EXPLORING THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF KINSHIP GROUPS IN PAKISTAN. Mehr Latif. B.A., Grinnell College, M.A. Johns Hopkins University, 2004

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1 EXPLORING THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF KINSHIP GROUPS IN PAKISTAN by Mehr Latif B.A., Grinnell College, 2000 M.A. Johns Hopkins University, 2004 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Dietrich Graduate School of Arts & Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts University of Pittsburgh 2013

2 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH GRADUATE FACULTY OF THE DIETRICH GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This thesis was presented by Mehr Latif It was defended on January 18, 2013 and approved by Mohammed A. Bamyeh, Professor, Sociology Akiko Hashimoto, Associate Professor, Sociology John Markoff, Distinguished University Professor, Sociology Thesis Director: Mohammed A. Bamyeh, Professor, Sociology ii

3 Copyright by Mehr Latif 2013 iii

4 EXPLORING THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF KINSHIP GROUPS IN PAKISTAN Mehr Latif, M.A. University of Pittsburgh, 2013 In this thesis, I examine the structure and practice of kinship groups in Pakistan. For the majority of Pakistanis, kinship is the most fundamental basis of identity, superseding membership to a particular religious sect, social group, or economic class. Kinship groups are based on class, geography, and occupation, following the Hindu-caste structure, a structure that was inherited by Pakistan following the partition of the two countries in While kinship groups are an important social structure that is critical to local governance, they have been ignored in the literature since the 1970s. This thesis aims to fill the gap in the literature by exploring contemporary kinship structures and the role that they play in local governance, specifically dispute resolution. In order to illuminate relationships between kinship groups and their constituents and how such kinship groups intersect with the state, I examine the space of the dharra, which is defined literally as the physical courtyard space where local landlords hold their negotiations. This study of the dharra helps to elucidate both the social ties between kinship groups as well as how they connect to institutions of the state. I discuss how interactions within the dharra help landlords develop social capital that translates into votes during times of election. Through this research, I discover that the dharra continues to be a central local governance mechanism, responsible for dispute resolution. In addition, the dharra serves as an important mobilizing mechanism during times of election. Contrary to the existing research on iv

5 Pakistan, my research reveals that in spite of the hierarchy within kinship networks, there is some measure of answerability. As kinship groups operate by consensus, they have to be responsive to their members to some degree, and the selection of the kinship leader is somewhat competitive. This study suggests that any study of democracy in Pakistan must consider the role of kinship groups in local governance structures. v

6 TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE... vii 1.0 INTRODUCTION METHODOLOGY FIELD SITE ORGANIZING STRATEGY LOCATING THE DHARRA HISTORICALLY LOCAL ACTORS THE STRUCTURE OF THE DHARRA EXPLORING SOCIAL CAPITAL THROUGH A STUDY OF PRACTICE THE HISTORICISATION OF THE MISSING COW TRIALS JAMAL S DHARRA TRUST NETWORKS AND CONNECTIONS TO THE STATE THE DHARRA AND ELECTIONS THE DHARRA AND SOCIAL CAPITAL KINSHIP GROUPS AS TRUST NETWORKS CONCLUSION APPENDIX BIBLIOGRAPHY vi

7 PREFACE I would like to thank all the voices in Faisalabad who contributed to this project, many of whom have chosen not to be named. In particular, I would like to thank Shandana Khan for her endless support and great help in the facilitation of this field research. I would also like to thank Naeem Ahmed, an influential gatekeeper, who provided me with critical help in Faisalabad. Finally, I would like to thank David Montero for his ceaseless inspiration, guidance, and support. vii

8 1.0 INTRODUCTION This thesis explores the structure and practices of kinship groups in Pakistan. For the majority of Pakistanis, kinship is the most fundamental basis of identity, superseding even membership to a particular religious sect, social group, or economic class. Kinship groups are based on class, geography, and occupation, following the Hindu-caste structure, a structure that was inherited by Pakistan following the partition of the two countries in In contemporary literature, Pakistani society has been described in terms of a patron-client framework, emphasizing a feudal-based system, where prominent landlords provide the largely rural population with some measure of security in exchange for labor and political support during election years. However, this literature falls short of examining the complex exchange between the state, kinship groups, and their members. In particular, the existing literature has often downplayed both the agency of the villagers in extracting favors and to some extent accountability from their landlords. There is also extensive anecdotal evidence that these kinship networks play an important role during elections in terms of mobilizing voters and fielding candidates. In the years following partition, social scientists undertook detailed studies on the structure of kinship, often in class-based terms. However, since then it has not been examined systematically. This thesis seeks to fill the gap in the literature on this local structure, which I argue remains vital to understanding the quality of local politics in Pakistan. Building on the strong anecdotal evidence, I will employ an 1

9 ethnographic approach to examine the mechanisms through which parties mobilize kinship networks and how kinship networks make claims on parties and the state. In this thesis, I also examine the present-day structure of kinship networks and mechanisms of local governance through a study of the dharra. The dharra refers both to public space where landlords receive guests, the symbolic sphere of their influence, and may also refer to a political faction. While the role of the dharra is significant to village governance and is probably the first space one enters in a village, it has largely been ignored in the literature on kinship networks perhaps due to its ubiquity. In this thesis, I argue that dharra is a vital institution, as it is the center of local patronage and decision-making. In that way, the interactions that take place in the dharra provide important insights as to how landlords preserve their social ties. Further, the dharra also serves as an important mobilizing structure or mechanism through which the political parties reach voters. In this thesis, the dharra will be treated as both a mechanism of mobilization as well as decision-making. Through this ethnographic exploration, this thesis is guided by the following questions: 1) What is the role of kinship groups in village level governance? 2) How do political parties mobilize kinship networks during the electoral process? 3) How does the involvement of kinship groups in the political process reveal conceptions of trust? I employ two theoretical concepts to examine the role of kinship networks: Pierre Bourdieu s theory of social capital as well as Charles Tilly s discussion of trust networks. Bourdieu s discussion of social capital is relevant for understanding how kinship structures shape local practices. In particular, I will explore how kinship networks cultivate capital to maintain their political influence through the dharra (Bourdieu 2003). Further, Tilly s discussion of trust 2

10 networks provides an important lens through which to examine how the incorporation of networks, such as kinship groups, within the state shapes the quality of democracy (Tilly 2005). This thesis is organized into three main sections. The first section discusses the methodology, a discussion of the key actors, and the overall organizing strategy of the thesis. The second section will examine the role of the dharra in village level governance and conceptions of social capital. Finally, the third section will examine how kinship network are connected to the state and the role of the dharra as a mobilizing mechanism. In the third section, I will also use the idea of trust networks to discuss possible ways that a study of the dharra could provide insights into the quality of democracy in Pakistan. 1.1 METHODOLOGY This project seeks to elucidate the following dimensions of kinship networks: 1) relationships between kinship group members; 2) interactions between kinship groups and formal institutions of the state; and 3) the underlying values and practices. To conduct an investigation encompassing these dimensions, I employed ethnographic methods, including interviews with members of different kinship groups and members of formal state institutions. In particular, I interviewed a range of kinship groups, including land-owning and service-oriented groups. Within kinship groups, I spoke to landlords who were in a position of hierarchy as well as ordinary households. As I was looking for links between kinship groups and political institutions, I also interviewed members of the national assembly, members of the provincial assembly, and party workers. 3

11 Overall, sixty-five interviews were conducted, representing the actors described above. The interviews were designed to be open-ended to ensure that that the interviewees were able to use their own language to discuss the dynamics of kinships groups. This strategy was important, as the literature on kinship groups is outdated, and it allowed me to ensure that I was able to capture the evolution of kinship networks and the concepts that were salient for members. The interviews were conducted either in Urdu, the national language, or Punjabi, the regional language, which also ensured that topics weren t lost in translation. In addition, as I was interested in capturing the dynamic between kinship groups, I also spent significant time observing interactions between members at meetings, village events, and in people s homes. As noted above, much of the existing literature on kinship networks employs the structural patronclient lens. Ethnographic interview and observations techniques allowed me to go beyond a structural analysis and capture the micro dynamics of village-level interaction (Goffman 1983). Such techniques allowed me to gain a nuanced understanding of ties between kinship groups and the concept of reciprocity, which will be discussed in detail below. My research focused on kinship groups in and around the city of Faisalabad, a major industrial hub in Punjab, Pakistan s most populous, agricultural province. Gaining access to villagers was initially a challenge. As I will discuss further below, villagers were incredibly mistrustful of outsiders, especially outsiders affiliated with American institutions given the overall tension in the larger political relationship between the United States and Pakistan. During my fieldwork, the North American Treaty Organization s supply routes between Pakistan and Afghanistan had been closed due to a U.S. military-led helicopter attack that targeted a Pakistani military installation and caused the deaths of several Pakistani soldiers. Moreover, although the assassination of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan had taken place a year earlier, 4

12 resentment still lingered among the population that the American-led constituted a direct breach of Pakistan s sovereignty. Given the charged political atmosphere, people were suspicious about the nature of my research, especially as I was examining politically sensitive relationships. To gain access to the networks and individuals, I often relied on trusted local gatekeepers who could facilitate an introduction to the network. My research assistant proved to be extremely important in navigating the networks and finding the necessary gatekeepers, as he had lived in Faisalabad his entire life and had worked as a journalist covering political news, so had made contacts within various kinship networks. In particular, one of the individuals that my assistant introduced me to became an important mediator. This mediator had extensive connections within parties and local communities as he had been involved in several political campaigns and had also stood for local elections himself. While he was not directly responsible for organizing my interviews, he nonetheless facilitated my access to others, who would guide us regarding local networks. To further build the trust of individuals, I agreed not to tape the interviews. I wrote notes by hand and later typed them up on my computer. In addition, all the names of the interviewees have been changed and the names of the geographic areas have not been included to preserve their anonymity. This exercise in negotiating access to trust networks became a form of social mapping, allowing me to identify the broader kinship structures and gatekeepers. Tilly uses the term trust network to refer to social networks where members share collective risk for any malfeasance mistakes, or risks (Tilly 2005: 4). He argues that kinship groups are often trust networks, as the boundaries are tightly policed and there is extensive pressure to perform according to established rules. To gain access to kinship networks with closed boundaries, I had to adapt my original sampling approach. Instead of using a snowball sampling approach, I had to use my local contacts to identify a gatekeeper who could then facilitate an introduction to the rest 5

13 of a network. Once I had access to the network, to some extent, I still employed a snowball sampling approach. This exercise in social mapping enabled me to determine nodes of influence as well as the parameters of the network. The timing of my fieldwork proved to be critical in observing interactions between kinship networks and state institutions as national elections were anticipated to take place in early The announcement effect of the national elections was palpable and precipitated a small number of rallies and meetings that I attended. The announcement effect also led to popular discussion regarding elections, especially regarding the selection of local candidates. The fact that the election was at the forefront of everyday conversation facilitated my interviews to some extent. I was not able to witness formal election activity, but I asked people about their participation in the 2008 election when exploring the role of kinship networks in politics. There is always the risk that people erroneously remember past events. However, as I was more interested in larger mechanisms involving kinship networks, not individual behavior, I was able to triangulate responses that I received regarding the overall role of kinship groups in elections. 1.2 FIELD SITE I conducted fieldwork in the district of Faisalabad in central Punjab, which includes both urban and rural areas. While findings from Punjab cannot be extrapolated to all of Pakistan, Faisalabad is an important site, as it allows me to locate kinship structures historically as well as explore how they are shaped by forces of modernization. Faisalabad was one of the centers for the canal or agricultural colonies established by the British colonial administration in late 19 th century. 6

14 Although kinship structures have existed in one form or another throughout the history of the Indian sub-continent, the present kinship structure was integrally shaped by the colonial administration. According to Pakistani historians, British land allocation policies greatly influenced the local kinship structures. For example, the British land allocation policies fostered a certain social mobility, as several groups assumed the identity of particular kinship groups to gain access to land. In this way, the land allocation process formalized kinship boundaries in two ways. First, the British created extensive land records that differentiated land-holding groups from service-proving groups. Second, the British conferred local responsibilities on the land-holding groups that enabled landowners to serve as intermediaries between the villagers and the colonial state. Faisalabad was also one of the seats of industrialization in the 1980s. The process of social transformation that began in Faisalabad with the introduction of a burgeoning textile industry in the 1980s and also continues today provides a unique opportunity to examine the evolution of kinship structures. As Faisalabad s economic base transformed from agriculture to textile, one of the trends that I encountered was that to remain relevant, kinship networks, especially the landowning groups, embedded themselves within institutions of the state. This strategy allowed them to maintain legitimacy and mediate between their members, other kinship groups, and government agencies. A macro-level examination of how kinship structures evolved given the changes in the economy is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, I will focus on kinship networks in rural and peri-urban spaces, as the majority of the Pakistani population still resides in these areas and examine their local structure and the local mechanisms by which they interact with institutions of the state. 7

15 1.3 ORGANIZING STRATEGY Most of my interactions with members of kinship groups took place in the village and specifically within their dharras. Again, in rural areas, the dharra refers both to the physical space established by the landowning kinship groups for public meetings and consultations, as well as an informal governance structure. The dharra has a rich and complex history that dates back to the colonial time period, as the administrators appointed by the British used a similar mechanism for local governance and dispute resolution. The dharra continues to be a key space within contemporary Pakistani society, as it provides a mechanism to arbitrate local disputes, facilitate collective decision-making, and mobilize resources during times of elections. The dharra also elucidates the local hierarchy. For example, as the dharra is the site of interaction among kinship structures, it provides insights into local relationships, common practices, and the values informing the practices. Drawing from ethnographic research, this thesis aims to use the architecture of the dharra as an organizing strategy for this thesis to explore the structure and practices of kinships groups in Pakistan as well as how they are integrated within formal political structures. Employing this organizing strategy, also allows me to address the issue of agency and structure. That is, by focusing on the interactions within the dharra, I am able to depict the agency of the actors within the village hierarchy from the landowning groups to the serviceoriented kinship groups as well as how their access to the dharra is shaped by their local position. In addition to being an important organizing strategy for this thesis, focusing on the dharra also reveals the gendered dimensions of society in central Punjab. That is, with a few exceptions that I will discuss below, the dharra is largely a male-dominated space. My access to the dharra was during exceptional times. For example, people usually convene at the dharra at 8

16 night after business hours. When I met with the landlords at their dharras, I would usually formally request a meeting, which was held during the day, so that norms of propriety could be observed. Even in the daytime, my ability to walk into the dharra would require a particular protocol, given both my gender as a female and my status as an outsider. For example, when arriving to a particular dharra, I would wait in the car while my research assistant would locate the landlord and ensure that I would not be interrupting a male-dominated meeting. If a meeting was in session, I would be taken into the private residence of the landlord and introduced to the landlord s wife. This took place in an area of the house where my male research assistant could not join me. Once the landlord was ready, I would be hurriedly ushered into the inner, private room for the dharra, minimizing my exposure in the public sphere. As I learned, the dharras usually had two spaces, a public area where the villagers could informally gather and an inner private room reserved for private meetings and VIPs. The findings that I describe below should be considered in light of my limited or privileged access to the dharra. In some instances, my privileged access enriches the study, as it allowed me to examine the gendered nature of the space. However, in spite of the fact that I was not visiting the dharra during peak visiting times, villagers would sometimes hear that I was meeting with the landlord and would know that he was therefore available at his dharra. As a result, they would trickle in with to bring their complaints and to pay respect allowing me to witness the exchanges. However, there were countless incidents where I was not able to witness particular negotiations between the landlords and other kinship groups or members of political parties. In such cases, I address the gaps through the insights of my research assistant and rely on the existing literature to guide me. 9

17 2.0 LOCATING THE DHARRA HISTORICALLY The dharra arose from a feudal system, where the landlord would hold a local court to address the management of his land, undertake dispute resolution, respond to particular claims, and manage relationships with other kinship groups. The dharra refers to this space of adjudication. Such governance structures have existed since the time of the Mughal Empire, a central Asian dynasty that ruled from the early fifteenth to the nineteenth century. The present day form of the dharra emerged during the colonial era. The British appointed a numberdar or administrator, who was officially responsible for tax collection and the management of land records. This individual was usually a prominent local landlord, a tradition that continues today. Given his official position, the numberdar s informal role was to facilitate local dispute resolution, mostly involving land disputes. That is, the numberdar became the defacto village head with powers that were enshrined in colonial administrative law. The numberdar s dharra then became the site of local governance and also the point through which to access institutions of the state. While the dharra itself was an informal space, through the position of the numberdar, it became institutionalized. 10

18 2.1 LOCAL ACTORS Since Pakistan s independence and the establishment of parliamentary systems, there are a multitude of local leaders. While the numberdar remains an important position locally, today he is no longer the main representative of the state. The role of arbitrators has fallen to landlords who are heads of landowning kinship groups. As discussed above, kinship-based boundaries in Pakistan have historically been defined based on access to land. i Hamza Alavi, an anthropologist, outlines four categories of kinship groups: 1) large landowners, 2) small landowners, 3) service-based groups or kammis, and 4) peasants who work the land (Alavi 1972). While there are dozens of kinship groups, they mainly fit into these four categories. These categories broadly correspond to the land distribution policies of the British colonial administration. Supporting this point, Andrew Wilder, a political scientist, identifies four kinds of land grants to: peasant proprietors who received one square of land (28 acres), yeoman farmers who received four to five squares of land, and the landed elite or hereditary landed gentry (Wilder 1999: 39). The fourth category was grants given for the breeding of camels and horses for the military. Wilder argues that with these grants to the landed gentry, the British administration hoped to revitalize a landed class, which had diminished in the nineteenth century due to subdivisions of land inheritance caused by inheritance laws and the slow rise of the middle class in the towns. The colonial administration had a political and economic rationale to revitalize the landed gentry. The British considered the rural elite to be more stable and easier to control. Establishing a political infrastructure through the landlords in rural areas, where the majority of the population lived, allowed the British administration greater political control through strategies that relied both on coercion and patronage (Caton 2004; Gilmartin 2003; Gilmartin 11

19 1988). In addition the British administration established alliances with local-land-owning families to address the challenge of providing food for an expanding population. In this way, the land allocation process supported the dual need for political supporters and agricultural producers. This period of British rule was especially important in defining the boundaries of kinship groups. First, the British helped to create a sense of social order based on the dominance of single-lineage kinship groups. The British rewarded groups that were loyal to them and undermined the ones that they considered political threats. For example, Gilmartin notes that the British granted the Hayats and Tiwanas, currently two of the largest landowning families in Pakistan, large parcels of irrigated land to reward them for their loyalty in defeating the Sikh rulers in Punjab (Gilmartin 1988). Such land grants enabled these families to assume political and economic control of vast swaths of land. On the point of social control, Brian Caton writes: Panjabi responsiveness to the material rewards of British programmes produced increasing flexibility in the definition of the social categories administrators sought to define more narrowly, yielding an historically evolving discourse through which Panjabis and government struggled to secure control over property and social order (Caton 2004: 35). Second, the establishment of the canal or agricultural colonies opened 2.5 million acres of irrigated land for cultivation, which presented a tremendous opportunity for social mobility. The availability of this additional arable land allowed the British to substantially shape the quality of rural leadership (Caton 2004; Wilder 1999). For example, Caton discusses how heads of particular kinship groups gained status by agreeing to pay land revenue to the crown, which earned them their status of landlords (Caton 2004). Building on Alavi, Muhammad Chaudhry, a legal anthropologist, identifies several competing theories regarding the structures of kinship groups. According to Chaudhry, biraderi 12

20 (kinship group) or quom (people) are the broadest units of analysis. The term quom is used more commonly in Pakistan to refer to kinship group, while biraderi is most often associated with kinship groups from the Punjab province. According to Caton, these lineage groups certainly predate the British colonies and he cites that the Indian subcontinent was known to have unilinear kin with some corporate decision-making systems since the Mughal rule (Caton 2004). The tradition of kinship groups is not visible through a corporate decision-making system alone, but also through narrative genealogies of historical figures and families, supporting the diffuseness of the groups (Caton 2004). Kinship groups are also identified by geography especially as there was significant migration following partition, and particular groups splintered and adopted a geographic identity. The literature is not clear regarding the size of kinship groups, but suggests that these networks are quite large, possibly extending across the country or even internationally. They are difficult to map, as in many cases the network lies dormant and the relationships are not meaningful unless they are activated, for example through politics. Chaudhry also discusses the sub-structures under the overall kinship group that are based on patrilineal connections called sharika. Chaudhry notes that the distinctions between the substructures are not always clear and broader kinship identities may be activated only during particular times of the year, such as during election season or during a dispute (Chaudhry 1999). Based on my fieldwork, these various groupings of kinship networks remain valid. However, their validity depends on the context and the issues being discussed. For example, the concept of sharika is most commonly visible in social affairs. As Abdul Hameed, an influential member of the Gujar family in one of my field sites, exclaimed:... what do you mean by biraderi? All that really matters is sharika... Your father s brothers, their children, family these are the people who will come to your aid in times of need... 13

21 In line with Caton s discussion, when asked about the origin of their castes, the interviewees drew on mythical figures. When asked about his biraderi, Hameed cited that they descended from a group of ancient wrestlers, who wielded a club known as the guaarez. The kinship group derives its name from this mythical weapon. The term quom was also synonymous with biraderi or kinship network, which was invoked in describing relationships between people as well as with the state, suggesting that it depicted the larger political order. This observation is especially relevant to examining the intersection of kinship with politics. As I will discuss below, my fieldwork confirmed that heads of kinship group are often elected as legislators of the provincial and national assemblies, a trend confirmed by earlier studies of electoral systems in Pakistan (Wilder 1999; Waseem 1993). The hierarchy of kinship groups is not monolithic and there is often fierce competition within a particular group for overall leadership. However, leaders who hold formal positions within the government become the defacto head of the kinship group, at least while their formal tenure lasts. This idea of competition within kinship groups provides insights about the power relations within kinship groups, a point that I will return to during my discussion of democracy. As the heads of kinship groups, they respond to claims made by local kinship groups and mediate local dispute resolution. They usually delegate other members of their kinship group to address the day-to-day concerns of the village, adding to the hierarchy and creating a circle of local agents. However, for serious cases, such as ones involving murder, kinship heads will be called upon to mediate directly or to use their influence with institutions of the state. In essence, these heads of kinship groups assume de facto legislative and judicial authority at the village level. 14

22 2.2 THE STRUCTURE OF THE DHARRA As an outsider to village, it is impossible to miss the dharra, as it is the space where all visitors are received. The dharra is usually located away from the living quarters of the landlord and refers to the open common area in front of his house as well as a private greeting room. As I will discuss further below, the dichotomy between these private and public spaces reveals the dual function of the dharra. On one hand, dharras are structures that are accessible to villagers for a variety of purposes, including dispute resolution a public forum of sorts. On the other hand, the dharra also serve as the site of backroom political deals mediated by the landlord. While I only had access to the former, my interviews revealed the more private dimensions that I will discuss below. How well the space is appointed speaks directly to the influence of the landlord and reveals the dynamics of the role of dharras within the political socialization process. For the purpose of this thesis, political socialization will be discussed on two levels: 1) how kinship structures shape the social identity of their members, particularly their role in the larger kinship group and 2) how kinship structures shape the relationship between their members and political institutions of the state. The role of the dharra in political socialization also points to the performative nature of the socialization process. One of my first experiences at the dharra in a rural community reveals these dynamics. Initially to visit a particular village, I was going through a trusted mediator, a local journalist from the area, but he dropped out at the last minute, as he was busy (one of the few instances where we didn t have a local guide). My assistant and I decided to try the snowball sampling approach. We drove to the center of the village, where we found a group of men smoking a pipe under a tree, a rather typical occurrence as we discovered, and asked them to direct us to one of the prominent landlords. Our aim in this village was to 15

23 speak to a range of households, from landlords to ordinary villagers, in order to learn about their role in the last election. The men under the tree seemed somewhat nonplussed at our request and were reluctant to point us in any direction. After some consideration, we were directed to the largest house in the village, where we were asked to wait in the dharra while they summoned the landlord. The landlord s dharra was simply arranged with white wrought-iron chairs and a fan. The only ornament was a religious calendar on the wall. Shortly after we arrived, the landlord received us. With him were half a dozen additional villagers, who presumably joined us at the behest of the landlord. The receiving party was directly visible to street dwellers, as I later learned was typical of the performance at the dharra. That is, even a private transaction, such as my request to interview the landlord, was an occasion for a public performance that reaffirmed the importance of the landlord in this case, as someone important enough to be interviewed by an American scholar. I had made every effort to dress appropriately, wearing the traditional clothes women are expected to wear: shalwar kameez with baggy pants and a shirt, as well as a scarf to cover my head. Still, the sight of a woman in such a public space was such an anomaly that people often assumed I was some kind of foreigner. The gathering also provided insights into the hierarchy within the dharra and the role it plays in the political socialization process. What was clear from the gathering was the hierarchical nature of the group. The landlord took the lead in responding to the questions and moderated the participation of the larger group. This interview suggested to me a trend that was repeated throughout my fieldwork, where the dharra and how it was physically appointed and adorned served as a metaphor for the hierarchy of the village. In addition, even though I had not requested to meet with additional individuals, the landlord brought a retinue. While the 16

24 gathering arranged by the landlord was a public performance for me, it also seemed to be a public performance for the villagers. That is, such public performances emphasize the hierarchical role of the landlord who is empowered to mediate with others (especially outsiders) on behalf of the village. Such gatherings also privilege the collective identity over the individual, and serve as a part of the socialization process. Further, this exchange takes place within the central space of the dharra, where it is visible for the larger community, reinforcing the notion of hierarchy. As I will explore through cases below, kinship boundaries and relationships among members are shaped by such public performances. The dharra is neither a formal structure, nor is it monolithic. In most instances, there are at least two dharras in a village level affiliated with the major landlords. These two dharras sometime serve in opposition to one another. As one of my interviewees described, for every lobby, there will also be a counter lobby. When I asked on what basis the anti-lobby is formed, I was told there are a myriad of reasons. At times, there is a natural alliance between landlords because their land is adjoining or they have to share access to the same water source. Supporting that point, he added: I have water and people need me for water... this is not the kind of set-up where you can survive alone. In other cases, the grouping has to do with political rivalries that have existed for generations. These rivalries might be due to an underlying competition between kinship groups, a concept called anna, which evokes a sense of honor or status shaped through competition. I will discuss this concept in greater detail below. In some situations, where there are multiple landlords belonging to the kinship group, members will frequent the one that is considered to be the most influential a status that fluctuates based on: 1) whether the family has ties with the government or the local administration; 2) the availability of the landlord; and 3) ties established through prior history. The quality of the ties between the members of a kinship 17

25 group and a local landlord depends on capital he has cultivated by being available or performing small favors for the members. In some instances, if a landlord has moved to the city, his dharra will not be frequented and his influence will wane. In other words, the importance of a landlord partially depends on his local presence and relationships that are cultivated through the physical/symbolic space of the dharra, which again underscores the performative nature of the kinship ties. While the dharra is an informal structure, a careful protocol is maintained. That is, facts such as who is given a seat, the order in which people are served, and the language used is regulated by and reflects the larger hierarchy of the village. During my field visits, the kammis or the service-providing groups would often sit on the floor instead of on the chairs with the other landlords. Alternatively in more informal gatherings, the kammis were sometimes given chairs, but separately from the gathering, so that no mistake could be made that the kammis were in fact part of the same conversation as the landlords. Further, depending on who was visiting, the landlord would arrange for tea, snacks, and dinner to be served. The complexity of the meal refers back to the importance of the guest as well as the influence of the landlord. That is, a landlord will be considered influential if he is in a position to serve food to his visitors, and in part, he will attain his position and even the economic means through the public acknowledgement he receives at the dharra. Finally, Urdu has varying levels of formality that shape the use of particular pronouns, verb conjugation, and proper nouns, and the level of formality will be shaped substantially by who is present again, language and the presentation of the dharra are important aspects of performance. David Morgan s discussion of family practice is relevant to exploring the performative nature of the dharra. Morgan notes that practices or performances are constantly made within a 18

26 family to maintain ties (Morgan 2011). For example, Morgan discusses how certain practices, such as exercising, may be performed to set an example for other members of the family, serving as a form of socialization. Morgan s discussion of family practice has three important implications for the study of the dharra: 1) it introduces the idea of how practices translate into membership; 2) it links performance to socialization; and 3) it points to the importance of studying practices through a collective rather than an individual lens. Drawing from Bourdieu, Morgan notes how social structures shape practice. For Bourdieu, the location of one s class position shapes dispositions or habitus and associated practice. In effect, Morgan argues that particular practices determine the wider social parameters of a group or membership. Practice is a critical topic in light of the dharra, as a particular kinship background may grant you access, but membership is based on actively cultivating ties or participating in rituals, such as weddings. That is, not only is practice shaped by social position, but also engaging in the right social activities may redefine an individual s social position. In addition, as the performance of particular practices illustrates the social ties between members and the processes through which they are established, it also reveals elements of socialization. For example, as interaction with the landlord above suggested, hierarchy of kinship was shaped by the ability of particular members to undertake performances. Therefore, studying those performances can reveal how socialization takes places. Finally, as performances and socialization seek to reinforce boundaries between social groups, it is necessary to study kinship groups through a collective lens. The case material that I will introduce below seeks to elucidate how dimensions of performance and socialization helps us to understand the structure of kinship in Pakistan and the link between social structures and practices. 19

27 3.0 EXPLORING SOCIAL CAPITAL THROUGH A STUDY OF PRACTICE The existing patron-client literature on Pakistan neglects a discussion of practice in examining the social structures of the country and focuses on understanding the societal hierarchy purely through an institutional analysis. My analysis instead examines the social structures by examining interactions, many of which take place in the dharra. Goffman s work on stigma and interaction also has useful implications for the study of the Pakistani kinship groups. While like Bourdieu, Goffman acknowledges the linkages between structure and interaction, he also highlights that there may be contradictions between the structural and interactional order, emphasizing the importance of studying the dynamics of micro exchanges (Goffman 1983). In my field sites where there was a dominant kinship group, there was no doubt that there was a clear hierarchy within the village. As exemplified in the interview of the landlord discussed above, the hierarchy within the kinship groups can be examined through the landlord s performance in the dharra. In contrast, by focusing the interactional order, my fieldwork also suggests that in spite of the structural hierarchy, relations among kinship groups also have reciprocal elements. Based on my interviews, sources revealed that a landlord cannot maintain his position if he ignores his members or members of other the lower kinship groups. The sources suggested that while the position of the landlord is linked to his land resources, his economic means are not enough to maintain his social position. This point underscores the importance of understanding 20

28 social structures through interactions. As I followed landlords during the day, I learned that in spite of their obvious position, they invested heavily in maintaining local ties. These interactions suggested that even a high-ranking landlord must maintain ties even with kammis or the serviceproviding groups to maintain his position and legitimacy. A structural analysis alone obscures the reciprocal nature of the ties between kinship groups. An important landlord will provide regular hours to his dharra, usually in the evenings or the weekends, unless it is election season in which case, he can be found there more frequently. A woman I interview exclaimed: During election season, my husband was so busy at the dharra that he gave up his day-time job. This interview confirmed the idea that individuals take their roles at the dharra very seriously. Supporting this point, a landlord from the Jat kinship group explained to me the lengths he has to go to keep the villagers satisfied. Jats are one of the larger landowning kinship groups commonly associated with Hindus and Sikhs, who converted to Islam in the late 19 th and early 20 th century. While describing the role of kinship structure and the dharra, this Jat landlord emphasized that problem-solving was a large part of the role. Problem-solving included undertaking dispute resolution for his own kinship group, but also for other kinship groups. It also involved providing small favors, such as providing a job reference. When the landlord hears of an issue affecting the community, he explained, he doesn t wait for people to come to his dharra. Rather, he seeks out the parties involved and offers to mediate. He said, If you don t resolve the dispute, people will get away from you. He implied that if a landlord is not actively engaging in people s lives, his position will be undermined over time. Bourdieu s concept of social capital provides a useful theoretical framework to examine the reproduction of relationships within the dharra. According to Bourdieu, distinctions in social position cannot be understood only materially. For Bourdieu, the elite have access to 21

29 capital that can have political, economic, and social dimensions. This idea of capital can be thought of as a form of currency that is transferable and can be used by the classes to maintain position. As will be revealed in the discussion on elections below, for the landlord to use his dharra as a mobilizing structure during elections, he has to develop a particular kind of social capital in between election years, where he entertains the requests of the villagers and allows them access to his dharra. He will often leverage that social capital during election year to gain votes for himself or for one of his affiliates. If he is successful, the political capital will be used to develop further patronage by diverting state resources at the village level. Capital is a useful concept to consider the relationships within kinship groups, as it allows us to explore the temporal and spatial dimensions of an exchange. That is, capital is not only created based on an immediate transaction but may be considered an investment for a future exchange. For example, one of the common ways that people build capital in the village is by attending weddings and leaving a small monetary gift. Often the gift is in the sum of the money they might have received for a similar social function; however, to further build the relationship, they would even have to add to the value of the gift an investment in a future relationship. The guests attending the wedding may not have an ulterior motive in paying the host the courtesy of attending. However, if members don t attend at all, they would find it difficult to ask that host for a favor in the future. There is a high value placed on physically showing up to the wedding. Sending a cash envelope without physical presence would again constrain the relationship to a mere transaction. In the examples discussed above, the performance involved in gift-exchange disguises the transaction and affirms ties between the receiver and sender. The space of the dharra itself represents a particular symbolic capital. That is, even though the landlords do not have extensive economic power in present day Pakistan due to the 22

30 slow transformation from the agricultural-based economy to an industrial and service-oriented one, they still have a symbolic capital that allows them to command respect and attention. As the barber of one of the villages that I worked in grumbled: When the Chaudhry s [or the landlords] call, we have to come. While the barber remarked in earshot of the Chaudhry, he was compelled to leave his tasks for the day to respond to the Chaudhry s request. While the Chaudhry s may be as cash poor as some of the service kinship groups, the dharra as evokes the grandeur of the feudal era. Often, landlords can be found at the dharra with their pipes, smoking in the middle of the day an image that evokes men of leisure, and allows them to use the dharra to draw symbolic boundaries between themselves and the working class, or kammis. Building on Bourdieu s idea of capital, Michèle Lamont introduces the idea of symbolic boundaries to elucidate how particular national cultural patterns have evolved. She also uses this concept to illustrate how cultural production in this case pipe smoking--leads to social exclusion (Lamont 1992). The nomenclature for service providing groups itself is indicative of the symbolic boundaries between kinship groups. To this point, the word kammi can be translated two ways: 1) as someone who works and 2) as someone who is lacking both of which reinforce the symbolic boundaries between land-owning and serviceproviding groups. While kinship boundaries are reproduced fairly stringently through the institutions of marriage and inheritance, the notion of capital does not reveal the nuances of the exchange between the landlord and the barber. The fact that the barber was grumbling in earshot of the landlord, and followed this with a quip about how the landlords are fat because they rarely get out of their chairs, suggested that there was some space for the kammi to protest against the landlord. Again, structural accounts of kinship alone do not explain the space for resistance. 23

31 One explanation could be that the barber has accumulated sufficient moral capital, as he labors for the landlord, the year around. James Scott s discussion of everyday acts of resistance as strategies employed by peasants is also instructive. Scott suggests that peasants have some space for resistance as long as the overall symbolic order is not questioned (Scott 1985). In this case, through the use of humor, the barber is able to garner some space for criticizing the landlord in a way that does not challenge the landlord s position. The landlord s role of mediation discussed above has moral and social dimensions. That is, by playing the role of mediator, landlords set themselves apart for their moral qualities, such as their altruistic spirit and social service, both of which include elements of trust. However, by doing so, landlords are also drawing boundaries, or setting themselves apart from the villagers in whose matters they provide judgment. Such roles were strategically developed over generations. One of the landlords that I interviewed, who is hoping to run for parliamentary election in 2013, mentioned how the tradition of mediating disputes in his family started with his father in the 1960s. This landlord belongs to a small land-owning kinship group. He readily admitted that this kinship group does not have a good reputation; often his kinship group is associated with gangs. Others I interviewed also confirmed this impression. One of the underlying issues that the landlord alluded to was that his family is one of the native groups of the area, who were displaced by kinship groups migrating from India. Migrants referred to these natives as Janglis, or wild people, perhaps due to the fact that they did not practice Islam; although many have now converted. The discussion by the landlord of how his father sought to improve their image by his acts of social service refers to a kind of moral capital. Again this capital has multiple dimensions: first, the landlord s father developed capital with individuals that he helped. Second, the father was seen to be undertaking social work publically, a performance that also 24