--- 1 This paper is part of the results of the research project New spaces, actors and instruments in Spain s

Transcription

1 The interplay between domestic and international management of the Western Sahara conflict by Morocco: the new strategy of integration and the Autonomy Plan ( ) 1 Irene Fernández Molina Trainee at the Directorate-General for External Policies of the European Parliament (EuroMed and Middle East Unit). Researcher & PhD candidate at the Department of Public International Law and International Relations (International Studies) of the Universidad Complutense de Madrid and the Study Group on Arab and Muslim Societies (GRESAM) of the Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha (irenefmolina@cps.ucm.es, irene.molina@europarl.europa.eu) Abstract: The key to analyse the action of Morocco in the conflict of the Western Sahara resides in the articulation, or permanent dialectic, between its internal and international management. In the period between 2006 and 2008, following the crisis of the Moroccan negotiating strategy provoked by the rejection of the Baker Plan II (2003), the development of a policy of integration or reconciliation towards the Sahrawi population, at the domestic level, contributed to recuperation of the international initiative and the initial success of the new Autonomy Plan for the territory launched by Rabat. --- The supreme objective that has invariably prevailed in the hierarchy of priorities of Morocco s foreign policy in recent decades is the ratification and international legalisation of its de facto annexation of the Western Sahara, which took place in More than simply being the central theme of its foreign affairs, this is a question profoundly rooted in the political culture of the country and perceived, above all, as an internal issue. In practice, however, the moves of the Rabat authorities have always been simultaneously reproduced on two chessboards, one domestic and the other international. This is practically an ubiquitous issue on Morocco s foreign agenda: when it is not a direct object of conversation or bargaining with other states or international organisations, it is indirectly discerned in the background of relations established with them in other areas. In the end, this conflict interferes in a transverse way in all the issue-areas of Rabat s foreign policy. The positions of different international actors with regard to this question represent the critical criterion or acid test of the health of their relations with Morocco. The argument defended in this article is that the key to analyse the action of Morocco in the Western Sahara conflict resides in the articulation, or permanent dialectic, between its internal and international management. Relating both dimensions, we can see that between 1999 and 2008 there were various phases of political opening and waning of the repression in the territory under the control of Rabat, and an advance in both the internal and international arena of the idea of an autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, or a third way ( This paper is part of the results of the research project New spaces, actors and instruments in Spain s external relations with the Arab and Muslim world (CSO C05-02), funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness. Draft paper (please do not quote without the author s permission). 1

2 2003); a crisis of the Moroccan negotiating strategy (rejection of the Baker Plan II) and explicit and definitive abandonment of the referendum option ( ); and development of a policy of integration or reconciliation towards the Sahrawi population and recuperation of the international initiative with an Autonomy Plan ( ). From the point of view of foreign policy, in this chronology there were alternate stages of offensive strategy, in which Morocco took the initiative and actively promoted its proposals for the resolution of the conflict ( and ), along with others in which they were either waiting or on the defensive ( ). The tendency identified is that, starting from 2009, Morocco would increase repression again in the domestic sphere, while withdrawing, or facing a loss in their position, at international level. Table 1. Chronology of the internal and international management of the Western Sahara conflict by Morocco ( ) Stage Internal management International management Political opening and relative waning of the repression in the territory under Moroccan control + Advance of the idea of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty (third way) in the domestic sphere Impasse + Emergence of a new associative elite in process of politicisation (new protest movements) Policy of integration and reconciliation - (Re) creation of the CORCAS - Drafting of the Autonomy Plan ( broad process of dialogue and consultation ) New increase in repression Elaborated by author. Advance of the idea of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty in the international sphere (Baker Plans I and II) Rejection of the Baker Plan II Crisis of the Moroccan negotiating strategy International promotion and success of the Autonomy Plan Reduction of international advantage + Several bilateral crises Offensive strategy Defensive attitude Offensive strategy Defensive attitude 1. The rejection of the Baker Plan II Although my article will be centred on the period, in order to understand the new internal and international strategy began by Morocco in this 2

3 moment we have to go back a further three years, to the critical moment in which the Baker Plan II was rejected by this country (2003). Specifically this Plan was the second proposal for a political solution to this conflict put forward by James Baker, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General s Personal Envoy ( ), after the blocking of the Settlement Plan accepted by both parties in 1991, in the moment that the ceasefire was declared. The application of this Peace Plan, that included the holding of a referendum on self-determination among the population of the disputed territory had during the whole decade of the 1990s repeatedly come up against the obstacle of the composition of the electoral body, about which there existed no previous agreement, and over which Morocco and the Polisario Front had irreconcilable claims (Jensen, 2006). Baker Plan I (2001), that had considered a mixed formula of transitory autonomy with a final referendum, was accepted by Morocco but rejected by the Polisario and Algeria, who viewed it as unbalanced and favouring the integration option. The second version drawn up by UN officials was much more detailed and streamlined from a legal point of view, and was included by the Secretary-General in his report to the Security Council in May Although Plan II was relatively more balanced than its predecessor in the distribution of powers during the period of transitional autonomy, and more precise regarding the conditions of the final referendum, the new solution under discussion did not differ substantially from that of 2001 and seemed favourable overall to the interests of Rabat: it again brought together new elements of the Moroccan idea of the third way and above all it established a broad electoral census for the referendum, giving priority to the ius soli over the ius sanguinis, as the country had always claimed. However, against all forecasts, in these months the reticence of Morocco started to be glimpsed. The observations communicated to the UN before the project was known about sought, above all, to avoid any confusion between this political solution, or third way, and the Settlement Plan, or to put it in other words, [to reestablish] the initial architecture of the political solution: a viable alternative to the options set out in the Settlement Plan 2. Rabat did not accept, therefore, the very essence of the proposal of the UN envoy: an intermediate formula in which elements of the third way (autonomy) were combined with others emanating from the Settlement Plan (self-determination referendum). The critical moment that would put the firmness of the Moroccan position to test arrived in the month of June a little before the Baker Plan II was going to be discussed by the Security Council, when the Polisario abruptly changed their position and accepted the proposal, leaving Morocco alone in its rejection. This dramatic effect, a result of Algerian and Spanish pressure on the Polisario s direction and badly taken by the population of the refugee camps in Tindouf (Hernando de Larramendi, 2008: 191; Smith, 2005: 552), was interpreted by Rabat as an attempt to turn the tables and place it in a compromising situation before the international community; a sphere where, in recent years, it had always had the initiative. The habitual good student had now become the spoiler who was sabotaging international efforts to resolve the conflict. The 2 Observations of the Kingdom of Morocco on the new proposal of James Baker entitled Peace plan for self-determination of the people of the Western Sahara, in: UN Security Council: Report of the Secretary- General on the situation concerning the Western Sahara, S/2003/565, 23 May 2003, Annex III. 3

4 Moroccan decision to maintain its posture until the ultimate consequences surprised their own people, as well as foreigners (Jamaï, 2003; B., 2003). What were the real reasons for the Moroccan protest, beyond the battery of official observations sent to the UN? The transitional autonomy formula forecast by the Baker Plan II crossed some red lines: by not demanding that the laws approved by the Legislative Assembly of the Authority of the Western Sahara were in line with the Moroccan Constitution, by establishing an autonomous Supreme Court with the capacity to determine the compatibility of the laws of the territory with the peace plan and by impeding Morocco s repression of public debate on the campaign on any topic including independence for the distinct electoral dates. These regulations rang alarm bells in Rabat over the possibility of losing control of the territory during the phase of autonomy and risking a triumph of the option for independence in the final referendum (Hernando de Larramendi, 2008: ; Amirah Fernández, 2003). Arithmetically, this cannot be explained, if it were not for the fear that part of the colonists coming from the north supported the separatist thesis, whether it was because of discontent with the Moroccan regime or because of the ideological influence of the refugees returning from Tindouf and the new institutions (Hachimi Alaoui, 2003). These concerns had grown as the result of several surveys undertaken in the main cities of the Western Sahara at the end of the reign of Hassan II 3 and of support for the uprisings in 1999 by part of the theoretically pro-moroccan inhabitants of the territory (Smith, 2005: 557). Furthermore, in that hypothetical autonomy, Morocco would not retain the instruments of territorial control granted until that time by the administration under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior. Following an enormous diplomatic effort and thanks above all to the help of France, Morocco managed a significant reduction in the terms of what would be resolution 1495 of the Security Council: despite considering it to be an optimum political solution the final text adopted unanimously (15 votes in favour) on the 31st July did not endorse, but rather simply supported the Baker Plan II 4. This was the equivalent of granting it political support but lacking legal value: its application could not be imposed and it would therefore continue to be qualified by the acceptance of both parties (Ruiz Miguel, 2003: 20). The unanimous support of this plan by the Security Council represented, in any case, a setback without precedent for Moroccan diplomacy, and led this country, during a time, to toy with the phantom of international isolation and the incomprehension of the United States (US). In reality these were but temporary predicaments because both Paris and Washington came to Morocco s assistance by reiterating their rejection of any imposed solution. At this point ( ) a new phase in the Western Sahara conflict started, marked by the stagnation of UN initiatives to search for a political solution. To compensate for their blocking of Baker Plan II and to recover the initiative on the international stage, Morocco was obliged to put forward a credible alternative proposal. This necessarily opened up a stage of redefinition of its 3 These surveys did not definitively confirm majority support for the annexationist option in the case of holding a referendum. See Mohsen-Finan (2010: 560). 4 UN Security Council Resolution 1495 (2003), 31 July

5 strategy. The novelty was that, starting from this moment, their authorities were openly going to back a permanent solution for autonomy that would exclude the holding of a referendum of self-determination; in other words that it would be the final result and not a mere transitional formula (Hernando de Larramendi, 2010). The tacit abandonment of the referendum route that had been on the agenda since the arrival of Mohammed VI to the throne would be explicit from here onwards. The first tentative advance in the direction of autonomy was the Contribution of the Kingdom of Morocco to the negotiation of a mutually acceptable political solution to the question of the Sahara presented to the UN by the deputy minister for Foreign Affairs, Taieb Fassi Fihri, in December This proposal included a project for a statute of autonomy in the Region of the Sahara which is constructive and amenable to favouring the conclusion of a final and realistic agreement, which permits the people of the Sahara to freely manage their own affairs, respecting the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Morocco, its territorial integrity and its national unity. With this hypothetical statute, that would be submitted to a referendum and annexed afterwards to the Moroccan constitution, it also sought to contribute to the progress of Maghreb integration and the construction of the Union of Arab Maghreb (UMA) 5. Although inspired in Baker s two plans, this formula for autonomy was more conservative than that which was forecast by Baker for the transitory process. In the following years, countries allied to Morocco like France, the US and Spain encouraged the Moroccan authorities to develop a more credible second version that was capable of receiving their support (International Crisis Group, 2007: 6) Evolution over the terrain In parallel, during this phase of impasse and redefinition of their strategy on the international sphere ( ), Moroccan authorities witnessed some profound political transformations in the disputed territories that would condition their future domestic management of the Sahara question. Their most wellknown manifestation was the dynamism of an incipient local civil society, with new organisations and leaders, which focused its efforts on the socioeconomic demands or the defence of human rights, but flirted at the same time with independence demands of variable geometry, in function of the circumstances. Among the new generations of the Sahrawis of the interior, as Omar Brouksy argues, 5 Contribution du royaume du Maroc à la négociation d une solution politique mutuellement acceptable de la question du Sahara, 6 According to a cable released by Wikileaks from the US Ambassador in Rabat, Thomas T. Riley, his Spanish counterpart, Luis Planas, stated in a meeting of March 2006 that Spain was supporting Morocco in the task of drafting a formal autonomy plan, a demand shared by Madrid and Washington. US Embassy in Rabat (2006): Spanish Ambassador on Western Sahara, migration, Islamists (06RABAT557), 29 March. 5

6 the third-world ideology, the weight of the cold war context and decolonisation, the basic principles from which the combat for the liberation of the Sahrawi people drew its ideological and identity-building foundations are ( ) being replaced by new legitimising concepts: human rights culture, universal principles governing individual and political rights and liberties, international legality, etc. (2008a: 162). This had provided, on the one hand, the emergence of a new associative elite in process of politicisation that opted for a non-violent, legalist and universal discourse, that was based on the principles of international law and human rights, and was therefore capable of achieving growing visibility, legitimacy and support in the international sphere (Brouksy, 2008a). Associations such as the Collective of Sahrawi Defenders for Human Rights (CODESA), headed by figures like Ali Salem Tamek, Mohammed El Moutawakil and Aminatou Haidar, led a process of reorientation of the demands of the Sahrawis of the interior towards the field of human rights that would introduce new parameters into the conflict. All of them emphasized the Sahrawi identity; although their militant trajectories did not exclude collaboration with the Moroccan institutions, and their links with the Polisario Front initially appeared week. On the other hand, in the periodic mobilisations of students and other Sahrawi youth one can glimpse an equally ambiguous relationship with the Moroccan State: Globally, they offer a critical discourse in the face of the latter. Frequently, this adopts social themes: unemployment, marginalisation, social inequalities; and a lack of opportunities for the future. This can also incorporate a less evident but nonetheless strong political dimension: criticism of the Moroccan State and its socioeconomic strategies in the Western Sahara is often accompanied by an underlying discourse that tends to put in question the legitimacy of a Moroccan presence in the region (Brouksy, 2008b: 9-10). The possibility of employing identity as a card to play according to the interests of each actor in every moment gave special complexity to the relation between socioeconomic and political demands in this context (Veguilla, 2010). In reality, besides generational gaps, the breeding ground that little by little would start to be seen as independentism of the interior was to be found to a great extent in the Moroccan regime s own orientations: on the one hand, in the process of opening, liberalisation and political reconciliation fostered by the whole State after the arrival to power of Mohammed VI with the hearings of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER, ), in which the Sahrawis also participated, as the highest exponent ; and on the other, within the Western Sahara, in the need to give credibility to the option of the third way before both the international community and the population of the territory. In 1999, as has already been highlighted, the strategy of compromise and dialogue with the inhabitants of the area, and the increase in their political participation at all levels, demonstrated how internal management could serve the international management of the conflict, but was also as a sine qua non to 6

7 convince the Sahrawis of the benefits of integration into Morocco (Serfaty, 2003). All this turned into a two-edged sword, of uncertain political consequences from the point of view of Moroccan interests, as shown by the protests of May and June 2005, dubbed in some media as the Sahrawi intifada. What was initially a simple concentration of human rights organisations and students in Laayoune developed, after the violent intervention of the security forces, into disturbances and protests of an openly independentist character in contrast to those of 1999 in various cities of the territory. Hundreds of young Sahrawis were detained and processed as a result of this episode (Smith, 2005: 545, 558; Mundy, 2007; Solà-Martín, 2007: 402). 3. The new integrating strategy and the Autonomy Plan ( ) In any case, from 2006 onwards the Moroccan authorities fully backed the integration strategy for the Sahrawi population, coinciding with their attempt to again go on the offensive on the international stage after the phase of withdrawal provoked by their rejection of the Baker Plan II (2003). New prospects in the management of the conflict both at the internal level the resurrection of the Royal Consultative Council for Saharan Issues (CORCAS, 2006) and the international sphere the launching of a new Autonomy Plan for the territory (2007) were once again intertwined. The new CORCAS was one of the ad hoc consultative councils under the immediate authority of the monarch and without any organic relation to the government or parliament that Mohammed VI had promoted since his arrival to the throne (Fernández Molina, 2011). In reality it was not a new institution but rather the remodelling of a similar, long inactive one created by Hassan II in 1981, to counteract the internal political fallout from his acceptance of the principle of a referendum for the Western Sahara. Its activity from 2006 onwards would have a twin domestic and international facet. Firstly, the council s (re)creation could not be dissociated from the preparation of the new Autonomy Plan in which it actively intervened, dedicating several extraordinary sessions to it (MAP, 2006; El Messaoudi and Bouabid, 2008: 11-12). Afterwards, the council was to take on functions of parallel, and even official, diplomacy: in 2007 and 2008 it was directly associated with the government campaign to diffuse the Plan and the subsequent negotiations with the Polisario in Manhasset (New York). Not in vain, one of the arguments with which Morocco defended its project was the extension of the space of participation to the management of local issues and the emergence of new elites capable of taking on responsibilities 7. The development of the Autonomy Plan in question had been announced in November 2005, in the discourse for the anniversary of the Green March, when Mohammed VI fired the starting gun to what he presented as being a broad process of dialogue and consultation with political and social actors 8. In its 7 Discourse of Mohammed VI. Laayoune, 25 March Discourse of Mohammed VI on the 30th anniversary of the Green March. Rabat, 6 November See also MAEC (2005). 7

8 desire to recover the initiative before the international community, the Moroccan regime wanted to obtain the collaboration of all the forces of the country to put together a second proposal with a permanent solution for autonomy which was more solid and streamlined than that of December Political parties also accompanied this reflection by offering some suggestions (El Messaoudi and Bouabid, 2008: 9-10), and they participated in a preliminary diplomatic campaign to diffuse their achievements in October 2006 (C., 2006; Ridouane, 2006). The project drafted by the CORCAS was delivered to the King in December. A Moroccan delegation travelled to France, Spain, the US, the United Kingdom, Germany and Russia to verbally inform them of its content in February of the following year (MAEC, 2007a), before presenting it to the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon 9, and the members of the Security Council in March and April, respectively. It was, in principle, a document conceived as a basis for negotiations in later direct talks between both parties, whose result would be submitted to a referendum among the concerned populations (unspecified). In this way they sought to solve the legal requirements of the right to self-determination (Solà- Martín, 2007: ). Afterwards it was proposed to revise the Moroccan constitution and incorporate the regulations for the statute of autonomy. In sum, the populations of the Sahara Autonomous Region and their corresponding institutions would gain powers in the fields of local administration, local police and jurisdiction of the territory, economy, budget and tax regime, infrastructures, social policies, culture and environment. The Moroccan State would maintain exclusive jurisdiction over the attributes of sovereignty (flag, national hymn, money), the attributes linked to the king s constitutional and religious powers, national security, foreign defence and national integrity, foreign relations and the judiciary. The institutions of the Sahara Autonomous Region would be a parliament made up of members elected by the various Sahrawi tribes, and of members elected by direct universal suffrage, by the Region s population ; a head of government voted for by this parliament but responsible before the king, a High Regional Court responsible for interpreting the law at regional level and an Economic and Social Council. The laws, regulations, and judicial decisions of the organs of the Sahara Autonomous Region should be in line with the statute of autonomy and with the Moroccan constitution. The guarantees for human rights of the population would be the same included in this constitution 10. Table 2. Plan of Autonomy (2007) Powers Financing Institutions Sahara Autonomous Region Local administration, local police and jurisdiction of the territory Taxes, rates and contributions established by the organs of the region Parliament (members elected by the various Sahrawi tribes + members elected by direct universal suffrage by the 9 The letter sent to the UN Secretary-General can be found at 10 See Moroccan Initiative for Negotiating an Autonomy Statute for the Sahara Region, 7 April 2007, 8

9 Moroccan State Economy - Economic development - Regional planning - Promotion of investments - Trade - Industry - Tourism - Agriculture Budget and tax regime Infrastructures - Water, hydraulic installations - Electricity - Public works - Transport Social policies - Housing - Education - Health - Employment - Sport - Social security and protection Culture Fostering of Hassani Sahrawi national heritage Environment Attributes of sovereignty - Flag - National hymn - Money Attributes linked to the king s constitutional and religious powers National security, foreign defence and national integrity Profits derived from the exploitation of the natural resources assigned to it and a part of those received by the State Resources in the framework of national solidarity Income proceeding from its heritage region s population) Head of government (voted for by the regional parliament, but invested by the king and responsible before him) High Regional Court (responsible for interpreting the law at regional level, but without prejudice to the powers of the Kingdom s Supreme Court or Constitutional Council ) Other jurisdictions of lesser status Economic and Social Council Foreign relations (in consultation with the autonomous region) * Laws, regulations, and judicial decisions by the organs of the Sahara Autonomous Region in line with both the statute of autonomy and the Moroccan constitution * Guarantees for human rights of the population included in the Moroccan constitution Elaborated by author. 9

10 The new autonomy formula outlined did not differ significantly from the Moroccan proposal of 2003 inspired at the same time in the plans of Baker regarding the distribution of attributes between the regional organs and the central State, although the list of exclusive powers was this time less exhaustive. The principle novelty was that now any sign or presumption of temporariness had been eliminated 11, which implied greater emancipation with respect to the cited proposals of the UN. Furthermore, within the autonomous institutions, there was the possibility of a Higher Advanced Court; an Economic and Social Council; and a mixed formula for parliamentary elections in which the tribal element was considered for the first time 12. In sum, at the end of a very long process of development, the presented Autonomy Plan did not meet the expectations of the countries that had most encouraged and supported Morocco in this project, because it did not include any advance or incentive capable of convincing the Polisario. This dissatisfaction was evident in an informal meeting promoted by the political counselor of the Spanish embassy in Rabat with his counterparts from the US, France, the United Kingdom and Germany in March 2007, coinciding with the presentation of the Moroccan plan to the UN Secretary-General. According to the US report that has appeared thanks to the leaks of Wikileaks: In general, participants noted the intensity of Moroccan diplomatic efforts, including multiple consultations with the U.S., France, and Spain. The energy of the initiative, however, did not appear to be matched by any apparent breakthrough on the substance of autonomy that could convince the other side. The broad outlines of the autonomy plan, which have been universally briefed, suggested Rabat would retain full control, and did not go far beyond what was in the 2003 plan. That had been rejected out of hand by Baker and governments 13. In their public declarations, however, State representatives opted to praise the Moroccan initiative as a point of departure for new direct negotiations. Rabat, on the other hand, had started since the previous month, a monumental diplomatic campaign to diffuse, throughout the world, its proposal for autonomy 14. Its primary objectives were, in February, the countries considered to be key for the resolution of the conflict, namely the permanent members of the Security Council (France, the US, United Kingdom, Russia) 15, the old colonial power (Spain, which formed, together with the four previously cited 11 The Moroccan proposal of 2003 forecast a distinct electoral body for the first elections of the Regional Legislative Assembly and every successive election. 12 For a detailed analysis of this proposal in comparison with different European experiences or international standards in matters of state decentralisation and autonomy (always from the Moroccan point of view), see El Messaoudi and Bouabid (2008: 12-29). For a critique of the lack of definition in such basic points as the geographic limits of the hypothetical Sahara Autonomous Region and the modalities of the referendum, see International Crisis Group (2007: 7). 13 US Embassy in Rabat (2007): Rabat Pol Counselors informal discuss Western Sahara (07RABAT494), 19 March. 14 The politics of image was vey significant in this context: So that its own project of internal autonomy can be imposed, Morocco relies ( ) above all on its own image. In fact, the Moroccan initiative falls within a double context: the global democratic opening of the kingdom and the will of not considering the Sahrawis as a population of second zone to assimilate (Soudan, 2007a). 15 China would be visited later, on the 16 and 17 March. 10

11 countries, the Group of Friends of the Western Sahara in the UN) and the president of the Council of the European Union (Germany). From this moment onwards, in barely two months, visits followed to the Arab states that were deemed to be closest to the Moroccan positions (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Oman); the Maghreb (Mauritania, Libya, Tunisia) and Senegal; Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Chile, Peru, Colombia, Mexico); China; and other countries from Europe (Belgium, Portugal, Italy) and Africa (Ghana, Congo Brazzaville). The composition of the Moroccan delegations varied in function of the importance conceded to the distinct geographic areas. Strategic destinations (UN, key countries, Maghreb and Senegal, Europe) were entrusted by the King to a trio of men: namely Fouad Ali El Himma (deputy minister of the Interior), Fassi Fihri (deputy minister of Foreign Affairs) and Yassine Mansouri (head of the General Direction of Study and Documentation [DGED], the foreign intelligence service). Depending on the issues, they were accompanied by the minister of the Interior, Chakib Benmoussa (key countries, Maghreb and Senegal, Europe) or the president of the CORCAS, Khalihenna Ould Errachid (UN). Fassi Fihri and Mansouri alone took responsibility for China and the African countries. The latter travelled with the royal adviser Mohammed Moatassim to the majority of the Arab countries. Finally, for the minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohammed Benaissa, there was no other place left than the capitals of Latin America, where the Spanish speaker Ould Errachid supported him. The direct control of the monarchy and the consequent marginalisation of the government in the Western Sahara issue were once again demonstrated. Table 3. Diplomatic campaign for the diffusion of the Autonomy Plan (February-April 2007) Phase Date City Country Members of the delegation 1 Key 5-6 February Paris France Chakib Benmoussa (minister of countries 8 February Madrid Spain the Interior) 13 February Washington United States Fouad Ali El Himma (deputy minister of the Interior) 21 February London United Kingdom Taieb Fassi Fihri (deputy minister of Foreign Affairs) February Berlin Germany Yassine Mansouri (DGED) 2 Arab countries 3 Maghreb + Senegal 28 February Moscow Russia 6 March Riyadh Saudi Arabia 8 March Abu Dhabi United Arab Emirates 10 March Manama Bahrain 10 March Kuwait Kuwait 11 March Sana Yemen 18 March Cairo Egypt 19 March Amman Jordan Mohammed Moatassim (royal adviser) Yassine Mansouri 25 March Muscat Oman Mohammed Benaissa (minister of Foreign Affairs) 8 March Nouakchott Mauritania Chakib Benmoussa 8 March Dakar Senegal Fouad Ali El Himma 10 March Tripoli Libia Taieb Fassi Fihri 12 March Tunisia Tunisia 4 UN March New York UN Fouad Ali El Himma 11

12 5 Latin America (General Secretary) 12 March Buenos Aires Argentina 14 March Brazil Brazil 15 March Asunción Paraguay 16 March Santiago Chile 19 March Lima Peru 20 March Bogota Colombia 22 March Mexico, D. F. Mexico Taieb Fassi Fihri Yassine Mansouri Khalihenna Ould Errachid (CORCAS) Mohammed Benaissa Khalihenna Ould Errachid 6 China March Peking China Taieb Fassi Fihri Yassine Mansouri 7 Europe 26 March Brussels Belgium Chakib Benmoussa 27 March Lisbon Portugal Fouad Ali El Himma 27 March Rome Italy Taieb Fassi Fihri Yassine Mansouri 8 Africa 28 March Accra Ghana Taieb Fassi Fihri 29 March Brazzaville Congo Yassine Mansouri Brazzaville 9 UN 20 April New York UN (Security Council) Fouad Ali El Himma Taieb Fassi Fihri Khalihenna Ould Errachid Sources: MAP, ARSOM. Elaborated by author. The Moroccan diplomatic campaign was reinforced, within the US, by a very significant investment in lobbying companies that specialized in influencing Congress 16. Its main result was a letter to President George W. Bush signed by some 170 members of Congress in April 2007, in which that it requested support for Rabat by appealing to the arguments related to security risks and the growing presence of international terrorism in the Maghreb-Sahel region: With al-qaeda and other terrorist groups expanding their presence into North Africa, we are concerned that the failure to resolve this conflict of more than 30 years poses a danger to U.S. and regional security (cited in Solà-Martín, 2007: 404). The effort was also considerable in Internet propaganda, which had turned into a new battlefront with the Polisario (Amar, 2008), and the publication of apparently academic works which were deep down orientated towards the defence of the Moroccan thesis and widely diffused by the embassies of this country 17. At the internal level, the government explicitly requested support and mobilisation from political parties and the media (R. and Q., 2007; D., 2007). This unprecedented display offset to a great degree the relative lack of new proposals in the Autonomy Plan. The gesture of political goodwill and the intense Moroccan activism prevailed over the insufficiencies of the document in question and made people forget the dissatisfaction expressed initially (in private) by countries such as the US and Spain. Days before its presentation to the UN, the US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, R. Nicholas Burns, had described the Moroccan proposal as serious and credible (AP, 2007; Herradi, 2007), The White House was still more categorical in 2008, stating that 16 The website ProPublica put the figure near to 3.4 million dollars between 2007 and 2008 (Narayanswamy, 2009). 17 For example, Cherkaoui (2007) and El Ouali (2007). 12

13 autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty [was] the only feasible solution for the Western Sahara dispute 18. The support of the US was crucial to achieve Morocco s primary objective: to reorientate the negotiating process (sponsored by the UN) and to start direct talks with the Polisario Front in which autonomy and not the referendum of self-determination was the priority option on the table. Morocco s bet had its effect. Reproducing the same adjectives employed by the Bush Administration in April 2007, the Security Council praised the serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution, and called on both parties to enter into negotiations without preconditions in good faith, taking into account the developments of the last months ( ) 19. This resolution 1754 marked a turning point in the approach of the UN to the Sahara conflict, given that it confirmed the rupture with the Baker focus, and backed direct negotiations upon new bases (C., 2007a; Soudan, 2007b). The following resolutions 1783 (October 2007), 1813 (April 2008) and 1871 (April 2009) stressed the same line 20. In sum, the Autonomy Plan had allowed Moroccan diplomacy to recover an offensive posture (Bouqentar, 2010: 331) and had found a favourable echo in the international political and normative discourse (El Houdaïgui, 2010: 316). The immediate consequence of this change of course was the four rounds of direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario held in Manhasset (New York) between June 2007 and March 2008 under the auspices of the Secretary- General of the UN 21. The representatives of Rabat in these meetings were the same fixed members of the delegations sent previously to the UN El Himma, Fassi Fihri, Mansouri and Ould Errachid, although this time the head was the minister of the Interior, Benmousa 22. Finally, these efforts ended in new failure, given that neither of the two parties moved one millimeter from their initial positions. According to Khadija Mohsen-Finan, the old conflict had degenerated at this stage in a communiqué war in which the protagonists limited themselves to affirm their own postures and at the most [played] at frightening each other by appealing to a phantom return to arms (El Rhazoui, 2008). The paralysation of the process led the Personal Envoy of the Secretary- General, the Dutchman Peter van Walsum ( ), to acknowledge in April 2008 in one intervention behind closed doors in the Security Council that, from his point of view, an independent Western Sahara [was] not an attainable goal. To Morocco s satisfaction, his recommendation was to urge the parties to negotiate without preconditions on the temporary assumption that there will not be a referendum with independence as an option (PR Newswire, 2008) In statements by his spokesperson, Dana Perino (MAP, 2008). 19 UN Security Council Resolution 1754 (2007), 30 April See also Sater (2010: 131). 20 UN Security Council Resolution 1783 (2007), 31 October UN Security Council Resolution 1813 (2008), 30 April UN Security Council Resolution 1871 (2009), 30 April The meetings took place on June 2007, August 2007, 7-9 January 2008 and March In some of the four rounds, the permanent representative of Morocco in the UN, Mustapha Sahel, the Secretary-General of the CORCAS, Maouelainin Benkhalihenna, or the wali of the Sahrawi province of Oued Dahab-La Güera, Mohammed Saleh Tamek, were also present. 23 These observations formed part of a document that Ki-moon finally refused to incorporate in his new report, against normal custom, which represented a sort of disavowal. 13

14 These statements led to a considerable diplomatic earthquake, for the Polisario accused Van Walsum of having departed from his neutral position, and this led in turn to the non-renovation of his mandate 24. The Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted to this adverse decision by sending a letter to the UN Secretary-General in which he assured that the Security Council had confirmed the pre-eminence of the Moroccan initiative for autonomy (MAEC, 2008b; Hamrouch, 2008a). The negotiating process, in sum, remained in deadlock due to the lack of results of the four initial rounds and was not reactivated until August 2009, when the new UN Envoy, Christopher Ross, organized, at the request of the Security Council 25, a more informal and restricted meeting in Durnstein (Vienna) to try to unblock it (MAEC, 2009; MAP, 2009). At the same time, documents like the resolution adopted at the end of 2008 by the General Assembly of the UN at the request of its Commission of Special Policy and Decolonisation (Commission Four) 26 were presented by the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs as proof of a significant change in the treatment of this dossier at the heart of this Commission and the approximation of its doctrine to the approach of the Security Council (MAEC, 2008d; MAEC, 2008e; Hamrouch, 2008b): The treatment of the Sahara question has experienced an important qualitative advance at the heart of the UN as has been demonstrated in the change in discourse, language, terminology and treatment of this dossier ( ) (MAEC, 2008c). In sum, it seems indisputable that, with the Autonomy Plan, Moroccan diplomacy had achieved some notable successes in the stage. Among the arguments or guidelines that had facilitated this advance were: the absence of an obligatory equivalence between self-determination and independence, the dangers of divisions or Balkanisation in any part of the world, the importance of political stability in the region of the Maghreb, the risks for international security that would derive from a lack of governance, and the implantation of international terrorism in this zone 27. Aside from this, the instructions received by the representatives of Rabat throughout the world were to reach out to local civil society and public opinion, trying to counteract the Polisario s influence in countries like Spain, and to boost the role of the Moroccan immigrant communities in the diffusion of the official thesis over the Sahara, a work that might be described as parallel diplomacy (Antar, 2010). 24 See also Van Walsum (2008). 25 UN Security Council Resolution 1871 (2009), 30 April The communication stated that all available options for self-determination of the Territories are valid as long as they are in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned ( ). UN General Assembly: Resolution adopted by the General Assembly [on the report of the Special Political and Decolonisation Committee (Fourth Committee) (A/63/408)]. Question of the Western Sahara, A/RES/63/105, 18/12/ See also MAEC (2008a). This type of argument was taken to the extreme of propaganda by a report of the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center (ESISC), a think tank led by Claude Moniquet and with its seat in Brussels, that emphasized the risks of an islamist or even terrorist drift of the Polisario. Le Journal Hebdomadaire argued that this report had been directly inspired by the Moroccan authorities in an article published in December 2005, which led to two of their journalists being sentenced to pay 270,000 euros for defamation. See Iraqi (2005). 14

15 The effect of the Moroccan Autonomy Plan was such that to remind the international community of its existence the Polisario notably intensified between 2007 and 2008 their threats to return to the armed struggle. The moment of greatest tension in the territory occurred at the end of 2007, following the Polisario s decision to hold its 12th congress in Tifariti, a small city situated in the reduced portion of the Western Sahara that is not controlled by Morocco. This zone, located between the Walls built by Morocco and the Algerian border, theoretically demilitarized since the ceasefire (1991) but considered by the Polisario as liberated territory, had seen increasing Polisario presence and activity in recent years. The choice of this location for specific political acts and even official buildings of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (RASD) carried with it an enormous symbolic charge (Brouksy, 2007). The previous Moroccan minister of Foreign Affairs, Benaissa, had already protested because of the attempts to create a consumed fact in a tampon zone in a letter directed to the Secretary-General of the UN, Annan, in February 2006 (MAEC, 2006). The publicized congress of December 2007 provoked two further letters to Kimoon, signed this time by the Moroccan representative in the UN and the new minister of Foreign Affairs, Fassi Fihri, in which they condemned the passivity of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and demanded that the necessary measures be taken to address these actions, which are at the same time dangerous and provocative and that threaten peace and stability of the region : The Kingdom reserves the right to adopt whatever action is deemed necessary to react to this lamentable evolution, that the Moroccan people together reject and denounce (MAEC, 2007b; Soudan, 2008; C., 2007b). The escalation would be prolonged during the following months, when plans were announced to permanently install in Tifariti the parliament of the RASD (El Rhazoui, 2008) and the so-called Association of Moroccan Sahara decided to hold a march in this city, which finally did not take place (Iraqi, 2008). 4. A new change of course (2009-)? However, from 2009 onwards, Morocco would again lose the diplomatic advantage achieved with the Autonomy Plan for the Western Sahara, and go on the defensive in several aspects. This change of direction was conditioned once again by the international juncture and changes in the Polisario s strategy, as well as some new policy developments in the interior of the territory under dispute. From the international point of view, the first reverse for Rabat was the dismissal of Van Walsum as the UN Secretary-General s Personal Envoy in August 2008, and his substitution by the American Ross, who stopped putting emphasis on the autonomy proposal of Rabat as a basis for direct negotiations between the two parties (Morocco also viewed him with suspicion because he was previously an Ambassador in Algeria). To this was added the uncertainty produced by the arrival in power in Washington of a new Democrat president, Barack Obama, whose future orientations towards the North African conflict were still unknown. Despite the lack of definition or initial ambiguity of the approach of this Administration in which a sort of division of work was perceived between the more neutral president and the more pro-moroccan 15

16 Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, the Moroccan authorities realized that they could not now rely on the firm and almost unconditional support of the US that they had enjoyed in the Bush era (Al Aouni, 2008). For their part, the Polisario also recovered the initiative in this moment by fostering contacts and connections with the independentists of the interior of the territory of the Western Sahara, which had developed in recent years in a basically autonomous way. This strategic turn was dramatized in the publicized visits of the activists of CODESA to the camps at Tindouf, the first of which took place in September 2009 and ended with the detention of their protagonists when they returned to Morocco, in the middle of a climate of patriotic exaltation and virulent attacks by the media and political forces. The rapprochement of the Polisario to the interior front was the fruit, above all, of the need for the former movement to relegitimize itself and recover prominence in the fight for independence, as much for foreign opinion as for the population of the territory. The new organisations that arose at this time enjoyed much greater renown and international legitimacy as much in Europe as the US thanks to their discourse centred on the defence of human rights, which was more in line with the times than the Polisario s rhetoric, which sometimes seemed inherited from the Cold War. The international visibility achieved by the intifada of 2005 was a good test of the potential to attract these immaterial political resources, and the leaders at Tindouf now sought to benefit by it. The goal was to overcome the phase of lethargy, confusion and strategic crisis into which Polisario had been plunged after the Autonomy Plan and Morocco s subsequent diplomatic offensive (Bennani, 2007). During the international negotiations, the new Polisario focus was reflected in the demand for a broadening of the mandate of MINURSO to include vigilance over human rights in the Western Sahara (Capella Soler, 2011). The anxiety provoked by these international and domestic developments explains the toughening up of the Moroccan regime s positions towards the independentists of the interior and the growing toughening of this country s foreign policy in everything that is related with the question of the Sahara. Regarding the internal management of the conflict, this was a moment to question the integrating or reconciliatory strategy of the previous period, crystallized when CORCAS and the Autonomy Plan were launched. Apart from empowering protest movements and organisations such as CODESA, the mistake of this policy from the Moroccan authorities point of view was to have favoured the emergence of a counter-power in the territory, as a result of the accumulation of resources and privileges by certain pro-moroccan families and tribal sectors, which had in the end only produced still more discontent (López García, 2009). The new authoritarian stance was reflected in the royal discourse of November 2009, during the anniversary of the Green March, in which besides announcing the restructuring of the CORCAS, Mohammed VI called on all public authorities to redouble their vigilance and mobilisation with the purpose of counteracting with the force of the law any attack on the sovereignty of the nation and preserving security, stability and public order with all the firmness necessary 16