VI. Rawls and Equality

Transcription

1 VI. Rawls and Equality A society of free and equal persons Last time, on Justice: Getting What We Are Due 1

2 Redistributive Taxation Redux Can we justly tax Wilt Chamberlain to redistribute wealth to others? Nozick says no, but Objection 1: Others need the money more than Chamberlain. Response: Maybe so, and this may motivate rich people to give to charity. But stealing from the rich to give to the poor is still stealing (i.e., a violation of property rights) Someone may need my kidney more than I do, but that doesn t obligate me to give it to her. Objection 2: Chamberlain consented to taxation by choosing to remain in a redistributive society. If that society is democratic, he also had a voice in making the tax laws to which he is subject. Response: Possibly true, but irrelevant. Violating individual rights doesn t become acceptable simply because a democratic majority agrees to it. (Compare: rights to freedom of expression, freedom of religion) 2

3 Objection 3: Chamberlain is simply lucky he didn t do anything to deserve his natural talents or the good fortune of being born into a society that happens to highly value basketball. Response: Hmmm. But if that s true, then Chamberlain s talents are not really his (or not fully his). This is politically dangerous; it undermines the idea of selfownership Rawls s Theory of Justice For John Rawls ( ), the luck objection provides one of two main foundations for a theory of justice Like Hobbes and Locke, Rawls's theory is based on an account of the social contract (though with some different assumptions); as with Kant, Rawls s view of the social contract is inherently hypothetical. It s output: An account of the fundamental principles of justice for a just society composed of free and equal persons 3

4 #1: The Original Position (OP) Argument Rawls: As a starting point, think of justice as the solution to a problem: The fact that people (notoriously) disagree about values E.g., about the nature of the good life, about religion, about morality, about who ought to get what and why etc., etc. Yet (recall Hobbes here) they also have an interest in securing the benefits of cooperation (trust, security, trade, contracts, etc.) The Fact of Reasonable Pluralism We may strongly disagree about what is good (You think that modesty is good, I think that sensual pleasure is good; I want ecstasy, you want sobriety, etc.) but we may at least be able to agree on some minimal account of what is right. Rawls: Society is a cooperative venture between free and equal persons for their mutual advantage. Cooperation makes life better since, in Rawlsian terms, it increases the stock of primary goods 4

5 Primary Goods Whatever it is rational to want, irrespective of whatever else you want. (e.g., rights, income and wealth, material resources, social bases of self-respect) The basic idea: We can identify an acceptable conception of justice by asking what principles for the distribution of primary goods it would be rational for persons who think of themselves as free and equal members of society to agree to. So: What principles of justice would people rationally agree to? Principles that are fair Setup to the OP But how do we know what principles are fair? How do we actually determine what reasonable people would accept as fair? Rawls s (rather clever) suggestion is that we can see for ourselves what ought to count as fair principles by performing a thought experiment. Rawls: Imagine what principles would be chosen be people in the following special (imaginary) situation 5

6 The Original Position (OP) Your task: To choose the principles of justice according to which the basic institutions of society will governed. To ensure impartiality, you are placed under special conditions. Knowledge of your gender, ethnicity, social class, talents and handicaps is temporarily hidden from you so as to remove factors which might bias your decision in your favour. You do, however, retain non-biasing knowledge (social scientific knowledge, knowledge about what human beings need in order to live, etc.). The Veil of Ignorance Persons in OP are thus said to be under a 'veil of ignorance'. They do not know their interests, their place in society, their personal characteristics or their conception of the good. I.e., they are mutually disinterested moral agents. When choosing the principles of justice for your society, you have no way of knowing who you will turn out to be once the veil of ignorance comes off: You could be a winner or loser, a beggar or a millionaire, part of a disadvantaged minority or a privileged majority 6

7 Perfect Procedural Justice The OP thought experiment is meant to model (albeit imperfectly) what Rawls calls perfect procedural justice The basic idea: I cut, you choose By choosing the right procedure, injustice can be made self-defeating. And note how hypothetical agreement in the OP differs from actual agreement: No one can get their way simply because they are more powerful. So What Won t Persons in the OP Choose? Rawls: Choosers will consider and reject various candidate principles: 1. Feudal Aristocracy/Caste Systems: Will be rejected as unfair since such systems make the distribution of wealth, power, opportunity, etc. dependent on an accident of birth. When the veil comes off, I could turn out to be a noble or a serf, but since I can t know which, it would be irrational to make my life prospects depend on arbitrary facts about heredity. 7

8 2. Utilitarianism: Will be rejected because, while it would everyone as well-off as possible collectively, it doesn t respect persons as free and equal. When the veil comes off, I could turn out to be the black man in the Southern Sheriff case; I could turn out to be a member of a minority group sacrificed for the wellbeing or the majority. (E.g., Christians being fed to the lions for entertainment of Romans) 3. Libertarianism/Free Market Principles: Exponents of individual rights and free markets (e.g., Nozick) typically argue for equality of opportunity (a level playing field ) in a meritocracy ( to each according to what the free market provides ). From the OP chooser s perspective, that is certainly fairer than, say, a feudal society, but would we freely choose a pure meritocracy under (hypothetical) conditions of equality? 8

9 #2: Argument from Moral Arbitrariness According to Rawls, we would not. Libertarian/free market principles of justice distribute primary goods in a way that is morally arbitrary. Chamberlain was lucky that he was born with basketball talents (in the genetic lottery ); was lucky to be born into a society that happened to especially prize basketball. Yes, he had to develop his talents (and successfully exploit demand for them), but (pace Nozick) why should he get to keep all of the wealth resulting rom a fundamentally arbitrary distribution of talents and opportunity? If Chamberlain can be said to be entitled to his wealth, he is entitled to it mainly in the way that a lottery winner is entitled to her winnings: i.e., by virtue of the rules that are already in place. Rawls: Since the natural distribution of talent and opportunity is fundamentally arbitrary, no one morally deserves their talents or their wealth. (Compare: Galen Weston, David Thomson, 9

10 So what specifically will people in the OP choose? In other words, what are the fundamental principles of justice, according to Rawls? Rawlsian Principles of Justice The First Principle (The Liberty Principle) Each person has an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of equal liberty for all. The Second Principle Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged (the Difference Principle ) and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. Priority Rule The two principles are in lexical order. The first principle has priority over the second; part (b) of the second principle has priority over part (a) 10

11 The Difference Principle Rawls: The difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as a common asset and to share in the benefits of this distribution whatever it turns out to be. Some talented/ambitious/fortunate people may be entitled to more, but only insofar as the use and development of their resources benefits the leastadvantaged. A Just Society Rawls: If the two principles characterize (or very nearly characterize) the basic institutions of a society, then that society is just. (a well-ordered society ) The principles are the outcome of a fair choice procedure (though it is not proper bargaining, since individuals do not know their own interests), but the duty to abide by them does not itself derive from the contract 11

12 Instead: Fair play. People who think of themselves as free and equal citizens recognize that the rules are both fair and beneficial and, accordingly, (at least ideally) agree to be bound by them. Rawls: the notion of a well-ordered society is an extension of the idea of religious toleration. 12