Michael Jacobs (2016), Our Obligations to Future Generations, The Ethics Centre, Sydney OUR OBLIGATIONS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS

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1 OUR OBLIGATIONS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 1

2 Contents Part I: A New Ethical Language? 01 Part II: A Liberal Framework of Rights 02 Part III: The Intergenerational Moral Community 09 Part IV: Applications 12 Part V: Conclusions 18 Part VI: References 19 2

3 Part I: A New Ethical Language? Some have argued that intergenerational ethics requires a fresh approach, distinct from our treatment of justice within generations. In particular, the language of liberal individualism, based on individual rights and voluntarism, is deemed incapable of expressing the peculiar and profound relation that we share with our ancestors and our descendants. When we attempt to extend liberal concepts of rights and justice to future generations, it is argued, we find ourselves lost in logical thickets and conceptual swamps (Ball 2001, 89). Radical environmentalists find this unsurprising. They argue that the Western liberal-individualist approach tends always to favour the powerful and marginalise the weak and what weaker group is there than the unborn? On this view, the failure of liberalism to deal adequately with our obligations to future generations is only symptomatic of its deeper flaws. Liberal-individualism, then, is inadequate, not only in its account of intergenerational obligations, but also in its account of intragenerational obligations. Even the most ardent critic of liberalism must accept, however, that the language of liberal-individualism (of rationalism, self-interestedness, and materialism) is the language spoken by most in the Western developed world. Whether or not such a language is worth changing, it must be accepted that for the foreseeable future, liberal individualism will continue to exert a powerful influence. Whilst this does not make it right, it does have important practical implications for those concerned about the future. This point is expressed plainly by Ball: If the fate of the earth and of future generations requires that most of us must abandon the familiar and become Buddhists or Deep Ecologists or Eco-feminists or indigenous earth-worshippers, then the earth and its future inhabitants are in very grave peril indeed (Ball 2001, 98) The threat of global catastrophe, caused by human short-sightedness, is immediate. In order to prevent such catastrophe (or minimise its damage) we will need to extend our moral sensibilities in order to recognise the rights and interests of future generations. This is what post-individualists seek to achieve by teaching a new 1

4 moral language. However, such radical change may take more time than we have. In order for conceptual innovation to succeed, it must satisfy two conditions: intelligibility and legitimacy (Ball 2001, 100). The liberalindividualist paradigm possesses both of these qualities (in the Western world at least). Liberal-individualism may well be the cause of our self-destructive tendencies, but given the urgency of the threats, it may just be our best hope of salvation. So what is it about our relation to future generations that is so peculiar, and why is it so problematic for liberalism? There are at least three answers to this question that are frequently offered; of which I think the third presents the most significant difficulties. The first is that future generations are temporally distant. This, however, seems entirely arbitrary. As Kavka argues, if spatial location does not affect our obligations to contemporaries, then why should location in time be any different? (1978, 188). The second answer is that the future is uncertain, thus the effects of our actions on future persons are unknown. Whilst problematic, this is by no means incontrovertible. Liberal-individualism, in the form of mainstream economics, is highly adept at dealing with risk and uncertainty. The third answer is the most problematic it is that future persons depend, for their very existence, upon the present generation. We are the creators of the future just as past generations are the creators of today. This has led some to argue that we are the owners of the future and that past generations are the owners of today. This upsets the liberal framework, because, all of a sudden, the idea that individuals are pre-social beings is revealed as the fiction that it has always been. In the Lockean state of nature, individuals exist in isolation, except for when they choose to interact. Libertarianism premises itself upon protecting that pre-social liberty in political society, but once it is revealed that such pre-social liberty was a fiction, the palace begins to crumble. I call this the problem of creation. In part III of this paper, I will outline this problem in detail and offer a solution, which, I hope, allows us to ascribe rights to future persons. Before that, in part II I will sketch a system of rights that could be supported by various types of liberals. In the final section, I consider the implications of this system of rights when applied to future persons, with respect to five kinds of intergenerational resources. My investigation leads me to the conclusion that a radical change in our property rights over certain intergenerational resources is needed in order to respect our obligations to future persons. Specifically, I argue that certain intergenerational resources ought to be considered the common property of all present and future persons. On this account, those intergenerational resources are on loan to each generation, and any damage inflicted on them ought to be compensated. In the absence of future persons, we are responsible for managing these resources in their interest. Since future person are not here to determine their interests, we can only make assumptions about their values and preferences with the reference point for doing so being the norms of our own society. Just as a parent is designated to make decisions about what is good for their child, we must make decisions about what is good for future persons. This is a challenge, but not an insurmountable one. 2

5 Part II: A Liberal Framework of Rights 2.1 The Responsibility Principle In order to consider our obligations toward future generations, I will begin by outlining a system of rights that, I hope, could be advocated by a variety of liberals from libertarians to liberal egalitarians. In order to do this, I begin with a principle that is agnostic between various contentious positions within liberalism that pertain to intragenerational justice. For example, there is a great deal of debate between distributivists and proceduralists with regard to the nature of justice. Whilst libertarians, such as Robert Nozick (1974), argue that a distribution of goods is just so long as it was arrived at through just procedures (justice in acquisition and justice in transfer), distributivists, such as John Rawls (1971) argue that a distribution is just insofar as it coheres with a specific pattern (the difference principle). In order to bypass this dispute, I will use a principle that is agnostic between the proceduralist and distributivist camps. Another key dispute amongst liberals regards the importance of natural talents or innate skills in distributive justice. Whilst some argue that individuals are entitled to the fruits of their labour (usually as a result of self-ownership), others argue that since these features of an individual are merely the result of a birth lottery, they should be accounted for (for example, through a hypothetical underemployment insurance ) (Dworkin 1981). Again, I hope to avoid this dispute by formulating a principle that is non-specific with regard to natural talents. Two central tenets of liberalism can be found in all its forms: (i) universalism; and (ii) respect for autonomy. Universalism is the idea that every person should be treated according to the same universal standard. Although some people may be richer than others, and although some people may be more (politically) powerful than others, universalism requires that such differences can be explained according to a universal principle. This entails a presumption of equality, deviations from which require justification. The second key tenet respect for autonomy can be divided into an epistemic and a moral claim. The epistemic claim is that individuals are presumed to know what is right for them they are authoritative over their own beliefs. The moral claim follows from this: that individuals are entitled to pursue their own ends without interference, so long as it does not infringe the similar rights of others. The latter claim is the grounds for J.S. Mill s well-known harm principle, which states that: The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others (Mill 1859, 21-22) This principle, it may be noted, is a procedural one. As such, it cannot serve my purposes as a principle that is acceptable to a wide range of liberals specifically, Rawlsian liberals will be inclined to disagree with me. However, this principle is an insufficient standard of justice, even for pure proceduralists, because it is indeterminate. Suppose, for example, we take the following definition of harm: An action (or inaction) at time t 1 harms someone only if the agent causes (allows) this person to be worse off at some later time t 2 than the person was before t 1. (Lukas 2015) The harm principle, it would seem, is only applicable if the state of affairs at time t 1 is just. To demonstrate this, consider the case of a thief in possession of a handbag that he has stolen. Would it be wrong to retrieve the handbag from the thief even though doing so would bring about a reduction in the thief s well-being? Even a pure proceduralist would not believe that this was so. As Nozick argues, the thief is only entitled to the handbag if he has acquired it justly (Nozick 1973, 47). Thus in order to establish whether the harm principle ought to apply, it is necessary to consider whether the status quo is just. In order to do this, libertarians such as Nozick will ask is the thief entitled to the handbag. Desert theorists on the other hand, will ask does the thief deserve the handbag. These accounts will diverge in a number of ways, however, they will converge on the following idea. Both accounts will give special recognition to the role of the thief in creating something socially valuable this is closely related to the liberal respect for individual 3

6 Nobody is entitled to any external resources that they are not responsible for creating autonomy. On the libertarian account, an individual is entitled to whatever he creates, and hence whatever he can obtain in exchange for whatever he creates. On the desert account, an individual deserves goods in proportion to his effort or contribution. Both accounts, then, will agree that the thief is not entitled to (or not deserving of) the handbag, since he has not, in any way, contributed to the creation of the handbag. In light of this, I propose the following principle that might be acceptable both kinds of liberal: The Responsibility Principle: nobody is antecedently entitled to (or deserving of) any external resources that they are not responsible for creating I specify external resources because whether an individual is antecedently entitled to his own body is an issue of contention amongst liberals, and it is not one that needs to be resolved in order to assess our obligations to future generations. This is because, even if individuals do owe some of their natural talents to the community, we have no reason to expect that future generations will have any less talent than the current generation. Thus any redistribution of talent-rent will occur within generations. I specify antecedently because it remains an open question whether any other reasons might justify the allocation of resources, but the tenet of universalism requires us to presume equality. Thus I hope to have left the principle vague enough to be acceptable to a wide range of liberals, but specific enough to offer a determinate account of our obligations to future persons. 4

7 2.2 Identifying the Commons I will begin by identifying the set of resources that fail to be distributed by the responsibility principle. This is the set of resources for which no individual can be considered responsible for creating, be it through effort, contribution, or merit I shall call this set of resources the commons. Whilst some will consider this set to be larger than others, there will be a common subset over which all liberals should be in agreement. I propose that there are three categories of resources that make up the commons: (i) natural resources; (ii) resources left behind by past generations; and (iii) the by-products of social interaction. The most obvious category of such resources is natural capital. Natural capital exists in spite of, rather than because of, human action. As such, no individual can claim to be responsible for creating natural capital. This includes the land, the sea, and raw materials, as well as ecosystem services, such as carbon sinks and the water cycle. Whilst some may be responsible for maintaining natural capital, it does not follow that they are entitled to (or deserving of) the whole of that capital. Rather, they are responsible for the value-added in the process of maintenance. Another candidate for the commons are those resources that have been created by past generations. Unlike natural capital, resources left behind by past generations do have a responsible creator. If, from this, we conclude that past individuals have a right to such resources, even after they have died, then the responsibility principle succeeds in distributing such resources. If, however, we find this to be non-sensical, then the responsibility principle fails to do so. In this case, the creations of dead people would revert to the commons. I discuss this in more detail later (see 4.2). A final category of resources that are undistributed by the responsibility principle is the by-product of social interaction. Social institutions develop gradually through many iterated interactions. They are not the making of some set of individuals. Although the founding fathers of a nation may have contributed to the establishment of state institutions, the survival of those institutions has always depended on the compliance of the people. As such, the responsibility principle fails to distribute the rights to benefit from such institutions (see 4.4). 5

8 2.3 Who Owns the Commons: Everyone or No One? Once the responsibility principle has been exhausted, all differences in entitlement (or deservingness) between individuals have been reconciled. No one is any more deserving or entitled to an additional unit of resources than anyone else. We are left, then, with a distributive vacuum. Resources exist and are available, yet no individual has any exclusive right to them. How is this vacuum to be filled? There are broadly two approaches to this problem. The first is to preserve the vacuum and to consider the leftover resources unowned ; the second is to consider them owned by all, in some egalitarian manner. I will argue that the second approach is the most appropriate. Option 1: Unowned If a resource is unowned then it follows that: nobody has a right to use, profit from, or abuse the resource. But at the same time, nobody has an obligation to leave it alone. In other words, although nobody has an exclusive right to use unowned resources, it is permissible for them to do so. This becomes clear when it is considered that a right is the same as a reciprocal obligation for others. If nobody has property rights over a resource, then nobody has an obligation to respect property rights in relation to that resource either. This gives rise to first occupancy theory, which holds that the first occupant of a resource may appropriate it, since she is not expropriating the resource from anyone else. This type of account is favoured by Samuel Pufendorf, who argues that unowned resources may rightfully be appropriated by the first user since in doing so, nobody has been deprived of the resource (1991). Pufendorf is correct to assert that using unowned resources at will is permissible due to the fact of non-expropriation. However, the fact of non-expropriation is not, in itself, sufficient to justify appropriation. If a resource is appropriated it is not only used; it is protected from use by others. Suppose I occupy an unowned field. In doing so, I have violated no rights. However, if the resource remains unowned, then someone else who attempted to occupy the field whilst I was away, would also not have violated my any rights. Thus in order to defend first occupancy theory, Pufendorf must defend the claim that the first occupier has a right to appropriate, that is, the right to impose an obligation on others to respect one s property rights. It is not clear, however, how one might defend this claim. It cannot, for example, be defended on the grounds that the first occupier has created the land, or that the first occupier has exerted effort in finding the land (he may simply have stumbled upon it). First occupancy in itself seems to have no special qualities worthy of entitlement. It cannot, at least, be justified by appeal to the responsibility principle. Thus in order to justify first occupancy theory it is necessary to appeal to an entirely new, somewhat ad hoc, principle, which cannot be justified by appeal to the normative foundation of liberalism. I therefore recommend that we reject this option. Option 2: Egalitarianly Owned John Locke s account, from which much of the debate around the genealogies of property rights arises, supplements occupancy with labour-mixing (1988). Locke argues that one comes to own a resource by mixing one s labour with it. There is an intuitive aspect to this account that links to the responsibility principle. That is, by labouring on the land, I have made myself responsible for the fruits of the land. As such, I am entitled to it. It is clear, however, that I am not fully responsible for such fruits, since the land itself was also a factor in their production. I am, it seems, responsible only for a portion of the fruits, the land itself is responsible for the rest. I am therefore entitled only to that portion for which I am responsible, the remainder is left unowned. Locke s own account differs from this. He argues that appropriation through labour-mixing is fine, as long as enough and as good is left for others. This proviso has been the basis for an intense dispute over whether Locke favoured first occupancy theory, or an alternative approach based on common ownership. Locke himself states that whether through natural reason or divine gift, Earth has been granted to humankind in common. However, the account so far defended does not recognise natural reason or divine gift. In order to defend this position, it will be necessary to justify the common ownership of leftover resources as a second, 6

9 lexically subordinate axiom, in addition to the responsibility principle. I believe there is good reason to accept such a principle. The responsibility principle tells us that each should receive an equal share of the left-over resources (since no one is any more entitled than anyone else). This is compatible with: (i) everyone receiving no leftover resources; (ii) everyone receiving an equal share of the total remaining resources; and (iii) everyone receiving an equal share of some fraction of the remaining resources. It seems that very few systems of morality would prefer options (i) or (iii) to option (ii). Clearly option (ii) offers the greatest possibility for the achievement of ends, as opposed to leaving resources unused. The only conceivable objection to this is that by permitting humans to exhaust all resources, other beings (nonanimals) will be discriminated against. However, it is quite plausible that we might include animals within the set of beings amongst whom leftover resources are distributed, by making stakeholdership the qualification for inclusion. I will not investigate this possibility in detail since it is contentious and not essential to my argument. However, it should be noted that including animals as stakeholders would not necessarily lead to the, (somewhat counterintuitive), conclusion that animals should receive equal resources to humans. In many respects, animals cannot benefit from resources in the same way that humans can. For example, animals cannot benefit from the wind by producing electricity, and they cannot use rocks to make steel, and they certainly cannot benefit from historical institutions. As such, animals cannot be considered stakeholders in those resources they cannot enjoy. Hence they would not receive an equal share of certain resources. For the sake of simplicity, however, I will from now on assume that only humans are stakeholders in leftover resources. As Vallentyne et al. (2005) point out, there are many forms of egalitarian ownership. One approach is to divide resources up and distribute them equally. However, much of the commons cannot be divided in this way. One could not sensibly divide up the sea or the air, the same applies to the by-products of social interaction. A second approach is to consider the resources commonly owned. If a resource is commonly owned, its use is governed by rules that are aimed at making it available for use by all or any of its owners. Locke s proviso that one must leave enough and as good for others, and that one ought not to appropriate more than one can consume without leaving waste, may be considered examples of this. In the following section I will outline some fair rules of common ownership that might be adopted for the commons. 7

10 2.4 Fair Rules of Common Ownership Given that, once the responsibility principle has been exhausted, no one is more deserving than anyone else; it seems appropriate that each individual ought to have an equal share in the benefits of the commons. To ensure this, I propose the following rules of common ownership: 1. Either, one may use the commons in a manner compatible with equal usage by other stakeholders. This entails two further rules: (i) one may not damage the use or profit-yielding value of the commons for subsequent users (for example, by depleting the resource); and (ii) one may not preclude others use of the resource (for example, by building a fence around a field). 2. Or, one may purchase rights to exclusive use of resources. In many cases, the commons cannot be used in a manner compatible with the first rule. For example, using agriculture precludes others use of it, and burning fuels reduces the use and profit-yielding value of that resource for future users. In these cases, it seems reasonable to permit individuals to purchase the right to reduce the resource s value, by compensating others for that loss of value. This may take two forms: (i) if one is precluding others use of the resource, but otherwise maintaining its value for future users, one need only compensate the community by the use and profit-yielding value of the resource for the period it is in use; (ii) if one is reducing the value of the resource for future users, one must compensate all those future users, which essentially means purchasing full property rights over the resource. If we include future persons amongst the stakeholders of these resources, the compensation for permanent damage to a resource becomes immense (possibly infinite). In effect, this serves as a justification for sustainability, defined as: the maintenance of the value of intergenerational resources. This is a form of weak sustainability since it allows for the possibility of one type of intergenerational resource being substituted for another. For example, if this generation depletes coal reserves, future generations will be worse off, however, if we develop solar power sufficiently, we may be able to compensate them for this loss. In order to justify this, it is necessary to first show why future persons ought to be considered equal stakeholders with contemporaries. 8

11 Part III: The Intergenerational Moral Community 3.1 Who Hold the Rights? The Living, the Dead and the Unborn The stakeholder rights outlined above are presented as universal. That is, they are ascribed to every member of the moral community. The question that I shall now attempt to answer is whether future persons should be considered members of the moral community to which those universal rights apply. One way to approach this question would be to consider what the qualifications are for possessing rights. However, to specify qualifications for possessing rights would seem to go against the tenet of universalism. Indeed, throughout history, the name of liberalism has been tainted by the exclusion of certain groups of people from so-called universal rights e.g. women until the early 20 th century, and slaves in much of Europe and America. On the other hand, it seems that the ascription of rights to some entities would be absurd e.g. trees, rocks and oceans. How, then, are we to impose sensible limits on the ascription of rights, without marginalising some groups? The solution, I propose, is that universal rights ought to be ascribed to all those capable of possessing such rights. Trees, rocks, and oceans, for example, are not capable of acquiring property or running for president. Living people, on the other hand, do possess such capabilities. Animals, as I have already suggested, possess such capabilities, though perhaps to a lesser extent. But what about future persons? It seems almost as absurd to claim that future persons are capable of acquiring property as it does to claim that trees and rocks are. As presently non-existing entities, it would seem that future persons are not capable of possessing any rights at all. Beckerman and Pasec (2001) express this argument with the following: the general proposition that future generations cannot have anything, including rights, follows from the meaning of the present tense of the verb to have (p.16). Unborn people cannot delegate anything, in the same way that they cannot do in the present tense anything. In other words, it would be false to declare that future people have rights, but correct to say that they will have rights. However, in order for future persons to make a moral claim on existing persons, it would seem that they would have to possess rights at the present moment. Does it really matter, though, if future persons do not have rights (in the present tense)? In the future, we can be almost certain that they will have rights. Thus the pertinent question is whether these future rights can make a claim on us now. It remains possible, in other words, that we have obligations to future persons, even if they do not have rights. It seems to me that the obligation to respect one s rights arises from the fact that to violate a right is wrong. It may well be true that at the time that an action is taken, no rights are violated. However, if, in the long run, it does violate someone s rights, it seems appropriate to say that the action was wrong. This applies not only in the case of future persons, but also in day-to-day cases. For example, if I were to set a trap designed to kill someone at some point in the future, it would not seem to matter whether I set that trap to kill them today, tomorrow, or next year. In any case, their rights will have been violated and this is what renders the action wrong. The Problem of Creation I have so far assumed that any given future person will (in the future) possess rights. However, the indeterminacy of future persons creates unique issues that undermine the typical liberal assumptions that persons are pre-social, autonomous beings, and brings into question the extent to which interpersonal moralities can inform us with regard to future generations. Since future people are indeterminate that is, they may not come into existence it is not clear that we can treat our relations with future persons in the same way we treat relations with determinate people. This creates a number of related problems. The problem that has received the most attention relates to the possibility of harming future persons, in particular, the problem of disappearing beneficiaries (Parfit 1982). However, as I have already argued, the harm principle is indeterminate 9

12 It relies on the status quo being just itself. Suppose we adopt the following counterfactual definition of harm: An action (or inaction) at time t 1 harms someone only if the agent causes (or allows) this person to be worse off at some later time t 2 than the person would have been at t 2 had the agent not interacted with (or acted with respect to) this person at all. (Lukas 2015) Parfit argues that it is impossible to harm future persons on this account, since by acting with respect to future persons, it is possible that we might change whether or not that person comes into existence at all. For example, when considering whether to conserve or deplete natural resources, it might be argued that it is impossible to compare the welfare of future persons in each case because a different population of future persons will come into being, depending on the action taken. This is because changes of this sort will have ripple effects that change who meets whom, and thus who has children with whom. However, if we can determine that at time t 2, any given future person ought to be in possession of a certain set of resources, other than what he would have had, then the harm principle does not apply. This, I demonstrated with the stolen handbag example above ( 2.1). It does, however, create problems of its own. Specifically, if it is argued that a given future person (A) is entitled to a certain set of resources at t 2, does this not oblige us to bring person A into existence. In other words, does this not entail a right to life? In this case, we would be required to bring into existence all possible future persons, or at least as many as we could. I do not think that we need to adopt this conclusion. The qualification for possessing the stakeholder rights outlined above is that one is, in fact, a stakeholder. Someone who never comes into existence cannot be considered a stakeholder in the commons. Only if one actually comes into being can one be so considered. Thus whether or not a future person is brought into being can, I argue, be detached from whether, if he does in fact come into being, he shall possess stakeholder rights. Whilst this response may avoid the repugnant conclusion of maximising procreation, it still fails to answer the question of how we ought to exercise our procreative powers. This question cannot be answered by appeal to the usual liberal axioms equality, reciprocity, or non-interference. Rather it is a distinct realm of moral relations that requires entirely new axioms. Rather than attempting to formulate an answer to this question, I will instead show that even if we were to assume that there are no procreative obligations, it would not be problematic. If we possessed no moral obligations pertaining to our procreative powers, the option not to procreate at all that is, not to bring about a subsequent generation would be open. Given that each future person that we create will take away some of our resources, it may seem that we have an incentive not to procreate at, thus maximising a portion of resources. However, Samuel Scheffler (2013) offers the following thought experiment against this: suppose that every member of the human race became suddenly infertile, meaning that although your life would not be cut short, this will be the last generation on Earth. Consider the ways in which knowing this would change the way you lived your life today. Think of a cancer researcher, a philosopher, or an architect. Would any of these occupations be worth continuing if this were the last generation on Earth? Certainly some would if they are intrinsically valuable but many of their goals outlive the individual. Thus, in this sense, we rely on future persons to provide our lives meaning. I do not deny the importance of the problem of creation, and I may even concede the incapacity of liberal morality to resolve it. However, I have tried to argue that we can separate our procreative duties from our interpersonal duties. Furthermore, I have argued that given future persons will, eventually, become stakeholders in the commons, they will, eventually, possess rights to an equal share in the commons. As such, we have an obligation now to avoid violating those rights in the future. 10

13 3.2 Whose Obligation? Parents and the Childless If we accept that future people will possess rights, and we accept that those future rights can make a claim on us now, the question remains: upon whom is that claim made? Specifically, is everybody obliged to reduce their share of the commons to accommodate future persons, or are only those responsible for creating future persons so obliged? In support of the latter, we may appeal to the responsibility principle in order to argue that it is wrong to impose the burden of obligation upon those who are not responsible for creating future persons. If I wish to support the former, then, I must show why the responsibility principle does not apply in this case. Suppose we accepted the principle that children were to receive their share of the commons from their parents (i.e. they were to inherit it), and that those who abstained from procreation were exempt from reducing their share. The consequence of this would be that each subsequent generation s share of the commons would shrink, as those who abstained from procreation would consume (or damage) their share. This would fail to treat future people with equal respect. But even more problematic are the more general implications of such an argument. If we maintain that one cannot have moral obligations to someone unless one is responsible for creating that person, then it would follow that one can only hold moral obligations to one s children. This absurd outcome would not be accepted by most. The reason, I would argue, why the responsibility principle does not apply in this scenario is because the good being generated is in fact an obligation. To say that one is responsible for generating an obligation does not change the fact that an obligation has been created. That is, whilst you might be annoyed that you must reduce your share of the commons because your neighbour has had another child, that does not change the fact that you must reduce your share. Obligations are not goods or resources that can be distributed. Rather, they are non-transferrable. As such, the obligation to respect the rights of future persons applies to everyone indiscriminately. 11

14 Part IV: Applications If the arguments so far are correct, then there is no good reason not to include future persons amongst the stakeholders in common resources. Furthermore, every one of us is obliged to respect future persons future right to an equal share. How, then, do these rights translate into obligations for contemporary persons; that is, you and I? Our obligations to future generations will depend on how we affect them. Given that we will never meet future persons (at least not those that are born after we die), our impacts upon them must be channelled through some intergenerational medium just as our impacts on those on the other side of the world are channelled through inter-spatial mediums. There are broadly two mediums through which we can affect future persons: (i) procreation; and (ii) intergenerational resources. I have already argued that procreative rights are beyond the purview of liberal morality, but that this does not affect our obligations to respect the rights of those future persons that do eventually exist. Furthermore, the chance of there being future generations is immensely high, even if we concluded that there should not be. Therefore, the interesting area to apply this framework is with regard to intergenerational resources and on the assumption that there will be future generations. In order for a resource to be intergenerational, it must possess two key properties. Firstly, it must be shareable between multiple generations. Therefore, it must have a relatively low depreciation rate. For example, the value of a fruit depreciates rapidly over time, thus it cannot be shared between generations. The value of a fruit tree, on the other hand, depreciates much slower, and can be shared. Some things depreciate slowly such that they can be shared between generations, but the latter generation will receive the resources in a different (less valuable) form. Some things appreciate over time such that the latter generation will receive the resource in a more valuable form (e.g. the stock of knowledge of a particular thing). Secondly, it must be valuable to more than one generation. For example, coal was very valuable to people in the 19th and 20th century. However, by the 23rd century, it is likely that coal (if it is still around) will be obsolete, since its functions will be performed better by solar and wind energy. With this in mind, we can identify the following non-exhaustive list of intergenerational resources: (a) natural capital; (b) industrial capital; (c) financial capital; (d) social capital; and (e) human capital. Some of these resources will be distributed according to the responsibility axiom. That is, some resources will be distributed to those individuals that are responsible for creating them as in the case of some manufactured resources, for example. However, a great many of these resources will not be distributed on this basis. These resources are those that will be created by none and therefore held in common by all persons. Given that the majority of stakeholders in these resources are unavailable for comment, we require a managing committee to make decisions on their behalf. Let us suppose that we are that managing committee, tasked with managing these common assets in the interests of all of humankind, past, present, and future. 4.1 Natural Capital A resource that is natural is one that exists through no human endeavour. That is, if humans had never existed, these resources would have existed anyway. They include the land, air, water, and other living organisms, all of which provide humans with valuable ecosystem services. Such services can be categorised into four main types: (i) provisioning services (products obtained from the ecosystem, such as food, fresh water, and wood); (ii) regulating services (benefits obtained from the regulation of ecosystem processes such as climate regulation, water purification and pollination); (iii) habitat services (benefits of the ecosystem in providing habitat for migratory species); and (iv) cultural services (non-material benefits that people obtain from ecosystems such as recreation and spiritual enrichment) (TEEB). Natural capital is undoubtedly intergenerational. The ecosystem is a self-regulating system that, but for human intervention, would continue to provide these services for thousands of years. It is also valuable to members of 12

15 every generation as it provides the resources and conditions necessary for survival and facilitates a welfare level beyond mere subsistence. Natural capital is, by definition, not the creation of any individual, and thus the responsibility principle fails to distribute it. It ought, therefore, to be managed so as to benefit all persons, present and future, and each should receive an equal share in these benefits. There are a number of questions that must be addressed in this regard: Are contemporary generations responsible for preventing natural depreciation? And can natural capital be purchased from the community? Natural Depreciation The first question regards resources that naturally tend to depreciate in value over time. Do we have a responsibility to maintain resources that become less valuable over time, even if we are not responsible for such depreciation? For example, in addition to human induced global warming, it is argued that there is also a natural process of warming that would be happening regardless of human activity. There are ways in which contemporary humans can prevent this natural depreciation, for example, creating more carbon sinks, however, these may be costly. In order to ensure that each gets an equal share of the benefits of natural resources, it would appear that contemporary people ought to invest in carbon sinks in order to maintain the value of ecosystem services. The problem with this is, however, that it appears to make contemporary people the servants of future people, forcing them to make a sacrifice (in terms of costly maintenance) for future generations. However, in addition to sharing the benefits of natural resources equally, it follows that the costs of natural resources ought to be shared out equally also. As such, future generations should burden the costs of maintenance work as well as benefit from it. If it is not possible for future generations to burden the costs of maintenance work, then the net benefits for each generation should be equal, where net benefit is benefit minus cost. In this case, contemporary generations should bear the costs of maintenance work up until the point at which the net benefit of the resource for them (benefit from resource minus cost of maintenance work) is equal to the net benefit of the resource for each future generation (benefit of resource). Trading Natural Capital Although by right, everyone is an equal stakeholder in natural capital, this does not preclude the trading (selling and buying) of such shares, and thus it is possible for an individual or firm to acquire property rights over natural capital. In order to do this, it is necessary that all stakeholders be compensated for any benefits they would have derived from the resource, had it remained under communal ownership. Under communal ownership, the resource would have been as valuable as an equal share in the maximum possible yield. This value cannot be determined by contemporary market supply and demand, since the demand of future persons is absent. The market value of a natural resource (such as land) is representative only of the compensation due to contemporary people. If we wish to compensate future persons also, we must enter into a hypothetical market in which future demand is taken into account for present prices. Renewable Resources In the case of renewable resources, which will continue to yield benefits indefinitely, the price of permanent ownership is surely prohibitively expensive. To deny all future generations the benefits of, for example, clean air to breathe, it would be necessary to compensate all future persons for the costs of breathing unclean air. If we assume that humans will continue to procreate indefinitely (unless there is a global disaster that leads to human extinction), then the number of people that must be compensated for this is immense. The only way in which posterity can be compensated for the loss of a renewable resource is with another renewable resource that yields at least the same rate of value over a generation. Since the capacity of the contemporary generation to provide such resources is limited, it follows that renewable resources cannot be purchased from the common 13

16 ownership of the moral community, only used in a manner compatible with everyone else receiving an equal share. This does not rule out the possibility of purchasing temporary rights to use and profit from renewable resources, or usufructuary rights. In order to do this, it is necessary only to compensate contemporary shareholders, who would otherwise be able to use and profit from the resource. As long as the resource is returned to common ownership at the end of its lease in as good a condition (in terms of use and profit yielding value) as when it was purchased, future generations will not lose out. The word usufructuary combines two of three property interests: usus (use) and fructus (fruit or profit); but excludes the third: abusus (abuse). The latter is the right to dispose of, or destroy the property. As long as this generation refrains from destroying renewable resources, future generations will be unaffected by our use of renewable resources. Non-renewable Resources There are some resources, however, that cannot be used without destroying them these are non-renewable resources. In these cases, the concept of usufructuary rights make little sense, since without the right to damage or destroy the property, it is impossible to use or profit from it. However, since the value of nonrenewable resources is considerably less than the value of renewable resources, it seems entirely possible to purchase full ownership rights over such resources in our hypothetical market (in which future demand is included in the price of a good). Since non-renewable resources have a finite value, it is possible to compensate each person, present and future, for their equal share in the good. We might suppose that the value of this compensation is approximately the contemporary market price of such goods, since even if future generations were present in the market, they would not be willing to pay any higher price for the good than contemporary persons. This suggests that it is possible to obtain full ownership rights over non-renewable goods as long as present and future persons are compensated for the market value of such goods. Our Debt Real property rights cannot be explained in this way. Rather, they can only be explained historically; and this is the history of wars and agreements between groups and individuals within the same generation with little or no regard for the future. Deciphering the rightful owners of natural resources through this history is an impossible task. However, in the case of non-renewable resources, we can safely assume that no individual has ever rightfully purchased full ownership rights over a non-renewable resource, for to do so would require an immense amount of compensation. To respect the rights of future generations, we must ensure that such non-renewable resources are as valuable when we die, as they were when we were born. Unfortunately, the destruction of natural capital is widespread. Rare resources are dug up and used before being thrown in landfill sites; fossil fuels are burned; and agricultural practices damage the carrying capacity of the land. These practices might be acceptable if they were offset by a resource of an equal value. In the case of finite resources, the necessary compensation is finite. However, in the case of infinite resources, such as the carrying capacity of Earth, compensation must be infinite. The only way of providing an infinite amount of compensation for future generations is to provide them with a replacement resource that is also infinite. This may be provided by any of the remaining four capitals, the most promising of which is human capital; however, financial and manufactured capital may also contribute. A great deal of damage has already been done to natural capital in this generation. Not only must we try to stop these practices, we must also attempt to pay off our debt by increasing the stock of other intergenerational resources. 14

17 4.2 Manufactured Capital Manufactured capital is material goods and infrastructure that contribute to production or service provision, but do not become part of its output. Not all manufactured capital is intergenerational some depreciates too fast but things such as factories, infrastructure and technology can last for centuries. Although technological development will render some manufactured capital redundant in the future, much of it will remain valuable for future generations. Manufactured capital that is created by living individuals is distributed to such individuals by the responsibility principle. However, much manufactured capital outlives its creator. In such cases the creator may bequeath the capital to a member of the next generation. This creates the following ethical dilemma. Inheritance On the one hand, the responsibility principle grants the creator of manufactured capital the right to give away his property as he wishes. On the other hand, the inheritor of the property is not responsible for creating it, hence does not seem to have an exclusive claim over it. We must therefore resolve a tension between the creator s right to bequeath and the benefactor s (lack of) right to inherit. This problem occurs whenever capital, or shares in a business that owns capital, is bequeathed. Natural capital can also be bequeathed under current laws, however, it has already been argued that full ownership over natural resources is impossible if the rights of future persons are respected. The implication of this is that inheritors of natural capital should pay a fee, compensating contemporaries for the denial of their rights of use and profit for the resource. Should the same principle be applied to manufactured capital? One solution to this problem is to argue that although the owner of property has a right to dispose of their property as they wish; they do not have the right to transfer their property rights to another (Steiner & Vallentyne 2009). Just as the right to appoint a president is not contained within the powers of the presidency, the right to transfer property rights is not contained in property rights themselves. Thus although the owner can legitimately waive their property rights, the receiver of the bequest cannot necessarily appropriate the property for themselves. This point is demonstrated by the analogy: one cannot give a present to a flea. If you tried to, and then someone stole the present, you could hardly say that the flea s property rights had been violated. As such the deservingness of the inheritor matters just as much as the deservingness of the bequeather. Bequeathed property is therefore the same as abandoned property if the inheritor does not deserve it. This does not mean that all inheritance is illegitimate. If we attempted to argue this, all gift giving would become the same as abandonment. To an extent, gift giving is a socially valuable practice that society will choose to permit. However, when it becomes socially harmful, this appears to serve as a sufficient justification for taxing excessive gifts or inheritances. The same thing may apply to inheritance. To an extent, inheritance is socially valuable as it allows parents to look out for their children after they have gone, and it allows sentimental items to be kept in the family. Beyond this, however, inheritance can become socially harmful as it leads to the concentration of capital and class division. Given that the responsibility principle gives children no antecedent right to inherit, the government may legitimately impose taxes on harmful inheritance. Circular economy In a world in which resources were evaluated on the basis of value for present and future generations, only sustainable manufactured capital would be built. This is because, unless the manufactured capital was as valuable as the natural resource used to make it, it could not be afforded. However, we clearly do not live in such a world. During the 1980s it was widespread amongst architectural faculties to teach students that the economic life of a building was 11 years, and so they should build it to last for 12. However, this economic life the amount of time before it has become profitable is based on a severe undervaluation of the resources used to create it. 15