Jus Post Bellum Seeking Peace in Iraq. Paul L. Gillis

Transcription

1 Jus Post Bellum Seeking Peace in Iraq Paul L. Gillis Lutheran Ethics Dr. Craig Nessan Wartburg Theological Seminary Spring 2007

2 On April 9, 2003, the U.S. military swarmed into Baghdad and Saddam Hussein's regime collapsed. The following day, President Bush spoke to the Iraqi people: The goals of our coalition are clear and limited. We will end a brutal regime, whose aggression and weapons of mass destruction make it a unique threat to the world. Coalition forces will help maintain law and order, so that Iraqis can live in security. We will respect your great religious traditions, whose principles of equality and compassion are essential to Iraq's future. We will help you build a peaceful and representative government that protects the rights of all citizens. And then our military forces will leave. Iraq will go forward as a unified, independent and sovereign nation that has regained a respected place in the world. (Bush 2003) The war was controversial from the beginning. Bishop Hansen of the ELCA questioned the ethical underpinnings of the war, as did the Roman Catholic Church, yet conservative evangelical Christians issued a statement that a first strike against Iraq was consistent with the time-honored criteria for just war (Hansen 2003; Johnson 2003) Most of the literature today suggests that the Iraq War fails to meet all of the requirements of a just war, yet some argue that despite this the war can still be considered just on humanitarian grounds. (Weigel 2007) Four years later the U.S. remains mired in Iraq. Violence continues on a daily basis and despite escalation in the war effort, nothing seems capable of containing it. The intelligence cited as the reason to go to war has been discredited, and the conduct of the war is widely considered to have been incompetent. Public opinion of the war and its conduct has turned against the U.S. both domestically and abroad. The political dialogue in the U.S. has polarized, with one group arguing for escalation and the other for a timetable for withdrawal. Neither approach properly deals with the ethical issues present. On January 26, 2007 Bishop Mark S. Hansen called the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA) to conversation on Iraq: Our country is engaged in a divisive debate about the nature and the direction of this war As the war in Iraq escalates and the way to a lasting peace seems unclear, how shall the members of the church respond? (Hansen 2007) 1

3 This paper will consider the ethical issues facing our nation as we deliberate on a way to end the war in Iraq. Lutherans have a long tradition of respect for just war theory, often called by its Latin name, jus ad bellum (ELCA 1995). Many credit jus ad bellum to Augustine, who synthesized values of Aristotle and Cicero with Christian principles. Over the centuries, jus ad bellum has become commonly accepted as the standard for international ethics in the conduct of war. Many of the concepts of jus ad bellum have been incorporated into international laws governing conflict, such as the United Nations Charter and the Geneva and Hague Conventions. Jus ad bellum led to jus in bello just conduct of war, and to jus post bellum just post-war conduct. Considering just war traditions as set forth in these three components of just war theory, this paper will discern the ethical principles that should guide us as we seek to end the war in Iraq. Jus ad bellum Jus ad bellum addresses the decision to begin a war. Just war theory has developed over the centuries since Augustine, and has been modified by new insights and human experience. Augustine was the first mature Christian to address in a public way the issues of justification, goals and means of war(watt 2004). The leading modern sectarian scholar of just war theory is probably Michael Walzer, who s Just and Unjust Wars follows tradition in setting forth six requirements, each of which must be met before a state is justified to resort to armed force.(walzer 2000) The rules are addressed to political leaders, since they are the ones who start wars and must be held accountable for them. Leaders who start wars without meeting each of the requirements of just war open the possibility of being accused of war crimes, as was done in the World War II Nuremburg trials(orend 2005). 1. Just Cause. War can only be started for the right reasons, that being to confront a real and present danger. Most modern just war scholars look to the resistance of aggression as being the only just cause. Other just causes frequently mentioned include self defense from an external attack, defending 2

4 others from attack, protecting innocent people from brutal regimes, and punishing grievous wrongdoing which remains uncorrected(orend 2005). At the time the Iraq war began there was a vigorous debate concerning whether just cause was met. Proponents of the war argued that the existence of weapons of mass destruction, Iraq s history of defying United Nations resolutions and past acts of genocide provided a just cause.(stiltner 2003) Those opposed to war did not object at the commencement of the war as to whether there was a just cause, but rather based their objections on other just war criteria as discussed below. The failure to discover weapons of mass destruction, however, meant that the primary reason set forth for just cause did not exist. Others have argued that the humanitarian injustices provided such a cause in any event.(mellow 2006) 2. Right Intention. Right intention flows from just cause A war must be intended only for the reasons set forth as a just cause.(nccb 1983) Ulterior motives, such as the desire to secure resources or power, or seek revenge or ethnic prosecution, are prohibited. This rule is not present in international law, probably because of the difficulty in assessing a state s intent(orend 2005). The announced intention for the war was to prevent Saddam Hussein from using his weapons of mass destruction. Because right intention and just cause are so closely linked, the failure to find weapons of mass destruction raises the serious question of how the war could be justified. Later rhetoric shifted the arguments for just cause and right intention to the removal of a brutal dictator. Others questioned from the beginning whether there was a right intention in starting the war, or whether the intention was to achieve regime change and to establish a Pax Americana in the region (Carter 2003). Others cited concerns that the war was justified by nonexistent links between Al Qaeda and Iraq, and that the real intention related to oil, fundamentalist Christian eschatological issues related to support of Israel, or President Bush s family revenge (Stiltner 2003) (Mellow 2006). A war that is legitimate because of just cause and proper 3

5 authority can have that justification undone by a wicked intention (Williams and Caldwell 2006). 3. Proper authority and public declaration. The right to use force must be invoked for the common good. War must be declared by those with responsibility for public order, not by private groups or individuals. Issues arise in a democracy such as the United States as to whether the President has proper authority or whether the consent of Congress is also required. Whether the United Nations must provide proper authority for war is not universally accepted, although commonly sought. War must be publicly announced secret wars are not permitted. In the Iraq war, there has been significant criticism that the United States did not seek the proper authority from the United Nations before proceeding to war, and to the extent that it did so, the authority was undermined by incomplete or false assertions that were made in obtaining that authority. Although unanimous Security Council approval was received to eliminate Iraq s weapons of mass destruction, the plans for regime change did not have such approval. (Mellow 2006) argues that even if the proper authority were not obtained, the war could still be moral if it were conducted to right grievous human rights indignities. 4. Last Resort. War must be the last resort, that is, all peaceful alternatives must be exhausted before a state resorts to violence. In particular, diplomatic negotiations must be exhausted. This requirement is difficult to assess, since once war commences it is impossible to know whether attempts to find peaceful alternatives were truly exhausted. Often situations must be brought to the brink of war before diplomatic solutions are accepted, yet the commencement of shock and awe tactics will end any chance of a peaceful negotiation. Opponents of the Iraq war argue that there was another alternative to war to deal with Iraq s possession of weapons of mass destruction to continue the UN inspection program. 4

6 5. Probability of Success. A state may not resort to war if doing so will not improve the situation. This is often a difficult rule to apply, since although military objectives may be easily attained, the ability to improve the situation may be less clear. International law does not include this requirement, because it could be applied against weak states with otherwise just causes(orend 2005). 6. Proportionality. The damage to be inflicted and the costs to be incurred must be proportionate to the good expected from the outcome of the war(nccb 1983). Most important in measuring the potential damage and costs is the lives of people, both combatants and innocents from both sides of the conflict. The military objective of removing Saddam Hussein from power was easily achieved. The unjust proportionality of the Iraq war lies in the failure to anticipate the enormous cost in treasure and lives that would be spent following the military victory. Defenders of the Iraq war argue that the history of brutality under the Saddam Hussein reign indicates that the number of civilian causalities under a continued Saddam Hussein reign could have been expected to be equal to, or greater than, that which has occurred as a result of the invasion and its aftermath.(mellow 2006) Jus in Bello Jus in bello deal with the conduct of war once it has commenced. Most of the principles of Jus in bello are incorporated in international treaties and other forms of international law. The rules have been designed for wars fought between uniformed armies, and applying them to today s conflicts and war on terrorism is often difficult. There are two primary principles traditionally accepted for jus in bello, and four additional principles that are widely accepted and incorporated in international laws. 1. Discrimination and Non-Combatant Immunity. Some scholars have suggested that Augustine neglected the plight of noncombatants in war. (Hartigan 1965) This could have been because one would not expect a just citizenry to be present in a state that conducts an unjust war. 5

7 Modern war tends to have more civilian than military casualties. To protect civilians soldiers are required to target only combatants. Some civilian casualties are unavoidable, but it is wrong to target civilians. With certain exceptions, American forces have not been accused of violating these rules. The enemy, however, has targeted civilians as its principle strategy. There are repeated suicide bombings in public places, and killings of civilians for no apparent reason other than their religious affiliation. Proportionality. Soldiers may only use force proportional to meet the objectives. The rule is intended to prevent unnecessary damage to property and lives by the excessive use of force. The results in Iraq indicate a need to reevaluate this rule, and that perhaps proportionality also requires the combatant to use sufficient force to make certain the objectives can be achieved with reasonable probability. The Bush administration has been criticized for deploying sufficient force to topple the Saddam Hussein regime, but inadequate force to secure the peace. In addition to these two traditional principles the following four jus in bello principles are commonly accepted: 1. Obey all international laws on weapons prohibition. The Iraq was started over allegations that it would use weapons of mass destruction, but these were not used, nor found 2. Benevolent quarantine for prisoners of war (POWs). Enemy soldiers who surrender or otherwise become captives are no longer engaged in harm. The Geneva Conventions provide rules for their treatment and ultimate exchange for one s own POW s. These rules are being applied with great difficulty in the war on terror. The alleged indefinite confinement and aggressive interrogation of enemy combatants is argued by some to be a violation of the principles of jus in bello. The treatment of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison was a clear violation of this rule. 6

8 3. No Means Mala in Se. Soldiers may not use weapons or methods which are evil in themselves. American forces have not been accused of violating this rule, but the use of suicide bombers to target civilian populations is a common strategy of the enemy. 4. No reprisals. Reprisals happen when one party breaks the rules to punish the other party for doing so. There have been a few incidents of reprisals with American forces in Iraq. The major problem in Iraq today is reprisals between Sunni and Shia. To a certain extent, jus in bello violations are to be expected in war. As Christians, we recognize that the sinfulness of humans makes consistent good behavior impossible. In general, American forces and their leaders appear to have performed well in meeting ethical standards in the conduct of war, with two major exceptions. First, the failure to commit sufficient force to secure Iraq and to make adequate plans for occupation once military victory was achieved was unethical. Secondly, the treatment of prisoners was and remains unethical. Prisoners must not be subject to torture and humiliation, and have a basic human right to challenge the basis of their detainment. The enemy has committed many violations of jus in bello principles, principally the targeting of innocent civilians and the practice of reprisals. Jus post bellum Just war theory has always had a component that deals with the post war stage of conflict jus post bellum. It is been much less developed than the ad bellum and in bello parts of the theory(rodin 2006). Jus post bellum would deal with justice after a war, covering such matters as peace treaties, war crimes trials, reparations and reconstruction. Brian Orend suggests the following principles for guidance: 1. Proportionality and Publicity. The peace settlement should be measured and reasonable, as well as publicly proclaimed. To make a settlement serve as an instrument of revenge is to make a volatile bed one may be forced to sleep in later. In general, this rules out insistence on unconditional surrender. 7

9 2. Rights Vindication. The settlement should secure those basic rights whose violation triggered the justified war. The relevant rights include human rights to life and liberty and community entitlements to territory and sovereignty. This is the main substantive goal of any decent settlement, ensuring that the war will actually have an improving affect. Respect for rights, after all, is a foundation of civilization, whether national or international. Vindicating rights, not vindictive revenge, is the order of the day. 3. Discrimination. Distinction needs to be made between the leaders, the soldiers, and the civilians in the defeated country one is negotiating with. Civilians are entitled to reasonable immunity from punitive post-war measures. This rules out sweeping socio-economic sanctions as part of post-war punishment. 4. Punishment #1. When the defeated country has been a blatant, rightsviolating aggressor, proportionate punishment must be meted out. The leaders of the regime, in particular, should face fair and public international trials for war crimes. 5. Punishment #2. Soldiers also commit war crimes. Justice after war requires that such soldiers, from all sides to the conflict, likewise be held accountable to investigation and possible trial. 6. Compensation. Financial restitution may be mandated, subject to both proportionality and discrimination. A post-war poll tax on civilians is generally impermissible, and there needs to be enough resources left so that the defeated country can begin its own reconstruction. To beggar thy neighbor is to pick future fights. 7. Rehabilitation. The post-war environment provides a promising opportunity to reform decrepit institutions in an aggressor regime. Such reforms are permissible but they must be proportional to the degree of depravity in the regime. They may involve: demilitarization and disarmament; police and judicial re-training; human rights education; and even deep structural transformation towards a minimally just society governed by a legitimate regime. This is, obviously, the most controversial aspect of jus post bellum.(orend 2005) A problem with Orend s principles is that they are extraordinarily difficult to apply to the conflicts of today. Wars today are not like the wars of the past, where uniformed soldiers fought for identifiable governments. It is arguably much easier to craft a just settlement to a war when the belligerents unconditionally surrender as happened at the 8

10 close of World War II. In the case of Iraq arguably all of the combatants have fought an unjust war, and the principles need to be applied mutatis mutandis. Rear Admiral Louis V. Iasiello, a Navy Chaplain, has developed a framework for jus post bellum that is focused on developing a healing mindset (Iasiello 2004). He points out that defeat carries with it a trauma that is experienced on many levels, personal familial, communal, societal, national and international. It would be constructive if all parties entered into the post-conflict stage in a spirit of regret, conciliation, humility, and possibly contrition. Such a mind-set may further the healing of a nation s trauma and thus enhance efforts to seal a just peace (Iasiello 2004). Isaiello sets forth three phases to a just restoration: Phase One: Protectorship. This phase is marked by efforts to provide security for both the occupying force and the defeated society. Phase Two: Partnership. At this phase, all sides work together to rebuild the defeated society. Iasiello indicates that by the time the transition to this phase takes place, the parties should enjoy some meaningful level of trust and goodwill. Phase Three: Ownership. This phase marks the final stage in the just restoration of a nation the return of its sovereignty and reentry into the community of nations. Iasiello s conceptual framework of developing a healing mindset is sound and his observation about the need for a spirit of regret, conciliation, humility, and possibly contrition has great application in the Iraq situation. His three-phase framework might have worked if phase one had been accomplished and in the process some level of trust and goodwill between the United States and Iraq had developed. The spirit of repentance that underpins his framework was simply not present on any side of this conflict. 9

11 (Williams and Caldwell 2006) argue that we cannot conclude that a post-war condition is just or unjust; we may have to acknowledge that there are only degrees of justice and injustice in the aftermath of war..accordingly, they base their jus post bellum principle on the foundation that a just peace must vindicate the human rights of all parties to the conflict. That involves securing the rights of those the intervention was supposed to assist, as well as respecting the rights of those in the aggressor state. The framework for this process is similar to that constructed by other scholars: 1. Restore Order 2. Economic Reconstruction 3. Restoration of Sovereignty and Self-determination 4. Punishment of Human Rights Violations (Stassen 1992) does not specifically address jus post bellum in his theory of Just Peacemaking that mediates between just war tradition and pacifism. Stassen roots his theory in the Sermon on the Mount. Just Peacemaking involves seven steps: 1. Affirm common security partnerships with our adversaries and build an order of peace and justice that affirms their and our valid interests. 2. Take Independent Initiatives directed towards transforming the reaction of the adversary. 3. Talk with your enemy; seek negotiations, using methods of conflict resolution. 4. Seek human rights and justice for all, especially the powerless, without double standards. 5. Realistically acknowledge the vicious cycles we are caught up in, and our need to participate in a realistic peacemaking process. 6. Instead of judgmental propaganda, we can acknowledge to others that we have caused hurt and want to take actions to do better. 7. Participate in groups with accurate information and a voice in policymaking(stassen 1992). A Lutheran Jus Post Bellum Article XVI of the Augsburg Confession, which declares that "Christians may without sin...engage in just war, serve as soldiers..." reflects the church's understanding of war. Just war tradition set forth the criteria a particular war should be judged as just, 10

12 with the reminder that these criteria were "understood not as justifying war per se but as giving criteria by which to evaluate the justice or injustice of a particular war."(alc 1966) Just war theory for Lutherans has always been rooted in Luther s theology of the two kingdoms. It reflects a tension between Christ s rejection of violence in the Sermon on the Mount and those passages in Scripture that admonished obedience to secular governments (Romans 13:1-2; 1 Peter 2:13-14)(Johnson 2003). Luther s left hand, or temporal kingdom, is the means by which God orders the earthly world. The right hand, or spiritual kingdom, is how God orders his spiritual kingdom. (Stassen 1992) argues that Lutheran s (and Catholics) traditionally have fenced off the Sermon on the Mount as applicable only to one realm and not authoritative in normal life and society. Stassen s argument misunderstands Luther s two kingdoms. A better understanding comes from Luther s seemingly contradictory claims on Christian freedom: A Christian is a perfectly free lord of all, subject to none. A Christian is a perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all?(luther 1990) While a Christian becomes free because of God s grace in the right hand kingdom, the riches of freedom must grow with the person through his life on earth and beyond in both the left and right hand kingdoms. The single occupation of a Christian is to grow in love of Christ: The inner man, who by faith is created in the image of God, is both joyful and happy because of Christ in whom so many benefits have been conferred upon him; and therefore it is his one occupation to serve God joyfully, and without thought of gain, in love, that is not constrained (Luther 1990 p. 294) It is from this point that good works proceed. Good works do not make a good man, but a good man does good works. (Luther 1990) A Christian lives not in himself, but in Christ and in his neighbor. Luther tells everyone should put on his neighbor and so conduct himself towards him as if he himself were in the other s place (Luther 1990 p. 309) That is what Christ has done for us. Jesus set the example of what we should do with our freedom, and that example is found in the Sermon on the Mount. Christians recognize both the goodness and limits of earthly peace. Earthly peace is not the same as the promised peace of God s present and future eternal reign (ELCA 11

13 2004). Earthly peace is often fleeting and always partial. We must always be cognizant of the persistent, pervasive, and subtle power of sin. Applying Jus Post Bellum to Iraq -Principles for a Just Withdrawal The political debate over Iraq has become so polarized that the discussion has lost touch with reality. All sides to the debate have become so focused on advancing their own positions that they are unwilling to find common ground. The first step in finding just cause for a withdrawal strategy is to develop a war termination vision. That vision will establish the right reasons for ending the war, and end the judgmental propaganda that has poisoned any attempt at a reasoned and just approach. We must recognize that no solution to the situation in Iraq should be expected to result in total security. Those who seek to do so are likely to become agents of arrogant pride and the injustice and insecurity that flow from pride. If they are to secure freedom for vulnerable people, governments must recognize their limits in providing security (ELCA 1995). Just cause and Right Intention The foremost objective in any just withdrawal must be the restoration of human rights. A decision on whether to stay, to escalate, or withdraw must have as its primary objective the restoration of human rights of the victims of the war. Actions to terminate the war, or to continue the war are just only if the actions have as their primary purpose the restorations of the human rights of the victims. Classical just war theory assumes a clear distinction between the victims of war and the oppressors. The arguments for the war point to the victims being the American public (and by extension the world s people) and the Iraqi people, with the aggressor being the Saddam Hussein regime. The unfolding of the war has identified more potential aggressors the Bush Administration and Sunni and Shiite militias. A just war termination vision would look to restore the human rights of all participants from injustice from any of these aggressors. The complexity of this puzzle will make it a very difficult problem to solve. 12

14 The restoration of human rights is a process of healing. Healing can be start with repentance. Americans can start the process of healing by acknowledging that we have caused harm in Iraq and that we sincerely want to do things that will make the situation better. Unacknowledged guilt is not merely a moral sin but also, objectively seen, a powerful barrier to reconciliation (Stassen 1992 p.107). The first step to take here is to end the judgmental propaganda that poisons the dialog. The present dialog has become a battle of slogans. While they may have political effectiveness in their simplicity and appeal to base groups, they encourage serious misrepresentation of reality. The umbrella slogan of the War on Terror is often invoked to discredit any attempt to disagree with Administration policies. Other arguments misstate the issue Support the troops is used to justify continued escalation in Iraq, as if the only way to support troops is to engage them in combat. While the rules of proportionality clearly place a moral obligation to give military forces sufficient resources to defend themselves and achieve the just objectives, there can be no moral obligation to continue an unjust war. Lives may have been sacrificed for an unjust cause, but continuing a conflict so that those lives are not lost in vain is immoral because the loss of lives in an unjust cause is in vain. A common argument of the Bush administration and its allies is that we can either fight them there or fight them here. The logic of that statement is questionable. Do we really expect that we will defeat the terrorists in Iraq to the point where they are incapable of mounting a terrorist attack In the United States? Even if the statement is accurate, is it moral to make the decision where to fight? Wherever the war is fought there will be innocent civilian casualties. Deciding to fight terrorists in Iraq means that Iraqi civilians are being valued less than American civilians. Do we have the right to make that decision in our obvious self-interest? The decision on how and when to begin a withdrawal is significantly contentious. Those who favor withdrawal have been accused of cutting and running following a cowardly and disgraceful plan for exit. Others fear the consequences of a withdrawal: 13

15 If when we go, we leave behind nothing but a failed state and chaos, the consequences will be disastrous for the region and for America s position in the world.(kissinger 2005) We must be careful as we consider options that we make certain our intentions are moral. Complacency and wishful thinking endanger peace; pride and self-righteousness endanger peace as well (ELCA 2004). A decision to continue the conflict should not be made for reasons of pride or protecting one s legacy. Some have argued that we must stay until we win in order to maintain America s status in the world. Defeat would shrivel American credibility around the world (Kissinger 2005). To the extent that sustained American power and credibility will lead to future peace in the world, this argument may have moral traction. However, the potential rooting of this argument in pride and self-righteousness should make us very cautious about its application. Proper Authority Should the United States alone make the decision on when to end the war? I believe that because the United States relied on the United Nations to justify the war, they are obligated to seek the guidance of the United Nations in ending it. Many American s view U.S. participation in the UN as a waste of time, and a erosion of American sovereignty. The United Nations remains the best chance for providing proper authority for just war decisions, and the United States should make every effort to make it effective. In any event, a unilateral decision on Iraq would be wrong. The United States should involve regional countries and the Iraqi sects in the decision as was recommended by the Iraq Study Group. Glen Stassen s Just Peacemaking step of talking to the enemy, seeking negotiations, and using methods of conflict resolution (Stassen 1992) appears to be appropriate. Underpinning American authority for participation in the peacemaking process should be the willingness to seek accountability for all who have committed violations of just war principles. Ideally this would be conducted under international authority, such as by The Hague Court. However, this would likely prove extremely divisive within the United States, possibly to the extent of jeopardizing other important international 14

16 initiatives. According, the best course of action may be for the United States to conduct a thorough and transparent review of American conduct of the war, starting with the decision to go to war. Based on the seriousness of any violations that are found, appropriate penalties should be imposed. In part this process began with the 2006 Congressional elections where certain Congressmen were punished by being turned out of office. Potential for Success Actions that are taken to end the war must be first assessed for the probability of their success. Actions must not be taken if they do not increase to possibility of peace. This will often be very difficult to assess. However, the difficulty in assessing the potential of alternatives does not justify maintaining the status quo, particularly where the status quo is likely to not result in peace. Any solution to the problem in Iraq will likely involve considerable risk, and an objective analysis of the potential for success of alternatives is necessary. Proportionality One major criticism of the conduct of the war in Iraq is that inadequate force was used to secure the peace. According to the Cato Institute, this is the first war in the history of the world that was accompanied by a tax cut. Peace in Iraq is likely to be a long, expensive undertaking, and it is important that the expenditure is adequate to do the job. The issue of financing the war and reconstruction must be addressed, since the present approach puts an unfair burden on future American generations. The sharing of costs between Iraq and the United States should be determined under the oversight of the United Nations. The most serious question of proportionality may be determining whether the certainty of the present situation creates proportionally more risk than the possibility of genocide upon withdrawal. Last resort The just war doctrine of last resort leads to the conclusion that every action which puts more lives at risk must be taken only if it is the last resort for peace. Our objective in 15

17 winding down the war must be based principally on avoiding further harm. Every decision to escalate or continue the war must be based on this principle. That means we need to establish clear objectives for our actions, and have benchmarks against which our actions can be measured. The current debate between Congress and the Bush Administration is a prime example of the need for this concept. A decision to continue the war without objectives and benchmarks fails to measure whether these actions are the last resort. Simply committing to a fixed withdrawal schedule fails to determine whether that action is the last resort for peace. Setting objectives, and measuring and holding people accountable for the achievement of those objectives, is a necessary step in guiding a just withdrawal. Some would argue that a withdrawal of American forces should be our last resort. If we are certain that genocide would be the result of withdrawal then withdrawal should be our last resort. We must, however, not allow this thinking to lock us into an unlimited commitment to war. We must always be testing alternatives, and testing our assumptions about the consequences of those alternatives. Summary There is little question today that Iraq did not pose a clear and present danger to the United States when the war began in 2003, but there is little question that it is now a serious and imminent threat to America. This threat will be difficult to defend against. Serious damage has been done to American credibility and power in the world. The American military has been stressed and may be unable to effectively serve its role in world peace. The American public has been polarized, and serious damage has been inflicted on the constitution. Iraq has been devastated, and the entire Middle East is much more dangerous today than it was in Resources have been diverted from the war against terrorism, and the United States is less safe. There will be no easy solution to these problems. America has a moral commitment to a just withdrawal from Iraq. Our actions in withdrawal must meet the criteria of just war theory most significantly we take actions that will lead to healing 16

18 healing of relationships between Iraqis, between Americans, between the United States and the international community, and between Islam and Christianity. Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of God. (Matthew 5:9) 17

19 References ALC. War, Peace and Freedom. American Lutheran Church 1966 [cited. Available from Bush, George W. Message to the Iraqi People 2003 [cited. Available from Carter, Jimmy Just War -- or a Just War? New York Times, March 9, ELCA. For Peace in God's World. Evangelical Lutheran Church in America 1995 [cited. Available from Living in a Time of Terrorism. Evangelical Lutheran Church in America 2004 [cited. Available from Hansen, Mark S. Statement from Presiding Bishop Mark Hanson in response to U.S. preemptive military strike on Iraq 2003 [cited. Available from A Call to Conversation on Iraq. Evangelical Lutheran Church in America 2007 [cited April 1, ]. Available from Hartigan, Richard S Saint Augustine on War and Killing: The Problem of the Innocent. Journal of the History of Ideas 23 (1): Iasiello, Louis V Jus Post Bellum: The Moral Responsibilities of Victors in War. Naval War College Review 57 (3/4). Johnson, John F Can War Be Just? The Lutheran Witness 122 (1). Kissinger, Henry A Moving Toward a Responsible Exit Strategy. San Diego Union Tribune, December 11, Luther, Martin, ed Freedom of a Christian, Three Treatises. Philadelphia: Augsburg Fortress Press. Mellow, David Iraq: A Morally Justified Resort to War. Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (3): NCCB The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response. A Pastoral Letter on War and Peace by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference. Orend, Brian. War (Winter 2005) 2005 [cited. Available from Rodin, David The Ethics of War: State of the Art. Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (3): Stassen, Glen H Just Peacemaking: Transforming Initiatives for Justice and Peace. Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John Knox Press. Stiltner, Brian The Justice of War on Iraq. Journal of Lutheran Ethics 3 (6). Walzer, Michael Just and Unjust Wars. 3rd ed. New York: Basic Books. Watt, Alan J Which Approach? Late Twentieth-Century Interpretations of Augustine's Views on War. Journal of Church & State 46 (1): Weigel, George Just War and Iraq Wars. First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion & Public Life (172): Williams, Robert E. Jr., and Dan Caldwell Jus Post Bellum: Just War Theory and the Principles of Just Peace. International Studies Perspectives 7 (4):