'Rock, Paper, Scissors' or 'The Young and the Restless': Towards a New Way of Thinking about (Non)Proliferation

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1 See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: 'Rock, Paper, Scissors' or 'The Young and the Restless': Towards a New Way of Thinking about (Non)Proliferation Article CITATIONS 0 READS 35 2 authors: Wyn Bowen King's College London 42 PUBLICATIONS 102 CITATIONS SEE PROFILE Susan Martin King's College London 4 PUBLICATIONS 1 CITATION SEE PROFILE All content following this page was uploaded by Susan Martin on 08 September The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

2 Rock, Paper, Scissors or The Young and the Restless : Towards a New Way of Thinking about (Non)Proliferation Prof. Wyn Bowen and Dr. Susan B Martin Department of War Studies King's College London The Strand, London, WC2R 2LS susan.b.martin@kcl.ac.uk DRAFT: August 2011 Please do not cite or quote without permission Prepared for delivery at the 2011 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1-4, Copyright by the American Political Science Association.

3 2 The story of the international community s efforts to address proliferation concerns is often described in what can be thought of as rock, paper, scissors terms: The suspect state is seen as intent on developing nuclear weapons, while the international community searches for the right tool to crush, smother, or cut off its efforts. Too often, it seems that whatever hand is played by the international community, determined proliferators are able to trump it and move inextricably toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons. 1 But this analogy, and the image of the (non)proliferation problem that underlies it, is too simple, in at least three ways. 2 First, it ignores the way that the nature of the proliferation problem evolves over time. Proliferation is a process, not a discrete event. As a state pauses or advances its nuclear activities, the nature of the (non)proliferation problem, of the choices facing the suspect state as well as the international community, evolves in important ways. Second, in a game of rock, paper, scissors the goal of each player is set from the beginning. While this accords with the idea of a determined proliferator, we argue that such proliferators rarely exist from the very outset of a state s nuclear programme. Instead, goals evolve over time as part of the proliferation process, and in response to 1 For example, Ogilvie-White has argued that since 1985, North Korea has been making and breaking commitments, playing cat and mouse with the IAEA and international negotiators, periodically appearing to climb down, and all the while pursuing an independent nuclear deterrent. See Tanya Ogilvie-White, The Defiant States: The Nuclear Diplomacy of North Korea and Iran, The Nonproliferation Review 17, 1 (March 2010), We use the term (non)proliferation problem to encompass both the viewpoints of the international community and the suspect state. For the international community, the problem is one of nonproliferation; for the suspect state, the problem can take at least two forms: for a state interested in nuclear weapons, the problem is how to proliferate or to advance its nuclear program; for states not interested in nuclear weapons, it is how to credibly demonstrate that non-interest without sacrificing other goals.

4 3 international and domestic events. This in turn suggests that the tactical goals of the international community must also evolve in keeping with changes in the motivations and actions of suspect proliferators. Third, the various players involved in any given (non)proliferation problem also evolve over time, with new players coming on to the scene and the roles allotted to existing players increasing or decreasing in size, and sometimes disappearing completely. To capture these aspects of the (non)proliferation problem, we suggest that it is useful to view it as a soap opera. Like The Young and The Restless, Coronation Street, or 24, the (non)proliferation narrative spans across various episodes, can include numerous sub-pots, and involves a changing and sometime revolving cast of characters. The idea of proliferation as a soap opera draws on arguments about strategic scripts advanced by Lawrence Freedman. Freedman suggests that instead of seeing strategy as a planned sequence of events where one thing inevitably follows another, leading in the end to the desired result, it can be helpful to view strategy as a story line or script, with parts played by multiple players and where the only role a policymaker truly knows is his own. Freedman further suggests that instead of envisioning this script as a movie or play that culminates in a final scene that resolves the major themes, it is more useful to think of strategy as the script of an on-going soap opera, where both actors and the roles they play evolve and change, and each episode leads, not to a finale with an ultimate resolution, but simply to the next episode. 3 3 Sir Lawrence Freedman, Opening Address at Making it Personal: Anglo-American Perceptions of Middle East Adversaries and the Shaping of Strategy, held at King s College London, 9-10 June 2011.

5 4 The idea of (non)proliferation as a soap opera fits well with the arguments that we are making about proliferation as a process. If proliferation is a process that evolves and changes over time, nonproliferation should be one as well. Key to understanding these processes is an understanding of how motives, capabilities, opportunities, and the role of the characters and actors involved evolve and interact over time. 4 Traditionally nonproliferation policy has tended to focus on stopping the acquisition of capability; in part this is because it is the easiest (though not easy) part of the suspect proliferator to assess. In addition, there is a sense that once the capability is acquired, there is little or nothing external actors can do to stop a state from going nuclear. Here supply is the key to proliferation. But this contrasts with another piece of conventional wisdom, which is that when a state is determined to get nuclear weapons, there is little that can be done to stop it. Here demand is key. We argue for the need to problematize the goals and motivations of suspected proliferators, for analysis of how and why motives and goals evolve over time, and especially for a greater awareness of how non-proliferation policy may have an unexpected, and even undesirable, influence on the goals and motivations of a suspect proliferator. The idea of strategic scripts also opens up the possibility that the international community and the suspect state may actually be playing from different, or only partially overlapping, scripts. A suspect state may be reading from a script that focuses on 4 Crucially, this conception of the (non)proliferation problem should facilitate analysis of the interaction between demand and supply factors. See Scott D. Sagan, Nuclear Latency and Nuclear Proliferation in Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21 st Century, vol. 2: A Comparative Prospective ed. William C. Potter with Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, 81, 99.

6 5 regional or even domestic factors, while the international community s script revolves around international commitments and implications. 5 This highlights the need for nonproliferation strategies to take into account the evolution of the (non)proliferation problem over time. Here we present some preliminary ideas that we are in the process of developing as part of a new research project on nonproliferation strategies. We argue that recognition and analysis of the various ways that the (non)proliferation problem can evolve can improve policy by helping policymakers set targets and determine tactics with an eye to the overall goal of nonproliferation. Below we focus on evolution in three areas: evolution in the capabilities of the suspect state, evolution in the aims of the suspect state, and evolution of the actors involved in the (non)proliferation problem. We then look at what this suggests for proliferation policy, both in general and in the specific case of Iran. While there are important interactions between changes in capabilities, aims, and the actors ( cast ) involved in the (non)proliferation problem, we address each separately for the sake of clarity. Evolution of Capabilities An examination of the evolution of capabilities presupposes that the lack of a sufficient quantity of fissile material is not the only meaningful stopping point for suspect nuclear programs. Different degrees of capability as well as different public postures have different consequences for regional and international stability (including, for example, sufficient warning for counteraction if the program restarts, incentives for other 5 Iran may be an example of this. At least in the 1980s and 1990s, Iran s script seems to have focused on Iraq, while the script of the international community and the United States focused on the implications of Iranian actions for international stability and security.

7 6 states to start or intensify nuclear programs, incentives for first and preemptive strikes, and arms races) as well as the overall health of and support for the nonproliferation regime. In general, a suspect state s fissile material production capabilities can be expected to expand over time, as may its capabilities related to weaponization and delivery. From the point of view of nonproliferation policy, too often a state s capability is seen as a dichotomous variable: it is either a nuclear-weapons state or it is not, and nonproliferation strategy has been seen as dichotomous as well: one of compellence to roll-back and end a nuclear weapons program or one of deterrence and containment once a state has become nuclear. 6 We argue that our understanding of the range of both a suspect state s capability and of non-proliferation policy needs to be more continuous. Scott Sagan argues that nuclear latency, defined as a measure of how quickly a state could develop a nuclear weapon if it chose to do so from its current state of technological development, differs from human pregnancy with its standard gestation period. Instead, different nonnuclear weapons states, even those starting from the same technological threshold, are likely to take different lengths of time to move to the possession of a single nuclear weapon or a usable arsenal. 7 In addition, as Hugh Gusterson has argued in relation to North Korea, Being nuclear isn t like being pregnant at all: One can think of a number of agreements with North Korea that might allow it to be a little bit nuclear. 8 One can certainly think of states that would be widely spaced out on a continuum of nuclear 6 Of course, both carrots and sticks can be used in a compellence strategy. 7 Sagan, Nuclear Latency, Hugh Gusterson, Thinking Creatively about the North Korean Stalemate, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (12 August 2009) available at: (accessed 4 August 2011).

8 7 weapons capability, with a state like the Sudan at one end and the US and Russia at the other, with Australia, Japan, South Africa, and many others at points in-between. The process of proliferation is often described as a ladder, where proliferators progress in a linear manner, acquiring specific technical capabilities and materials until they become a nuclear weapons state. 9 In fact, acquiring nuclear weapons involves a series of connecting ladders, and states may move up, across and even down then,. The interconnecting ladders involve the production/acquisition of the necessary fissile material, design and fabrication of the fissile core as well as of the non-nuclear components of a weapon, weapons assembly, the development and use of testing capabilities, the development and production of a delivery system, and integration of the weapon with the delivery system. The final ladder involves deployment, the development of doctrine and command and control arrangements, and training. But even these multiple ladders of capability are not enough to characterize a nuclear weapons program; as Braut-Hegghammer argues, we also need to analyze the goals/motives of nuclear activities as well as the program s intensity, its level of funding and its degree of organization. 10 Typically a state is recognized as a de facto nuclear weapons state once it has a successful nuclear test. The exception is Israel, which is widely recognized as possessing nuclear weapons despite its official denial (and questions regarding whether or not it has carried out a test). Much of the focus of nonproliferation policy, however, is 9 See, for example, Lewis Dunn, Controlling the Bomb, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Jacques E.C. Hymans, When Does a State Become a Nuclear Weapon State? An Exercise in Measurement Validation. Nonproliferation Review 17,1 (March 2010) Critiques of the ladder concept are not new; see, for example, Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, Opaque Nuclear Proliferation, Journal of Strategic Studies, 13, 3 (1990), Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Revisiting Osiraq: Preventive Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Risks, International Security 36, 1 (Summer 2011), 104.

9 8 on preventing the acquisition of the requisite fissile material, and as Jacques Hymans has discussed, some analysts have focused on the possession of a significant quantity (SQ) of fissile material as the measure of nuclear weapons capability. 11 While the ultimate goal of nonproliferation policy is to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons, different states can stop at different points short of that capability. Failure to stop a state from acquiring a SQ does not mean that it will be impossible to stop it at some other point short of a full nuclear weapons capability. This is currently at issue with Iran. No one today doubts that, given enough time, Iran will be able to produce a SQ of fissile material or continue on from there to produce, and if it wishes, to test, a nuclear weapon. Given this, the question is whether the international community continues its strategy of compellence whereby Iran is offered a range of carrots and sticks to end its nuclear program, or whether the evolution of Iran s capabilities requires evolution in the international community s non-proliferation strategy. Of course, at the same time as this change in capabilities occurs, the motives behind the nuclear program as well as the actors involved in it can change as well. Evolution of Aims The motives behind a state s development of nuclear capabilities are inherently difficult to discern. This is due to the dual-use nature of the technology and materials, as well as to incentives to conceal weapons programs because of the opposition of leading states and the international community to the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Public statements of intentions may deliberately mislead; they may also be used instrumentally in an attempt to gain bargaining leverage, curry favor with particular groups, promote a 11 Hymans, When Does a State Become a Nuclear Weapon State?

10 9 domestic agenda, or to play different international states and groups against each other. In other words, it can be as difficult to discern the intentions that lay behind public statements as it is to discern the intentions behind the suspect activities themselves. As a result, analysts tend to emphasize statements that correspond with their preconceived image of a state (e.g. Iran s claims about nuclear weapons and Israel) and to dismiss as propaganda those that challenge it (e.g. Iran s claims that it is not pursuing nuclear weapons.) 12 Too often, the capabilities of a state are taken as an index of intentions, and a state engaged in nuclear activities seen as suspicious is treated as a determined proliferator, which we define as a state that is determined to cross the military nuclear threshold as soon as it is technically capable of doing so. The Soviet Union is probably the best example of a determined proliferator. But capabilities are not necessarily a good index of intentions. In their quantitative study of the Determinants of Nuclear Proliferation, Jo and Gartzke found that latent nuclear weapons production capability is positively and significantly associated with the presence of nuclear weapons programs but not with the actual possession of nuclear weapons. 13 In their analysis, Jo and Gartzke examine underlying capabilities (by summing uranium deposits, metallurgists, chemical engineers, and nuclear engineers/physicists and chemists, electronic/explosive specialists, nitric acid 12 An example of the former is a statement in 1991 by Iran s Deputy President, Ayatollah Mohajerani that Because the enemy [Israel] has nuclear facilities, the Muslim states, too, should be equipped with the same capacity. See The Middle East Talks; Iran is Said to Seek to Make Atom Arms with Chinese Help, Washington Post 30 October An example of the latter is Iran s Statement at IAEA Emergency Meeting, Mehr News Agency, August 10, 2005 available at: (accessed 12 August 2011); see also Iran leader Khamenei brands US nuclear criminal, BBC News 17 April 2010, available at: (accessed 12 August 2011). 13 Dong-Joon Jo and Eric Gartzke, Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, 1 (February 2007), 176, 181.

11 10 production capacity, and electricity production capacity); they do not examine more proximate capabilities, such as the ability to produce fissile material or the existence of a delivery capability. 14 Fitzpatrick suggests that it is these more proximate capabilities that may be most important when he argues that no country that has proceeded as far as Iran in nuclear-weapons development has failed to go on to weapons production. 15 The fact that it has not happened yet does not mean that such a result is inevitable, however. After all, if capabilities lead inexorably to nuclear weapons, then nuclear hedgers would not exist. Yet the existence of hedgers, drifters or fence sitters is widely recognized. 16 Ariel Levite defines hedging as a national strategy of maintaining, or at least appearing to maintain, a viable option for the relatively rapid acquisition of nuclear weapons, based on an indigenous technical capacity to produce them within a relatively short time frame ranging from several weeks to a few years. In its most advanced form, nuclear hedging involves nuclear fuel-cycle facilities capable of producing fissionable materials (by way of uranium enrichment and/or plutonium separation), as well as the scientific and engineering expertise both to support them and to package their final product into a nuclear explosive charge Jo and Gartzke, Determinants, Mark Fitzpatrick, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Avoiding the Worst-Case Outcomes, Adelphi Papers 48, 398 (2008), 9. Sagan also argues for the importance of fuel cycle technology in assessments of latent nuclear capability. See Sagan, Nuclear Latency and Nonproliferation, Braut-Hegghammer defines drift as an exploration of the technical foundations for a nuclear weapons program without an explicit political mandate guiding these efforts. See Braut-Hegghammer, Revisiting Osiraq, 109. Solingen uses the term fence-sitter to refer to undecided states reluctant to commit themselves fully and effectively to a denuclearizing regime.such states can wait to make the ultimate declaratory political stand while sitting on various types of fences (some with basements), holding different levels of nuclear capabilities. See Etel Solingen, The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint, International Security 19, 2 (Autumn 1994), 127, footnote Ariel E. Levite, Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited, International Security 27, 3 (Winter 2002/03), 69.

12 11 Examples include, at various times in their histories, Japan, France, India, and Pakistan. 18 While the salient cases of India and Pakistan seem to suggest that once a nuclear capability exists it will eventually be converted to nuclear weapons, Jo and Gartzke report a negative relationship between the age of a nuclear program and subsequent development of nuclear weapons: There is no indication that older programs are more likely to lead to proliferation. In fact, the passage of time makes states less likely to acquire nuclear weapons. 19 This means that buying time can in and of itself be an important goal of nonproliferation policy. It also suggests that one goal of nonproliferation policy should be to prevent hedgers from becoming determined proliferators. To do this, a better understanding of why states hedge, and what sort of events may lead to a state to evolve from a hedger to a determined proliferators, is needed. However, as James Acton has argued, nuclear mind-reading is difficult, and we should avoid, if possible, making the success of non-proliferation policies rest on our ability to accurately understand the motives behind a state s nuclear activities. 20 We argue instead for the analytically-prior step: for the need for non-proliferation policy to problematize motives, to take into account the fact that state motives can evolve and change over time, and to consider the factors that might influence such changes. States may have a variety of motives for engaging in suspect activities. They may simply be exploratory, without a clear end in view, or they may have a goal that is 18 Braut-Hegghammer cites Richelson in arguing that France, India, and Israel began to pursue a nuclear weapons option with an explicit commitment to acquire nuclear weapons. See Braut- Hegghammer, Revisiting Osiraq, 107, fn. 27 and Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb (New York: WW Norton, 2007). 19 Jo and Gartzke, Determinants, James Acton, The Problem with Nuclear Mind Reading, Survival 51, 1 (February-March 2009),

13 12 distinct from the development of a nuclear weapons arsenal. For example, writing in 2006, Gareth Porter reports that analysts familiar with Iranian thinking believe that the enrichment is not for the purpose of acquiring nuclear weapons but to force the United States to negotiate a settlement with Iran. 21 Levite argues that states do not make a decision about whether to go nuclear until the last possible moment, which suggests that almost every nuclear weapons program was at some point exploratory or intended as a hedge. 22 Again using Iran as an example, early claims that it is determined to develop nuclear weapons are giving way to an emerging consensus that Iran has not yet decided whether or not to acquire nuclear weapons. 23 This means that if we conclude that any state engaged in suspect capabilities is intent on developing nuclear weapons, we may miss important opportunities to influence the direction of the program. With a determined proliferator who is intent on a nuclear capability, nonproliferation policy may have to focus exclusively on building obstacles 21 Gareth Porter, Burnt Offering, The American Prospect, May 21, 2006, available at prospect.org/cs/articles?articleid=11539 (accessed 4 Aug 2011). 22 Levite, Never Say Never Again, For example, in 2003 Warren Christopher stated that Iran was determined to develop nuclear weapons. See Elaine Sciolino, Christopher Signals a Tougher US Line Toward Iran, New York Times March 31, 1993; see also The Middle East Talks; Iran is Said to Seek to Make Atom Arms with Chinese Help, New York Times Oct. 29, Even in the early 1990s, there was disagreement about the meaning of Iran s activities. See, for example, Elaine Sciolino, CIA Says Iran Makes Progress on Atom Arms, New York Times Nov. 30, 1992; Elaine Sciolino, Report Says Iran Seeks Atom Arms, New York Times Oct. 31, For claims that in 2011 Iran may still be undecided about whether to acquire nuclear weapons, see James R Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 10, 2011, available at: United States Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the United States, March 10, 2011, particularly the answer provided by James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, on 14; Adam Entous, US Spies: Iran Split on Nuclear Program, The Wall Street Journal February 17, 2011; Wyn Q. Bowen and Jonathan Brewer, Iran s Nuclear Challenge: Nine Years and Counting, International Affairs 87, 4 (2011), ; Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, Pride and Prejudice: Understanding Iran s Nuclear Weapons Program, in Pride and Prejudice: Understanding Iran s Nuclear Program in Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21 st Century, vol. 2: A Comparative Prospective ed. William C. Potter with Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, 42.

14 13 and imposing costs. With a state that is undecided about whether it needs nuclear weapons, there may be more room to maneuver. Libya is a suggestive example. The literature on proliferation drivers provides a ready-made source of hypotheses about factors that may influence the evolution of a state s motives. 24 These include factors at every level of analysis. For example, Jacques Hymans has argued for the importance played by the beliefs and personality of individual leaders in explaining proliferation. 25 This suggests that changes in a country s leadership may act as important turning points in the evolution of a country s program, and that analysis of the fit (or lack of fit) between a nuclear weapons program and a particular leader s grand strategy could provide important information about both the expected evolution of a program and opportunities for influencing it. State level models of proliferation suggest that it will be easier to curb a program when in its early stages, when the regime is oriented towards the international economy, and when the nuclear issue has not become an important political issue domestically. 26 At the international level, changes in norms as well as the strategic situation of states can also impact the direction of a nuclear program. 24 Good overviews include Scott D. Sagan, Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb, International Security 21, 3 (Winter ), 54-86; Tanya Ogilvie-White, Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate, Nonproliferation Review 4, 1 (Fall 1996), 43-60; Jacques E.C. Hymans, Theories of Nuclear Proliferation: The State of the Field, Nonproliferation Review 13, 3 (November 2006), See also William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova. "Divining Nuclear Intentions: A Review Essay." International Security 33, 1 (Summer 2008), ; Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results (Frank Cass, 1993); and William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, eds., Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21 st Century vol. 1: The Role of Theory (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010). 25 Jacques E.C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 26 See, for example, Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Peter R. Lavoy, Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation, Security Studies 2, 3-4 (1993) Note that Braut-Hegghammer s analysis suggests that both security concerns and resource availability may help to determine how receptive policymakers

15 14 We suggest that it is also important to think about how nonproliferation policies themselves may affect the evolution of aims. In particular, public and coercive efforts at nonproliferation may have a perverse affect on a suspect state s aims, leading it to become more committed to its nuclear program and/or more committed to the development of nuclear weapons. 27 Public efforts at coercion can lead to the domestic politicization of nuclear activities, where state leaders who comply with international demands risk increased opposition at home. While it is probably impossible to prevent the domestic politicization of a nuclear program supporters of the program will always have an incentive to politicize it if they appear to be losing ground it may be possible to delay such politicization. This can be done by first focusing efforts at strengthening the first tier of nonproliferation policy the overall nonproliferation regime, and second, if policies targeted at particular states are necessary, by emphasizing private engagement over public, coercive policies. Again, Libya provides an example; the secret nature of the Libya-US-UK talks during 2003 allowed progress to be made in resolving a nuclear proliferation problem. Keeping the talks a closely held secret, even within the respective governments, meant that it was possible to prevent any opposition developing to the direction and ultimate conclusion of the deal on Libya renouncing nuclear and other WMD. 28 are to the myth making activities of scientists. See Braut-Hegghammer, Revisiting Osiraq, , 116 and 117. The role of public opinion is often highlighted in particular cases, such as Iran and India, but to our knowledge has not received in-depth analysis. 27 Ukraine may illustrate the opposite effect of engagement policies, where the aims of security and independence were ultimately seen as best served by no nukes rather than nukes, at least in part because of the role of the West (and the fact that Ukraine lacked actual control over the nuclear weapons on its territory). 28 See Wyn Q. Bowen, Libya and Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink, Adelphi Papers 46, 380 (2006).

16 15 Coercive policies may backfire by creating a firm link between the state s security and independence and the possession of nuclear weapons. 29 To the extent that coercive policies increase a state s concern about its security and independence, they may actually strengthen the security motives for proliferation. Braut-Hegghammer has argued that while the 1981 strike on the Osiraq reactor in Iraq resulted in the Saddam Hussein regime s abandonment of the plutonium route to developing a nuclear capability, this effect was outweighed by the fact that the attack triggered a nuclear weapons program where one did not previously exist. She argues that Saddam s statements after the attack signaled a reinforced commitment to bolster strategic defenses and a desire to sooth Iraq s wounded pride; in addition to strengthening the motives behind the program, it also led to an increase in the resources devoted to it. 30 We suggest that other coercive policies carry the risk of similar effects. While this risk is not entirely unrecognized, we argue that it has not received enough attention, especially in regard to policies that fall short of preventive attacks. 31 In this regard, it is also interesting to note that the 2007 and 2012 NIEs place the Iranian nuclear program in the context of Iran s rivalry with Iraq. 32 The decision to 29 This is not to suggest that such a link may not already exist. The experience of the Iran-Iraq war including the international community s failure to respond to Iraqi use of chemical weapons and the arms embargo together with the difficulties that Iran has faced maintaining its conventional military, have all been seen as providing a motive for an Iranian nuclear option. While Iran s oil reserves have lead analysts to question Iran s need for nuclear power, the fact that Iran is dependent on external refineries for 40% of it domestic gasoline needs may also help to explain Iran s desire for self-sufficiency. The figure of 40% is from Chubin, Iran, She also notes that the fear of preemptive strikes in 1990 led to the instigation of a crash program. See Braut-Hegghammer, Revisiting Osiraq, 102, 116 and Braut-Hegghammer, Revisiting Osiraq, notes that there was disagreement within the Israeli government and military and intelligence services as to whether an air strike would reduce or intensify the risk that Iraq would acquire nuclear weapons. See 111, fn See US National Intelligence Council, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, National Intelligence Estimate, November 2007, available at: No public version of the 2011 National Intelligence Estimate has been released; for information see: Josh Rogin, New National Intelligence Estimate on Iran complete, The Cable, Foreign Policy (February 15, 2011)

17 16 restart the Iranian nuclear program was taken during the Iran-Iraq War, perhaps as early as According to the 2007 NIE, work on weaponization was stopped in 2003, the year when the threat from Saddam Hussein was removed. 34 In 2003 the Iranians also made what appears to be their strongest effort at a grand settlement with the United States. While the failure of the Bush administration to respond positively to the Iranian initiative has been widely criticized, the possible impact of this failure on the goals of the Iranian program has not received as much attention. It is possible that the lack of response to the Iranian initiative, combined with US actions in Iraq and Afghanistan along with efforts to erect new barriers to proliferation, such as Additional Protocols (1997) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (2003), combined to take a nuclear program that had lost its adversary (Iraq) into one aimed at creating a hedging capability. Evolution of the Cast Involved In addition to changes in capability and aims, changes in the cast involved can have dramatic effects on the nature of the (non)proliferation problem. The most salient cast changes occur on the international stage and on the domestic stage in the suspect state, although changes at the domestic level in leading international states can be available at: n_complete; Seymour M. Hersh, Iran and the Bomb, The New Yorker June 6, 2011, On the role of Iran in the Iraqi program, see Braut-Hegghammer, Revisiting Osiraq; Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Rebel Without a Cause? The Nonproliferation Review 13, 1 (2006) In this latter piece, Braut- Hegghammer describes Saddam Hussein s attempt to convince international inspectors that Iraq had disarmed while at same time maintaining some ambiguity about its capabilities in order to deter Israel and Iran as well as enemies at home. 33 While later dates are commonly given, Reuters cites an Iranian National News Agency report in 1982 that Iran is to start importing nuclear technology again. See Reuters, Iran to Restudy A-Power, New York Times March 18, The provision of different dates for the restart of the program may involve different definitions of what constitutes a nuclear program. 34 See US National Intelligence Council, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities.

18 17 important drivers of changes in the cast at the international level. At the international level, the role of the United States is crucial; other major states, such as Russia and China and the states of the EU, may have the ability to prevent a deal, but by themselves they have not been able to engineer a solution to (non)proliferation problems. In contrast, the US is an essential player. This is clear in the cases of Libya, North Korea and Iran, where achieving some sort of accommodation with the United States has been a central issue, as well as in cases ranging from South Africa, the FSU states, and Argentina and Brazil. 35 In the case of Iran, for example, the failure of the United States to engage diplomatically with Iran following the October 2003 and November 2004 agreements reached by the E3 foreign ministers and Iran on suspending enrichment contributed to Iran s subsequent decision to restart its enrichment program. 36 The lack of a state to act as a mediator between the US and Iran, as the UK did between the US and Libya, may also help to explain the difference in outcome in these two cases. 37 This is a hypothesis that should be further explored. For instance, what scope is there for Turkey or Brazil to play such a role with Iran today? As discussed above, there are various factors at the domestic level that may drive changes in the (non)proliferation problem. Changes in state leadership both in 35 For example, see Levite s argument about the US and Argentina and Brazil. Levite, Never Say Never Again, Hassan Rohani, who led Iranian talks with the E3 and who has also served as secretary of Iran s Supreme National Security Council, argued on April 19, 2006 that the offers made by the EU3 in negotiations were of no immediate benefit to Iran. See Chen Kane, Nuclear Decision-Making in Iran: A Rare Glimpse, Middle East Brief from the Crown Center for Middle East Studies, 5 (May 2006), 4; Johan Bergenas, The European Union s Evolving Engagement with Iran: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back, The Nonproliferation Review 17, 3 (November 2010), 492. See also the argument presented by Flynt Leverett, Dealing with Tehran: Assessing US Diplomatic Options Toward Iran, (New York: The Century Foundation, 2006), Apologies need to track down cite for person who discusses how E3 negotiations with Iran remove them as possible mediator between US and Iran.

19 18 terms of individual leaders and type of regime can dramatically change the (non)proliferation problem. Solingen, for example, argues that the general attitude of the regime towards the international community its desire for integration as opposed to isolation is a key determinant of proliferation. 38 While Jo and Gartzke found little support for the role of bureaucratic/interest group politics in their qualitative study of proliferation, case studies of countries such as India suggest otherwise. 39 Public opinion can play a role, and the degree to which and the stage at which it doe so may be important. The extent to which public opinion is an actual driver and/or constraint, or something that is manipulated and channeled, is not clear, and can be expected to vary across regimes and over time. There seem to be no examples where public opinion has led to the discontinuation of a nuclear program, despite claims that public dissatisfaction due to sanctions and the costs of the program can be important; arguments about public opinion as a driver (or at least a constraint on roll-back) have been made in regard to India s nuclear test as well as Iran s enrichment capability. 40 The ability of a suspect state to portray efforts to curb its nuclear activities as an attack on its independence and autonomy, as for example Ahmadinejad has done in Iran, suggest that it may be in the interest of the international community to avoid activating public opinion. Chubin notes that before 2002 in Iran, public opinion was neither a driver not a constraint on nuclear development. 41 This changes in August 2002, when the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCIR) publicly announces that 38 Solingen, Nuclear Logics. 39 See Jo And Gartzke, Determinants; Solingen, Nuclear Logics; Peter R. Lavoy, Nuclear Myths. 40 On the effect of sanctions, see Shahram Chubin, Iran: Domestic Politics and Nuclear Choices, in Strategic Asia : Domestic Political Change and Grand Strategy eds. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Washington: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2007), 311; Chubin also addresses the role of public opinion in Iran s Nuclear Ambitions (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2006). 41 Chubin, Iran, 311.

20 19 Iran has a secret nuclear facility at Natanz, on the basis of information some say was leaked by the United States or Israel. 42 Prior to 2002 the United States dealt with the Iranian nuclear issue largely though an effort to cut off the supply of various materials and facilities, and through providing data to the IAEA. After the NCIR press conference and the subsequent investigation and press conference by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), the Iran nuclear issue moved to the public stage. 43 With hindsight, it appears that this move may have hindered a negotiated solution. It apparently increased pressure on Iran, but it may also have activated Iranian public opinion and political sensitivities, and over the long-term constrained Iran from rollback. 44 Implications for Policy Policy recommendations emerge from this analysis and they notably include: the need to think in terms of nonproliferation strategy as opposed to nonproliferation policy; the value of being open to grand bargains with suspect states; and the need to take into account political sensitivities, including the need to avoid loss of face for suspect states 42 Despite claims by the NCIR that it had identified the plant through its own resources, it is widely suspected that the information was leaked to the group. US intelligence has been watching the Natanz and Arak sites, and had briefed the IAEA on the intelligence earlier in See New Information on Top Secret Projects of the Iranian Regime s Nuclear Program, Remarks by Aliereza Jafarzadeh, US Representative Office, National Council of Resistance of Iran, August 14, 2002, available at: (accessed 9 August 2011). See also Jeffrey Lewis, NCRI Did Not Discover Natanz, Arms Control Wonk 28 October 2006, available at: (accessed 2 Aug 2011); Barbara Slavin, How Do You Solve a Problem Like Iran? The Nonproliferation Review 15, 1 (March 2008), In December 2002, ISIS releases satellite photos of the facility and identifies Natanz as a gas centrifuge enrichment facility. ISIS., Nuclear Iran: Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant, available at: (accessed 2 August 2011). 44 As noted elsewhere, the exact role of public opinion in Iran (and other countries) is not clear. Chubin argues in 2007 that popular will remains clearly a background factor in decision-making on nuclear policy, but given that he contrasts this with the pre-2002 role, it does suggest that it acts as a constraint. See Chubin, Iran, 311.

21 20 when negotiating over nuclear issues, and the related challenge of avoiding domestic politicization. The need for non-proliferation strategy The most important recommendation is the need to think in terms of nonproliferation strategy as well as, or instead of, nonproliferation policy. Once a policy is set, it can be difficult to make changes in policy towards a particular state because such changes can be seen as concessions or exceptions that weaken the specific approach in any given context, or provide unhelpful signals to other parties about how to deal with international efforts to address proliferation challenges. A strategy, however, is a plan that can take into account the possibilities and need for changes in approach as circumstances evolve and in response to moves by other actors. These possibilities are highlighted well by the concept of strategic scripts because it leads one to focus on the scripts being used by each actor, the ways in which these can interact in the context of the evolving (non)proliferation problem, and the potential ways the story line can unfold over time. Thinking in terms of strategy rather than policy better reflects the fact that proliferation is a process, not a discrete act, and that (non)proliferation problems evolve over time, as argued above. However, an understanding of how the (non)proliferation problem can evolve over time is helpful only if one is willing to alter nonproliferation approaches to better take into account the changed circumstances. At least three general objections could be made to the idea of changing nonproliferation policy towards a specific state in response to the evolution of the

22 21 (non)proliferation problem. The three objections revolve around the following concerns: encouraging states to use nuclear activities as a bargaining chip; the potential for nuclear chains to be set in motion if a state is allowed to make progress towards nuclear weapons status unchecked; and weakening the overall nonproliferation regime. 45 The likelihood of inciting a state to undertake questionable nuclear activities or start a nuclear weapons program because concessions have been made to a suspected proliferator is slight. Nuclear programs are resource intensive; they are also technically challenging, and programs significant enough to induce negotiation cannot be created on a whim. In addition, there are clear costs and risks associated with such a program international opprobrium, economic sanctions, and even pre-emptive military action. The empirical record supports the claim that nuclear programs are not something that states undertake lightly. While everyone worries about proliferation chains, and it is possible to sketch a dotted line from the US to the Soviet Union, and from the Soviet Union to Great Britain and France, and so on, it is not clear that such links can carry substantial causal weight. Potter and Mukhatzhanova argue that the work of Hymans and Solingen challenge the notion of proliferation chains, and Jo and Gartzke find that the presence of a nuclear threat actually decreases the predicted probability of a nuclear weapons program by and the predicted conditional probability of nuclear weapons by Jo and Gartzke hypothesize that this may be due to the threat of preemptive war, which might leave room to argue that concessions to one suspect state will lessen this fear for 45 Fitzpatrick argues that the dangers of moving away from no enrichment to a fall-back position in the case of Iran include the possibility of proliferation chains and damage to the Nonproliferation Treaty that would then encourage other states to go nuclear. See Mark Fitzpatrick, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Avoiding Worst-Case Outcomes, The Adelphi Papers 48: 398 (2008). 46 Potter and Mukhatzhanova, Divining Intentions; Jo and Gartzke, Determinants, 184.

23 22 others. But concessions in one instance do not remove the threat of preemptive war in another; even if leading states such as the United States are willing to make grand bargains with (some) suspect states, there is no guarantee they can control the reaction of regional actors to a suspect state s nuclear activities. The research project led by William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova on forecasting nuclear proliferation also suggests that the risk of proliferation chains is over-stated. In their conclusion, Potter and Mukhatzhanova note that a consensus emerges among the case study authors in this volume that nuclear weapons spread is nether imminent nor likely to involve a process in which one country s pursuit of nuclear weapons leads to a chain reaction involving other states. 47 In her case study of Iran, Mukhatzhanova recognizes that Iran s nuclear program has provoked a wave of interest in indigenous programs in the region, but cautions that such programs should not be automatically equated with nuclear weapons programs, and that even if Iran were to develop nuclear weapons in the future, whether the reacting states will ultimately go nuclear will depend on a host of other factors, many of them domestic. 48 However, some caution is still in order. The example of a nuclear North Korea or a nuclear Iran may not prompt another state to pursue nuclear weapons, but their example could provide lessons about how to and how not to pursue such weapons if they are desired for other reasons. For example, it is difficult to believe that the regime in Tehran has not learned some pointers from North Korea s example of nuclearizing 47 William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, In Search of Proliferation Trends and Tendencies in Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21 st Century, vol. 2: A Comparative Prospective ed. William C. Potter with Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, Mukhatzhanova, Pride and Prejudice, 74.

24 23 under the cover of the NPT and then withdrawing from the treaty and developing and testing a weapon. The third concern, the possibility of damage to the overall nonproliferation regime, depends on the specifics of the changes made in nonproliferation policy. The extent to which the emergence of India, Pakistan and North Korea s nuclear status has challenged the regime remains unclear, in part because India and Pakistan never signed the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states, and North Korea announced its withdrawal from the treaty before testing. The impact of a nuclear Iran could be different if it evolves into a case of nuclear weapons creation while a member of the NPT. Such an evolution is unlikely, and it is not clear that accepting uranium enrichment in Iran, under appropriate safeguards and after questions concerning past activities have been answered satisfactorily, would pose a severe challenge to the regime. And of course there are also risks attached to sticking to a policy even as it appears to be failing. So far, the Western reluctance to acknowledge Iran s right to enrichment and/or to explore a grand bargain has not resulted in success. Supply side measures and reported attempts at sabotage have had tactical success in slowing the progress of Iran s nuclear activities, but they have not been able to either halt those activities or create arrangements that would alleviate concern about them. As suggested above, they may also have increased Iran s resolve to maintain a significant enrichment capability. 49 It is also important to remember that there are at least two tiers to nonproliferation policy. The first tier is the nonproliferation regime, which provides 49 It is notable that the corollary to the new consensus that Iran has not yet decided to acquire nuclear weapons is a proposition that Iran has, all along, been determined to acquire a hedging capability. The proposition that the goal of a hedging capability might also have evolved over time has not been explored.