19 A Brussels Identity? A Speculative Interpretation

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1 19 A Brussels Identity? A Speculative Interpretation Serge Govaert ABSTRACT The Brussels Region, now a recognized partner in the foderal Belgian state, has been endowed with a flag and a celebration day. But is there altogether a Brussels identity? This is what this chapter focuses on, analyzing the historical backgrounds and the specific foatures of the Brussels political field. Brussels has changed a lot since the first foderalization moves in the sixties. In a final section, we try to establish a link with other capital cities, though comparisons of this type are a hazardous exercise. A COMBINATION OF IDENTITIES Most inhabitants of Brussels do not know the name of Jacques Richez. Yet the man, who died recently, is the author of a drawing which can be seen everywhere in the city nowadays : on trams and buses, in underground stations, on official buildings, on roadsigns and even on some tax forms. The drawing represents a flower that once grew in the marshy grounds Brussels was built on : the iris. The iris has been chosen as a symbol by the Brussels Parliament and Government. The latter first tried to consult their citizens, then organized a competition, but failed in both cases. So the choice was to be a rather authoritative one and Richez had in fact to honour an order in due form. The Brussels Region chose a celebration day too and picked the date when the iris is supposed to blossom (on the last Saturday of April). This is a rather peculiar choice : most countries celebrate a conclusive battle or their independence day. Once again, the population of Brussels had to accept this decision without any preliminary debate. Both the symbol and the celebration day are of the uncommon type. Does this mean that the Brussels Region has an uncommon identity? Is there altogether a Brussels identity? If you lend an ear to the Brussels politicians, there is no doubt about it : Brussels has an identity and the iris is the symbolic and even institutional proof of it. Only the extreme right- K. Deprez et al. (eds.), Nationalism in Belgium Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1998

2 230 Nationalism in Belgium wing parties disagree : for the Flemish radical nationalists of the V/aams Blok, Brussels is part of the Flemish nation and in the eyes of the Francophone Front National, only Belgian citizenship matters. But for the other parties, the Brussels identity is - politically speaking - a successful item. Most Brussels politicians boast about their Brussels identity. Yet, at the same time, they are proud of belonging to the Flemish (or the French) Community and of being a local representative, i.e. of sitting in one of the 19 borough councils. Brussels Region and Brussels boroughs About 60 per cent of the members of the Brussels Parliament are also councillors (or even aldermen or mayors) in one of the 19 boroughs. This is more or less the same proportion as for the whole of the country in the Federal Parliament 1, but as the Brussels territory covers a rather small area, this combination of two power positions has a stronger impact there. Indeed, both fimctions are very close to each other and some members of the Brussels Parliament could, therefore, turn out to stand nearer to the borough they live in than to their Region. To verify this, one could attempt an analysis of their points of interest. What do their interpellations, questions and proposals focus on? Do they concern local or regional matters? Such an analysis is only possible to a certain extent for the amount of parliamentary activity is intrinsically variable. Some MPs ask most of their questions behind closed doors (during commission meetings). Furthermore, in each political group, a few MPs specialize in well-defined topics; generally, these topics have a regional - and not a local - significance : budget, social housing, environmental protection, employment policy, public works, etc.; consequently, these specialists pay less attention than others to municipal issues. If one only considers those MPs who ask a relevant number of (written or oral) questions the proportion of locally related questions is, broadly speaking, relatively small. Region and Community Sure, you can be an inhabitant of, say, Molenbeek or Anderlecht and simultaneously feel you're a citizen of the Brussels Region. But what if, besides this, you are Flemish? Is it possible to belong to the Flemish Community and, at the same time, share a Brussels identity? This combination does seem feasible : Wij zijn Vlamingen uit Brussel en daarenboven goede Brusselaars [We are Flemings from Brussels and, on

3 A Brussels Identity? 231 top of that, good Brusselers], this was the way the Flemish Brussels Minister Jos Chabert put it, answering an oral question from a Dutchspeaking Brussels MP on 20 December For the same reason, several Flemish Members of the Brussels Parliament expressed the wish that provision should be made for a specific Brussels section in the decrees issued by the Flemish Parliament. The second Congres van de Brusselse Vlamingen [Congress of the Brussels Flemings] demanded the installation of a "structure of dialogue" between the Flemish Community and the Brussels Flemings. One could add that TV Brussel, a Dutchspeaking television channel for the Flemings in Brussels, was created in 1993 because the Flemish public broadcasting corporation (BRTN) was felt not to pay enough attention to Brussels 2 The relationship between Francophone Brussels and the Walloon Region is a complex one too. As long as the process of federalization was on its way, the French-speaking Brusselers and the Walloons were allies but in recent years, the idea that both belong to a same French-speaking Community has been questioned, mainly but not exclusively by Walloon politicians (cf. Fontaine, in this volume). So the Brussels identity actually seems to be something very special like the iris - if only because it can be combined with other identities, and this double allegiance is a complex, not entirely unambiguous phenomenon. IDENTITY BUILDING AS A RESULT OF A SUBTRACTION Brussels came out of the institutional "fridge" in 1989, when a bill was passed that granted the Brussels Region the autonomy already promised as early as 1971 (see Falter, in this volume). Yet, the appearance of something resembling a Brussels consciousness dates back to the early sixties. From 1960 on, the Flemish Movement demanded the firm establishment of the language boundary between Flanders and Wallonia and around Brussels, in order to prevent an extension of the Frenchspeaking oil slick. At the same time, there was a growing social discontent in Wallonia, protesting against the decline of the Walloon economy and the increasing Flemish predominance in the country. In 1962, negociations began to take place to solve the first problem. As a result, Belgium was officially divided into four linguistic regions. This marked the actual beginning of the federalization of the country; indeed, federalist solutions are only possible when the territorial delimitations have clearly been defined (Witte, 1993). The Brussels politicians, at least the French-speaking ones, experienced this breakthrough of the federalist ideology as a danger. Their defensive reactions can easily be explained. In Flanders, the Flemish Movement was in full expansion and, in its eyes,

4 232 Nationalism in Belgium Brussels was a conceited provincial town willing to frenchify its boroughs and its suburbs (the "periphery"). In the South, the Walloon Movement, which then set its first steps on the political scene, accused Brussels - the place of economic decision-making - of being responsible for the decline of the industrial basins in Wallonia. In those years- in fact, already in the fifties-, one encountered quite a few expressions of this anti-brussels climate : Do you really think Brusselers are interested in the future of Wallonia? [... ]Don't tell me they actually care for us; in fact, they absolutely don't, declared Arille Cartier, a well-known Walloon militant, in For a long time, Socialists in Wallonia resented the fact that on 16 December 1960, the Brussels delegates did not support the Walloon leader Andre Renard against the Fleming Dore Smets when a national congress of the Socialist Trade Union, the ABVV /FGTB, decided not to go on an all-out strike. Renard and a majority of Walloon delegates defended the strike; Smets and a majority of Flemish delegates were opposed to it ( cf. Kesteloot, in this volume). On the Flemish side, Wilmars wrote : The French-speaking Brusseler always sides with the stronger[... ] Even if he pretends to be a great patriot, he knows which way the wind blows; Brussels is probably the only capital city in the world where there is so much disdain for the language spoken by the majority of the country's population (1971, p ). Craeybeckx, at the time the Mayor of Antwerp, in his preface to Wilmars's book did not beat about the bush either: Brussels is a Capital city, so it enjoys enormous advantages, in the first place from a material point of view [... ] Flanders and Wallonia know very well that Brussels chiefly owes this privileged position to its central geographical situation and to its subsequent status as a Capital city (1971, p. 8). These are the reasons why, in the sixties and the seventies, Brussels politicians started to build a Brussels identity by default, that is to say against the Flemings and the Walloons. They were backed by a majority of Brusselers, as can be attested from the successes of the Front Democratique des Bruxellois Francophones [Democratic Front of the French-speaking Brusselers], a purely Brussels, French-speaking party founded in 1964; the FDF was the first party in Brussels from 1974 to 1985.

5 A Brussels Identity? 233 As the reform of the Belgian state progressed, political alliances were formed. As a result, the concept of a French-speaking Community emerged, i.e. a political union between the Walloons and the Frenchspeaking Brusselers. This concept was included in the revision of the Constitution (but it was named French Community thus creating possible confusion with the citizens of French nationality in Belgium). Due to the institutional creation of the Regions and, in particular, of the Walloon Region, in 1980, it lost much of its political weight and was replaced, in recent years, by the idea of a French-speaking Nation that is now put forward by a new coalition between the FDF and the Frenchspeaking Liberals (PRL), born in Both concepts - French Community and French-speaking Nation (nation francophone in the words of the defunct PRL-chainnan Jean Gol) - are not, in spite of appearances, vectors of the federalist ideal but the outcome of a protective reflex and, perhaps, of a rather unitarian (Belgian) reaction. This explains why this federation between a long-time unitarian political family like the Liberals and a so-called federalist party like the FDF was an electoral success in Brussels. The commitment to Brussels of the FDF as well as the occasional Belgian-patriotic eruptions of the PRL are of a mere conjunctural nature : they are, as it were, the political equivalent of a "peace, but on our terms" position. In fact, there have been political tensions between the Walloon and the Brussels politicians from the early sixties on (Vagman, 1994). When the FDF and the Rassemblement Wallon formed an alliance in April 1968, some constituents of the Walloon Movement had already warned against what they called a Brussels party including some very belgicains representatives of the Bloc de Ia Liberte linguistique, whose influence is certainly not to be neglected 3 In fact, the FDF did not approve of federalism until When the French Community had to choose an emblem in July 1975, it adopted Pierre Paulus's coq hardi, a cock with a fiery raised foot, in fact a Walloon symbol. A few Brussels MPs openly stated their disagreement: A. Saint-Remy, for instance, a Christian Democratic MP, declared that the Brusselers would never accept a flag bearing the Walloon cock. Anyway, the alliance between the FDF and the RW came to an end in The leaders of the RW no longer concealed their opposition to the "community" positions of the FDF; their own party was then declining. Anyhow, both parties had never joined the Belgian Government together : the RW had been in the government coalition from 1974 to 1977, the FDF from 1977 to 1978 and from 1979 to In short, the Brussels political identity at that time was the result of a subtraction and was built upon a defensive reflex; at first, to slow down an

6 234 Nationalism in Belgium evolution presented as the beginning of a national dismembering, later on, to form political (and not unambiguous) alliances in order to "save what could be saved". BRUSSELS YESTERDAY, BRUSSELS TODAY The history of the Brussels Region as an autonomous political entity with its own parliament and government begins in But Brussels is, at that time, quite different from what it was in the sixties or even the seventies. While Craeybeckx and others still claimed, in 1971, that Brussels was more prosperous than Flanders or Wallonia, all indicators now show that Brussels is growing poorer and that its population has changed a lot since First of all, there is an obvious demographic decrease. In 1971, Brussels had 1,075,136 inhabitants; in 1994, it had only 949,070 ( per cent). Besides, the downturn was a selective one : from 1971 to 1990, the Belgian population ofbrussels fell from 901,629 to 685,734 inhabitants( per cent) whereas, during the same period, its foreign population climbed from 173,507 to 274,590 inhabitants( per cent!). These tendencies have not changed in recent years : on 31 December 1995, there were 281,245 foreigners in Brussels and 667,825 Belgians. What is more, these figures do not make any distinction between the native Belgians and those who have been naturalized between 1971 and The family structures have changed also : on average, there are more large families ( 4 children or more) and more single-parent ones in Brussels than in the other Belgian Regions (Thomas, 1993 ). In 1983, 342,448 inhabitants of Brussels had a job of some kind; in 1991, this figure had decreased to 331,274. Surely, there are more jobs vacant in Brussels but mainly in the tertiary sector; industrial jobs are getting scarcer. As a result, the number of inhabitants of Brussels working outside their Region is growing (about 25,000 in 1983, 37,000 in 1991) and there are more and more commuters coming into Brussels (320,951 in 1983, 361,738 in 1991). The share of Brussels in the global national income has decreased (11.65 per cent in 1980, 9.79 per cent in 1990). The disparities have increased within the Brussels Region itself. For instance, people with an annual income lower than 100,000 BF have gained one per cent additional income between 1982 and 1990; during the same period, the increase was 14 per cent for the 100, ,000 BF group and for the highest incomes (more than 5 million BF), it exceeded 40 per cent. There are also big differences between the 19 boroughs : in 1993, the average annual income per fiscal declaration in Woluwe-Saint-Pierre was 1,114,300 BF whereas

7 A Brussels Identity? 235 in Saint-Josse-ten-Noode it was barely 631,700 BF. And as there are more inhabitants in the former than in the latter, the average income per capita ammmted to 450,000 BF in Woluwe-Saint-Pierre and to 184,100 BF in Saint-Josse-ten-Noode. These figures do not include the many international (particularly European) civil servants living in W oluwe. The linguistic profile of the Brussels Region has changed as well. We no longer have official statistics as there is no question about the language in the five-year population census anymore. Nevertheless, if we consider the votes cast at the regional elections, one thing is sure : the Brusselers voting for Flemish candidates were less numerous in 1995 than in 1989 (15 per cent voters for Flemish lists in 1989, 13.3 per cent in 1995). What about the non-belgians? Probably one third of the Brussels population has no right to vote, among which a majority of Frenchspeakers (70,000 from Morocco; 29,000 from France). Yet, there are also a number of Dutch-speaking migrants : some of the 30,000 Italians and 21,000 Turks have indeed made their way to Brussels via the coalmines in Limburg. The question is, of course, whether these foreign populations may at all be connected to the Belgian linguistic communities (see Morelli and Schreiber, in this volume). WHICH IDENTITY IN THE YEAR 2000? The linguistic tensions have certainly not disappeared. Yet, the constitutional reform of 1988 forces both communities in Brussels to collaborate. Their mutual positions (in the government, the regional institutions etc.) have been clearly outlined. The conflicts between Flemish and French-speaking politicians now focus on topics that are no longer of a direct linguistic type, but rather related to the logics of political power. Such topics are the possibility of fusions between some boroughs, the persistence of cultural activities set up and/or subsidized by both Communities (the so-called "bi-cultural" sector), the relations with the other Regions and the Communities, the proportions of the delegations of both Communities in executive and advisory bodies etc. A new tension has appeared, opposing the Region and the boroughs. It comes on top of the linguistic split. Local autonomy is one of the touchstones of the Belgian democratic system. In times of crisis, the citizen feels more attracted to the level of power that is closest to him, i.e. the borough. But there is also a tendency to centralize and to cut back expenses by "delocalizing" some decision centres. In Brussels, the 19 boroughs have a sometimes conflictual relationship with the Region, even though the same people are occasionally in office at both levels. The borough institution is not a model of democracy. The aldermen are elected

8 236 Nationalism in Belgium for a period of six years and so is the mayor (who is, in fact, appointed by the Government); there is no possibility of ousting them. Many local representatives are heading quasi-baronies which they tend to keep under very close control - as their own power is being threatened from above by the Region and from below by a wide range of local associations. Such tensions appear, for instance, when the Region intends to improve public transport by broadening the streets : the boroughs concerned do not always agree about these works and try to delay them. Conflicts of that type also arise in social matters : some boroughs refuse any regional support for actions in favour of the migrant population because, in fact, they do not want any action of that kind to be taken (this was the case in Schaerbeek until1994). The main conflict between the Region and (some of) the boroughs concerns financial and fiscal aspects. In 1989, many of the 19 boroughs were in a very poor financial state. So the Region took several measures (stronger regional inspection, policy of austerity) which the boroughs were not always willing to accept. The Region also decided to give more money (via a regional fimd) to the poorer boroughs, thus displeasing the richer ones. For the same reason, the Region disapproved when one of these richer boroughs, Woluwe-Saint-Pierre, decided to lower its taxes; in the eyes of the Brussels Minister-President, Charles Picque, this initiative was a misuse of the local autonomy and a form of non-solidarity, as the rich eventually pay less tax than the poor. Nonetheless, the linguistic split keeps playing a role. As there are only a handful of Flemish aldermen in the borough executives, mainly because there are but a few Flemings elected in the local councils, the Congresses of the Flemish Brusselers demanded a fusion of the 19 boroughs - not a complete fusion, as you have "to keep an intermediate level between the Region and the citizen" 4, but a construction of, for instance, eight or ten boroughs. Another Flemish strategy is to ask for a guaranteed representation of Flemings in the borough executives. Even some Frenchspeaking associations are in favour of a fusion : this is the case, for instance, of the Ateliers de recherche et d'action urbaines and of the Union des Entreprises de Bruxel/es 5 Brussels, a Region resulting from a subtraction, is sometimes used nowadays to justify the survival of the federal state, but this happens on contradictory grounds. For a long time, the Flemish Movement considered Brussels as a fimdamental issue; Craeybeckx put it this way : V/aanderen /aat Brusse/ niet los [Flanders won't let go of Brussels]. So the Flemish politicians were rather reluctant to granting Brussels the status of a third Region; the capital of a future federal state, so they argued, should

9 A Brussels Identity? 237 maintain very close ties with this very state (Peeters, 1983). Nowadays, some Flemish nationalist groups recommend to "let Brussels go", but they still form a minority. Others, including the radical nationalists of the Vlaams Blok, claim Brussels should be part of an independent Flanders (on a voluntary basis); the Blok is convinced that Brussels will, as always, side with the stronger. Finally, some fear that, if Flanders gets its independence, it will have to give up Brussels and its Flemish inhabitants. At the same time, the solidarity within the French Community is getting weaker. This Francophone solidarity had been necessary as long as federalism was not achieved - as an alliance against centralizing forces and against the Flemings. The tensions between the French Community, Brussels and Wallonia could contribute to the emergence of a Brussels identity. Of special significance nowadays is the growing number of immigrants. So-called ''new Belgians" (i.e. naturalized persons) have been elected in some of the 19 borough councils, in October 1994, and in the Brussels Parliament, in May Besides, a strong community feeling (in the social, not institutional sense of the word) has developed since the seventies through a dense web of associations, particularly at the local level of the boroughs. Both phenomenons have an effect on the way these people experience their identity and on the forms of political representation they develop. THE IDENTITY OF CAPITAL CITIES A last question might be phrased as follows : do people who live in capital cities like Brussels have a different identity from the people in the provinces? Do they share common features with persons living in other capitals? This issue can only be discussed on the basis of historical and geographical comparisons. This is a rather difficult exercise, as Brussels displays very specific features that contribute towards making up its political identity. One of these features is the high percentage of foreigners in the very heart of Brussels (Kesteloot, 1984; De Lannoy and Kesteloot, 1990) whereas in other capital cities like Paris and Berlin, these populations have been driven to the suburbs because of the housing prices. The proportion of foreigners is high in Brussels; only a few industrial centres in Great Britain and Germany have similar figures, but they are not capital cities (Birmingham or Frankfurt, for instance). The comparisons with Berlin or Paris are not conclusive. Their political status is very different. Berlin has had a very particular history as the long-time checkpoint between two separate states. Paris has been for a very long time the symbol of French

10 238 Nationalism in Belgium centralism; Wltil1977, it was Wlder direct control of the govermnent (there was no mayor of Paris, only a prefet). Paris is certainly not the capital of a federal state. The Brussels identity is a very specific one in comparison with other urban identities. After a period of "subtraction", it was built upon the addition of various identities, some of which are very difficult to define. This evolution has different aspects : it has to do with democracy (the local associations, especially in environmental matters), multiculturalism in cosmopolitan cities, spatial planning etc. but also with the implosion of the Belgian unitary state and the emergence of new allegiances, to a regional structure or to the European Union. Quite a few European institutions are based in Brussels, such as the Commission, the CoWlcil of Ministers, the Parliament (for COREPER and some plenary meetings), the Economic and Social Committee as well as the West European Union. Brussels, therefore, benefits - directly or indirectly - from the expenses these institutions bring with them (in 1991, for instance, these amowlted to 32.5 billion BF - cf. Mens en Ruimte, 1992). Still, the social cost of this European presence (e.g. higher rents, the development of offices instead of housing etc.) has a negative impact on the attachment of a part of the Brussels population to the European enterprise. Whatever the case, the concepts of nation and state are at stake here insofar as their homogeneity and continuity are concerned. The Brussels symbols, which did not emerge from historical processes and are not the result of the people's choice either, offer a good example of the way representation mechanisms have been distorted. CONCLUSIONS Even if there existed such a thing as "the Identity of a Capital City", the Brussels identity would be a very specific one. First of all, it developed as the result of a particular historical process : the progress of the federalizing forces in the Belgian state. Brussels was distrusted by the Flemish Movement and - in spite of a long-time political alliance of a strategic type- even by some parts of the Walloon Movement. Its identity was thus of a subtractive kind. In the ensuing years, throughout the building of a new federal Belgian state, this identity had to cope with radical changes within the Brussels population and with an alteration of its social and economic positions; as a result, it now consists more and more of additions. Even though the Brussels Region is sometimes seen as the last possible link between both linguistic communities in the federal state, Flemings and Francophones do not any longer hold a monopoly position on the Brussels political scene.

11 A Brussels Identity? 239 These are some of the new particulars which, together with the crisis affecting political loyalties, might affect the Brussels identity in the future. NOTES 1. In 1991, 67.7 per cent of the Members of the Federal Parliament were at the same time local COWlcillors. 2. J. Chabert, interviewed in Gazet van Antwerpen, Belgicains is, in this context, a vecy pejorative term. The reference to the Bloc de Ia Liberte linguistique clearly implies that these belgicains are mainly blamed for their exclusive interest in linguistic matters. 4. K. Deschouwer, chairman of the 1994 Congress, in De Morgen, In the Financieel-Economische Tijd,