South Korea s Engagement of North Korea: Policy Consideration and Challenges. Geetha Govindasamy

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1 South Korea s Engagement of North Korea: Policy Consideration and Challenges Geetha Govindasamy Introduction North Korea is vital to the national security interests of South Korea. For over half a century, South Korea s security has been tied to North Korea s political behaviour. Hostility between the two antithetical regimes started with the division of the Korean peninsula in 1948, and worsened during the Korean War of The two Koreas are still technically at war, since the Korean War ended in an armistice and not in a peace treaty. To counter such an anarchical environment, South Korean governments have strived for improving inter-korean relations based upon concepts of reconciliation and cooperation since the 1980s. Integral to this effort is a broad and somewhat vigorous engagement of North Korea. Ten years ago, being pro-north Korea in South Korea would have been considered have been more sympathetic towards North Korea. These liberal governments stress active engagement with the North. Consequently, since 1998, continued broader engagement with North Korea serves as a core policy doctrine of the South Korean national security strategy. Such an approach resulted in the first-ever inter-korean summit in Pyongyang on 15 June 2000 between the then South Korean President Kim Dae-jung ( ) and North Korea s senior leader, Kim Jong-Il. The previous Kim Dae-jung government and the present Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003 to the present) have kept up momentum in continuing efforts to improve relations between Pyongyang and Seoul. In the last seven years, an interdependent relationship has emerged between the two Koreas as the summit promoted ministerial and working level meetings in various fields between the South and the North. Over the years, these talks have helped to increase exchanges and cooperation and the building of confidence between both Koreas. This article examines the change in perception by the South Korean government in softening its attitude towards North Korea. It provides an understanding of how engagement policies work. It seeks to locate the type of engagement the South Korean government is pursuing with North Korea. In particular it deals with the Sunshine Police and the Policy of Peace and Prosperity. 1 The background to these policies is explored through the trajectory of inter-korean relations within the context of political and economic engagement. Against this backdrop, this chapter addresses the evolution of active South Korean diplomatic efforts from several angles: the perception change towards North Korea during the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the continuing efforts to promote engagement and the challenges faced by the Roh Moo-Hyun government in promoting the policy. The final section examines the internal division in regards to the engagement policy. Different perceptions of the policy have led to internal divisions within the Roh government. Hence, this section reflects on these internal divisions and the criticisms that accompany them. Changing Perceptions Towards North Korea The South Korean state maintained a hostile stand towards Pyongyang for five decades. South Koreans were thought by their government to view the North as their primary enemy. In recent years, this South Korean sentiment has been replaced with a more positive perception. The government of Roh Moo-hyun has encouraged its citizens to be more optimistic about peace and eventual reconciliation with their Northern brothers and sisters. South Koreans now 1

2 view their Northern counterparts as wayward or distant impoverished kin from the other side of the demilitarised zone. The change of perception can be attributed to numerous South Korean initiatives towards rapprochement. Most initiatives failed. Nonetheless they represent a continuous South Korean concerted effort in attempting to bring peace to the peninsula. The first initiative began when the two Koreas drafted a joint statement in 1972, pledging to work together to bring peace on the Korean peninsula. Unfortunately, the accord did not last. Later in the 1980s, Chun Doo Hwan ( ) barely managed to negotiate limited reunions of families divided during the Korean War. Chun Doo-hwan s unsuccessful attempt to arrange a summit meeting with Kim Il Sung, and Roh Tae Woo s less than successful Nordpolitik policy equally failed to promote inter-korean relations. Then, the end of Cold War saw the establishment of the Agreement on Reconciliation and Non Aggression and Exchange and Cooperation, signed in Again the agreement failed to deliver any positive results either in arms control or in confidence building. Yet, South Korean presidents were determined to dismantle and replace the negative legacy of global Cold-War politics with the promotion of peace and reconciliation on the Korean peninsula. The end of Cold War paved the way once again for Seoul to push for a pro-active engagement policy with the North. The election of Kim Dae-jung as president in December 1997 resulted in dramatic changes in the way North Korea was perceived by the South Korean public at large. Known as the architect of the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung gradually redefined South Korean perception of the North. The 2004 International Crisis Group report aptly explains Kim s determination in engaging the North: Throughout his years as a democracy campaigner, Kim had consistently advocated a more open policy toward the North, a stance that during the 1970s and 1980s had him labeled as a communist and made him the target for arrest and assassination attempts by South Korean governments. In power, he set about implementing his long-held dream in hopes of securing a legacy as the man who put Korea on the road to reconciliation and reunification. In doing so, he fundamentally transformed the way South Koreans view their northern counterparts. 2 The Sunshine Policy or DJ Doctrine is not an appeasement policy but rather a policy of expectations of nurturing the North s institutional and behavioural changes through active engagement. Moon Chung-in uses the term flexible dualism in summarizing the policy: (1) Easy tasks first, and difficult tasks later ( 先易後難 ) ; (2) Economy first, politics later ( 先經後政 ) ; (3) Nongovernmental organizations first, government later ( 先民後 官 ) ; (4) Give first, and take later ( 先供後得 ).6 It represents a profound paradigm shift in managing inter- Korean relations. Past governments failed to overcome the inter-korean stalemate precisely because of their rigid adherence to the principles of government first, civil society later, political-economic linkage, and the primacy of mechanical reciprocity. 3 2

3 The basic postulation was that as inter-korean relations economically strengthen, political relations with North Korea would improve and military tensions would abate. More importantly, external economic support would aid in bringing economic reconstruction of the North, and in the long term, stimulate political stability on the Korean Peninsula. In this case, economic engagement refers to the economic assistance provided primarily by South Korea to the North. Reciprocity was not expected, nor did it play a part in the policy implementation. The Case for Engagement In order to understand why engagement was chosen as a strategy, one has to examine how such a strategy works. The policy of engagement in international relations refers to using positive incentives by one state to influence the behaviour of another. In practice, implementing engagement relies heavily on economic incentives in order to promote ties and influence the behaviour of other states. A successful engagement policy is premised upon the following assumptions: It encompasses any attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order. In practice engagement may be distinguished from other policies not so much by its goals but by its means: it relies on the promise of rewards rather than the threat of punishment to influence the target s behaviour The policy succeeds if such concessions convert the revolutionary state into a status quo power with a stake in the stability of the system Engagement is most likely to succeed when the established powers are strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats, to use sticks as well as carrots Otherwise, concessions will signal weakness that emboldens the aggressor to demand more. 4 On the other hand, Keohane and Nye (2000: 10-11) suggest that economic interdependence should be understood in terms of asymmetrical power. Such interdependence provides sources of influence for all states in their dealings with others, either to use an issue as a bargaining chip or to affect various other issues. Additionally there exist conditional and unconditional economic engagements. 5 Conditional engagement promises incentives in return for policy changes. Drezner argues such conditional economic engagements work between adversaries when threats are unsuccessful. Alternatively, unconditional economic engagement is designed to induce interdependency. It is expected, over time, such a strategy will culminate in the desired policy in the adversary s behaviour. Engagement with North Korea is recognized in all sectors of South Korean society as the preferred, option but there is much disagreement about how it should be implemented. So far, the Sunshine Policy seems to employ both aspects of economic engagement, at least under the Roh government: conditional and unconditional. On paper, inter-korean ties are based on reciprocity, implying it is not premised upon economic engagement. In practice however, South Korea seems to follow the practice of unconditional economic engagement. Since the engagement policy is not based on reciprocity, critics argue that the policy lacks tangible security benefits to South Korea. Unconditional engagement supposedly brings about a reduced military threat. But North Korea s nuclear and its weapons of mass destruction still remain a military threat to South Korea. Growing domestic discontent in South Korea suggests that the public perceives the government to have failed to mix concessions with threats to induce a change in North Korea s behaviour. 3

4 The engagement strategies of Drezner and Keohane and Nye seem to be more applicable in the South Korean case. Drezner s ideas of inducing policy changes and interdependency according to the type of engagement employed fits well in the South Korean case. Similarly, Keohane and Nye s asymmetrical power approach implies that the power to influence is a two-way relationship. Engagement of North Korea in terms of economic interdependence is seen asymmetrically favouring South Korea. This is anchored in the assumption that the Sunshine policy would be able to shape the North s behaviour by using economic interdependence as a tool of influence. While knowing it had no way of replacing the current regime, at minimum, South Korea wanted to be able to influence economic transformation of a closed society. On the other hand the engagement policy serves the North as well as it has been given the option of interacting with the outside world without giving away too much. Herein lies the contrasting view that resonates in the South Korean society in regards to the engagement policy. The government is under fire from certain segments of the society as they ask who is influencing whom? The Rationale for Engaging North Korea Previous South Korean approaches, though limited, laid the groundwork for a more active engagement policy. However, they were unsupportive of any rapprochement between the two Koreas. 6 In South Korea, the president leads the government and the bureaucracy. Although new policies are initiated by the leader, the implementation and survival of any policy depends on the president s advisors, the bureaucracy, the ruling party and the public perception of North Korea. The start of President Kim Dae-jung s administration saw the rise of progressive politics by a newer and younger generation of power elite shapers. As a consequence, perception towards North Korea changed in line with progressive politics, in contrast to conservative dominance in the past. Based on the concepts of peaceful coexistence, peaceful exchanges and peaceful unification, the Kim Dae Jung government began with what is commonly known as the Sunshine Policy in The Sunshine Policy, was the brainchild of President Kim and his advisers, most especially Lim Dong-won. 7 Why is engagement of North Korea necessary? In a speech at the London School of Oriental and African Studies on 4 April 1998, Kim answered as follows: The Republic is now able to push a North Korean policy with self confidence arising from firm public support. I have been steadfast in advocating what I call a sunshine policy which seeks to lead North Korea down a path toward peace, reform and openness through reconciliation, interaction and cooperation with the South. As President I will carry out such ideas step by step. 8 Reunification remains the most important national objective and aspiration of both North and South Korea. The assumption of the Kim government was that reunification will not take place without ending the cold-war confrontation with the North and establishing solid peace on the peninsula. Past hostile policies and blockades only worsened the situation and intensified military confrontation between the two Koreas. In order to avoid another war or even the collapse of North Korea, the South Korean state believed it was necessary to persuade the North of the benefits they would reap from economic exchange with the South. The death of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung and a dramatically weakening economy, together with incidents of North Korean starvation and natural disasters, brought fear of internal collapse in Pyongyang. Given this uncertainty, the challenge to South Korea was to 4

5 find a strategy that encouraged positive reforms in North Korea. At the same time, South Korea needed to be able to secure itself against the possibility that in the longer term, North Korea may embark on a hostile course. The Kim administration believed that containment of North Korea had negative consequences. For instance, North Korean economic failure and political isolation by the outside world had forced Pyongyang to use its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes as bargaining chips to guarantee its own survival. Consequently, President Kim was convinced that engagement rather than confrontation was the only way the two Koreas could avoid war or the collapse of North Korea. In the quest for engagement, such a policy requires reciprocated trust and a dynamic approach. The Kim administration decided to aid the isolated and bankrupt North Korea by unconditionally providing aid and reassurance. Treating North Korea without hostility and providing greater economic flow was expected to motivate the North to act as a responsible member of the international community. The main assumption was that peace will be secured in the long run, and that North Korea will open up and change its ways in due course. The Sunshine Policy without doubt paved way for a new beginning in inter-korean history. However, Haksoon Paik observes that policymakers designed the Sunshine Policy to facilitate the economic recovery of South Korea, not the North. 9 The South Korean economy was severely affected by the Asian Financial Crisis. The government was forced to accept an IMF bailout at the end of Moreover, the South Korean economy was dependent upon perceptions of foreign rating service companies like Moody s Investors Service and Wall Street. 10 Pursuing a hard-line policy would certainly obstruct the flow of international capital desperately needed to overcome a weakened economy. More importantly, any collapse of the North would burden the South Korean economy greatly. The Asian Financial Crisis made many South Koreans that they could not cope with the burden of an unplanned unification or the flood of refugees. Since North Korea is larger and poorer compared with the South, unification would cost taxpayers highly. Based on pragmatic calculations, policymakers believed reducing tension on the Korean peninsula would attract foreign investment which, in the long run, would aid the recovery of South Korean economy. In hindsight, Paik asserts that the Sunshine Policy did promote investor confidence and increase direct foreign investment. 11 Policy Implementation To promote a genuinely peaceful relationship and unification, the core ideas of this policy were that that the two Koreas would renew a sense of national identity and promote trust as well as ease political, social and economic disparity. 12 Under the Kim administration, reducing tension meant South Korea had to pledge not to absorb the North (in contrast to the de facto policy of his predecessors) and was determined to pursue increased official and unofficial North South contact. 13 A three stage unification strategy plan was agreed by both sides. Bruce Cumings summarizes the plan as following: The two sides would manage relations between each other through various inter-korean organizations, pending the second stage when after a fairly long period of preparation, formal unification would occur under a federal system of one people, one nation, one political system, but two autonomous regional governments; the federal government would run Korea s diplomacy, defense and major domestic policies The third stage would be real unification under a central government. 14 5

6 What is interesting is that the engagement policy began with the approach of separation of politics from business. 15 While previous governments were preoccupied with politics, the Kim administration decided to concentrate on economics first. Economic cooperation between the South and the North began through private businesses. Big businesses were particularly interested in the investment opportunities of the North. 16 The Kim government lifted investment caps on South Korean businesses in an effort to encourage private sector activity in North Korea. Simultaneously, legal regulations were also simplified. In the private sector, the Hyundai group s tourism industry in Mount Kumgang and the Kaesong Industrial Park project in North Korea have been the most successful ventures to date. Riding on Hyundai s success, other South Korean conglomerates such as Samsung, Daewoo and LG also began actively seeking to make inroads into North Korea. However, none of these companies succeeded. Thus far the Hyundai group dominates the North Koreanrelated business ventures. Though Hyundai seems to be important in the equation, in practice however, the South Korean state, through the Ministry of Unification, still directs and rewards businesses entering the North. Inter-Korean relations were also expanded beyond governmental agencies by including non-profits, private sector, and other civil society organizations. In order to pursue multi-level inter-korean reconciliation, the South Korean government continued its humanitarian aid in the form of food and agricultural shipments to Pyongyang. The June 2000 Summit between South Korean president Kim Dae-Jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il became the crowning achievement of the Sunshine Policy. It was the first time leaders of the two Koreas had met since the country s division in From Seoul s perspective, the summit transformed inter-korean relations from confrontation and hostility to reconciliation and cooperation. 17 Donald Kirk, a prominent journalist, describes the summit as having had no real agenda, but he concedes that the meeting bolstered chances for the North Koreans to get aid to revive their economy. 18 Since the main objective was to lay a framework for a positive dialogue with North Korea, the adoption of the June 15 Joint Declaration became a guiding principle for peaceful coexistence and eventual reunification of the Korean Peninsula. In other words, the summit declaration became a major turning point in dismantling the Cold War confrontational configuration in inter-korean relations that existed since Since June 2000, much progress has been made in economic and humanitarian aid programs, as well as sports and cultural exchanges between the two Koreas. South Korean engagement incentives continued to grow throughout the remainder of Kim Dae Jung s term in office. As a result, the world saw a dramatic thaw in inter-korean relations, including reunions between families split by the Korean War, agreements to reestablish road and rail links, and co-operation in clearing landmines on the border of the Demilitarized Zone. The conviction that inter-korean relations should be cooperative was very much understood by the Roh Moo Hyun government (2003 present). Following in the footsteps of Kim Dae Jung, President Roh Moo-Hyun s Participatory Government, beginning 2003, took a relatively open approach towards North Korea. Naming his engagement strategy the Policy for Peace and Prosperity. Elected by the efforts of the 386 generation, Roh, a newcomer to career politics, represents the new generation of liberal elite who want to initiate reforms, especially in terms of South s North Korea policy. 19 The Roh administration maintains the basic elements of Kim Dae Jung s policy towards North Korea. However, Roh made it clear from the start that the North Korea s nuclear issue will not be linked to inter-korean relations. Acknowledging that the nuclear issue remains a problem in inter-korean relations, Roh vowed to include discussions on military/security confidence building between the two Koreas. A change in the name of the policy was necessary to differentiate the Kim and Roh 6

7 governments. While vowing to carry on former President Kim s Sunshine Policy, the new president pledged to pursue peace on a broader scale. His policy emphasizes economic prosperity between the two Koreas that would greatly add to the overall economic development of the Northeast Asian region. In his inaugural address (February 25, 2003 in Seoul) Roh remarked: In order to bring about a genuine Age of Northeast Asia, a peace regime must first be institutionalized on the Korean peninsula. It certainly is most unfortunate that the peninsula still remains the last legacy of the Cold War of the 20th century. In the 21st century, we have to change the peninsula into a land that sends out messages of peace to the world. It has to be reborn as Northeast Asia s gateway to peace that connects the Eurasian continent with the Pacific Ocean. We have to soon bring the day when passengers will be able to buy a train ticket in Busan and travel all the way to Paris in the heart of Europe via Pyongyang, Shinuiju and many other cities in China, Mongolia and Russia. If President Kim Dae Jung looked towards inter-korean relations through the end goal of unification, the Roh government s approach is based upon institutionalizing durable peace before realizing the unification goal. As a reformist president, Roh pledged to obtain broader consensus, meaning cooperation from the public and opposition parties for his policy. President Roh s strategy includes not only expanding inter-korean cooperation but also building a peaceful regime on the Korean Peninsula through national consensus and coordinated international cooperation. 20 The conviction is that improved inter-korean relations would assist in the process of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. 21 Roh, a former human rights lawyer, from the beginning stated his desire to abolish the current National Security Law. He believes the law is outdated and undemocratic. In the last four years, the Roh government like the Kim Dae Jung government, has played down conflicts involving North Korea. Political observers postulate that his inexperienced aides have strongly advised him not to provoke the North, in order to keep the engagement policy alive. So critics accuse the government of allowing the North to have the upper hand where engagement is concerned. They view the policy as one of appeasement which has become a major source of hard currency for the impoverished communist North. According to the Ministry of Unification, in the first eight months of 2006, inter-korean trade exceeded $775 million.22 As such inter Korean economic cooperation is indeed a major source of funding for the North. Impact of the Engagement Policy on the North It can be argued that the Sunshine Policy has reformed North Korea s behaviour to a certain degree. For instance, the engagement policy has produced positive and viable inter-korean economic cooperation projects. Fundamentally, South Korea s input of capital and infrastructure development in joint economic projects serves to facilitate policy changes made by the North Koreans. In the last few years, the North has shown signs of considering a market-based economy and outward oriented economic policies. This has come about with the aid of projects resulting from the engagement policies. To open its economy and to earn hard currency, North Korea designated the Mt. Kumgang Tourism District (October 2002), and the Kaesong Industrial Complex (November 2002) as special economic zones. These projects 7

8 are crucial to North Korea in its efforts to adopt further economic reforms, revive its industries, and attract foreign currency and foreign investment, as well as expand economic cooperation with other Northeast Asian nations. The Mount Kumgang tourism project was developed by the Korea Asia-Pacific Peace Committee (North Korea) and the Hyundai Group (South Korea) in November The very fact that this tourism project went ahead is proof of North Korea s deliberate policy changes towards the outside world. By cooperating with the South, North Korea heralded a fresh approach to inter-korean reconciliation. Hyundai-Asian, an arm of the Hyundai conglomerate that runs the tourism project, pays $1 million a month to the North in tourist fees. Jhang Hwan Bin, senior vice president of Hyundai Asan explains that keeping the door open with the North is worth the money. It took us 50 years to come this far. If we shut the door now, it will be more difficult to open it again. 23 Despite numerous other problems, this project is a testimony to North Korea s willingness in building trust and easing tension with South Korea. On top of that, North Korea earns hard cash emanating from South Korean tourists visiting Mount Kumgang. More than 1,000 tourists visit the mountain on a daily basis. Visitor numbers increase yearly, and the number of tourists visiting the mountain surpassed one million on 7 June In the course of realizing this tourism project, North Korea s active involvement also served as a stepping stone for other lucrative projects like the reconnection of the Eastern and Western railway lines. A landmark test run on the two lines across the demilitarized zone was carried out in May 2007, the first time the line had been used since the Korean War of The two Koreas have agreed in principle on the phased introduction of cross-border rail services. When regular train service starts, the inter-korean railroads will also have a positive impact on transporting goods and people that will curtail logistical costs. The Gyeongui Line (western track) would certainly help North Korean workers to commute to the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The Mount Kumgang tourism business will also receive an additional boost once trains start carrying tourists along the Donghae (East Coast Line). If all goes well, in the distant future, North Korea might even concede to open all other possible inter-korean transportation connections, including air, sea and land routes. Besides the Mount Kumgang project, Pyongyang took another bold step in approving the development of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Currently, 23 South Korean factories employ more than 13,000 North Korean workers at the complex. Allowing South Koreans and foreigners to operate their businesses at Kaesong signifies North Korea s strong commitment to opening its economy. The failure of the earlier projects, like the Rajin Songbong and the Shinuiju Special Economic Zones, prompted Pyongyang to cooperate with the South. This project provides Pyongyang with the opportunity to learn market economic principles. The Kaesong Industrial Complex has now become a pilot project for opening its door to the outside world and earning foreign currency by exporting North Korean goods to the South. Using South Korean technology and North Korean labour, the project serves as a testing ground for future North Korean special economic zones. In order for businesses to operate efficiently, South Korea has provided electricity and installed telephone lines. North Korea also expects the Kaesong project to act as a catalyst in hastening the opening of other areas, such as Nampo, Haeju, and Wonsan. North Korean goods now can be exported to the south through the Kyongui and Donghae rail lines and roads. The successful implementation of the Kaesong project encouraged the North to develop the Special Economic Zones of Najin and Seonbong with the Russians. 25 From a legal point, Pyongyang also has signed agreements with Seoul on investment protection, avoidance of double taxation and dispute settlements. To regulate procedures necessary for inter-korean economic cooperation, North Korea enacted the Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Act, consisting of 27 articles as a government ordinance (no.1182) of 8

9 the Presidium of the Supreme People s Assembly on July 6, The Act prevents confusion surrounding joint economic projects and makes it possible for a smooth expansion of South Korean companies into the North Korean market. 26 In sum, the Act forms a legal framework for existing and future inter-korean cooperation. The above discussion clearly gives the impression that North Korea has maintained a cooperative stance in its dealings with South Korea. Pyongyang s ongoing internal policy changes and gradual openness provide the best form of guarantee for a peaceful coexistence and in improving inter-korean relations. In order to ensure its survival, Pyongyang will not jeopardize its chances of getting support from South Korea and the outside world. In sum, with North Korea s involvement in inter-korean economic projects expanding, the current peaceful and stable environment will continue as long as Pyongyang s dependence on the South increases. This fits in very well with Keohane and Nye s engagement theory that suggests that economic interdependence has the capacity to influence and transform the behaviour of states. However, there are those in the society who are less willing to send aid to North Korea if the nation doesn t show significant signs of reciprocity. In spite of the numerous setbacks and intense opposition from domestic hawks, the present centre left government of President Roh Moo Hyun has been reluctant to take a harder line towards the North. If the government ends economic assistance or terminates inter-korean projects, it is feared that this would heighten Pyongyang s isolation and the North Korean population would suffer the most. Additionally, the South is concerned that inter-korean relations will worsen and this will raise military tensions. Internal Difference in Perceptions The Roh government controls all information and communication with North Korea. Both the Kim and Roh governments pledged to promote inter-korean polices based on transparency and domestic consensus. In spite of that, North Korean issues have to a degree, polarized domestic consensus. In the past South Korean governments were considered to be very conservative in their political orientation. However, President Roh has surrounded himself with a cohort of advisors and friends from the 386 generation, people who were political activists during the Chun government. Most are relatively young liberals and reform-oriented college professors. Many of them share Roh s views of the North. They make up the core of key advisers and are in positions of influence in his administration. In 2003, 236 of 281 highranking presidential staff were from the 386 generation. 27 Unfortunately the 386ers are not considered to be politically savvy. Though a change of public perception of North Korea has taken place, differing perspectives persist within the government as to what manner relations with the North should develop. Consequently South Korea s engagement policy has a mixed track record of acceptance within the government. First of all a power struggle between the reform group and career bureaucrats exist. 28 The career bureaucrats are normally conservative while the reform group is labeled more progressive. Lack of consensus on how best to deal with Pyongyang within the ministries is one of the biggest challenges internally faced by the Roh government today. Ministry officials are still divided about how to handle the North. Opinions differ over issues such as lack of progress in the North s nuclear crisis, failure to address North Korea s human rights record, failure to successfully negotiate the issue of reunion of separated families, unequal trading inter-korean partnership, and failure to resolve the question of abductees and prisoners of war still believed to be held in the North have became some of the central issues in criticizing the engagement policy. For instance, the 2004 ICG report observes: As the nuclear crisis drags on, however, there are signs of a split within the government bureaucracy over how to deal 9

10 with North Korea. A recent survey of officials found a distinct gap between the Ministry of Unification (MOU) and the National Security Agency (NSA). While 54 per cent of MOU officials favoured increasing aid to North Korea, 45 per cent of NSA officials want to reduce it, and an additional 10 per cent to end it altogether. A majority (74 per cent) of NSA officials believe that aid to North Korea should be linked to solution of the nuclear issue, while a plurality (42 per cent) in the MOU believe the two should be kept distinct. 29 Additionally, South Korean Ministry of Unification and Ministry of National Defence also differ on how to manage relations with the North. Both ministries approach inter-korean relations through the competing principles of containment and engagement. Overall, differences in ideological stand and domestic interest concerning North Korea have contributed to a divergent policy perspective. The Ministry of Unification s main objective is to promote and facilitate better inter- Korean relations. It supports engagement and works closely with the President on issues relating to North Korea. Its unification diplomacy, aims to brief South Korean citizens and the international community of the need for closer cooperation with the north. Growing discontent among the public has created awareness that the ministry should communicate to the population why engagement is essential. Both Kin and Roh appointed prominent individuals such as Lim Dong Won and Lee Jong Seok to the post of Unification Minister. For example, Lim Dong Won was the principle architect of the Sunshine policy and Lee Jong Seok was considered a North Korean expert who had a track record of supporting the North Korean regime s survival. Lee Jong Seok was also the Chairman of the National Security Council, which is the nation s top decision-making body on security matters. The close relationship between the President and the Minister of Unification certainly helps promote the engagement policy. For instance, since Kim s government did not have majority in the National Assembly, he had problems getting support for the Sunshine Policy at the legislative level. 30 The traditional power elite in South Korea are anti-communist and conservative, which is detrimental to the Sunshine Policy. 31 Consequently, President Kim appointed Kang In Duk, a senior conservative heavyweight, to garner support from the legislature and the public. 32 In sum the state used the position of the Minister of Unification to advocate the engagement policy. On the other hand, the role of the Ministry of National Defence is to defend South Korea and its security interests. The engagement policy is successful in terms of mitigating the nation s collective perception of North Korea as an evil regime. However, military officials prefer to be cautious about North Korea. From the onset, the Ministry of Defence has been conservative. Many in the defence force argue that the South s security is already weakened by the planned withdrawal of the US troops by While the Ministry of Unification looks upon North Korea as a partner in peace, the Defence Ministry identifies North Korea as a threat to the South s security interests. For instance, though the South Korean Defence Ministry published the 2000 Defence White Paper six months after the 15 June inter-korean summit, it identified North Korea as the South s main enemy. That aroused debate in South Korea and for the next four years the Defence Ministry did not publish its defence White Papers. Then the removal of the decadeslong practice of calling North Korea the South s main enemy from the 2004 Defence White Paper was considered to be unjustified. Many were of the opinion that such conciliatory gesture would have implications on future defence strategies towards the North. Two years 10

11 later, in the wake of the missile test conducted on 9 October, the 2006 Defence White Paper took a harsher tone. The report cited the North as a serious threat to the security of the South. As always ministry officials indicated the North s massive build up of artillery, chemical and biological weapons as well as standing army of more than a million soldiers as a cause for concern. Security staff view the North as a dangerous neighbour for South s national security. Whether North Korea is viewed as the main enemy or a serious threat, such labels clearly indicate that the Ministry of Defence does not share the view that North Korea is a partner in peace. Most ministry officials are reluctant to criticize the policy publicly for fear of being accused of expecting the collapse of the North Korean regime. Hence officially and in public, the Ministry of Defence supports the engagement policy. This conflict of perspective undermines the state s engagement policy, at least internally. It collides with the President s attempts to minimize tension and bring perpetual peace on the Korean peninsula. While South Korean governments under Kim and Roh espoused a strong deterrence posture against and cooperation with North Korea, security issues seemed to be relegated to the backburner. But the military is prepared for any unexpected incidents involving North Korea. South Korean governments have tried to overcome this conflict of perspective by appointing liberal senior military personnel. Kim Doh Jong argues that due to inverse politicalization, the military appears to have less power to express views as an authority. 33 This means that with democratic consolidation and the process of breaking away from politics after the Chun regime, the Defence Ministry no longer has the power to set the agenda for inter-korean relations. Furthermore, officially the ruling government party controls all information and communication with North Korea. It is understood that for the sake of partisan interests, the government has strict regulations on the military s freedom to discuss North Korean related information. This is easily done as the military has retired from politics and is controlled by a civilian government. However, if the Sunshine Policy seriously erodes the security capability of South Korea, the military might apply pressures to overturn the engagement policy through personal influences and the media. The role of veterans (who are conservative in their stance) in influencing South Korea s policy on North Korea should not be underestimated. Engagement rests on the hope that continued economic cooperation will either transform North Korea into being cooperative or, at a minimum, bring convergence on some key interests. Consequently, there has to be a certain level of trust within the South Korean government circles so that the North Koreans will believe in the implementation of engagement policies that help in solidifying inter-korean relations. Accordingly, if the engagement policy is to thrive, a genuine bipartisan ministerial consensus is very much required. Roh has not been able to solve the internal conflicts of his ministry. The reality is, by overruling critics within the government, mobilizing government resources, and continuing the engagement policy, President Roh has alienated a large section of his staff. Roh s main ally is the Ministry of Unification, which promotes and controls the level of interaction with North Korea. Roh has surrounded himself with like-minded individuals who will push for their engagement policies. In this environment, the military has been effectively depoliticized. However, such internal divisions based on ministerial interests are damaging the consolidation of the policy. The state through the president, who controls the National Security Council, seems to be pursuing an independent foreign policy. In advocating a policy of engagement with the North, Roh also faces opposition from conservative groups. Until recently, the leading conservative Grand National Party (GNP) refused to recognize North Korea and was openly critical of Roh s policies towards the North. However, even the conservative camp seems to support Roh s progressive ideas now. In a surprise reconciliatory move, recently the GNP revised its policy orientation towards the North. Contrary to its usual tough line on North Korea, the GNP indicated its support for the 11

12 continuation of the engagement policy as well as support for peace initiatives that include formally ending the Korean War. 34 It is unclear whether the policy is an attempt to garner votes in the coming December 2007 presidential elections, or an indication that the leadership thinks there is no other alternative but to with engage the North. Whatever the reason, it is an important development that could further promote a positive attitude towards North Korea. In spite of this new thinking, the engagement policy has polarized South Korean society as to what extent the country should engage with North Korea. Many in South Korea argue that North Korean sales of missiles and nuclear weapons-related technology to other states, the absence of satisfactory progress on North Korea s human rights record, and the ever increasing number of weapons of mass destruction, demonstrate that the engagement strategy has failed. They believe the Roh government has not been tough enough in dealing with the North. As Schweller contends, any engagement policy is more likely to succeed when concessions are mixed with credible threats. Critics also argue that engagement is helping North Korea develop economically and militarily, making it more dangerous. The Call for Conditional Engagement The need to engage with North Korea is well accepted by South Korean society. But active engagement with the North has not proceeded without serious internal discord. There are contending perspectives from various segments of society. Without internal cohesion and political competence on this issue, Roh has problems pursuing the engagement policy. In reality there is a fundamental lack of consensus on what strategy can best serve South Korean interests. According to a 2006 South Korean public opinion poll, conducted just after the 9 October 2006 North Korean nuclear test, 78% of South Korean respondents felt that the policy should be revised and only 17% believed that the policy should change. Figure 1 Survey of Public opinion Should the Sunshine Policy be continued? 17% 5% should change should continue do not know 78% Source: Joongang Daily, October This sort of rhetoric suggests that majority of South Koreans want some sort of change in the way South Korea deals with the North. The September 2006 Hankook Ilbo survey produced similar results 59.4% of respondents believed that a more constructive relationship would come about if economic assistance to the North were is conditional, while 25.6% of respondents felt that South Korean economic aid to the North should be reduced. Figure 2 Survey of Public Opinion 12

13 Economic Assistance to North Korea no answer 1.60% should be reduced 25.60% should remain the same 8.10% Series1 expand with conditions 59.40% should be expanded 5.30% 0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00% Source: Hankook Ilbo, Media Research (September 2006) Despite the policy, the South Korean state has not entirely succeeded in translating economic cooperation into improved political relations with North Korea. Evidence suggests that the engagement policy has failed to produce the desired changes in Pyongyang s security behaviour. The June 1998 submarine incursion, the August 1998 test of a three-stage rocket, the 1999 incident in which North Korean torpedo boats intruded into South Korean waters in the West Sea and the 9 October 2006 missile test imply that the engagement policy has had little effect on the North. There is little evidence that the Roh Moo Hyun government made any serious attempt to alter North Korea s behaviour by using any form of leverage that the increased economic ties had created during nine years of engagement. This lack of action seems inexplicable when the original policy of creating economic ties with the North was to be able to influence it. Despite the above incidents, the Roh administration remains committed to its engagement policy. The administration believes that engagement has increased opportunities for economic linkages, and improved the situation in North Korea itself. The government is confident that the policy is still relevant and offers the most practical means of reducing tensions and promoting confidence building measures on the Korean peninsula. North Korea is changing. The fact that Pyongyang has agreed to shut down its Yongbyon nuclear reactor as part of the 13 February 2007 denuclearization agreement is cause for optimism. Shifting to a containment policy would have negative repercussions for the Korean peninsula. Should the engagement policy then continue in its present form? It appears that whatever the political persuasion, most South Koreans believe a hawkish stance or tougher sanctions on the impoverished regime would be detrimental to the stability of the Korean peninsula. Majority of the South Korean population lives within the range of North Korean artillery, yet most don t believe that the North will attack the South. But most agree the policy needs to be modified. The common sentiment is that engagement policy should be based on a principle of reciprocity. Concluding Remarks Until the 1990s, state-sanctioned activities demonized North Korea and its people. Despite fluctuations between expansive engagement and a retreat toward containment, active engagement of the North has helped reduce decades of distrust towards Pyongyang among the South Korean population. Kim/Roh s pro-north indoctrination policies have promoted a change in public perception, especially in the mindset of the younger generation. Most South Koreans no longer view the North as the primary threat to their security. The engagement policy has certainly transformed North Koreans as worthy kith and kin from the other side 13

14 of the demilitarized zone. While an engagement policy has the potential to bring divided nations closer, it will fail unless the two sides view the policy through the one lens. For this reason, engagement diplomacy needs like-minded partners. The Roh government acts contradictorily at times, and in many ways its policies are inconsistent. For example, in March 2007, South Korea blocked 32 pro-north Korean websites. The Korea Central News Agency and the Kim Il Sung university websites were deemed to contravene the National Security Law. The censorship insinuates that the Roh government believes that these websites promoted propaganda messages that imply the illegitimacy of its government. 36 In the wake of the 9 October 2006 North Korean nuclear test, the South Korean government again insinuated that they may abandon the engagement policy toward North Korea. South Korea disregarded international pressure to terminate the two prominent inter- Korean projects: the joint industrial zone of Kaesong and tours to the Mount Kumgang tourist resort. Furthermore, by not participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative, South Korean authorities did not have to take part in transport interceptions and inspections of nuclear material hidden aboard North Korean ships at sea, as imposed by the United Nations Security Council. The politics of fear still dominate South Korean attitudes towards the North. The Roh government was too concerned with potential aggressive reactions by North if it imposed sanctions on Pyongyang. Also, South Korea is under the impression that by maintaining economic influence in the North, it can modify the North s behaviour. The situation reveals the limitation of the policy effect of the South s engagement with the North. In sum, the engagement policy has shown its limitations by bringing very little promotion of a culture of peace and reconciliation. Despite a decade of engagement policy there seems to be little progress in bringing the two Koreas closer together. Therefore, before the policy loses ground, the South Korean government needs to revamp it in order to force the North to modify its behaviour. Moreover, the South Korean public s support could wear thin if there isn t obvious reciprocity. After a decade of implementation, it would be rather disheartening if the policy remains merely a symbol of peace and prosperity. End notes 14