Six Party Talks can be seen as a semi-regional arrangement since the participants do not share the same regional identities while the arrangement is based upon a geographical area called Northeast Asia. 8. KSOI, 2008, August, Hankyoreh 2008, August, Donga Ilbo, 2008, January Table 5. How Much Do You Trust North Korea? Very High High Neutral Low Very Low No Response Total Results Table 6. How Much Do You Trust China? Very High High Neutral Low Very Low No Response Total Results Table 7. How Much Do You Trust Japan? Very High High Neutral Low Very Low No Response Total Results Table 8. How Much Do You Trust the United States? Very High High Neutral Low Very Low No Response Total Results Table 9. How Much Do You Trust Russia? Very High High Neutral Low Very Low No Response Total Results

11 9. Examples are Lee Jong Seok (Unification Minister during Roh Government) s view expressed in his article Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia and Korea s Option, Jeongse wa Jeongchaek, May 2008; Lim Wonhyuk, Peace System in Northeast Asia and the European Experience, KNSI report, September, 2007; Cho Sungryul, Peace System on the Korean Peninsula and Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia, a paper presented at the annual conference of Korean Association for International Studies, December 9, On the concept of intermediary state, see Peter Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Cornell University Press, 2005). 9