Canadian Council for International Co-operation

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1 The Post 9-11 Security Agenda and Canadian Foreign Policy: Implications for the Global South? Key Entry Points for Action: A CCIC Policy Background Paper Erin Simpson (May 2005)

2 The Canadian Council for International Co-operation (CCIC) is a coalition of Canadian organizations who seek to change the course of human development in ways that favour social and economic equity, democratic participation, environmental integrity and respect for human rights. CCIC is grateful to the the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) for their financial support. This paper and others are available through the Canadian Council for International Co-operation at or by contacting: CCIC 1 Nicholas Street, Suite 300 Ottawa, Ontario K1N 7B7 CANADA Tel: (613) Fax: (613) Canadian Council for International Co-operation May 2005

3 THE POST 9-11 SECURITY AGENDA AND CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GLOBAL SOUTH? KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER INTRODUCTION In the post-911 era, poverty and violent conflict in the Global South are viewed increasingly as threats to the Global North. Development assistance is being used as a tool for rich countries to defend themselves against threats ; aid allocations are being influenced by their strategic value in the war on terrorism; failed and fragile states are a focal point for donors; and conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance in the South are increasingly dominated by the security objectives of the North. The international community has a responsibility to protect and promote the rights of those living in situations of insecurity, failed states, and conflict. Renewed attention to poverty, conflict and security is welcome but on what terms? In 2002, the year following 9-11, security assistance and related aid from the United States to Uzbekistan increased by $45 million. Aid to Pakistan increased from $3.5 million to $1.3 billion. Since that time, Australia has placed poverty reduction second to security in its aid rationale; Japan has amended its Development Assistance Charter to include prevention of terrorism ; and the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has added to the criteria for Official Development Assistance (ODA) to include new security related expenses. Since 2002, in Canada, CIDA s mandate has included to support international efforts to reduce threats to international and Canadian security. The review of the European aid arrangement with the ACP countries (countries in Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific with special relationships with the European Union) suggests the conditioning of European aid delivery on partner country performance in the areas of counter-terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In March 2005, two key drivers of the war on terrorism and security-centric foreign policy, John Bolton and Paul Wolfowitz, were designated as US Ambassador to the United Nations, and appointed head of the World Bank respectively. Donor national interests have always played a significant role in aid spending. During the Cold War, aid was overtly political: allies, potential allies and the enemies of enemies were heavily supported, others were undermined. The result was, at best, the diversion of scarce resources away from poverty reduction, and at worst, the empowerment of human-rights-abusing-regimes and institutions. Following the collapse of the Berlin War, donor governments began to re-think these practices: the political space for aid reform gradually opened up, and donors started to write, think and meet about better aid practices or aid effectiveness. Conferences and agreements on aid effectiveness proliferated. Donors began to commit rhetorically to better donorship and to realistic evaluation of the interests of recipients. KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 1

4 Central to these discussions was careful consideration of the role of development aid and antipoverty interventions in helping to prevent and resolve violent conflicts. Within the OECD in particular, donors published in 2001 a thoughtful analysis of the relationship between conflict and development in Helping to Prevent Violent Conflict based on the best practices of DAC members. The response to the events of 9-11, however, took these discussions about aid, poverty and conflict in a new direction. The perceived threat of terrorism convinced many Northern governments of the need for better and more powerful tools to influence developing countries. The United States and their allies began to seek out to stronger channels of influence; development aid was an obvious point of entry. The terms poverty eradication, conflict and peace began to be confused with terrorism and security. Quite abruptly, the agenda of those arguing for holistic approaches to poverty eradication and the scourges of violent conflict was high-jacked by those arguing that large amounts of human, financial and military resources needed to be mobilised to prevent terrorist attacks and protect the national security of the rich. Some donors began to argue that since you can t have security without development, and you can t have development without security, security concerns are, in fact, development concerns. As a result of this conflation of aid and conflict prevention with the global security and antiterrorism agenda, many are starting to fear that any movement towards better aid practice and conflict prevention will be reversed by the security agenda. Rhetoric on the part of some donors is increasingly security-centric and the containing of risks facing donor countries seems to be growing as an acceptable rationale for aid. At issue is not only the integrity of development assistance although that is important. Most concerning is the shrinking policy space available to developing countries when they are seen through the lens of their efficacy, or threat, to Northern interests. There are important distinctions between what is good for strengthening local security, that is, for people experiencing violent conflict, what is beneficial for national security and what is helpful for global / regional security. The key issue in the convergence of peace, security and development agendas must be whose security are we protecting, in whose interest and at the expense of what? Is development cooperation again becoming an extension of donor foreign and defence policy? To what extent is our aid increasingly risk-management for national security? This paper begins an exploration of the impacts of the post-911 security agenda on Canada s actions vis-à-vis development and conflict prevention. It lays out some key policy entry points for Canadian organisations to influence current policy processes in these areas. KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 2

5 The paper is divided into the following sections: 1. DAC Debates New Goals for Development Assistance? 2. Development Agency Mandates 3. Aid Diversion? Spending trends among recipient countries 4. Failed and Failing States 5. New conditionalities for aid agreements? 6. Security Sector Reform 7. Interventions in Conflicts: 3D approaches 8. Provincial Reconstruction Teams 9. Funding mechanisms 10. Proposed Framework for Action KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 3

6 1. DAC DEBATES NEW GOALS FOR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE? The Development Assistance Committee (DAC), based in the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), is a forum for the 22 donor countries who periodically review together both the amount and the nature of their contributions to aid programs, bilateral and multilateral, and consult each other on all other relevant aspects of their development assistance policies. It constitutes the main donor forum for policy setting and best practice development; for Canada and many other donors, DAC statements, which must be agreed to by consensus, have significant influence on aid policy. Following the 9-11 attacks on the United States and the declaration by George W Bush of a War on Terrorism, the DAC released a statement outlining A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention. The statement marked a significant departure from an earlier DAC statement on conflict and aid Helping Prevent Violent Conflict, which emphasised the effects of violent conflicts on the lives and potentials of people living in poverty. Instead, the 2002 DAC paper on terrorism prevention explored root causes of terrorism, arguing that people living in poverty can easily become disaffected potential supporters of terrorism. The statement suggests that the precarity of their political development, government structures and civil society [in fragile and failed states] can render them more vulnerable to radicalisation, less able to deal with illicit activities (e.g. training camps) and more likely to provide an environment in which terrorists are recruited and supported. With respect to the role of development aid in the war on terrorism, the statement argues the need for donor sponsored education campaigns (to convince people they can make change within the system), multi-sector dialogues, media training, youth programs and education curricula. As CCIC s commentary on the statement argued, it situates the motives for development co-operation within a mind-set defined by terrorism poor, marginalised, disaffected people are a threat to lives and freedom of citizens in the North. For many donors in the DAC Network on Conflict Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC), the terrorism paper diverged markedly from ongoing work on the relationship between insecurity, poverty and development co-operation, but did not signal new directions for the work of the DAC. Instead, it was seen to be the result of back-room dealings by the United States. The DAC CPDC s work since 2002 is consistent with this: the DAC has not significantly taken up the rhetoric of counter-terrorism in their work, with one important exception. One key element in the terrorism paper, relating to the adequacy of criteria for what constitutes aid, has become a major focus of the DAC program. The debate over the role of development co-operation in conflict prevention and security dates back to the establishment of DAC guidelines on development co-operation. As recently as 1997, there was no consensus among DAC members on the role of ODA in addressing violent conflict and insecurity, but there was a recognition by many that conflict needed to be included within development concerns. A group of donors formed the Network on Conflict Peace and Development Co-operation, and began the work of integrating conflict prevention and peacebuilding into official development co-operation thinking and practice. Canada, the Netherlands KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 4

7 and Australia (all members of the network) agreed to lobby other DAC member governments between meetings, in order to move the debate along toward the eventual goal of expanding the ODA criteria to increase programming in security and conflict. In the context of the CPDC work, and the 2002 terrorism paper, the issues of ODA criteria took centre-stage. At the April 2004 High Level Meeting of the DAC, member Ministers considered clarification and adjustment of ODA guidelines in areas relating to conflict and security. According to the final statement of the April HLM, members agreed to adjust and clarify reporting guidelines relating to preventing recruitment of child soldiers, enhancing civil society role in security sector reform and civilian oversight of security expenditure. Ministers, however, were not able to agree on two controversial proposals for ODA criteria adjustment reform and training of security and military forces in non-military practices (such as human rights and humanitarian assistance), and contributions to developing country peacekeeping operations capacity but agreed to continue discussions and report to the March 2005 High Level Meetings. In the meantime, the DAC Working Party on Statistics and the Network on Conflict Peace and Development Cooperation (CPDC) would work to define the changes in operational terms, and establish consensus among members. The logic for these adjustments, in the opening lines of the final statement of the 2004 High Level Meeting, is the general agreement on the importance of security-related activities for development. In the lead-up to a December 2004 meeting of senior aid officials, the Dutch government presented a short paper for consideration by its DAC colleagues. The paper includes a series of proposals for the re-definition of ODA, all rooted in a profoundly security-centric logic. The Dutch proposals cover Governance of the Security Sector, Strengthening of Security Structures, Peace-building and human security. With respect to Governance of the Security Sector, the Dutch have called for ODA-eligibility for governance activities targeted at the military, activities relating to the creation of integrated armies, and the destruction of surplus and illegal weapons within the military. In the area of peace-building, they argue that the transport of civilian and wounded troops, the hiring of local workers to help peace operations, medical facilities, military monitors, and training in peace tasks should also qualify as ODA. In a joint statement to DAC member states, CCIC and other members of a global network on security and development issues (the Global Security and Development Network) argued that financing assistance in the area of military reform, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations from already small and overstretched ODA budgets would inevitably be at the expense of the resources required for achieving the Millennium Development Goals, sustainable development, social justice and human rights. Canada chaired the DAC CPDC during this important debate over security and development cooperation. According to Canadian government officials, Canada has played the role of moderator / facilitator, not taking sides in the debate in recent High Level Meetings. There have been unconfirmed suggestions from NGO colleagues in other DAC member states; however, that Canada has been promoting the Dutch proposals. If true, this would be consistent with Canada's history of collaborating with the Dutch to push for changes in ODA orientations. The United States has apparently not been heavily involved in these deliberations. KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 5

8 Due to a lack of agreement among the 22 donors, this broader debate based on the Dutch proposals was suspended at the March 2005 Ministers meeting of the DAC (HLM), where members agreed to three less controversial elements of adjustment. According to a DAC statement on Conflict Prevention and Peace-building released following the 2005 HLM, consensus has been reached on technical cooperation and civilian support for six items. It goes on to list: 1. Management of security expenditure through improved civilian oversight and democratic control of budgeting, management, accountability and auditing of security expenditure. 2. Enhancing civil society s role in the security system to help ensure that it is managed in accordance with democratic norms and principles of accountability, transparency and good governance. 3. Supporting legislation for preventing the recruitment of child soldiers. 4. Security system reform to improve democratic governance and civilian control. 5. Civilian activities for peace-building, conflict prevention and conflict resolution. 6. Controlling, preventing and reducing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. DAC members also agreed to re-assess their positions on the two more controversial issues for inclusion non-military training for the military and building peacekeeping capacity at the DAC Ministers meeting in This amounts to a short-term moratorium on debate on these other issues. European NGOs, however, remain concerned that in spite of this moratorium within the DAC, the pressure to expand ODA criteria to include security activities will continue in the EU, the G8 and the African Union, eventually leading to more changes at the 2007 DAC meeting. The delineation of guidelines and reporting requirements for ODA was a key step in limiting the political use of aid, and strengthening transparency and accountability in donor aid practice. Some subsequent adjustments and clarifications to the guidelines did serve to enhance accountability and transparency, while other adjustments have been expansions, blurring the lines between poverty-focused interventions and other dimensions of international and domestic policies. Canadian civil society organisations should: Monitor the process for expanding the criteria of Official Development Assistance at the DAC and related discussions in the G8 and other international fora, through contacts with counterparts in Europe and relevant Canadian officials and the Minister for International Cooperation. Meet regularly with CIDA officials in the Security issues in Policy Branch, FAC officials in the Regional Security and Peacekeeping Division. Support initiatives for legislation establishing poverty reduction as the exclusive purpose of Canadian aid spending. KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 6

9 Engage with interested parliamentarians and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and for International Cooperation to protect the integrity of ODA internationally and in Canada. Government should: Support further adjustments to DAC ODA criteria only where they clearly constitute clarifications in relation to an exclusive mandate for poverty reduction, that is, for the most part, further categorisation of existing activity areas, rather than an expansion into new activity areas involving military roles in peacebuilding and peacekeeping. Work with colleagues in the DAC and in other international fora to actively resist the proposals put forth by the Dutch government regarding the expansion of ODA criteria. Questions What is Canada s position on the outstanding issues at the DAC, and in particular, the Dutch proposals? How will the agreed new areas for ODA reporting affect Canadian aid disbursements? How will they affect other donors aid spending? What types of activities are included in each of the new categories? 2. DEVELOPMENT AGENCY MANDATES In the wake of the DAC s Development Cooperation Lens on Preventing Terrorism paper (and no doubt influenced by factors other than the DAC paper) several DAC members made significant changes to the mandates of their official development agencies, reflecting new realities in development discourse. The Dutch, the Australian and the Japanese governments all changed their agency mandates to include preventing, fighting or countering terrorism. Programming changes, and changes in the language and logic used to justify actions in these agencies reflect these new priorities. 1 The government of Canada has not updated the purpose of Canadian ODA since the 1995 foreign policy review, and did not do so in the recent International Policy Statement. But as noted earlier, Canada s official donor agency, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), has referred to a revised mandate for the Agency to reflect new realities, which has been accompanied by shifts in the language used to describe agency priorities and the role of the agency in promoting national security. Since 2002, the phrase to support international efforts to reduce threats to international and Canadian security, has been added to the mandate of CIDA. In addition, CIDA s Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS) includes new language on peace and security in the Key Agency Results (KARs). This is a shift from the Agency s Sustainable 1 See Ngaire Woods of the Global Economic Governance Program at Oxford and Howard Mollett at BOND. KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 7

10 Development Strategy which included reference to peace and security only in relation to work in the former Yugoslavia, not as a key priority, objective or result for the Agency. According to CIDA officials, these changes were added without the benefit of a well-defined CIDA policy to guide aid interventions for security and peace. Following the April 2004 release of Canada s first National Security Policy, which proposed a role for development assistance in countering terrorism, there have been concerns that ODA funds might be mobilised for Canadian international counter-terrorism cooperation. But at the time of writing, CCIC has been assured by officials that ODA funds will not be used for these counter-terrorism activities: rather, they will be funded out of Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) budget from the peace and security component of the 2005 International Assistance Envelope. According to FAC and Finance Officials, $15 million has been set aside for these activities for the Budget. Canadian civil society organisations should: Monitor the evolution of CIDA s mandate, as well as any purpose for ODA included in the legislated mandate. Monitor the evolution in programming in light of the new Agency mandate for international efforts to reduce threats to international and Canadian security. While increased attention to conflict is a welcome development, the resulting programs and activities must be carefully scrutinised given the foreign policy pressures on Canada and the United States and the apparent shifts in priorities that have been observed in the programs of other donors. Government should: Place poverty reduction and the promotion of human rights as the exclusive mandate of Canadian development assistance. The Government should introduce legislation to solidify this mandate. Make any further changes to CIDA s mandate through a consultative and transparent process, rooted in evidence-based assessments of the role of aid in promoting security and resolving conflict. Develop a CIDA policy and strategy for peace and security cooperation that address some key questions: What are the most important peace and security issues that Canadian ODA should be addressing given an exclusive mandate for ODA to reduce poverty? What are the implications of Canadian policy for the rights of the poor and their representatives to press for change? What factors determine the priorities for Canadian interventions for peace and security, particularly those involving ODA? CIDA programming in peace and security issues should be firmly rooted in its poverty eradication mandate. Keep CIDA programming in peace and security issues independent from Canadian National Security priorities. KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 8

11 Questions What policy framework will guide Canadian aid in the area of peace and security? Do interventions address key concerns for those affected by violent conflict, particularly vulnerable and marginalised population, or are they mainly oriented to the key concerns of the interveners? What impacts will these interventions have on long-term conflict prevention and resolution, and on sustained progress in improving the livelihoods of the poor and marginalised? 3. AID DIVERSION? SPENDING TRENDS AMONG RECIPIENT COUNTRIES A recent study by Ngaire Woods at Oxford s Global Economic Governance Program suggests that among the major donors, increased amounts of aid have been spent in security-strategic countries, rather than the poorest and most vulnerable 2. This has not, however, always happened at the expense of other aid spending: aid has not always been diverted to fund strategic interventions, but rather, aid has been added for these purposes. In some cases, however, such as in the UK and US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is strong evidence that aid monies were diverted away from the poor and towards these geopolitical imperatives. Although the Woods study does not specifically examine the Canadian case, CCIC s analysis indicates that these trends hold for Canada. The geo-politically strategic moves in aid since 9-11 have been made in addition to, not at the expense of, other aid spending. The preliminary monies for Afghanistan and Iraq, for instance, were supplementary spending, from unallocated federal government budgetary reserves, not pulled away from other projects in other countries. Nevertheless, between 2001 and 2003, about 26% of total new aid resources, created by Canada s commitment to increase aid annual by 8% and supplementary estimates during the fiscal year, were targeted at these two countries 3. In addition, Canada contributed $1.5 billion of non-oda funding from 2002 to 2004 for Canadian military forces participation in various operations related to Afghanistan and the fight against terrorism in the region. The result has been a distortion of the government s commitment to allocate new aid resources since 2002 for CIDA s program in its nine countries of focus, largely because of foreign policy considerations and the pressure for politically strategic interventions. In both the Iraq and the Afghanistan programs, CIDA makes clear that geopolitical and security objectives are key drivers. The Afghanistan program overview states that Canada s work will ensure the country never again becomes a haven for terrorism and that Afghanistan's reconstruction is key to creating lasting security in the country, the region, and the world. The political push for the expansion of aid is also made clear: before 2001, our assistance was largely humanitarian aid, typically $10 million a year for basic human needs. Since the Tokyo 2 3 Reconciling effective aid and global security: Implications for the emerging international development architecture, Ngaire Woods and Research Team, Global Economic Governance Programme, University College, Oxford CCIC calculations based on information from 2004 federal budget and CIDA. KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 9

12 conference Afghanistan has been the single largest recipient of Canadian bilateral aid. CIDA's Afghanistan funds are focused on humanitarian assistance and reconstruction as well as development assistance targeted to four priorities (rural livelihoods and social protection, security and the rule of law, natural resource management and agriculture, and operating budget support to the Afghan government). The total allocation for is $616.5 million. 4 See Table A. The Iraq program is more nuanced. Canada s interventions are justified first and foremost to alleviate suffering, then because Canada has a longstanding tradition in post-conflict situations. Only after these two objectives is Iraq s recovery seen as crucial for the stability of the region and critical from a global security perspective. When Canada joined the reconstruction effort in 2003, the $300 million contribution was focused mainly on humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, with a priority on basic education, good primary health care, clean water and sanitation. In addition, Canada provided substantial support for debt reduction as part of an international agreement among major creditors. The current program highlights include building participatory and accountable democratic institutions, and security sector reform. The program makes clear that Canada s engagement is likely to be limited once order, good governance and institutions are restored, and oil production is resumed, foreign assistance is unlikely to be needed 5. It is important to note that Canadian assistance to Iraq was channelled to the World Bank and the UN system, and not to the transition administration controlled by the United States. See Table A. The 2004 Budget set out commitments for Afghanistan and Iraq of $916 million between 2002 and Up to 2003, about 32% had been disbursed, largely from supplementary estimates 7. But what will be the source of the remaining commitments, and any subsequent additions? Will they come from already announced aid increases (8% per year) up to 2010, or from supplementary sources? In its listing of 25 partner countries for CIDA, the Liberal government s 2005 International Policy Statement (IPS) does not include either Afghanistan or Iraq 8. This focus applies only to two-thirds of bilateral funding, with the remaining third of bilateral funding reserved for failed and fragile states, and funds for humanitarian assistance, partnership and multilateral channels apparently unaffected by the country-focus 9. Given the types of disbursements in Afghanistan and Iraq, it seems likely that funds will continue to flow from humanitarian assistance, multilateral, partnership, and the remaining third of bilateral branch funding. However, clarity is needed on the nature of funding mechanisms for programming in Iraq and Afghanistan CIDA s Afghanistan Program -Overview. CIDA Iraq Program see: Federal Budget, CCIC calculation based on information from CIDA. CIDA news release, April 19, 2005 see: 1FA5B F FE D2?OpenDocument. A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Canada s International Policy Statement. Development Chapter, p April KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 10

13 Beyond the diversion of resources away from poverty eradication, the focus on Afghanistan and Iraq raise issues concerning the role of aid in the war on terrorism itself. Where Canada (and Canadians) have been unwilling, as in Iraq, to support the US-led attacks with soldiers, our leaders, along with other non-combatant countries, have found it politically advantageous to provide humanitarian assistance and reconstruction aid. By playing clean-up crew for the United States aggressive wars on terror, is Canada encouraging by implication a more aggressive military approach to the use of terrorism as a tactic of disaffected organisations? Canadian civil society organisations should: Monitor the proportion and purposes of overall CIDA resources spent in Afghanistan and Iraq and other geopolitically driven allocations. Pressure for aid allocations based on poverty eradication and human rights, locally defined needs, and Canadian historic ties and involvement. Monitor Canada s adherence to the standards set out in the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles to supply humanitarian assistance according to need. Government should: Continue to determine country focus for Canadian aid based exclusively on poverty-related criteria, with strategies to address poverty reduction efforts in both well-governed countries as well as failed and fragile states where there has been long-standing Canadian presence on the ground. Direct CIDA, in the realm of humanitarian assistance, to allocate funds proportionately according to need, as laid out in the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles. Reject clearly the aggressive and militaristic approach to terrorism prevention of the United States and its allies. While Canada should provide humanitarian, development and other types of assistance to people affected by violent conflict, this assistance should not be used to show support for the war on terrorism. Questions How does Canada intend to implement its commitment to allocate humanitarian assistance proportionately according to need? How will the remaining commitments to Afghanistan and Iraq be funded? Will ODA funds be used to finance aspects of the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan, expected to be deployed in August 2005? KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 11

14 4. FAILED AND FAILING STATES Historically, the threats to powerful states were other powerful states. The attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent attacks on Western targets, allowed for the argument that weak states, poor states, and poor people could be the new threats to Northern security. In order to contain these threats, interventions in these failed and fragile states, in the form of development assistance, military assistance, and even outright armed intervention, becomes a priority. The Dutch government, in its paper, Failing States: A Global Responsibility, defines a failed or fragile state according to three criteria: security, legitimacy and services. According to the Dutch, a failing state is unable to control its territory or large parts of its territory and guarantee the security of its citizens, because it has lost its monopoly on the use of force; no longer able to uphold internal legal order; no longer able to deliver public services to its population or create the conditions for such delivery 10. The European Commissioner, Paten, has described failed states as countries where the institutions, coercive power and basic services of national government have simply crumbled away. The US Agency for International Development (US AID) defines state fragility in terms of legitimacy and effectiveness of governance structures in the security, political, economic and social realms 11. In Canada, CIDA, Foreign Affairs Canada, Privy Council s Office and the Prime Minister s Office have begun to devote considerable attention to issues related to failed and fragile states as a priority for Canadian foreign policy. The Budget makes several references to the need to engage with fragile, failed and failing states 12 ; the April 2005 International Policy Statement is heavily focused on state failure 13 ; and within CIDA, there is apparently a crossbranch group working on a strategy paper on fragile states. In addition, CIDA submitted a case study on Haiti as a fragile state to a DAC Senior Level Meeting on Aid Effectiveness in Fragile States, January 13-14, The aid effectiveness orientation of rewarding only good performers left many of the most vulnerable people in the world with diminished support and attention from the international community. According to the Commission for Africa Report, countries where the state is perceived to be fragile, of which there are many in Africa, received as much as 43% less aid between 1992 and 2002 than the level that these countries performance (under the World Bank s CPIA index) suggested might have been possible to absorb. 15 Aid receipts for fragile states were twice as volatile as those to other low income countries. Renewed attention to so-called poor performers is therefore welcomed. However, in the current political environment, political focus and the orientation given to aid spending in failed / failing / fragile states must be approached with healthy skepticism and caution Failing States: A Global Responsibility. Netherlands Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) and Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law (CAVV), No. 35, May 2004, p.11. Fragile States Strategy, USAID, January 2005, p. 3. The Budget Plan 2005, Tabled in the House of Commons by the Honourable Ralph Goodale, Minister of Finance, February 23, Chapter 6, Meeting our Global Responsibilities, p A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Canada s International Policy Statement. Canadian Cooperation with Haiti: Reflecting on a Decade of a Difficult Partnership, CIDA, Decemeber Commission for Africa Report, p.349. KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 12

15 The definition of failed / fragile states is rich terrain for such scepticism. A state that is failed or failing is not a development partner, and certain development and security interventions can be justified in a failed state which cannot be justified in a development partner. A firm definition will be key in guarding against the political use of the label failed state to meet security objectives. The 2005 International Policy Statement (IPS) suggests that the definition will be informed by the UNDP Human Development Index and the World Bank's Country Policy and Institution Assessment (CPIA) 16. The latter, the CPIA, is notoriously unaccountable and non-transparent. The methods used to determine which quintile countries are assigned to are not publicly available and have raised concerns by Bank critics and development advocates. There is therefore a need for clarity on the definition of failed or fragile state if the category is to be used as an organising principle for disbursements and approaches to programming. Donor analysis and understanding of state failure is also a key consideration. How do we explain the high prevalence of state failure in the East and South, and, conversely, the high prevalence of what must be state success in the West and North. What are the origins of state failure? The analysis of state failure should be holistic, acknowledging the external and internal causes of state collapse, and, significantly, the complicity of donor governments in said failure. Links between state failure and other donor policy areas, including the arms trade, trade in conflict resources, and the impacts of foreign investors, must be made. Ultimately, an understanding of these root causes of failure will inform and determine the prescriptions for success. An understanding of state failure will also inform the rationale for engaging in failed states. The IPS, in setting out the rationale for focus on failed and fragile states, put undue emphasis on perceived threats to Canada's security emanating from failed and fragile states. The IPS paints a picture of a security-centric world in which threats to Canadian lives, values and prosperity are the main driving force behind policy decisions. In the Statement, failed and fragile states are posited as harbours for terrorists; investment in counter-terrorism is significantly increased to reduce vulnerability to terrorism; weapons of mass destruction are a concern because of the potential for terrorists to get a hold of them 17. Canadian foreign policy should be clear that the complex conflicts in the South are primarily human catastrophes not threats to Canada s security or potential harbours for terrorists. Flowing from the rationale for engaging in failed states is the question of how Canada engages in failed or fragile states: what tools are most appropriate? Here, a rights-based approach is instructive: Canada s efforts should be rooted in the primary obligation of states to protect (ensuring that Canada s actions do no undermine the capacity of other states to meet their human rights obligations), fulfil (provide), and promote international human rights (encourage states to meet their human rights obligations). The Responsibility to Protect doctrine, which Canada played a lead role in developing through the United Nations, also provides a useful reference point for structuring donor engagement in certain failed and failing states. The three pillars of the Responsibility (to prevent, protect and rebuild), emphasize the obligation for the international A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Canada s International Policy Statement. Development Chapter, p April A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Canada s International Policy Statement. KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 13

16 community to do everything possible to prevent deadly conflict, to exhaust all possible avenues before intervening militarily, and to work with local partners in re-building societies postconflict. By this logic, Canada s efforts to deal with state fragility must address our roles in international negotiations to control the sale of small arms, and a source of government-supported direct investment (particularly in extractive industries with well-established links to conflict). In addition, Canada should support the fulfilment of human rights through local peace processes, good governance and development, and through international advocacy on states human rights records. Finally, the issue of how Canada chooses which failed / failing states to focus its policy resources is important. Are they the states in which the most people are the most vulnerable? Or are they the states that are seen by the US and others as geopolitically important, based on their assessment of perceived vulnerability to threats emanating from these states? Is aid spending being used as a means to encourage alignment and discourage straying from a commitment to the global anti-terrorism agenda? The 2005 International Policy Statement (IPS) suggests that up to one third of CIDA's bilateral programming resources will be allocated to failed and fragile states 18. The statement does not, however, give details on which failed and fragile states CIDA will prioritise, though, as is suggested above, it is likely that Afghanistan and perhaps Iraq will figure prominently. Canadian civil society organisations should: Engage in government consultative processes on failed states, and ensure that Canadian engagement in failed states addresses the concerns of the most vulnerable. Engage with CIDA officials and DAC members on the Draft Principles for engagement in failed and fragile states. Work through media, public engagement, and government relations, to expand the debate over state fragility to include donor complicity. Work collaboratively to develop recommendations and principles for donor and NGO engagement in fragile states. Continue organising around the control of small arms and light weapons, and the regulation of Canadian government support for Canadian investments in fragile states. Government should: Set out clear policies to direct its work for conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and socioeconomic reconstruction in failed and fragile states, drawing on the expertise of those with long histories of work in such contexts. These policies should define a role for the Canadian government that is inclusive of non-state actors and centred on local change agents. 18 A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Canada s International Policy Statement. Development Chapter, p April KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 14

17 Define clearly the parameters of a failed or fragile state. The definition should not be based on a non-transparent and unaccountable World Bank Country Policy and Institution Assessment (CPIA). Provide leadership to quell the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. Canada s interventions in this regard should be guided by, but not limited to, the UN Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in All its Aspects (PoA). This includes the promotion of the draft Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers or the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), and reducing the demand for SALW through development and peacebuilding interventions. Missing from the PoA is action on civilian possession of military assault weapons. Canada should use the opportunities presented by the July 2005 Biennial Meeting of States and the July 2006 Review Conference to reintroduce language into the PoA on global norms prohibiting military assault weapons. Additionally, Canada should work towards a legallybinding convention banning civilian possession of military assault weapons, inside or outside the United Nations. Cease supporting Canadian investments overseas where they can clearly be shown to exacerbate and perpetuate human rights violations and environmental destruction. Such investments have been linked to the propping up of illegitimate and repressive regimes (as in Burma), and the perpetuation of violent conflict (as in Sudan and elsewhere), situations clearly of relevance to the issue of state failure. Government support for Canadian investments overseas range from financial guarantees through the Export Development Corporation (EDC), investment in the Canadian Investment Fund for Africa, to promotion through Canadian embassies and trade consulates. Canada should introduce legislation conditioning the provision of any state support for company activity overseas on a declaration of adherence to internationally accepted norms (ILO Convention 169, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, IFC Standards to name a few), including monitoring and compliance mechanisms. A similar such legislation was recently introduced in the Belgian parliament. Support for local peace processes and governance in failed and fragile should be done in partnership and consultation with local change agents. Here, the OECD-DAC Draft Principles for Good International Engagement in failed and fragile states are a good starting point, though they lack a comprehensive and rights-based approach to state failure, as outlined above. Questions How will Canada define failed / failing states? What policy framework will guide Canadian interventions in failed and fragile states? How will CIDA policies on failed and fragile states relate to those of other government departments? KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 15

18 5. NEW CONDITIONALITIES FOR AID AGREEMENTS? Concerns have also been raised over the inclusion of security-related conditions in aid agreements. The review of the Cotonou agreement between the European Union and the ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries with special relationships with the European Union) includes specific reference to a country s performance on security policy, such as co-operation with counter-terrorist programs and commitment to non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery mechanisms. Members of the European platform, CONCORD, representing major European CSOs, are concerned that these constitute conditions for the agreement; CONCORD has voiced its objection to the clauses which are driven by Europe s internal focus on security, and not by the fight against poverty 19. CCIC s research for this paper suggests that Canada has so far not included security-related policy objectives in the conditions negotiated with recipients of its aid. But increasingly, CIDA is involved in multi-donor initiatives, particularly with the poorest countries, where it only takes one major donor imposing such conditionalities to have the effect. The use of conditionalities in aid relationships to influence social and economic processes in ways favourable to donor interests has been a long-standing practice, and is widely critiqued by CSOs and analysts. Responding to these concerns, the UK s official development agency, DFID, recently released a statement, Partnerships for Poverty Reduction: Rethinking Conditionality, signalling its commitment to supporting greater country ownership, especially of the policy process, and better mutual accountability. The paper highlights the critique that conditionalities have been used to promote policy choices not in the interests of poor people, and commits to switch from process conditions to mutually agreed outcome conditions. Donor-recipient negotiations would guide the allocation of donor resources based on mutually agreed time-specific outcomes (e.g. high rate of student enrolment or quality teaching measured by student performance) without insisting on policies or mechanisms by which to achieve said goals (macro-economic policies or user fees for schools). Canadian civil society organisations should: Monitor closely the inclusion of conditionalities and expected outcomes in Canada s aid relationships, particularly in countries where Canada has security interests. Government should: Review its aid practices in relation to donor conditionality, with a view to eliminating donor imposed conditions for its aid. 19 BOND newsletter. KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 16

19 6. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM In response to increasing security concerns in both failed and failing states and good performers, donor countries are programming increasingly in the area of security sector reform (SSR). Security Sector Reform (SSR) is defined in the OECD-DAC 2004 paper, Security Sector Reform and Governance, as activities to increase the ability of partner countries to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance and the rule of law. Examples of activities include political and policy dialogue between civilian decision-makers and security forces; improving the governance of the armed forces etc. In Canada, both Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) and CIDA carry out variations of SSR programs. In FAC, SSR projects are funded through the Human Security Initiative, and range from the Modernisation of Bolivia s Military, which aims to make the military more representative of Bolivia s indigenous and female populations, to Strengthening the Security-Development Nexus through a thematic workshop given by the International Peace Academy. Until the March 2005 DAC decision to broaden reporting criteria for ODA to include a range of SSR activities, SSR activities were not ODA-eligible, and official development agencies, like CIDA, did not program in security sector reform. CIDA did, however, program in the areas of governance, human rights and peace-building, and therefore often dealt with elements of the security sector in a reform framework. Projects in these areas include training of police in Haiti and elsewhere. Due to the recent introduction of aspects of SSR as an ODA category, reliable statistics and reporting for CIDA s current programming in SSR are not yet available. According to CIDA officials, an increased number of security-related projects should be expected from CIDA and other official donors following the March DAC decision to expand ODA criteria. While CIDA does not have its own policy paper on SSR, it is expected that CIDA will program over the range of SSR activities laid out in the DAC 2004 policy paper consistent with the new DAC ODA criteria. CIDA will begin reporting on SSR activities using the new DAC coding starting in the present fiscal year, making it easier to assess the nature of CIDA security sector reform activities. From an anti-poverty and human rights perspective, increased SSR activities could be a welcome development. The actions and financing of the military and repressive police forces in developing countries can be significant impediments to human rights and democratic development. The reform of the security sector can be a key factor in conflict prevention and resolution, and in democratic development. Advocates of small arms control and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration (DDR) programs have long argued for increases in funding for SSR in conflict-prone societies. In the current geopolitical context, however, increased SSR activities should be closely monitored by the development community. Canadian CSOs should be monitoring SSR spending on both the project level (what types of projects, for what purposes, are being funded) and on an agency level (how much of the agency s limited resources are being spent on these types of projects). KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 17

20 At a project level, there are questions about SSR programming both in terms of relevance to the anti-poverty agenda, and impact on development and human rights. There are concerns that by opening the door to SSR activities, donors have allowed themselves space to program outside the realm of those security investments relevant to poverty reduction, in areas which might in fact impair anti-poverty interventions, for the benefit of their own security interests. Examples of the latter activities might include counter-terrorism training for police, training of border guards, and regulation of remittances from diaspora communities. There is also an important considerations as to the extent to which such security sector investments might serve to later prop up or legitimate a repressive state apparatus. CIDA has identified four key priorities for its programs, one of which is governance and human rights. SSR is justifiably a component of these activities, but should not dominate. But analysis of trends over time is very difficult at this point, since CIDA has not reported discreetly on SSR. Civil society organisations should: Monitor the proportion and nature of CIDA funding for SSR activities annually and over time. Government should: Create a policy framework for CIDA s work in SSR should explicitly rooting the Agency s programming in this area in poverty reduction and human rights promotion strategies. Ensure that SSR activities in developing countries have a clear poverty-reduction focus and are screened for potential human rights impacts. Questions What policy framework will guide CIDA s work in SSR? How will CIDA and CSOs judge the impacts of SSR projects on the police and military, and on people s rights? 7. INTERVENTIONS IN CONFLICTS: 3D APPROACHES Donor governments, including Canada, are increasingly championing 3D (Diplomacy, Defense, Development) or joined-up government approaches to conflict and post-conflict situations. The approach is rooted in a desire for more coordinated interventions across the entire government, and reflects the complexity of modern conflict. The (mostly metaphorical) threeblock war is the common illustration of this approach: troops could be fighting insurgents in one block, providing humanitarian aid in another, and supporting reconstruction on a third block. KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 18

21 While movement towards better coordination and coherence in foreign policy is welcome, humanitarians and development actors have raised concerns about the 3D approach. One such concern revolves around the extent to which coordination and communication between the 3 Ds become integration and common objectives. Better coordination is essential for effective external intervention in crises, but integration risks conflating development objectives with foreign policy objectives, and blurring the lines between humanitarian and military action. In this regard, the April 2005 International Policy Statement (IPS) goes too far, proposing integration as the goal of 3D efforts, rather than coordination. In fact, defence, diplomacy and development have separate but related goals; work in each field should be well communicated and coordinated, but cannot be integrated into one effort without blurring the lines between humanitarian and military action. Can humanitarian actors work alongside, and co-ordinate with, military without jeopardizing their neutrality? Does a common objective undercut the humanitarian objective? Can military actors carry out humanitarian assistance without undermining humanitarian principles? These questions need urgent attention by government and CSOs alike as they respond more forcefully to complex conflicts and challenges of fragile states. Also of concern are the ways in which a 3D approach to determining common objectives includes development processes. The role of development actors is to work in partnership with local populations and / or institutions, listening to and supporting their development objectives. Reconstruction processes are no different; they involve significant changes to and evolutions of communities. These processes must be rooted firmly in people's locally-owned development strategies. The notion of a three block war for the Canadian military potentially conflates support for local peoples self-determined development paths with hearts and mind operations. The latter may have some limited role in a peacekeeping operation as it requires building trust with local people, but this should not be confused with sustainable reconstruction and development efforts. 3D objectives, which are often short term, must explicitly recognise important distinctions among the 3 Ds, and permit space for those who will be working to root development and reconstruction objectives in local processes. Canada's 3D approach is being piloted in Haiti, Sudan and Afghanistan. Other likely candidates might include The Democratic Republic of the Congo. Canadian civil society organisations should: Develop a mechanism to share information and analysis among CSOs active in countries in which Canada is undertaking 3D approaches. Monitor the Canadian 3D approach at a policy level and make interventions within FAC, CIDA and DND. Monitor Canada s adherence to the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles regarding the involvement of the military in humanitarian assistance. KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 19

22 Government should: Separate clearly humanitarian objectives and development objectives from military and foreign policy goals in its approach to 3D coordination. Preserve explicitly the neutral space for humanitarian action in government policy and action relating to 3D approaches. Be clear about the relatively autonomous roles of civil society actors in relating to 3D mechanisms within Government and in the field. Questions How will the 3D approach coordinate not only among Canadian actors, but align with local and regional actors in ways to protect their independence and safety? How will the government ensure that the humanitarian space is preserved in its 3D approach? What are the appropriate roles for the military, if any, in carrying out humanitarian assistance? 8. PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS In Afghanistan, Canada's 3D approach will soon take the form of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). While there are various types of PRTs, the term describes a unit of people based in a given Afghani province, from both International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) countries and the Afghani local authority, who s goal is to advance the Afghani central government s presence throughout Afghanistan and support the reconstruction 20. The United States established the first PRT in 2003, followed by the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Germany. Defence Minister Bill Graham has indicated that Canada's PRT will be established in Kandahar in August Since the establishment of the first PRT in 2003, humanitarian agencies and analysts have been voicing concerns over their impacts on the independence and neutrality of humanitarian actors, as well as the perception and safety of local government officials. The U.S PRT, which carries out humanitarian assistance and development projects and closely coordinates with NGO actors, has raised particular concerns. Given Afghanistan's centrality in the US-led war on terrorism, and the contention surrounding the US-led stabilisation forces, there are unique challenges for humanitarians originating in, and / or funded by governments involved in the stabilisation. Humanitarians are seen by occupying forces as force multipliers, conduits for information and deliverers of rewards for co-operation. Many are concerned that the US-led PRTs further blur the lines between humanitarian and military, threatening the lives and invaluable work of those who deliver and receive humanitarian assistance. 20 NGO / Government Dialogue on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and the Militarization of Humanitarian Assistance, December 2003, Peace Operations Working Group of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee. KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 20

23 The UK model, which does not carry out humanitarian assistance and restricts its development interventions to SSR and Disarmament Demobilisation and Re-integration (DDR) while still controversial, is held up as a more positive example of coordination and cooperation among actors on the ground. In the case of the UK, the PRT is presented mainly as a military operation, which maintains a working dialogue with International Oraganisations and NGOs on PRT activities. While little is known about the details of the Canadian PRT, officials in DND, as well as the Minister of Defence Bill Graham, have indicated that Canada s model will be closer to the UK model. However, it will be functioning in the region of Kandahar, an area of where American stabilization forces are very much present and still very actively pursuing supporters of the former Taliban regime. Canadian civil society organisations should: Bring together those CSOs active in Afghanistan to establish joint guiding principles for their interaction with the Canadian PRT and engage regularly with government on the issues. Government should: Establish the principles and mandate guiding Canada s PRT through a consultative and transparent process. The mandate for the PRT should clearly separate humanitarian and development activities from military operations. Questions What impacts will the Canadian PRT have on the neutrality and independence of humanitarian actors? Will projects and agencies outside the PRT lose funding and support or be otherwise affected by a highly visible PRT? What types of humanitarian and development projects, if any, will the PRT carry out? What type of management structure will guide the PRT? 9. FUNDING MECHANISMS The Budget put aside substantial resources for larger Canadian roles in peace and security issues. For the sake of clarity and transparency, the budget divided Canada s International Assistance Envelope into five pools : development, research, crisis, international financial institutions, and peace and security. While the budget itself did not include exact numbers, sources within the Finance Department have indicated that the peace and security pool would be allocated an estimated 289 million dollars for the fiscal year One hundred (100) million of this has been allocated to a new Global Peace and Security Fund KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 21

24 (GPSF) (see below); according to a forthcoming article in the North South Institute's Canadian Development Report, the remaining funds will be allocated towards CIDA programming and multi-departmental programs like Canada Corps, the Canadian Police Arrangement and the Landmine Fund. 21 CIDA programming in peace and security issues is housed in the Peace-building Unit (Multilateral Branch), as well as in Geographic and other Branches. A recent study by Stephen Baranyi at The North South Institute notes the growth in peace-building funding in recent years: CIDA disbursements amounted to 53 million, growing to almost 80 million in Baranyi notes, however, that much of the growth was geo-political driven. Asia Branch disbursements to post-war Afghanistan dramatically swelled the total allocations, and CIDA's peace-building expenditures in Africa have been modest compared to its expenditures in these two regions [Africa and Central Europe], notwithstanding Canada's stated commitments to Africa and the dramatic scope of conflicts on that continent. 23 (see table B and Graph A) The GPSF, consisting of $100 million per year over 5 years, was created to support the renewal of the Human Security Program and provide security assistance to failed and failing states, as well as resources for post-conflict stabilisation and recovery. 24 It is designed for flexible funding for whole of government approaches to conflicts. Examples include Canada s contribution to the African Union intervention in Darfur. Most of these activities will not count as ODA. However, the Fund has been added to the International Assistance Envelope in addition to the annual 8% increases promised by the government for ODA. Similar funds have been developed in the UK and more recently, in the Netherlands. The experience in the UK has been, on balance, positive according to British CSO colleagues, but concerns remain regarding the increased priority to rapid response security interventions over long-term engagement and peace-building. The new $100 million Global Peace and Security Fund is an important and welcomed step forward in coordinating and dedicating resources for effective Canadian interventions and recovery efforts in conflict situations. Many questions remain surrounding the policy framework that will guide governmental action in this domain, and the roles for civil society actors and initiatives. Questions What policy framework will guide the operation of the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF)? Will the management and allocations of the GPSF be transparent, with CSO input into future priorities for the Fund as it evolves? Canada and the Peace & Security Pillar of the Millennium Declaration, Stephen Baranyi for the North South Institute s Canadian Development Report, Ibid, p.4. Ibid. Department of Finance, KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 22

25 10. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION Policy issues arising from the impacts of the security agenda on the anti-poverty agenda need concerted attention from Canadian CSOs. There are emerging issues which need to be monitored (Monitoring / Long-term), issues which need to be further researched in order to develop thoughtful positions (Research / medium-term), and issues which CSOs should be advocating on in the near term (Advocacy / short-term / urgent). The list below outlines some of the key issues, along with questions that need to be asked, and changes that CSOs should seek. Monitoring Aid flows vis-à-vis SSR and other security-related programming (purpose and extent) Is security-related programming increasing disproportionate to other sectors (agriculture, health, education etc.) Specific projects in SSR Are projects development focused? Do projects address local priorities for security and peace? 3D approaches to conflict (Haiti, Afghanistan and Iraq) Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan CIDA strategy on failed and failing states FAC strategy on failed and failing states Is there a distinction between the security of states and the security of people? (UK model) Research Failed and failing states: what does a human rights approach look like? Advocacy: Small Arms and Light Weapons UN Program of Action Arms Trade Treaty Export Controls OECD-DAC discussions expansion of criteria CIDA Fragile States policy KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 23

26 TABLE A Canadian ODA for Afghanistan and Iraq Year Million Cdn $ Type of Aid Afghanistan %age of Country Total Iraq %age of Country Total Humanitarian Assistance $ % $ % Food Aid $ % 0.0% Multilateral $ % $ % Bilateral / World Bank 0.0% 0.0% Bilateral $ % 0.0% Cdn Partnership Branch $ % 0.0% Total $12.3 $ Humanitarian Assistance $ % $ % Food Aid $ % $ % Multilateral $ % $ % Bilateral / World Bank 0.0% $ % Bilateral $ % $ % Cdn Partnership Branch $ % $ % Total $46.6 $ Humanitarian Assistance $ % $ % Food Aid $ % $ % Multilateral $ % $ % Bilateral / World Bank $ % 0.0% Bilateral $ % 0.0% Cdn Partnership Branch $ % 0.0% Total $121.9 $ Humanitarian Assistance $ % $ % Food Aid $ % $ % Multilateral $ % $ % Bilateral / World Bank $ % 0.0% Bilateral $ % $ % Cdn Partnership Branch $ % 0.0% Total $102.4 $117.3 Total New Aid Resources to for Afghanistan and Iraq: $382.0 Total New Aid Resources to : $1,592.8 Afghanistan and Iraq as Percentage of New Aid Resources: 24.0% Total New Aid Bilateral Resources to : $581.7 Bilateral Afghanistan and Iraq as Percentage of New Bilateral Aid Resources: 36.8% KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 24

27 Incremental Canadian Military Costs Associated with Afghanistan and Iraq Afghanistan Op APOLLO (southwest Asia) $ UNAMA OP ACCIUS Afghanistan $0.1 Iraq OP ATHENA ISAF Afghanistan $ OP ALTAIR (South-west Asia) $ Op APOLLO (southwest Asia) $ OP ALTAIR (South-west Asia) $ OP ATHENA ISAF Afghanistan $ UNAMI OP IOLAUS (Iraq) $ UNAMA OP ACCIUS Afghanistan $0.1 Three Year Total Incremental Costs $1,514.0 Source: CCIC calculations TABLE B Multilateral Africa and Middle East Branch Americas Asia CEE Partnership Source: Stephen Baranyi, North South Institute Canadian Development Report 2005 KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 25

28 GRAPH A Source: Stephen Baranyi, North South Institute Canadian Development Report 2005 KEY ENTRY POINTS FOR ACTION: A CCIC POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER 26