U.S. Sanctions and Iran

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1 U.S. Sanctions and Iran Warfare By Other Means Tami Fawcett Global Studies 360 May 10th, 2012

2 1. Introduction The year was Thousands of Iranians poured into the streets to mourn the loss of a fallen hero in the city of Tabriz during the Constitutional Revolution. This hero, a young man of only twenty four years old, became a martyr to Iranians, as he died for the cause of freedom. There is even a bust in the center of the city honoring this brave young soldier, and today, you will still find flowers of remembrance left upon his monument. Schools in Tabriz are named after this courageous, yet unlikely Iranian hero. While this may seem like a common tale of heroism, Howard Conklin Baskerville, the Iranian martyr, was an American citizen. He was a young Princeton graduate, a Presbyterian missionary and a school teacher in an overwhelmingly Shia Islamic community. Yet, he once said, [t]he only difference between me and these people is my place of birth, and this is not a big difference. [1] Forty-four years after the death of Baskerville, the U.S. staged a CIA operation to overthrow Iranian nationalist Prime Minister Mossadeq as tensions mounted between Iran and the West over economic interests. The United States and Iran traveled down diverging paths which have ultimately led to the severance of diplomatic and economic ties that once bound the two nations together against common enemies. Currently, the United States is engaged in its fourth decade of sanctions against Iran in an effort to coerce the Iranian government into cooperative relations with the West. However, these sanctions are counterproductive to United States policy goals not only in Iran, but also in the broader Middle East region. 2. U.S. Policy in the Middle East and Iran According to the Congressional Research Service, the official United States policy goals in the broader Middle East are as follows:[2] To discourage interstate conflict that can threaten allies (including Israel) and jeopardize

3 other interests To preserve the flow of energy resources and commerce that is vital to the U.S., regional, and global economies To ensure transit and access to facilities to support U.S. military operations To counter terrorism To stem the proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons To promote economic growth, democracy, and human rights The immediate U.S. policy goals in Iran are to compel Iran to suspend its nuclear enrichment program, to promote democracy and human rights, and, arguably, to enact a regime change through the use of pressure tactics, such as sanctions. The latest sanctions against Iran were put in place earlier this year and target both the financial and energy sectors. Specifically, the U.S. has enacted sanctions against firms that sell Iran energy equipment or petrochemical equipment and foreign banks that do business with Iran s Central Bank. In addition to these sanctions, the Society for Worldwide International Financial Transfers (SWIFT) announced it sanctioned Iranian banks out of its electronic payment network as of March Over thirty years of sanctions have produced a policy that dictates the following: In general, a person may not export from the U.S. any goods, technology or services, if that person knows or has reason to know such items are intended specifically for supply, transshipment or reexportation to Iran. Further, such exportation is prohibited if the exporter knows or has reason to know the U.S. items are intended specifically for use in the production of, for commingling with, or for incorporation into goods, technology or services to be directly or indirectly supplied, transshipped or reexported exclusively or predominately to Iran or the Government of Iran.[3] There are certain exceptions that are permitted such as donations of food, clothing, and medication, gifts valued under $100, licensed exports of agricultural commodities, medical devices, and trade in information and informational materials.

4 Though these policies are intended to isolate and pressure the government of Iran, because of measures such as the ones listed above, the Iranian public is effectively cut off from most of the Western dominated global economy. The financial sanctions, in particular, make everyday transactions, such as buying food or paying bills, all but impossible for the average Iranian. 3. The Historical Effectiveness of Sanctions A widely cited study by Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott found that of 116 cases of sanctions since 1914, only 34 percent, or 40 cases, have been successful at coercing the target nation to give in to the demands being imposed.[4] Later studies have concluded that this percentage is a generous interpretation of the success of sanctions, since the original study did not factor in threat or use of military force used in tandem with sanctions. A later study concluded that only 5 of the 40 successful cases were correctly designated as sanctions used alone without the threat or use of force. Robert Pape, the security expert who performed this research, notes that economic sanctions are often a prelude to using force, not an alternative to using force. [5] This is in line with other research that has shown the chances of military conflict often increase as broad economic sanctions are applied. Trita Parsi, the President of the National Iranian American Council, concludes in a recent article that sanctioned regimes become more repressive, more undemocratic and more destabilizing, as exhibited by the cases in Iraq and North Korea. As sanctions against Iraq increased, so did the regime s reluctance to negotiate peacefully. A similar scenario is seen in North Korea where sanctions have contributed to the state s perceived need of nuclear deterrence.[6] Parsi goes on to argue that sanctions cause an escalatory cycle to occur, where the sanctioned government feels they have no other option but to endure for fear of appearing weak and the

5 sanctioning government feels they, too, need to buff up their sanctions until the target government backs down. The sanctions become the only method of communication as options for peaceful diplomacy diminish. An endless cycle is created that makes negotiation and resolution impossible since the only option the sanctioned government feels it may have is military defense in order to avoid being deposed. According to David J. Lektzian and Christopher M. Sprecher, sanctions are often enacted as a tactic for the sender nation to appear strong in their demands. However, in their research, they found that sanctions actually have the opposite effect in most cases, especially when used by democracies touting sanctions as a specific alternative to avoid military conflict. The idea behind sanctions is to send clear signals about the seriousness of the sender nation s convictions in having its demands met. This can only be achieved if the sender nation is willing to limit its own economic choices by sanctioning another nation. If there is no significant cost to the sender nation, and only cost to the target nation, then the sanction will be seen as weak. This is the typical scenario that is seen historically and also the reason behind why sanctions often lead to military conflict. Since the sanctions alone are not effective at sending signals of strength, military force must then be utilized to strengthen the sender nation s position. 4. Sanctions, Democratic Change and Human Rights Sanctions are often called upon to promote democracy and human rights for the target nation s population. However, there is emerging research that suggests sanctions can actually hinder democratization and human rights in many instances, as they are felt hardest by the population and not the target government.

6 According to Jay Ulfelder and Michael Lustik, of 35 authoritarian states that have successfully democratized since 1955, only one South Africa did so under broad economic sanctions.[7] However, Mats Lundahl argues that the sanctions strengthened the apartheid regime since the sanctions focused on the trade, investment and oil industries.[8] This allowed for the largely agrarian-based apartheid regime to shore up the agricultural industry and arguably prolonged the rule of this repressive regime. Limited sanctions seem to have a higher success rate, though a closer look at this research reveals that typically some politically charged event within the target nation and not sanctions directly, becomes the catalyst for democratic change. Examples of this can be seen in the cases of South Korea, Uruguay and Romania, as well as many other countries around the world that have democratized. In South Korea, the United States enacted limited sanctions in the 1970s and 1980s, yet it was the death of a student protestor that triggered the Democracy Movement in 1987.[9] In Uruguay, sanctions were also ineffective. The United States enacted sanctions from 1976 to 1981 for human rights violations, and yet the torture of Uruguay s citizens continued. A general strike in 1984 led to democratic elections in 1985 and it was not until after those elections that military rule, and subsequently torture, ended.[10] Romania is another case where sanctions were arguably ineffective. It was civil and political unrest in 1989 between the Communist party members and the protestors of Timisoara that led to a revolt and the overthrow and execution of the Communist regime leader.[11] This evidence points to a ground-up framework for democratization. Consideration need also be given to the idea of legitimacy. In the rare case that sanctions alone work to oust a non-democratic regime, or sanctions combined with military force or the threat thereof, if a new government rises up, there is often much question amongst that nation s population as to the legitimacy of that government. An example of this can be seen with the

7 installation of Mohammed Reza Shah in Iran after the CIA coup d'état that successfully removed Mossadeq. The illegitimacy of Mohammed Reza Shah s ascent to power is arguably the catalyst for the 1979 Iranian revolution and the rise of Khomeini and religious fundamentalism in Iran. Another study by political scientist Daniel W. Dreszner finds that broad economic sanctions not only tend to intensify pressure on politically weak groups, but that target governments are typically able to manipulate the effects of the sanctions to benefit their supporters.[12] David Lektzian and Mark Souva, experts in the field of sanctions and international disputes, add that broad economic sanctions increase a regime s ability to extract rents and secure the loyalty of its support base [13] which ultimately hinders the strength of the opposition and retards the transition to democracy. There is also a tendency for non-democratic regimes to increase repression against the population to ensure loyalty, and ultimately survival, as the economy declines due to sanctions. According to economist Ronald Wintrobe, the ability to buy loyalty increases the regime s confidence in its sustainability [.] [14] This has been seen in many cases of sanctions around the world, most notably the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq and also in the destruction of Iran s private sector caused by sanctions which has had the effect of expanding the state-controlled sector of the Iranian and ultimately legitimizing the regime. 5. Analysis and Conclusion One of the primary effects of U.S. sanctions on Iran thus far has been to intensify divisions within the regime itself. This destabilizes Iran and because Iran is such a key player in the region, it destabilizes the broader Middle East as well. This is in direct opposition to achieving the major policy aims of the U.S. in both Iran and the region at large since there is no way to know which part of the regime, the state or the religious head, with whom to negotiate. For

8 instance, even if a deal is successfully reached to halt the Iranian nuclear enrichment program with one part of the regime, there is no guarantee that the other part of the regime will honor such. According to Drezner in Foreign Policy magazine, the economic effect of U.S. sanctions has also strengthened Iran s nationalist sentiments towards its nuclear program, especially among the Iranian middle class.[15] This leaves me to conclude that even if democratization is achieved, there is no guarantee that a democratic government in Iran would operate in favor of U.S. policy goals in the region either. And furthermore, U.S. sanctions have been extraordinarily counterproductive in this regard by causing a rally around the flag effect for the Iranian people where the common threat to the Iranian people s sovereignty has actually become the United States. It is easy to understand this perspective if you take into account that not only is Iran surrounded by hundreds of U.S. military installations in neighboring countries, that both Afghanistan and Iraq have seen regime change at the hands of the United States, but also that U.S. sanctions have had a crippling effect on the Iranian population at large. Given U.S. dependence on foreign oil, it is also counterproductive to have an embargo against Iranian oil. This directly undermines the security of U.S. economic interests, energy resources and commerce in the region. Furthermore, as history dictates, when two nations have interdependent trade relations, military conflict and hostilities become much more difficult. There is a tendency to work through differences by using alternate means, such as negotiations and concessions. It is also difficult to see the correlation between the goal of supporting human rights and democracy in the region, when the U.S. is effectively cutting off food and other necessary supplies, as well as monetary transactions, either directly or indirectly through the use of

9 sanctions. This is by far one of the largest miscalculations of the policy of sanctions that the U.S. has against Iran, particularly if you take into account that Iran has an overwhelming majority of the population in the Shia sect of Islamic faith. The core doctrine of Shiism is the idea of martyrdom for a people who have been persecuted for centuries, not all that unlike Christianity. The ability of this group to adapt and endure through even the harshest conditions has been completely neglected by U.S. policymakers. I would argue that it is this strong faith and the idea of enduring through suffering for their beliefs that ignite even further anti-u.s. sentiment in the Iranian population and may even cause the extremists to seek out alternative ways of dealing with the threat of U.S. imposition upon their lifestyle, such as terrorism, as we have seen with Sunni Islamic fundamentalists. This, in turn, would have a momentous destabilizing effect not only on Iran, but also on the broader Middle East, particularly when looking at the large Shia minorities in neighboring nations. In conclusion, U.S. sanctions against Iran promote anti-western, and particularly anti-u.s. sentiments, in the region due to the hypocritical nature of sanctions which tend to impact the basic needs of the population on a devastating level and do little to coerce regime change or policy change in the target governments all while claiming to be put in place to further human rights and democratization. This leaves me to conclude that the current sanctions against Iran will not persuade the government of Iran to comply with U.S. demands. In fact, for over three decades sanctions have not effected policy change or regime change in Iran. It is important to look back before we can look forward when pondering ways that we can improve relations between the U.S. and Iran in an effort to achieve our policy aims in both Iran and in the Middle East at large. Using the hero, Baskerville, as a template for relations with Iran, it would behoove the U.S. to look at the root causes of our poor relations with this influential

10 nation and focus on the threads that weave our two countries together. Iran does not have a history of being an aggressor state, unlike many of our other allies in the region. The U.S. should stop treating it as one. And, like Americans, the Iranian people are known for their perseverance, their patriotism, and their faith. It is for these reasons that Baskerville could not sit idly by and watch them fight and die for the very truths that he, as an American, also held to be self-evident. It is for these very truths- freedom, justice, and love of country- that it is a mistake to continue the debilitating sanctions that take their biggest toll on the very people that they are enacted to help.

11 Works Cited Blanchard, Christopher M. Change in the Middle East: Implications for U.S. Policy. Congressional Research Service Report R PDF file. Calafi, Farnaz, Dadpay, Ali and Mashayekh, Pouyan. Opinion: Iran's Yankee Hero, New York Times, April 18, Chavkin, Samuel. Uruguay Under Civilian Rule: The Rough Road Back to Democracy, The Nation 242 (1986): Drezner, Daniel W. "The Policy Cul-De-Sac of the Iran Sanctions." Foreign Policy Magazine (2012). the_cross_purposes_of_the_iran_sanctions Drezner, Daniel W. An analytically eclectic approach to sanctions and nonproliferation in Etel Soligen, ed., Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation (New York: Cambridge UP, 2012). Fowler, James H. The United States and South Korean Democratization, Political Science Quarterly 114 (1999): 265. Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Schott, Jeffrey J., and Elliott, Kimberly Ann. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy (Washington, D.C.: Institute of International Education, 1990). Lektzian, David and Souva, Mark. An International Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success, Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (2007): 848. McNeil, Donald G., Jr. Romania s Revolution of 1989: An Enduring Enigma, New York Times, December 31, 1999: A4. Parsi, Trita. Sanctions Make War More Likely, Daily Beast, March 23, U.S. Department of Treasury. Iran: What You Need to Know About U.S. Economic Sanctions. An overview of O.F.A.C. Regulations involving Sanctions against Iran. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012.

12 Ulfelder, Jay and Lustik, Michael. Modeling Transitions to and from Democracy, Democratization 14 (2007): Wintrobe, Ronald. The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship, The American Political Science Review 84 (1990): 849. [1] Farnaz Calafi, Ali Dadpay, and Pouyan Mashayekh, Opinion: Iran's Yankee Hero, New York Times, April 18, [2] Christopher M. Blanchard, Change in the Middle East: Implications for U.S. Policy (Congressional Research Service Report R42393), PDF file, [3] U.S. Department of Treasury, Iran: What You Need to Know About U.S. Economic Sanctions, An overview of O.F.A.C. Regulations involving Sanctions against Iran, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, [4] Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy (Washington, D.C.: Institute of International Education, 1990). [5] Robert A. Pape, Presentation given in the U.S. Senate for National Iranian American Council (Washington, D.C., October 4, 2011). [6] Trita Parsi, Sanctions Make War More Likely, Daily Beast, March 23, [7] Jay Ulfelder and Michael Lustik, Modeling Transitions to and from Democracy, Democratization 14 (2007): [8] Mats Lundahl, Economic Effects of a Trade and Investment Boycott Against South Africa, The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 86 (1984): [9] James H. Fowler, The United States and South Korean Democratization, Political Science Quarterly 114 (1999): 265. [10] Samuel Chavkin, Uruguay Under Civilian Rule: The Rough Road Back to Democracy, The Nation 242 (1986): [11] Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Romania s Revolution of 1989: An Enduring Enigma, New York Times, December 31, 1999: A4. [12] Daniel W. Drezner. An analytically eclectic approach to sanctions and nonproliferation in Etel Soligen, ed., Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation (New York: Cambridge UP, 2012). [13] David Lektzian and Mark Souva, An International Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success, Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (2007): 848. [14] Ronald Wintrobe, The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship, The American Political Science Review 84 (1990): 849. [15] Drezner, Daniel W. "The Policy Cul-De-Sac of the Iran Sanctions." Foreign Policy Magazine (2012).

CHAPTER 20 NATIONAL SECURITY POLICYMAKING CHAPTER OUTLINE

CHAPTER 20 NATIONAL SECURITY POLICYMAKING CHAPTER OUTLINE I. Politics in Action: A New Threat (pp. 621 622) A. The role of national security is more important than ever. B. New and complex challenges have