COUNTER- AND ANTI- CORRUPTION THEORY AND PRACTICE FROM NATO OPERATIONS

Transcription

1 Non-classified Extract of a Report by NATO's Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre 27 June 2013 COUNTER- AND ANTI- CORRUPTION THEORY AND PRACTICE FROM NATO OPERATIONS

2 C OUNTER- AND ANTI-CORRUPTION THEORY AND PRACTICE FROM NATO OPERATIONS F OREWORD FROM THE C OMl\tlANDE R 27 June 2013 I am pleased to be able to publish this analysis report on Counter- and Anti-Corruption: Theory and Practice from NATO Operations, which examines lessons on corruption issues from fragile and post-conflict states, and particularly from ISAF. For a number of reasons, this study was challenging. Corruption is a complex issue subject to cultural interpretation which cuts across many functional areas. It has not hitherto been seen as a military issue and particularly not one in which the military has needed specific expertise. There are very few recorded lessons, in NATO or elsewhere, on the relationship between military operations and corruption, or on the ways and degree to which corruption can affect-or be affected by-military operations. Thus, while there are many opinions and theories on how to fight corruption, few of them have proven to be fully effective and all seem to be specific to the particular operating environment. The JALLC has not found any new, easy or quick solutions to corruption; counter- and anti-corruption efforts must be long-term. While this study was commissioned by COMISAF, it rapidly became clear that dealing with corruption effectively is not something that can happen purely at the strategic/operational level. It requires coordinated action at the political-military and strategic levels, in conjunction with other agencies, through a comprehensive approach. The participation of Allies, Partners and other actors in the International Community is needed if real and sustainable progress against corruption is to be made. Corruption is a factor that should be considered from the outset of any military operation, and thus must be incorporated into policy, doctrine, training, assessment and other lines of capability development if we are to minimize its effects in future NATO-led operations. This report contains recommendations which COMISAF can implement. Some recommendations are directly relevant to NATO's RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION and thus require consideration and planning in the very near future, by the appropriate HQs. Finally, there are some longer-term issues for consideration by the Strategic Commands and NATO HQ. I believe that the enduring value of this JALLC analysis report is not in its innovation but in its capturing of the hard-won counter- and anti- corruption experience of ISAF. The Alliance must ensure that the recommendations made in this report result in tangible action to institutionalize NATO's approach to counter- and anti-corruption. This version of the report has been slightly redacted to permit its open publication, so that the many Inter n Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations involved in counterand a orruptio that con!fiouted to the study and expressed interest in the report may no access the '71ie JALLC analysis.

3 COUNTER- AND ANTI-CORRUPTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE FROM NATO OPERATIONS This project executed by: Project Manager: Analysts: TSAMIS Vasileios LTC GRC A Military Analyst TORO, Claudio LTC ITA F Military Analyst FILLION Daniel CDR USA N Military Analyst (to Dec 12) GREENE Michael Sqn Ldr GBR F Military Analyst BRANSTON Nigel GBR C Civilian Analyst With Cooperation from: WRIGHT John USA C JCOA LOTHES Christa MAJ USA F JCOA WIRTZ Phillip CTR USA JCOA GOEHRING Russell CTR USA JCOA REMY David USA C JCOA PERMREP ISAF HORNYAK Zsolt LTC HUN A JALLC PERMREP ISAF VIEIRA Filipe LTC PRT A JALLC PERMREP ISAF At the JALLC in Monsanto, Lisbon, Portugal from October 2012 to April 2013 with data collected at Kabul, Afghanistan; Brussels, Belgium; London and Andover, UK; Washington DC and Monterey, CA, USA. Acknowledgements This project benefited greatly from subject matter experts voluntary contributions from a variety of personnel from NATO, ISAF, Nations (NATO and Partners), IOs, NGOs, and academics. JOINT ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED CENTRE AVENIDA TENENTE MARTINS, MONSANTO LISBON PORTUGAL TEL: FAX: A proud member of Allied Command Transformation ii

4 BACKGROUND AND MISSION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In August 2012, Commander International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) identified corruption as the primary risk that could undermine our mission, and requested a study into counter- and anti-corruption in post-conflict states. The Supreme Allied Commander Transformation tasked the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre to carry out such an analysis with the overarching aim being threefold: Firstly, to provide assurance that ISAF is as effective as possible in its current anticorruption activities. Secondly, to ensure that ISAF is well-prepared for hand-over of those activities to the follow on mission. Thirdly, to develop more enduring lessons thereby ensuring a better approach to counter- and anti-corruption (CAC) for future NATO-led operations. Analysis Requirement: Analyse anti-corruption efforts in post-conflict states in order to identify best practices, lessons and enduring challenges to support decision-making/policy development for ISAF and future NATO-led operations. AO 1 Identify best practices, lessons and enduring challenges for anti-corruption in postconflict states by conducting a comprehensive review of existing research on the subject. Sub-AO 1.1 Examine research conducted by international organizations (IO) and NGOs on anti-corruption Sub-AO 1.2 Examine anti-corruption activities of Kosovo Force, Stabilization Force and other applicable missions. AO 2 Identify NATO initiatives to reduce corruption in Afghanistan, with particular focus on ISAF efforts and relevant NATO policy, directives and/or doctrine. AO 3 Compare and contrast AO-1 and AO-2 in order to identify success and/or gaps in ISAF s operations and NATO policy, directives and/or doctrine. METHODOLOGY CAC lessons and practices from ISAF and previous conflicts and stabilization missions were collated, reviewed and analysed together with many papers produced by academia, governments, IOs and NGOs. Additionally, more than fifty military and civilian experts were interviewed within NATO International Staff, International Military Staff, the NATO Command Structure and ISAF and representatives of IOs and NGOs, in Afghanistan, Europe and the United States. The outcome has been a dataset rich in both breadth and depth on CAC theory and practice. Further analysis of this dataset resulted in 146 CAC challenges and good practices being extracted, divided into eight distinct categories. Finally, 19 recommendations were developed, each with action bodies proposed. MAJOR CONCLUSIONS Corruption is extremely complex, and there are no obvious, quick or easy remedies to corruption encountered during Crisis Response Operations. Certainly, the military alone cannot counter corruption, although they have a significant role to play; dealing with it requires inter-agency cooperation and coordination, under a comprehensive approach. Information-sharing is a key success factor to effective cooperation. Supporting all CAC activities across the spectrum of actors from the International Community involved in an intervention including the Host Nation has proven beneficial. iii

5 The three pre-conditions for minimizing corruption are: security, engagement of civil society, and political intent. Strategic Communications and Public Affairs are the most appropriate tools to address the latter two pre-conditions. The will of the Host Nation government, and the direct interest and involvement of its citizens can increase the pressure against corrupt actors and thus assist the International Community efforts to reduce corruption. Given the likelihood of corruption in fragile and post-conflict states, NATO forces are likely to encounter it in future interventions. A cadre of trained personnel working to agreed NATO policy and doctrine must be available to meet the challenge. Corruption can pose a threat to the mission, and should therefore be addressed in planning processes: it is much harder to fight corruption once it becomes established. and financial issues need close attention if NATO is to avoid fuelling corruption by employing inappropriate contractors or inadvertently channelling funds through corrupt agents. Financial intelligence may become an enabling capability for CAC in future operations. The provision of appropriate CAC mentoring, education and training to Host Nation security forces and officials has been observed to be beneficial in Afghanistan and should be considered good practice for future operations. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS NATO must ensure that lessons from ISAF s efforts against corruption are institutionalized and build on the experience gained through the Building Integrity initiative. There is a need for policy, doctrine, and directives to be developed or amended to incorporate CAC issues, and for increased training and education on corruption issues. Corruption issues must be factored into assessment and planning activities and a comprehensive approach is essential. Although unity of command is unlikely in a multiagency mission, NATO should strive to ensure unity of effort by enhancing cooperation and coordination with non-nato entities. In the short term, ISAF and in the future Resolute Support Mission (RSM) should enhance sharing of information with relevant non-nato entities; facilitate access to ISAF staff; and share CAC lessons and practices. In the longer term, the relationships that are needed at the operational level can be cultivated through agreements or exchanges at the political-military and/or strategic levels. RSM will need and future operational structures should incorporate where appropriate a Branch or Cell to deliver output similar to that of ISAF s Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force Shafafiyat (see paragraph 54) and to lead efforts against corruption, including mentoring Host Nation officials. Access will be needed to relevant financial and other intelligence on contractors (international and Host Nation) and criminal patronage networks. ISAF needs to ensure that a linked and coordinated approach to corruption, in line with COMISAF s specific direction and guidance, exists within its own structure and across all levels of command. The use of Afghan contractors and companies should be increased, but attention should be paid to gathering and sharing intelligence on contractors. ISAF should seek to sustain and enhance CAC mentoring of Host Nation security and defence personnel. ISAF (and future missions) must make effective use of Strategic Communications and Public Affairs to foster an appreciation and understanding in the Host Nation population of CAC activities. iv

6 CONTENTS Foreword from the Commander... i Executive Summary... iii 1 Introduction... 1 Background... 1 Analysis Requirement and Analysis Objectives... 1 Purpose and Structure of the Report... 1 Methodology... 2 Terminology... 2 Factors Affecting the Analysis... 2 Other Factors Observed On the Complexity of Corruption Corruption and its Relationship to Military Operations... 6 Defining Corruption and Counter- and Anti-Corruption... 6 Corruption in Afghanistan The ISAF Angle... 7 ISAF s Growing Role in Fighting Corruption... 8 NATO and ISAF CAC Initiatives...11 ISAF Successes and Challenges Conclusions and Recommendations...14 Introduction...14 Policy and Doctrine...14 Training Own Forces...15 Planning...15 Comprehensive Approach...16 Structures and Command Strategic Communications and Public Affairs...18 References...20 Additional Bibliography...21 Annex A Glossary of Acronyms... A-1 Annex B Inputs From Source Documents... B-1 Annex C Apparent Correlation Between NATO Footprint and Corruption Perceptions... C-1 v

7 BACKGROUND 1 INTRODUCTION 1. Corruption has not until recently been considered of major significance to military operations. However, operations in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan demanding a comprehensive approach to asymmetric warfare over extended periods coupled with the influx of large quantities of aid have exposed NATO and the Allies to corruption and viceversa. It is now understood that corruption threatens force protection and risks mission failure. Commander International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) has neutralize corruption and organized crime as one of his objectives in his operation plan (OPLAN) Reference A. 2. In 2012, COMISAF recognized the need to identify best practices and lessons in anticorruption. Accordingly, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) tasked the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) in an amendment to its Programme of Work (Reference B) to undertake such an analysis with the US Joint Staff J7 Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) in support. COMISAF was the identified customer. The customer representative helped refine the Analysis Requirement (AR) so that analysis would both cover ISAF operations and identify a better approach to corruption for future NATO-led operations. ANALYSIS REQUIREMENT AND ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES Analysis Requirement: Analyse anti-corruption efforts in post-conflict states in order to identify best practices, lessons and enduring challenges to support decision-making/policy development for ISAF and future NATO-led operations. 3. From the AR, the JALLC team defined three Analysis Objectives (AO): AO 1: Identify best practices, lessons and enduring challenges for anti-corruption in postconflict states by conducting a comprehensive review of existing research on the subject. Sub-AO 1.1: Examine research conducted by international organizations (IO) and NGOs on anti-corruption. Sub-AO 1.2: Examine anti-corruption activities of Kosovo Force, Stabilization Force and other applicable missions. AO 2: Identify NATO initiatives to reduce corruption in Afghanistan, with particular focus on ISAF efforts and relevant NATO policy, directives and/or doctrine. AO 3: Compare and contrast AO-1 and AO-2 in order to identify success and/or gaps in ISAF operations and NATO policy, directives and/or doctrine. PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT 4. This report presents relevant lessons and challenges gathered from previous missions and post-conflict situations. The intent is to inform current NATO and ISAF decision-makers, improving their awareness of corruption and how NATO and global agencies seek to minimize the effects of corruption. 5. In the short-term, the report should help COMISAF to focus current anti-corruption efforts on effective and efficient strategies and help planners address counter- and anticorruption (CAC) in planning NATO s future Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan. 1

8 6. In the medium- to long-term, this report should provide insight to ensure that ISAF is well-prepared for hand-over of those activities to the follow on mission and record for posterity more enduring lessons thereby ensuring a better approach to CAC for future NATOled operations. 7. This analysis report should be of value to those involved in addressing the political, military, civil and resource aspects of a crisis as part of the operations planning consultations, and SHAPE in helping them to better account for corruption in planning and executing future operations. 8. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 discusses the principal challenge that the JALLC team experienced during the execution of this study: the complexity of corruption. Chapter 3 broadly describes NATO s and ISAF s initiatives in reducing corruption in Afghanistan, and highlights the research on CAC by non-nato entities (NNE) such as the World Bank and Transparency International (TI) that is relevant to military operations. The intent of Chapter 3 is to summarize what JALLC has learned in addressing AO-1 and AO-2; the detailed research outcomes are given in Annex B to this report. Chapter 4 offers the most significant conclusions and recommendations arising from our research. METHODOLOGY 9. The Project Team consulted widely with recognised authorities on corruption, embassy staff, serving and former military and civilian ISAF and NATO staff, and members of IOs and NGOs, such as TI and the World Bank. Orientation and guidance were provided by the NATO Building Integrity (BI) staff (see paragraph 52) within the International Staff (IS) at NATO HQ. The team read many academic and government papers and reviewed lessons and other material on CAC practices from Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. The JALLC Project Team carried out interviews in Europe, and JCOA staff did those in the US; in Afghanistan interviews were conducted jointly by JALLC and JCOA representatives to HQ ISAF. Special thanks for advice, support and content review goes to the many individuals from IOs and NGOs, especially TI. 10. Data was analysed to identify challenges, lessons and best practices. Those wholly inapplicable to the military sector were discarded and the remaining 146 grouped into the following eight categories: Policy and Doctrine; Training Own Forces; Planning; Comprehensive Approach; Structures and Command; ; Mentoring the Host Nation; Strategic Communications and Public Affairs. The conclusions and recommendations in Chapter 4 are based on the Team s determination of the most relevant and pragmatic proposals, grouped into these eight categories. The full list of 146 issues is at Annex B. TERMINOLOGY 11. ISAF and NATO use anti-corruption to refer to preventative measures and countercorruption for action on corruption after the fact. This report uses the abbreviation CAC for Counter-/Anti-Corruption to describe all such work. FACTORS AFFECTING THE ANALYSIS 12. NATO has little time before the transition to RSM and, correspondingly, the time available for this study was short. Additional time may have allowed for more research and interviews with a broader spectrum of experts but the team believes that the majority of the issues have been captured. Nevertheless, requests for interview were declined by a small number of in-theatre experts (NATO and others) and no contractors were consulted directly. Excluding such perspectives may have inadvertently coloured the findings. 13. Documented lessons within NATO on corruption are few as NATO, prior to the initiation of BI, has traditionally eschewed corruption, treating it as a non-military issue. The team 2

9 looked for global, non-nato examples, but the only major successes in fighting corruption we found have been in Hong Kong and Singapore, neither of which is a fragile or recent post-conflict state. Furthermore, access to material on fighting corruption in military interventions is limited. Data on past conflicts (Iraq, Kosovo etc.) came principally from nonmilitary sources and individuals military anecdotal evidence. Consequently, the vast majority of the accessible, pertinent evidence presented in this report relates to Afghanistan. OTHER FACTORS OBSERVED 14. Contrary to widely held perceptions that religious belief influences corruption levels, the team found that research evidence 1 does not support a significant correlation between the two. 15. Annex C plots the changes to the TI Corruption Perception Index for Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Somalia over the period 2001 to The presence of a large in-theatre force footprint seems to result in a fall in the Corruption Perception Index i.e. higher levels of corruption. However, the presence of the in-theatre force has been accompanied by a large influx of aid into the country. Therefore, there are many factors that could be the cause of the observed changes to the Corruption Perception Index. We have not had the time during this study to build a comprehensive model and carry out the necessary statistical regression analysis to be able to make any definitive statements about which factors, for example, the presence of a large in-theatre military force, have the greatest influence on corruption levels. Such a regression analysis may be warranted; it may be possible to predict a deployment s likely effect on corruption levels from a judicious analysis of factors in the planning stage. 1 Atkinson-Seiferling: 3

10 2 ON THE COMPLEXITY OF CORRUPTION 16. Corruption is complex. There are no easy, obvious remedies: this is the main finding of this report. JALLC has found that the five months we were given to produce this report were insufficient to fully grasp the nature of corruption. Indeed, many much larger and more capable organizations including one of the major contributors to this study, TI have invested far more time and intellectual effort studying corruption and still have not found universally applicable approaches to combating it. 17. And yet, corruption will almost certainly impact any security or stabilization operation in a fragile or post-conflict state, particularly when that state is in political and economic transition. Corruption will therefore require attention from the commander of any multinational force engaged in such a country. Corruption is obviously not limited to these environments, but it is in such states that it will impact the kinds of military operations NATO can expect to be leading, indeed the kind it leads right now in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Therefore, NATO needs to have better understanding of the nature of corruption, its effects, and what do about it. 18. But, as already stated, corruption is a complex issue. It takes many different forms and manifests itself in quite different ways wherever it appears. Insidious and destructive, corruption can pass unnoticed by the military commander and set back his mission. Such indeed seems to have been the case in the early days of ISAF, when corruption was largely viewed as a minor impediment to the mission of ISAF and fighting it a task for other international partners in the country. Conversely, corruption and its effects on the legitimacy of the host nation (HN) government that the international force is tasked to support may be fully obvious, as General McChrystal (former ISAF commander) recognized publicly in , yet a clear approach on how to tackle it remains elusive. 19. What JALLC has found is that this complex topic of corruption must be included in the planning phases for any security or stabilization mission, but that no one solution or approach can be prescribed in advance. The pervasiveness and functional mechanisms of corruption in the HN must be examined and understood to the extent intelligence allows. Characteristics specific to the theatre of operations, to the mission of the force, and to the nature and relationship of other national and international actors, including hostile actors, must be understood and accounted for. All of this must be taken into account in the campaign plan from the beginning of an operation and depending on the anticipated extent of the problem specific courses of action must be devised for the military forces engagement in CAC. 20. An essential element of planning CAC efforts is recognizing not only that corruption can impact achievement of mission objectives but also that the military force can contribute, largely unwittingly, to the rise and prevalence of corruption. Corruption can derail efforts to establish governance through its impact on the perceived legitimacy of the HN government and can be exploited by insurgents, who simultaneously profit from corruption monetarily and use it in their media campaign to reduce public support for the military force. Equally, a large international military force engaged in stabilization and capacity building across vast extents of a country will of necessity insert large amounts of cash into the HN economy. It may also be faced with the need to deal with a spectrum of unsavoury local leaders, many of whom are not just involved in corruption but will actively exploit dealings with the military force for their own corrupt gain. Operational pressures may lead to good practice being abandoned or 2 It should be noted that his predecessors as ISAF commanders, Generals Richards and McNeill, made similar comments, in somewhat more subdued tones, before him. 4

11 only partially implemented, and unless actively checked, the mere presence of the military force places it at risk of inadvertently fuelling corruption and of being seen to be complicit in it. 21. And all of this is to say nothing of the military force s role within the overall efforts by the rest of the International Community (IC) in the HN. A comprehensive approach requires that the military force s efforts be aligned with and complement those of other actors, including in combating and inhibiting the spread of corruption. The IC faces the same challenges and, as we discovered in the course of this analysis, frequently has just as few answers to corruption as NATO does. 22. This is not to say that the IC has not thought about the issue. JALLC examined research produced by IOs and NGOs on corruption. What we found was an overwhelming wealth of literature which posed two problems: a. Synthesizing this large quantity of raw data on such a specialist, complex topic proved to be immensely challenging. b. Frequently, commentators expressed contradictory views, approaches, recommendations and best practices which depended not only on their perspective but also the subject geographical region, variety of corruption 3 on which they were commentating. 23. In essence, corruption and how to address it defy simple explanation and developing a straightforward list of effective actions is unfortunately beyond the capacity of the JALLC in the time available. Nevertheless, JALLC distilled the data into 146 challenges, lessons and best practices with military applicability (at Annex B) as a foundation from which we developed the specific recommendations in Chapter 4 of this report. 24. Before presenting our recommendations, it is useful to discuss the definition and nature of corruption in more detail and, using the example of ISAF and corruption in Afghanistan as the context, examine the relationship of corruption to military operations. These topics are the subject of the next chapter. 3 See paragraph 29 in Chapter 3 for definitions of varieties of corruption. 5

12 3 CORRUPTION AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO MILITARY OPERATIONS 25. NATO s interest in tackling corruption is relatively recent. NATO s first formal CAC efforts were designed to help NATO and Partner countries to fight corruption in their defence sectors through the BI Initiative. The focus on corruption in direct relation to operations was principally fuelled by the impact corruption had on NATO s activities in Afghanistan. The NATO-led ISAF operation has run up against all of the complexities described in the previous chapter. The vast majority of reports, papers and interviews reviewed by the JALLC team were based on experience from Afghanistan. In fact, JALLC found very little data relevant to the relationship between military operations and corruption that did not come from Afghanistan. 26. For this reason, it seems appropriate to discuss the definition of corruption and our overview of its relationship to military operations within the context of ISAF and Afghanistan. 27. This overview aims to provide the contextual background for our recommendations. While this chapter is indeed Afghanistan-focused, it is our intention that it will provide insight into broader types of corruption. Furthermore, describing ISAF s specific situation regarding corruption will help the reader better understand the challenges likely to emanate from crisis response operations (CRO) and perhaps gauge what might be done. DEFINING CORRUPTION AND COUNTER- AND ANTI-CORRUPTION 28. Corruption defies universal definition. The concept is generally understood the world over but cultural factors, variances in laws between nations and other factors blur the line between what is acceptable or not in a given country; even the UN Convention Against Corruption (Reference C) does not define the term. For example, Afghan Muslims consider bribery to be an unjustifiable violation of Islamic law which should be punished, yet in Afghanistan, patronage is considered to be an obligation. All the same, a study such as this needs a defined starting point so we have adapted the definitions of corruption used by both TI 4 and the World Bank 5 : The abuse of entrusted authority (public or private) for illegitimate (private or group) gain. 29. Furthermore, the Stimson Center report (Reference D) defines three varieties of corruption: a. Grand corruption: when high-ranking officials with access to government funds or resources abuse their positions to enrich themselves, often altering laws to do so. 6 b. Petty corruption: when lower-level government officials seek additional payment to perform their remunerated role or to cancel unsubstantiated charges. c. Private criminal corruption: when individuals or (transnational) criminal organizations extort resources or payments from individuals to safely conduct business. While not strictly having entrusted authority, the effect is indistinguishable from other varieties TI and the World Bank also propose a particular type of grand corruption, state capture: when some with corrupt backgrounds and intentions hijack most or all of the governmental processes, to their own benefit over that of the population. 6

13 CORRUPTION IN AFGHANISTAN THE ISAF ANGLE Corruption always has debilitating long-term effects and thus cannot play a part in building sustainable peace. Failure to deal with the downward spiral may ultimately doom any effort to rebuild governance after conflict. Philippe Le Billon Corruption is perhaps currently the biggest problem in Afghanistan. According to a UNDP report from 2012 (Reference F), Afghans now consider corruption, together with insecurity and unemployment, to be at the top of their country s list of biggest challenges worse than poverty or security. Corruption has worsened since the fall of the Taliban and the arrival of a large international presence together with the large amounts of international money flowing into the country. The IC s funds were loosely-controlled, ill-targeted, manipulated and used to buy influence and freedom of movement, often without considering broader, longer-term effects. Between 2005 and 2007, Afghanistan slid 70 places down the global ranking by country of TI s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 8 to where it remains at the bottom. 31. Corruption threatens both support to stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) activities in Afghanistan and the safe and secure environment there. Funds lost through corruption do not get to where they are needed for reconstruction and state-building, but may also end up being passed through corrupt local leaders or powerbrokers into the hands of the adversary, thus giving them ever greater means to threaten security. The rise of other types of crime associated with corruption often violent crime also directly affect security and public safety. The resulting perceptions of corruption can be portrayed as an offence to Islam and used to support insurgents claims that ISAF and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) are to blame for corruption s rise in Afghanistan. 32. Perhaps ironically, the IC and ISAF efforts in Afghanistan are seen by many experts including those of TI and the World Bank and by President Karzai himself to have contributed to the rise in corruption. Post-conflict reconstruction is often characterized by large-scale injection of resources into an environment of fragile or non-existent legal and institutional frameworks. Foreign aid may have as many negative, unintended effects as positive ones. 9 International peacekeepers spending and inflows of international aid can be many times the recipient nation s gross domestic product 10. When this influx exceeds a recipient s ability to manage and use it effectively also known as its absorptive capacity the excess will likely be lost to corruption. Such losses are more likely to happen during the first few years of an intervention when the IC provides large amounts of aid funding and corruption opportunities abound amid high aid inflows, the pressure to deliver, weak state institutions and the legacies of war economies (Reference I). 33. It is widely acknowledged among the IC and academics that the influx of funds has fuelled corruption and given regional powerbrokers a degree of autonomy and credibility that they exploit to this day in their relations with the central Afghan state. This situation has threatened not only political security, but also economic security where, in the words of a leaked US diplomatic cable, elites are extracting as much wealth as possible while conditions permit from the large sums of unmonitored aid spending, citing the example of the Afghan Vice President entering Dubai with $52 million in cash, the origins of which he refused to reveal Buying Peace or Fuelling War: the Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts (Reference E). Phillipe le Billon is an Associate Professor at the University of British Columbia. 8 See: 9 Stuart Gordon of Chatham House, quoted by David Brooks (Reference G) 10 PO(2010)0044 (Reference H) provides some figures for spending comparisons for From UK Government Stabilisation Issues Note (Reference J) 7

14 34. Specific practices of the IC in Afghanistan have been documented to contribute to the rise of corruption. An Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) 12 official observed that donors rarely monitor projects in situ themselves; updates are documented by photographs and letters from local officials without independent audit and perceptions are easy to manipulate. Other interviewees have noted instances of donors not coordinating with other donors, leading to some projects being paid for twice with one donor being played off against another. 35. ISAF, as part of the IC, has certainly contributed to corruption s spread. Whether buying locally or importing, the contracting and logistics required to sustain such a large international force offer opportunities for corruption. In achieving security aims, some ISAF commanders have unknowingly cooperated with corrupt officials and abusive warlords for intelligence, logistics and direct military operations because their local control and insight were considered valuable to helping maintain security. ISAF needs an understanding of local dynamics to support its capacity building and reconstruction efforts; too often it relies for this understanding on a limited number of trusted Afghan agents, local government officials and powerbrokers, some of whom could be (and in some cases are) corrupt. 36. The rise of corruption has led to a contradictory perception among Afghans of the IC s efforts in Afghanistan. According to a UNDP Report (Reference F), Afghans are unsure of where and for whom the IC stands. The IC encourages Afghans to report and act against corruption when they see it but perversely, Afghans see it every day in their own government; a government supported by the IC. ISAF S GROWING ROLE IN FIGHTING CORRUPTION 37. CAC was not and is not an assigned task in ISAF s mandate 13. However, the effect of corruption on governance and Defence Institution Building which are specifically mentioned should have led to the immediate identification of CAC as an implied task. ISAF mission reports from 2004 to 2006 and early versions of the SHAPE OPLAN recognized that corruption, along with narcotics and other crime, formed a part of the environment in Afghanistan but were not highlighted as areas that required direct involvement by ISAF. The JALLC team often heard that little action was taken by ISAF on corruption until This delay can probably be attributed to two factors: the limited scope of ISAF s original mission, providing security in Kabul; and the fact that in the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) (Reference K), anti-corruption was included as a cross-cutting issue permeating the three ANDS pillars. Plans 38. In April 2010, an updated Comprehensive Strategic Political Military Plan (CSPMP) (Reference L) provided ISAF s framework for engagement and contribution to wider IC efforts in support of GIRoA and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Originally valid until 2013 (the start of the transition period), the aim was to assist relevant Afghan ministries in promoting good governance and, through existing mechanisms, encourage the GIRoA to fight corruption, boosting its authority and legitimacy. 12 See paragraph See NATO website: 14 Unfortunately, the JALLC interviews were limited to personnel with ISAF experience from the past few years; we were unable to arrange any interview, in the limited time available for this study, with earlier leaders, such as previous ISAF Commanders, or other senior staff whose service dated from prior to However, published media interviews with Generals Richards, McKiernan and McNeill show that corruption was certainly on their minds during their tenures as COMISAF but was not yet considered a specific task for ISAF within a counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign. 8

15 39. In May 2012, the Allies agreed NATO s Strategic Plan for Afghanistan (Reference M) which superseded the CSPMP while retaining enduring principles of shared commitment, enhanced Afghan leadership, enhanced coordination and a regional approach. It includes the NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission and initiatives such as the BI programme, aimed at reducing the risk of corruption in the ANSF to build Afghan capacity to sustain own governance and services. 40. In March 2012, SHAPE stated that insurgency, corruption, crime and narcotics are the main threats to GIRoA and the ISAF mission, and assigned a specific task to provide targeted CAC expertise to the GIRoA 15. The Allied Joint Force Command (JFC) Brunssum OPLAN created a Building Integrity and CAC programme outlining how Commander JFC Brunssum will support ISAF CAC operations and provide out-of-theatre engagement through support to the BI Initiative, Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (CJIATF) Shafafiyat and NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) initiatives 16. CAC has been fullyintegrated into ISAF s Campaign Plan 17. ISAF Engagement with GIRoA CAC Initiatives 41. Following the Chicago Summit (May 2012) and the Tokyo Conference 18 (July 2012), donors are expected to provide continuing financial support post-2014 and throughout the Decade of Transformation, subject to conditions (some relating to anti-corruption). Moreover, responsibility for leading the fight against corruption was allocated to the GIRoA. 42. Afghanistan has an established system of loyalties underpinning political power. Despite having introduced some CAC measures, the GIRoA has not been universally willing to act decisively; President Karzai s focus is on maintaining his political coalition and its support for his government. When confronted with difficult decisions over dismissing corrupt ministers, government leaders procrastinate to the point of inaction (Reference F). Any CAC effort that risks disrupting the balance of power may be perceived as a threat and is often undermined. Furthermore, failure on the part of the IC (including NATO and ISAF) to enforce stated conditions for aid will permit perpetuating and possibly increasing corruption, which will thus continue to threaten ISAF and RSM. 43. The Afghan National Anti-Corruption Strategy (Reference P) was produced by the GIRoA in 2006 to guide national and governmental efforts to reduce corruption. It was superseded by Presidential Decree 45, issued in on 26 July 2012 (Reference Q), which set out in detail the GIRoA response to international pressure at the Tokyo Conference to demonstrate Afghanistan s determination to combat corruption. Additionally, several entities were created within an Afghan framework to fight corruption. However, while President Karzai and the GIRoA have followed some of the IC-imposed conditions, sources 19 report that they have done so more in name than substance: a. The MOD s Transparency and Accountability Office receives no direction, guidance or authority to operate independently or without approval from the MOD or the Inspector General Reference N 16 Reference O 17 Reference A 18 The Tokyo Conference established promises from international donors for future investment and funding for Afghanistan out to at least For example, MEC (Reference R), various reports from the UN and other members of the IC, etc. 20 From US Special Inspector-General for Afghanistan quarterly report 30 April 2013: 9

16 b. The High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC) remains a weak institution with little or no enforcement mechanisms 21. c. The Transparency and Accountability Working Group, is said by senior UN personnel not to have provided any recent updates, nor identified any new areas on which to focus counter-corruption efforts. d. The MOI s Transparency and Accountability Committee which CJIATF-Shafafiyat staff perceive as having a promising CAC role has yet to make an impact, according to Shafiyat staff. 44. A former officer from the SCR Office commented that the absence of effective government regulatory bodies means little audit or oversight allows corruption to flourish. Additionally, Tim Sullivan of the American Enterprise Institute and formerly a member of CJIATF-Shafafiyat notes that with no effective whistle-blowing process, much corruption goes unreported. The HOOAC has no trained prosecutors and can only refer cases to the government; without the full backing of the politicians, it is effectively toothless. For fear of disrupting political power bases, officials even when caught red-handed either go unpunished or are reemployed elsewhere. 45. ISAF has achieved some significant influence through formal relationships with the MOI and MOD, partly through the inspector generals, but coordination with other ministries is mostly ad hoc. However, elements of ISAF do regularly meet with GIRoA representatives from a variety of ministries, giving ISAF a window sometimes even a door into nonmilitary areas. ISAF Cooperation with the IC 46. There are many IC actors involved, to a greater or lesser degree, in CAC in Afghanistan such as UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), UNDP, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, World Bank, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the UK Department for International Development, TI and many more. 47. The two principal IC entities evaluating and monitoring progress in CAC in Afghanistan are the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) and IWA: a. The MEC was created to provide independent monitoring and evaluation of anticorruption efforts in Afghanistan. Under its mandate, it is to identify effective development criteria for GIRoA institutions, with necessary monitoring and evaluation of activities conducted against corruption at the national level. MEC comprises three senior anticorruption experts appointed on the recommendation of the GIRoA and three on the recommendation of the IC. It makes recommendations and publishes biannual reports to the President, Parliament, IC and the people of Afghanistan. The MEC investigates and reports on corruption, including among Afghan authorities and officials. It has already provided 74 recommendations, of which the majority are for GIRoA action with 14% addressed to the IC. b. IWA was created in October 2005 and established itself as an independent civil society organization in 2006 with the aim of evolving into a reference actor related to understanding, analysing and acting for transparency, accountability and anti-corruption issues in Afghanistan. The IWA aims to increase transparency, integrity and accountability in Afghanistan through the provision of policy-oriented research, development of training tools and facilitation of policy dialogue. 21 On 04 June 2013, Ariana News reported that Azizullah Ludin, Head of the HOOAC, had personally and openly stated that his Office lacks the necessary authority to eliminate corruption. 10

17 48. COMISAF has stated (most recently in his Quarterly Report dated February 2013, Reference S) that ISAF will continue to need the assistance of the broader IC to achieve substantive counter-corruption reforms and, indeed, there is a degree of CAC cooperation between ISAF, GIRoA and the wider IC. While there has been generally good communication between organizations notably through the Counter-Corruption Inter- Agency Effects Group and the International Community Transparency and Accountability Working Group there is little direct coordination among the larger and longer-term actors such as the UN, USAID, World Bank and ISAF. 49. There has been development of parallel committees, rather than cohesion of existing structures to help build a synergetic whole, and cooperation is less effective than it could be. For example, a senior source in UNAMA advised that some UNAMA staff were not aware of several of ISAF s specific efforts to counter corruption demonstrating an information gap. 50. Indeed, the willingness and ability to share information and intentions plays a fundamental role in successful coordination and cooperation between ISAF and other IC actors. However, a significant number of IOs and NGOs have little appetite to share information with NATO or any military organization and are not always transparent in what they do and how they do it. Equally, the security classification and releasability of ISAF information can be a significant barrier to cooperation and coordination with NNEs. These two factors combine to give some IC actors the view that sharing tends to be one-way they are expected to provide ISAF with information, but get little in return, deepening their own reticence to sharing with the military The following example illustrates how all these factors play out. A member of the MEC advised in interview that, MEC recommended that CJIATF-Shafafiyat review the procurement law and systems, but CJIATF-Shafafiyat does not issue products or updates, thus leaving the MEC unsighted on any progress or action taken. CJIATF-Shafafiyat has access to those who can and do implement changes, which the MEC does not. The two organizations have complementary knowledge, skills and access; so both would benefit from sharing information to engender better cooperation. NATO AND ISAF CAC INITIATIVES 52. Many parts of the ISAF structure are actively engaged in CAC, from the SCR and COMISAF themselves to individuals working in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). However, two particular initiatives are of note. Building Integrity Initiative 53. NATO s BI Initiative, established in November 2007 by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (Reference U), aims to improve transparency, accountability, good practice and reducing the risk of defence and security sector corruption by promoting good practice and providing NATO nations and partners with practical tools, including the BI Education and Training Plan (Reference V) 23. BI s tools were introduced to Afghanistan from 2010, with the 22 NATO has revised security rules in recent years to make information sharing with NNEs easier for operations staff. But these new rules are not well-known among ISAF staff, who tend to err on the side of caution. ISAF has recognized the problem and made efforts to downgrade more information. The need to improve releasability and the issue of over-classification are both covered in the JALLC report on Information Sharing with Non-NATO Entities (Reference T). 23 NATO s BI Education and Training Plan, issued in August 2012, includes the requirement for training at the political-military, strategic and operations levels covering primarily integrity in defence and security institutions, and aims to develop an understanding of corruption and its impact on NATOled operations. The objective is therefore to ensure that NATO's HQs and current and future operations' forces understand the impact of corruption as a security risk and have the tools and institutional mechanisms to be good stewards of taxpayer resources. 11

18 NATO GIRoA Enduring Partnership (Reference W). A tailored, 10-year ANSF BI programme (Reference X) was promulgated in July 2011, which was developed in cooperation with the NTM-A, Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan and key stakeholders such as the US Defense Resources Management Institute, the Defense Institution Reform Initiative of the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and TI. CJIATF-Shafafiyat 54. General McChrystal (COMISAF ) is widely credited with raising corruption s profile, as an integral element of his concept for a COIN approach in Afghanistan. In 2010, a US initiative, CJIATF-Shafafiyat 24, was created in order to lead the in-theatre CAC efforts, in coordination with NTM-A. CJIATF-Shafafiyat is now subordinate to CJIATF-Afghanistan, 25 which merges ISAF s CAC, counter-narcotics and suppression of financial crime activities into one task force. For what remains of ISAF s tenure, CJIATF-Afghanistan has refocused effort on the MOD, MOI and the HOOAC to enhance Afghan accountability and transparency, especially in procurement. CJIATF-Shafafiyat engages with civil society and media to campaign for Afghan corruption reform and coordinates with other organizations in theatre, such as embassies, UNAMA, the MEC and TI. ISAF SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES 55. ISAF faces many challenges to CAC in Afghanistan and has not made as much headway as some would have wished, but there have also been clear CAC successes. Mentoring 56. An integral part of ISAF s mission to improve security is its role in building up and mentoring the ANSF. ISAF has tried to foster integrity within the MOD and MOI, particularly among junior personnel. It is reported that NTM-A and CJIATF-Shafafiyat have made progress in CAC mentoring. Indeed, there has been a measurable reduction in levels of bribery by the Afghan National Police (ANP), increased trust among Afghans and in contrast to the country s overall ranking at the bottom of the CPI 26 TI recently reported the Afghan defence sector as being in the third quartile of its worldwide Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index (GDI) CJIATF-Shafafiyat has worked closely with NTM-A in developing CAC awareness among Afghan MOD and MOI staff and contributed to the adoption of the MOD s 50-item action plan. The Office of National Security Council Transparency and Accountability Workgroup fosters these mentoring efforts. The recently established MOD and MOI Schools for inspector generals created with ISAF s support are considered by many in the IC to be successful in instilling CAC ethos. Civil Society Engagement 58. Engaging with civil society is seen as a crucial aspect of CAC (see paragraph 77), since broad support for efforts to reduce corruption is essential and is a key objective of CJIATF-Shafafiyat. A significant success in this area has been the Afghan Hands Program 24 Shafafiyat is the Pashtun word for Transparency 25 CJIATF-Afghanistan mission is to synchronize operations related to Counter Narcotics, Counter Threat Finance and Counter Corruption (from CJIATF-Afghanistan Mission Statement) 26 See: 27 See Of note, of the two TI indices, CPI is considered to be more subjective and the GDI more objective. 12