Modeling and Estimating the Macroeconomic Consequences of Terrorism

Transcription

1 CREATE Research Archive Research Project Summaries 2009 Modeling and Estimating the Macroeconomic Consequences of Terrorism Brock S. Blomberg Claremont McKenna College, Follow this and additional works at: Recommended Citation Blomberg, Brock S., "Modeling and Estimating the Macroeconomic Consequences of Terrorism" (2009). Research Project Summaries. Paper This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CREATE Research Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Project Summaries by an authorized administrator of CREATE Research Archive. For more information, please contact

2 Modeling and Estimating the Macroeconomic Consequences of Terrorism S. Brock Blomberg, Claremont McKenna College 1. Executive Summary Research Accomplishments Estimating the Macroeconomic Consequence of 9/ Editor s Introduction to the Economic Impacts for the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks Terrorism and the Returns to Oil A Gravity Model of Globalization, Democracy and Transnational Terrorism Perspective Paper on Transnational Terrorism Policies for the Copenhagen Consensus Applied Relevance Direct Economic Cost Estimates International Relations Collaborative Projects Research Products Publications Presentations - Conference Presentations - Outreach Education and Outreach Products Executive Summary The purpose of my research is to consider the economic costs and consequences of terrorism in the macroeconomy. My research provides three contributions for our understanding of underlying macroeconomic consequences of terrorism. First, the studies estimate the long run economic growth effects associated with terrorism. To accomplish this task, I constructed a large panel data set that incorporates the World Bank data on national income and growth, IMF data on financial conditions, data on domestic and international terrorism incidents, and data on external and internal conflict. Using this unique dataset, which spans 40 years for 180 countries, I examined the dynamic effects of terrorism on economic growth, consumption growth, as well as possible effects on capital accumulation and macroeconomic instability. The panel dimension of this data is particularly useful as it allows identification of the effects of terrorism on economic activity, growth and stability that may be evident in long-run trends that cannot be detected absent long-horizon cross-country comparisons. With these added degrees of freedom across the globe, I can then extract the impact on the United States economy. This allowed me to estimate the impact of 9/11 on the U.S. economy which I find to be approximately a 0.50 percentage point decrease in GDP growth or $60 billion. Second, using this methodology, I explored the extent to which terrorism crowds-in and/or crowdsout alternative forms of domestic and international conflict and the potential differences in the macroeconomic consequences of these alternative forms of conflict in a variety of publications. This is of particular interest because terrorist episodes are far more frequent and persistent than are other forms of external and internal conflicts. While terrorism and more traditional forms of conflict are not typically considered as gross substitutes or complements for one another, the explicit consideration of this issue is essential for understanding the macroeconomic costs of terrorism per se, as opposed to the costs that might typically be identified with other forms of conflict. In doing so, I am able to examine the direct impact of globalization and democratization on terrorism. "This research was supported by the United States Department of Homeland Security through the Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) under grant number 2007-ST However, any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Department of Homeland Security."

3 One of these costs that I explicitly consider is the possibility that energy costs are influenced by terrorist organizations. I employ my model to investigate the extent to which terrorist attacks are associated with the profitability of firms in the energy sector. First, I find that the measures of terrorism have greater predictive power over the first part of the time sample, , when the market demand closely followed market supply and terrorist events were less frequent. During this time sample, the impact of a terrorist event raised returns to oil firms by 6 to 10 percentage points. However, as I widened the time sample to include more recent periods, the returns from conflict fall until they approach zero or even negative values in the most recent period. Finally, having established the empirical properties of how terrorism affects economic activity as well as the extent to which terrorism affects the nation-specific and world-wide frequency of domestic and international conflict, I concluded by pricing the macroeconomic impact of terrorism. This work explicitly looked at the direct role of terrorism on the present discounted value of utility as well as the indirect effect of how terrorism impacts on other types of conflict. In doing so, I am able to calculate a cost-benefit ratio for global counter-terrorism. This work builds on CREATE s efforts to assess the economic impact of terrorism and in particular to help DHS optimally allocate resources intended to stem violent outcomes. 2. Research Accomplishments The results from the research program fit nicely into several papers published during Some of the results follow directly from research developed specifically for the project and others are more indirect off-shoots from this research program Estimating the Macroeconomic Consequence of 9/11 Berkeley Electronic Press journal: Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, with Greg Hess, 2009, Vol. 15 : Iss. 2, Article 7, We reexamine the episode with hindsight of seven years to better understand the economic consequence of that period. While our paper cannot hope to begin to gain an understanding or appreciation of the human tragedy of that time period, we do stand to gain some scientific understanding as a result of the alliterated therapy. Unfortunately, estimating the consequence of September 11 using standard macroeconomic times series is not straightforward. For the United States, there were many macroeconomic shocks occurring simultaneously, leaving few degrees of freedom to estimate the separate impact of the attack on the World Trade Center. For example, there were the financial difficulties of the dot com bubble bursting as demonstrated by the drop in the Nasdaq which had peaked in March 2000 at 5,132 only to descend to 1,108 by October There were also significant corporate scandals epitomized by Enron s Chief Skilling leaving in August Contractionary Federal Reserve Policy also placed a drag on the economy as the federal funds rate was increased to 6.25 percent in December 2000, the highest rate since February of Given these simultaneous shifts in the economic landscape, it is challenging to precisely estimate the macroeconomic consequence of September 11. So, rather than attempt a direct calculation from the United States experience during 2001, we adopt a different empirical strategy. We appeal to other country experiences and compare their histories to the United States to estimate the economic cost of September 11. Finally, as the impact of September 11 may be larger than has been typically seen, we employ an upper bound estimate using the results from across the globe. Page 2 of 10

4 To conduct our empirical investigation, we first begin by estimating the long-term effect of terrorism on our cross-section of countries. We do this, to ensure that the effects are not merely washed-out over time. Second, we estimate the short-term effects using panel regression techniques. Finally, we conduct a series of robustness checks using VARs, quantile regressions, and welfare simulations. In this way, we are able to see how consistent our estimates are and what would be our upper bound estimate. However, our investigation also suggests that these results are more robust than we previously thought and slightly larger in magnitude if our upper bound estimates are to be taken seriously. We estimate the impact of the September 11 attacks to be approximately a 0.50 percentage point decrease in GDP growth or $60 billion. Our upper bound estimate of the impact of September 11 is approximately twice that or $125 billion Editor s Introduction to the Economic Impacts for the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks Berkeley Electronic Press journal: Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, with Adam Rose, 2009, Vol. 15 : Iss. 2, Article 1, This volume contains eight studies that address this issue and that together have succeeded in narrowing the range of plausible estimates of September 11. The studies use two major approaches: top-down macroeconomic modeling that is often applied in the context of forecasting and business cycle analysis, and a bottom-up economic impact analysis that is typically applied more directly to the basic features of the external shock. The former approach usually encompasses all changes that have taken place in the economy and attempts to decompose them. The latter usually is limited to a specific set of actions/reactions and omits many important background factors. In these contexts, the papers shed light on whether 9/11 was dwarfed by the business cycle downturn at the time and whether the shock measured up against an industry or system-wide economic collapse. The collection of papers in this volume represent the outcome of a collaborative and iterative research process known as the CREATE Economic Impact Modeling Forum (EIMF). In essence it capitalizes on an active exchange of ideas between modeling groups. The special issue considers work by academics, policy-makers, practitioners and consulting firms. Those represented include: New York Federal Reserve Bank, Regional Economic Models, Inc. (REMI), INFORUM (U. of Maryland), RMS, Inc., Bryan Roberts, Peter Gordon research team, Adam Rose research team, and Brock Blomberg research team. An innovative aspect of this set of studies is seen in the range of impacts considered in the study. The impacts of 9/11 extend beyond those covered by most ordinary models, including behavioral responses such as relocating businesses whose facilities incurred substantial damage and avoiding air travel. Many of the papers in the volume include government (and private sector) responses in mitigating future events, including increased airport security. In some of the studies, modeling has been undertaken to decompose the overall impact according to the various shocks, responses, and stimuli. Twelve modeling groups were invited to participate in the EIMF 9-11 Project, and eight ultimately contributed research projects. The group of teams first exchanged ideas on the scope of the topic in the early winter of In January and February 2008, the group agreed on a scope and on a set of basic assumptions and data during a series of exchanges and conference calls at two-week intervals, which continued throughout the course of the project. Initial runs were exchanged, and the group met in early April to discuss the results and the methodologies. We found several inconsistencies in assumptions and gaps in data. We also discussed the deeper philosophical issues of unscrambling the eggs of an event that had taken place in the midst of various other cyclical and secular economic, as well as non- Page 3 of 10

5 economic, phenomena. We found a great disparity in the initial results, due in part to some differences in assumptions and data, but also to the application of disparate models. Assumptions were made uniform and data and findings (e.g., on direct business interruption and resilience) exchanged. Participants also offered suggestions for improving each others methodologies. Subsequent modeling runs were presented at a Workshop at the Homeland Security Institute (HSI) in late July 2008, which was attended by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) staff and several DHS contractors, and members of the EIMF 9/11 Advisory Board. The review process was repeated, this time with advice from an audience. Not surprisingly, the range of estimates narrowed in relation to the April meeting. The groups then returned to their home bases and continued to refine their estimates. Eight presentations were made of methods and results at the Annual Meetings of the North American Regional Science Association in Brooklyn, NY in November The modelers benefited from the feedback from formal discussants and the general audience at the conference. Final refinements were aided by continued exchanges between group members and from detailed comments in formal reviews by the Advisory Board of preliminary versions of papers in this volume Terrorism and the Returns to Oil Economics and Politics, with Hunter Jackson and Gregory Hess, 2009, The effect of terrorism on global oil prices has been largely explained through demand-side effects. We estimate an empirical model to re-examine the effect of terrorism on the price of global oil stocks across oil market regimes that reflect different supply constraints. We believe that terrorism will have larger impacts when global capacity is tight (i.e. when global demand is close to global supply). This means that any shock to capacity (say by conflict) should have the largest impact on profits before the first OPEC shock in the early 1970s. Since, then, conflict shocks would not allow firms to exploit production in the same way, thus reducing the available profits that could be garnered by such production manipulation. If capacity constraints are binding when a conflict occurs, then we predict that a positive stock price reaction can be expected for oil firms from such a shock. We exploit a new panel data set to investigate the relationship between oil profitability and conflict, using conflict data from the top twenty oil producing and exporting countries in the world. We show that in the later part of our sample, 1974 to 2005, as cartel behavior of OPEC member countries has diminished and as conflict has become more regular and thus the information surrounding it noisier, oil stock prices do not increase in response to conflict. However, in earlier capacity constrained eras, we find that oil stocks can in fact increase in response to conflict. In some cases, the impact of conflict may cause the return of oil stocks to rise by as much as ten percentage points. In this study, we investigate the relationship between conflict and the financial market performance of firms in the energy sector. Oil companies have a substantial amount of influence over the availability and price of the oil we pay for. Therefore, the relationship between the increasing levels of conflict in the world and oil firm performance could be an important one. We compare monthly data on all types of conflict, ranging from no casualty events to the September 11th attacks, and examine their effects on financial market performance, using data on terrorism from the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). We included only data on attacks on firms subsidiaries from those countries that are top oil producers, top oil exporters, or members of O.P.E.C. We then compiled monthly stock price data from the WRDS database at the University of Pennsylvania for those companies listed as part of the AMEX Oil Index (XOI) and others that are typically regarded as indicators of market performance. These two sets of data were then merged. Page 4 of 10

6 Our results suggest several important facts. First, we find that the measures of terrorism have greater predictive power over the first part of our time sample, , when the market demand closely followed market supply and terrorist events were less frequent. During this time sample, the impact of a terrorist event raised returns to oil firms by 6 to 10 percentage points. However, as we widen the time sample to include more recent periods, the returns from conflict fall until they approach zero or even negative values in the most recent period. Second, we find that while all companies are impacted by conflict, Hess, Occidental, and BP, tend to reap the largest benefits from conflict A Gravity Model of Globalization, Democracy and Transnational Terrorism In Gregory Hess (ed) Guns and Butter (MIT) 2009, with Peter Rosendorff, World foreign direct investment flows (FDI), which amounted to less than $13 billion in 1970, quadrupled every 10 years, reaching $54 billion in 1980 and $209 billion in During the last half of the 1990s, however, FDI practically exploded reaching a peak of $1.4 trillion in World wide trade also increased dramatically over the same time period. Trade as a percent of GDP grew from 27 percent in 1970 to 38 percent by 1980 to 45 percent by the year During the latter half of the 20th century there has been an increase in democratization across the globe. The percent of countries that are non-democracies as calculated by Freedom House, starts at 46 percent in The percent falls to 35 percent by 1980 and steadily declines to 25 percent by the year While the run-up of FDI, trade and democracy in the 1990s, and especially in the second half of that decade, has several explanations, it is strikingly correlated with a decline in transnational terrorism during that period. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, approximately 1.5 transnational terrorist events occurred every day. As globalization and democratization grew at an ever faster rate, the frequency of terrorist events declined sharply, reaching less than 0.5 events a day by Did this shift toward a more integrated and democratic world contribute to the large increase in peace during that same period? In order to understand the effects that democracy and globalization might have on terrorist activity, we need an underlying view of the decision-theoretic mechanisms that determine terrorist choices. We define terrorism as the premeditated or threatened use of extra-normal violence to obtain a political, religious or ideological objective through the intimidation of a large audience. We assume that terrorists are rational actors, choosing strategies to maximize the chance of success with respect to particular objectives, taking full account of the constraints under which they operate. The levels of activity undertaken, and the location in which they occur depend on the costs, benefits and resources available. Higher costs mean fewer activities; higher benefits and resources imply more activity. This paper therefore provides an original study into how democratization and globalization influence transnational terrorism by examining the motives of terrorists and how democratic institutions and international integration influence non-state economic actors. We employ a gravity model to investigate the relative importance of globalization and democratization on transnational terrorism and external conflict. We construct an original database of over 200,000 observations from for 189 countries, to examine the extent to which economic, political and historical factors influence the likelihood of citizens from one country to engage in terrorist activities against another. We find that the advent of democratic institutions, high income and more openness in a source country significantly reduces conflict. However, the advent of these same positive developments in targeted countries actually increases conflict. Ceteris paribus, the impact of being a democracy or participating in the WTO/IMF for a source country decreases the number of terrorist strikes by about 2 to 3 per year, which is more than two standard deviations greater than the average number of strikes between any two countries in a given year. Page 5 of 10

7 2.5. Perspective Paper on Transnational Terrorism Policies for the Copenhagen Consensus In Bjorn Lomborg, Ed. Global Crises, Global Solutions, (Cambridge) 2009, Sandler, Enders and Arce (SAE) have written a thorough and thoughtful Challenge Paper entitled ``Transnational Terrorism''. My paper proposes five different policy alternatives and using Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) calculations, shows that most of the alternative policies to stem terrorism are not worth the effort, economically speaking. In fact, the only policy SAE find worthwhile is increasing international cooperation. The methodology is solid and the execution is top notch. Therefore, my paper is going to take a slightly different approach than suggested in the opening paragraph. Rather than spend the majority of the perspective paper quibbling over the various assumptions of the challenge paper, we offer a more productive strategy. We provide an alternative modeling strategy to SAE. We do not presume that one approach is preferred over the other but rather provide a menu of approaches to which the reader may select, depending on his or her preferences. Our alternative model that attempts to estimate the welfare cost of terrorism by exploring only the forgone consumption from being mired in a world of conflict. Following the approach by Nobelist Robert Lucas, we demonstrate how one can theoretically ``price'' the effect that war has on consumption's growth and volatility. Intuitively, these consumption growth costs from war would be avoided in a perpetually peaceful world, which allows us to calculate the equivalent variation of how much individuals would be willing to give up in order to live in a peaceful world. For the most part, our results dovetail with what was found in SAE. Using both the baseline GDP approach and the welfare approach, we show that Business as Usual (BAU) could be more cost effective. Interestingly, even though we come at the problem from a very different angle, these results are similar to what shown in SAE though we find more evidence of cost effectiveness. This may mean that these results are robust to various strategies for estimating the benefits and costs associated with the current policy environment. In addition, we show that increasing proactive measures is also an ineffective policy. These values are somewhat larger than what was found in SAE, though the conclusion is the same. The one area in which we find slightly different results than SAE is the international cooperation alternative. The differences are probably because we adopt a slightly different experimental design than SAE. Instead of assuming certain returns to international cooperation, our policy experiment assumes that the international community has already been cooperating to prevent UN targeted organizations, e.g. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Using the welfare cost approach, we find that increased international cooperation is not cost effective, yielding a return of 26 cents on the dollar. When employing the GDP cost approach, however, we find our only cost effective result. 3. Applied Relevance The applied relevance from the research program is naturally imbedded in the description of the results in the previous section. Rather than be repetitive, this section highlights two obvious areas that follow from the research described above Direct Economic Cost Estimates In order properly understand the role for policy-makers to stem terrorism, it is critical to first catalogue a measure of the economic consequence of a terrorist attack. It is then necessary to examine how robust is this estimate. The research employed in these papers uses a myriad of techniques and the results tell a Page 6 of 10

8 consistent story. Terrorism appears to have a statistically strong (though economically smaller than other forms of conflict) negative impact on growth. This remains true even when considering other types of conflict and endogeneity concerns. Panel regressions which attempt to control for the potential bias due to country or time also confirm the negative impact of terrorism on growth. To calculate the economic impact of such an effect we merely interact the coefficient with the dollar value of GDP in 2006 our base year. As the impact is not statistically relevant in previous or future years, we only calculate the impact of 9/11 for the year In this case, we estimate the economic cost to be $60 billion. However, this presumes the average impact of an international terrorist event is the same as the impact in the United States in There are many reasons to presume this assumption is restrictive. First, the severity of the attack was surely larger for 9/11 than for other attacks. Using casualties as a metric, 2,976 died during the attack on September 11. For many of other terrorist attacks, there were no casualties. Second, as the incidence of terrorism is higher in high income democracies such as the United States, it is also possible that the impact in these areas is not the same as the average impact. One way (albeit a crude way)to estimate the impact in the United States using the upper bound confidence interval from the average estimate. In this case, a two standard deviation estimate from the average estimate is $125 billion. There are, of course, other ways to explore how different the impact was during the 9/11 attacks. We consider four different methodologies to see if the results from the previous section are fragile. First, we re-estimate the model analyzing different parts of the cross-national income or growth distribution. Second, we calculate the cost with regards to lost utility rather than only lost GDP. Third, we calculate the loss to components of GDP rather than only GDP itself. Finally, we calculate the loss using a structural VAR. In summary, we find our results consistent with our earlier findings that September 11 resulted in lost GDP of $60 billion. The upper bound estimate continues to be a loss of $125 billion International Relations The liberal peace hypothesis alleges that democracies are less likely to engage in militarized disputes with each other, that they are less likely to initiate conflicts with other democracies, and when they do, they allocate significantly more resources to the conflict than other polities. Democracies trade more with each other, and are more cooperative with respect to multilateral trading arrangements by forming trade blocs. Countries that trade more with each other are also less likely to engage in militarized disputes. Conversely, countries that are conflict prone deter trade and investment and experience slower growth. This association between trade, conflict and democracy has been a central concern of scholars in international relations, working to establish the precise causal processes and mechanisms. How these dynamics fit together has been a subject of significant dispute among scholars in the field. In the recent period however, an alternative form of cross-border conflict has garnered closer attention -- transnational terrorism. While terrorism is not war waged between states per se, it has many of the similar features -- it is a cross-national violent process that threatens people and property, with attendant political and economic consequences. Moreover, observers have argued that terrorism is responsive to changes in the same underlying variables: democracies are less prone to terrorism, and terrorism is a response to increased globalization. This paper investigates the links between democracy, commercial integration and terrorism in a systematic manner. Page 7 of 10

9 These themes have dominated public debate with regards to current US foreign policy. The Bush administration for instance insisted that the instillation of democracy in the Arab world would stem the flow of anti-american terrorism, and increase the security of US assets and people, both at home and abroad. President Bush's speech at the Veterans of Foreign Wars annual meeting in August 2005 explicitly equates peace with freedom. Chuck Hagel (2004), republican US senator from Nebraska argues that the war on terrorism must be guided by principles that expand democracy abroad. While it is not clear where this hypothesis emerges from, one likely candidate is the administration's reading of the literature on the democratic peace. Similarly, the US National Intelligence Council's 2005 report argues that globalization is a source of insecurity for the US; the New York Times' columnist Thomas Friedman in his recent popular tract alleges that a flatter world (one without hurdles or barriers for the flow of resources) makes transnational terrorism more likely all add to the popular view that globalization and terrorism are linked. The questions however remain -- does democracy abroad reduce the flow of terrorism and does increased globalization make terrorism more likely? Key to an answer to this question is to realize there are two sets of issues at work -- what are the characteristics relevant to a country as a target, and do democracy and commercial integration matter as characteristics of the source country? Our estimates demonstrate there is indeed a link between globalization, democratization and terrorism, though the relationship may not be as straightforward as originally thought. 4. Collaborative Projects The majority of the research was conducted with co-authors at USC and CMC. There was little resource support given outside of the ordinary institutional support for faculty and students. However, as described above, the iterative research process known as the CREATE Economic Impact Modeling Forum (EIMF) was critical in developing some of the research explorations. Those represented include: New York Federal Reserve Bank, Regional Economic Models, Inc. (REMI), INFORUM (U. of Maryland), RMS, Inc., Bryan Roberts, Peter Gordon research team, Adam Rose research team, and Brock Blomberg research team. These discussions were presented at a Workshop at the Homeland Security Institute (HSI) in late July 2008, which was attended by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) staff and several DHS contractors, and members of the EIMF 9/11 Advisory Board and at the Annual Meetings of the North American Regional Science Association in Brooklyn, NY in November Research Products Research Products (Please detail below) # 5a # of peer-reviewed journal reports published 5 5a # of peer-reviewed journal reports accepted for publication 5 5a # of non-peer reviewed publications and reports 0 5a # of scholarly journal citations of published reports 0 5b # of scholarly presentations (conferences, workshops, seminars) 7 5b # of outreach presentations (non-technical groups, general public) 0 5c # of products delivered to DHS, other Federal agencies, or State/Local 2 5c # of patents filed 0 Page 8 of 10

10 5.1. Publications CREATE PUBLICATIONS Research Area Referred Not Referred PDF Available for DHS Blomberg, Brock - Claremont McKenna College 1. Blomberg, B., Hess, G., Estimating the Macroeconomic Consequence of 9/11, Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, Blomberg, B., Rose, A., Editor s Introduction to the Economic Impacts for the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Blomberg, B., Jackson, H., Hess, G., Terrorism and the Returns to Oil, Economics and Politics, Blomberg, B., Perspective Paper on Transnational Terrorism Policies for the Copenhagen Consensus, Lomborg, B., (ed) Global Crises Global Solutions, Cambridge University Press, Blomberg, B., Rosendorff, P., A Gravity Model of Globalization, Democracy and Transnational Terrorism, Guns and Butter, Hess, G., (ed), MIT Press, 2009 EA x x EA x x EA x x EA x x EA x x 5.2. Presentations - Conference 1. Blomberg, B., On the Duration and Sustainability of Transnational Terrorism, University of Texas at Dallas, May Blomberg, B., Macroeconomic Models and Macroeconomic Impacts of September 11, Department of Homeland Security University Summit, March Estimating the Macroeconomic Impacts of September 11, North American Regional Science Conference, November An Economic Model of Heroism, CEPR Conference - Conflicts, Globalization and Development," Paris, France, November Lines in the Sand: Post-War Iraq, Conference on Terrorism, Princeton University, September Lines in the Sand: Border Effects, Economic Integration and Disintegration of Post-War Iraq, NBER Conference - National Security, July Blomberg, B., On the Duration and Sustainability of Transnational Terrorism, University of Texas, Dallas, TX, May Blomberg, B., Macroeconomic Models and Macroeconomic Impacts of September 11, Department of Homeland Security University Summit, March 2009 Page 9 of 10

11 9. Blomberg, B., Estimating the Macroeconomic Impacts of September 11, North American Regional Science Conference, November Blomberg, B., An Economic Model of Heroism, Conflicts, Globalization and Development, CEPR Conference, Paris, France, November Presentations - Outreach 1. Blomberg, B, Border Effects, Economic Integration and Disintegration of Post-War Iraq Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, CA, April Blomberg, B, Economic Integration and Disintegration of Post-War Iraq University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, April Education and Outreach Products Education and Outreach Initiatives (Please detail entries below) # # of students supported by CREATE funds 1 # of students involved (whether funded by CREATE + any other programs) 1 # of students graduated 0 # of contacts with DHS, other Federal agencies, or State/Local (committees) 0 # of DHS committees served or Congressional testimony provided 0 # of existing courses modified with new material 0 # of new courses developed 0 # of new certificate programs developed 0 # of new degree programs developed 0 Candace Adleberg attended DHS University summit to present work. Page 10 of 10