The Solomon Islands: The UN and Intervention by Coalitions of the Willing

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1 The Solomon Islands: The UN and Intervention by Coalitions of the Willing RICHARD PONZIO The article examines the reasons behind the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) and Australia s reluctance to collaborate directly with UN agencies there. In reviewing the RAMSI s activities, special emphasis is afforded to its relationship with the UN Development Programme (the lead UN body in the Solomon Islands). Policy recommendations are advanced for facilitating conditions in the provision of external assistance whereby both a beneficiary country and a regional hegemon can benefit from active cooperation with the UN system (based on principle and performance instead of political convenience). Guiding principles include the need to: (1) identify and support, politically and financially, the comparative strengths of the UN system and other external assistance providers; and (2) involve local leaders in decision-making and coordination of reconstruction assistance. The recommendations seek to provide a framework for future UN system collaboration with regional and global arrangements involved in the reconstruction of war-torn societies. From 1998 to 2000, weak governing institutions, land disputes and population pressures, combined with the spread of illegal weapons, fuelled violent conflict in the Solomon Islands, particularly on the islands of Malaita and Guadalcanal. After more than two years of violence and material destruction, the Australianbrokered Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) was signed in October 2000 to halt hostilities. Mixed success in implementing the peace agreement contributed to a slow, often tenuous, improvement in the country s law and order situation. With the expiration of the TPA in October 2002, peace remained fragile, as many key elements of the ambitious agreement required renewed attention, including weapons collection, land dispute settlement, devolution of certain powers to the provinces and support for displaced persons and other conflictaffected groups. On 24 July 2003, at the invitation of the SI Government and following an endorsement from the Pacific Islands Forum (and later the UN Secretary- General), the initial contingent of a 2,300-strong Australian-led military and police force arrived in the capital, Honiara. Known as the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), its principal objective was to establish security in Honiara to help the government and civilians operate free of armed intimidation. 1 With personnel drawn from states across the Pacific, the mission was the biggest military deployment in the South Pacific since the Second World War. 2 Through an examination of the RAMSI s efforts to deal with the unfinished business of the TPA and sources of sustained human insecurity in the Solomon International Peacekeeping, Vol.12, No.2, Summer 2005, pp ISSN print= x online DOI: = # 2005 Taylor & Francis Ltd.

2 174 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING Islands, this article sheds light on new approaches to, and an expanding rationale for, intervention. With special reference to the RAMSI s reluctance to engage the UN system, in spite of its peacebuilding experience, in the planning and execution of its mission, the study also highlights the UN s difficulties in influencing the actions of a regional hegemon committed to leading a coalition of the willing. In a growing number of post-war environments, the UN s relevance may depend on its ability to adapt and cooperate creatively with regional and global responses to state failure initiated outside the UN framework. Origins of the Conflict and the UN Response (1998 to mid-2003) In April 1998, armed groups of Guadalcanal youths, angry about perceived government inaction in addressing their people s grievances, engaged in activities that resulted in the forceful eviction from Guadalcanal of settlers from other islands, especially Malaitan settlers, and the displacement of thousands of Solomon Islanders. The crisis reached its height when the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF), an ethnic militia that included large segments of the security force, raided the police armoury in Honiara on 5 June 2000, established a joint operation with members of the Royal Solomon Islands Police, and, subsequently, overthrew the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa alu. Following a ceasefire agreement on 2 August 2000, the TPA of 15 October 2000 outlined a package of steps to rehabilitate the Solomon Islands and address some of the underlying sources of the conflict. 3 This included measures to demilitarize the warring factions, promote reconciliation, facilitate greater political autonomy for the two provinces of Malaita and Guadalcanal, and help the many Solomon Islanders who were displaced, lost family members and saw their property damaged or stolen. Prior to the conflict, the Solomon Islands had made slow, yet marked, improvements in health, education and public infrastructure. The conflict resulted in extensive loss of life and property, setting back the gains of a government reform programme and severely disrupting the delivery of education, health and other basic services. Violations of human rights were widespread. 4 By 2001, total internal displacement had risen to over 35,000, and the gross domestic product which had already slipped from US $71 million to US $57 million from 1998 to 2000 contracted another 24 per cent between 2000 and Causes and Continuation of Criminal Behaviour and Poor Governance After the TPA, the Solomon Islands conflict moved from skirmishes in rural Guadalcanal to a battle for control of government resources (through, for example, a compensation payment scheme) and key government institutions, including the police. Indiscriminate violence and criminal activity remained rampant in the provinces of Guadalcanal and Malaita, hampering efforts to restore peace, promote reconciliation and undertake steps toward economic and social recovery. Parts of the country, particularly on Guadalcanal, became de facto no-go areas for specific groups. Poor national governance, widespread mistrust (among but also within major ethnic groups), and the perception of a high level of inequality

3 THE SOLOMON ISLANDS: UN AND INTERVENTION 175 FIGURE 1 THE SOLOMAN ISLANDS Source: Map courtesy of used with permission. between people in Honiara and the provinces intensified calls for devolution and, in some provinces, secession. Addressing some of the fundamental structural problems confronting the Solomon Islands requires analysis of the chief issues through a governance and conflict prevention lens. Although apparently an ethnic feud, a closer examination of the conflict reveals that it stemmed more from the struggle for scarce and poorly-managed resources, whose ownership was previously vested in the clan, tribe or line. With the arrival on resource-rich Guadalcanal of increasing numbers of migrant workers in the 1990s, resentment grew among the island s native settlers and violence erupted. Response to the uneven development patterns and perceived mal-distribution of public resources necessitated far-reaching governance reforms to engage politically, socially and economically marginalized groups and tap traditional means of resolving disputes. Instead, superficial reconciliation ceremonies, between and within major ethnic groups, represented the most visible activity in the peace process between the signing of the TPA and the arrival of RAMSI in mid Consequently, the government, along with international partners, failed to implement effectively many key sections of the TPA, including Part 4, Socio- Economic Issues. This resulted in the absence of essential social services and basic public infrastructure for non-combatants. The mismanagement and politicization of the government s Lost and Damaged Properties Claims scheme also served to reinforce the continued influence of armed youths and the breakdown of law and order. As a result, donors felt disinclined, from 2001 until the latter

4 176 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING half of 2003, to invest seriously in long-term social and economic reconstruction projects. UN Opportunities Lost and Found Through regional hubs in Fiji and Samoa, many UN agencies have delivered direct development assistance to the Solomon Islands since the country s independence in When the escalating ethnic tensions of the 1990s erupted into largescale violence in 1998, the only UN organizations with a permanent presence were the UN Children s Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP). At the SI Donor Meeting, held in Sydney in August 2000, and the UNDP-sponsored SI Expert Group Meeting, held in Brisbane in October 2000, it was agreed that the UNDP would lead and coordinate donor efforts to assist the government in a reintegration, rehabilitation and development programme. In April 2001, the UNDP and the government presented a comprehensive Community Reconciliation and Reintegration Programme to the donor community. With insufficient funds pledged to start implementation, another year would pass before the provision of urgent UNDP rehabilitation assistance commenced. Starting in mid-2002, with support from Australia, New Zealand, the UK and the Japanese-funded UN Human Security Trust Fund (and later from the EU), the UNDP launched nine new projects, totalling US $4,295,000. They were grouped into three categories: (1) Reintegration and Rehabilitation of Conflict-Affected Groups (including the demobilization and reintegration of the special constables/former combatants, and two large public works projects); (2) Democratic Institution-Building (including projects on constitutional reform and local governance capacity-building); and (3) Peacebuilding and Conflict- Prevention (including support for the National Peace Council s Weapons Free Village Campaign ). In response to the Prime Minister s two requests to the UN in September 2002 for international assistance to enhance the government s efforts to reduce ethnic tension and stop the violence, Kofi Annan sent a Department of Political Affairs-led inter-agency mission to the Solomon Islands. Fielded October 2002, the mission sought to formulate proposals for the UN system in the areas of reconciliation, weapons collection and reform in the security sector, including proposals that could build upon and expand on the local activities already undertaken by the UN agencies. 6 A Framework for Coordination was subsequently prepared and shared with members of the Security Council in New York. It recommended the establishment of a UN Peacebuilding Office in Honiara and the recruitment of a civilian police (CIVPOL) contingent to serve directly in the Royal Solomon Islands Police. 7 By March 2003, with the war in Iraq absorbing the world s attention and the Solomon Islands recognition of Taiwan likely to elicit a Chinese veto in any Security Council vote for increased UN assistance, 8 the government rescinded its formal requests. A month later, the Prime Minister formally sought Australia s support in addressing the governance and security problems besetting the Islands.

5 THE SOLOMON ISLANDS: UN AND INTERVENTION 177 RAMSI: A New Type of Intervention Force? Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect. 9 This core principle of state responsibility to protect civilians, and the conditions under which humanitarian intervention by an external force is warranted, have slowly gained international recognition, particularly after the cold war. They help provide the basis for international peacebuilders to assist governments in responding to a range of threats to human security, such as state collapse and the proliferation and use of small arms. Australia had rejected invitations from two previous governments in the Solomon Islands to intervene militarily (both prior to and following the coup d état of June 2000). 10 What, then, motivated the Australian government to respond favourably to the formal request of 22 April 2003, by the SI Prime Minister Sir Allan Kemakeza, to intervene with troops and police? Some observers attribute Australia s sudden change of policy in the South Pacific to its participation in the previous weeks swift and casualty-free military victory in Iraq, alongside the United States and the United Kingdom, and its newfound appetite for regional order building, reinforced by US encouragement for Australia to patrol its own backyard. 11 Australia s decision should also be viewed as a direct response to the humanitarian principles of the Biketawa Declaration, agreed on 28 October 2000 by the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). Pushing the Frontiers of Intervention Unprecedented in endorsing the intervention of PIF members in the internal affairs of another member state, the Biketawa Declaration recognizes: the need, in time of crisis or in response to members request for assistance, for action to be taken on the basis of all members of the Forum being part of the Pacific Islands extended family. The Forum must constructively address difficult and sensitive issues including underlying causes of tensions and conflict (ethnicity, socio-economic disparities, lack of good governance, land disputes and erosion of cultural values). 12 Although Australia regularly invoked the Biketawa Declaration, particularly on 30 June 2003 when the PIF foreign ministers unanimously endorsed the proposed Australian-led intervention force, all actions leading to the establishment of the RAMSI were initiated through Canberra rather than as envisaged by the Declaration through Suva, the seat of the PIF Secretariat led by a secretary-general. Moreover, leading proponents of the RAMSI within the Australian government expressed unease about involving the UN or seeking a Security Council mandate, causing some observers to question Canberra s motives behind its policy shift towards the Solomon Islands and wider South Pacific. 13

6 178 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING In a direct critique of the UN, the Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, stated: We ve got to recognise that the multilateral system does have its limits. And there have been occasions, I m afraid, when the UN has been unable to deal with crises in Rwanda, in Kosovo, quite a long list of missed opportunities by the UN. And the case of the Solomons, it would just be too difficult to get the UN to solve this problem. We ll have to do it ourselves, with a coalition of other countries. 14 In response to criticism by the media, opposition members, and major partners in the RAMSI such as New Zealand, who were concerned that the UN might be altogether by-passed and international legal norms circumvented, Downer soon refrained from any further anti-un rhetoric. To be sure, Australia assembled a multinational coalition, through the PIF to both legitimize and contribute personnel and material assistance to the RAMSI. 15 Furthermore, the Howard government sought and received a formal endorsement of the Australian-led intervention through the enactment of detailed legislation by the SI Parliament that included immunity for all military and other personnel serving in the mission. Finally, in accordance with Article 54 of the UN Charter, 16 the PIF informed the Chair of the UN Security Council, on 22 July 2003, about the mandate and proposed activities of the mission that were scheduled to commence two days later. Extending beyond the justification for intervention in recent conflicts such as Kosovo and East Timor, the mandate of the RAMSI sets a new precedent for external intervention by establishing as its chief priority: to reinforce and uphold the legitimate institutions and authorities in the Solomon Islands, and to ensure respect for the country s constitution and implementation of its laws. The commonly held view among leading policy-makers in Canberra at the time was that the Solomon Islands was on the verge of complete collapse, making it fertile territory for a range of illicit activities, including Al-Qaeda style terrorism that could threaten Australia and its Pacific neighbours. 17 According to an influential report released by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, the SI Government had become effectively paralysed by 2003, and a shadow state has emerged in the Solomon Islands a patronage system centred on the ruling cabal s control over resources. The state has been gutted from the inside, and the parliament largely serves as an avenue for access to dwindling resources by political players. 18 Essentially a policing operation in its first six months with military back-up to restore basic law and order in the Solomon Islands during its first phase, the RAMSI arguably broke new ground in lowering the threshold for intervention in the indisputably internal affairs of a sovereign state (albeit through a formal request by the state in question). Specifically, from July to December 2003, the mission concentrated its efforts on weapons collection, apprehending militant leaders and criminals, and strengthening the police force (including the termination of under-performing and criminal elements within the police force). To a degree not witnessed in international peacekeeping, insidious levels of crime,

7 THE SOLOMON ISLANDS: UN AND INTERVENTION 179 corruption and poor governance had become a primary impetus for external intervention, rather than a large humanitarian crisis which did not exist in the Solomons. In 2004, the focus of the RAMSI shifted to longer-term state-building issues, including economic reform, improving the machinery of government and strengthening accountability and judicial mechanisms. A significant expansion in development assistance got underway, accompanied by a military draw-down. The overall strategy of the mission incorporated a comprehensive approach: law and order (which includes several aspects: weapons, general crime, abuses of power, corruption); government legal structures (prison, judiciary, and legal officers); and government finances (budget, revenue and broader economic reform). 19 Under this mandate members of the international community lent support to the mission. The Security Council President, Fayssal Mekdad (Syria), expressed the hope that this important regional initiative will quickly lead to the restoration of normalcy and national harmony in the Solomon Islands. 20 Although short of a UN Security Council endorsement in the form of a resolution (that China would probably have blocked as noted above), Mekdad s statement represented an important milestone in establishing legitimacy for the RAMSI and justification for intervention. RAMSI s Structure, Resources, and Early Achievements The RAMSI was led by a Special Coordinator (an Australian), and at its height from mid- to late-2003, it comprised 325 police officers and a military component of some 1,800 personnel. Although New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Vanuatu, Kiribati, the Cook Islands, Nauru and Tonga contributed small numbers of police and/or military personnel to the initiative, the RAMSI was an Australian dominated mission. Australia sent 1,500 defence personnel, 155 Federal Police and 80 members of the Australian Protective Services, and had complete operational control over the policing and military components. By far the majority of the 80 RAMSI civilian staff, placed in the key economic ministries and within the law and justice sector institutions, are Australian. 21 Australia contributed A $200 million (US $138 million) during the 2003/2004 financial year. 22 For the 2004/2005 financial year, Australia committed an additional A $200 million for the RAMSI related activities, including over A $44 million (US $30 million) in direct development aid, dwarfing the committed contributions by the EU, Taiwan, Japan, New Zealand and the UN agencies. 23 Shortly after establishing its presence, the RAMSI became, in many ways, a quasi-transitional administration, involved deeply in both short-term law and order concerns and longer-term structural economic and political reforms. 24 In a remarkably short period of time, the RAMSI was credited with:. Disarming the militants and removing roughly 3,700 weapons from circulation (many of them high-powered weapons stolen from police armouries), through an amnesty in August The surrender of Weathercoast militant leader, Harold Keke, and arrest of other criminals and former militants, including Jimmy Rasta and Andrew

8 180 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING Te e. By March 2004, the RAMSI had succeeded in arresting over 50 former militants in Guadalcanal and Malaita, many for violent crimes against citizens, involving mass murder, abduction, rape and robbery. 26. Progress in purging the Royal Solomon Islands Police. Investigations revealed that in recent years police had received more than US $8.5 million in the form of unauthorized allowances and other illegal payments. 27 RAMSI oversaw the arrest of over 75 police officers and the firing of more than 400. As the RAMSI moves to longer-term state-building issues, including far-reaching economic and governance reforms, it faces a range of new challenges that test its central government, capital-centric approach to peacebuilding and reconstruction. Increasingly, prominent Solomon Islanders express the view that more attention and resources need to be channelled to rural communities and young people. 28 These areas require a long-term commitment by experienced postconflict recovery specialists, who recognize that development and reconstruction projects can both reinforce and undermine a peace process. The question then arises: to what extent will the Australian-led intervention force see the value over time in partnering and supporting directly the work of other long-term, development assistance actors? Australian UN Relations in the Solomon Islands If a hegemonic power is understood to mean a country that exercises dominant authority over a country or group of countries, then the relationship between Australia and the Solomon Islands resembles that of one state exercising hegemony over another. 29 At the same time, the rationale for the Australian-led intervention was at least partially based on concerns about the human security impact of further state collapse. In this respect, the UN faces a moral imperative to cooperate with the RAMSI to ameliorate the current situation. Nevertheless, if the UN system seeks to remain a relevant peacebuilding and reconstruction actor in the Solomon Islands, it must ensure that its relationship with Australia is built on principle and the quality of its performance rather than political convenience. The Pendulum of Australian UN System Relations As noted earlier, although the UNDP was to lead and coordinate donor efforts to assist the Solomon Islands in a reintegration, rehabilitation and development programme following the signing of the TPA, funds were not forthcoming from the Australians or other donors until the middle of Given that the UN was not offered a seat at the table in Townsville (as it had been during the Lincoln Peace Talks concerning the conflict in neighbouring Bougainville), a perception permeated across the UN system and particularly in the UNDP that the Australians were uncomfortable with the UN and its agencies assuming a leadership role in any peacebuilding or reconstruction activities. 31 To be sure, this viewpoint was complicated by the UN system s inability to promote its capabilities in responding to violent conflicts and its inability to fully understand Australia s multiple interests in the Solomon Islands.

9 THE SOLOMON ISLANDS: UN AND INTERVENTION 181 From late 2000 until early 2002, the UNDP provided the Chief Technical Advisor to the then Ministry of National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace, a key government ministry charged with overseeing the implementation of the TPA, particularly through the coordination of assistance for conflict-affected communities. However, Australia opted to channel a large portion of its reconstruction assistance directly (with limited government input) through its Community Peace and Restoration Fund. Further, the Australian backed International Peace Monitoring Team and Peace Monitoring Council resisted any attempts to be guided in their peace agreement implementation activities by the government or to be responsive to measures advocated by the UN and its agencies. 32 When it became clear by mid-2002 that the peace process had begun to stall as serious threats persisted, Australia discontinued its support for the International Peace Monitoring Team and turned increasing attention to alternative forms of assistance, including political and financial support for the UN system. This was demonstrated most visibly through Australia s backing of UNDP support to the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, as well as albeit only initially the UNDP s assistance to the government s constitutional reform process. Moreover, Australia welcomed the SI government s call for increased UN assistance in September 2002 and encouraged the UNDP, in late 2002, to provide technical and financial support to the National Peace Council (the successor body to the Australian funded Peace Monitoring Council). Why the sudden change in Australia UN relations? Given Australia s reluctance to encourage a sizeable role for the UN system at the height of the crisis and immediately following the TPA s signature, it subsequently became expedient for Australia to support greater UN involvement. The Islands proximity meant that Australia had an interest in averting state collapse. With the arrival of the RAMSI in July 2003 and Australia s efforts to increase its bilateral aid programme while providing the UNDP with only very limited support, the UN was clearly being marginalized. 33 But for a short period between 2002 and mid-2003, it suited Australia for UN bodies such as the UNDP to assume some of the more risky tasks so that the Australian government could reduce its exposure to future setbacks. This reinforced the perception that Australian UN system relations were built mainly on political convenience. Besides the issues of control and Australian scepticism towards the UN system s ability to manage crises, part of the problem in the relationship was a divergence at least initially about the nature of the conflict. The Australianbrokered peace agreement, for example, referred to the victims of ethnic unrest and the need to restore ethnic harmony. 34 But it is naïve and potentially dangerous for would-be peacemakers to view the conflict solely through the lens of inter-ethnic hostility. With hundreds of tribal groups and small clans, known as wantoks, the concept of larger ethnic loyalties is almost as foreign and artificial as the notion of the state. 35 Ethnicity constructions diverted attention from the core issues of land tenure, economic development and more decentralized and accountable governance that underpinned the protests all referenced in UN documentation from the late 1990s. Continuing to treat the problem as primarily an ethnic conflict reinforced and legitimized the politicized

10 182 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING identities created through violence and could, consequently, compromise peacebuilding efforts. 36 Opportunities for Renewed Collaboration Several opportunities exist for future cooperation between Australia and the UN system at the policy and programmatic levels. In terms of policy, the National Economic Recovery, Reform and Development Plan (prepared by a UNDP technical adviser following extensive consultations and endorsed at a donors meeting in November 2003) reflects the priorities of multiple actors on a broad set of development and peacebuilding issues that are now fundamental to guiding legislation, budget-making and public sector programming. Moving beyond the now stable law and order situation, RAMSI s growing attention to economic revitalization and government restructuring are welcomed developments. But the UN and its agencies also have considerable experience and technical knowledge to offer in these areas, drawing on the world body s expertise in managing transitions in a sensitive manner, aid management and coordination, and adopting integrated recovery strategies that link governance and economic reform to poverty reduction and conflict prevention. Other comparative strengths of the UN system include addressing the gender gap in peacebuilding and reconstruction, and aligning national with provincial and local policy concerns (building on its extensive networks in the nine provinces of the Solomon Islands and reputation as an impartial actor). Similarly, for programming, the UNDP and other UN agencies have shown in the Solomon Islands and other societies recovering from violent conflict that they can manage politically sensitive and technically challenging areas, such as the rehabilitation of former militants and constitutional reform. On complex issues of land reform, the devolution of certain powers to the provinces, and creating new opportunities for conflict-affected youth, Australia and its regional mission should capitalize on the UN system s perceived neutrality, trust established among many key national and local actors, and skill in promoting reconciliation and dialogue that are essential to addressing the sources of conflict. In order to avoid undermining capacity and contributing to conflict cycles, the development assistance managed by the RAMSI would further benefit from UN peace and conflict development analysis. But the Australian UN system relationship will only overcome past difficulties if rooted in a mutual respect for each other s relative capacities and commonly agreed principles as outlined in the next section. Coalition UN cooperation in War-torn Societies: Policy Lessons from the South Pacific Prior to the emergence of the notion of coalitions of the willing or military operations led by a regional or global power outside of the UN structure, UN peacekeeping had already started to transform itself in a similar direction, following disastrous ventures in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda in the early- to mid- 1990s. Labelled by some scholars as fifth generation peacekeeping, peacekeeping was increasingly undertaken, beginning in the mid-1990s, by a single power or

11 THE SOLOMON ISLANDS: UN AND INTERVENTION 183 ad hoc multilateral coalitions, authorized by the UN Security Council. 37 As illustrated by the US in Haiti, France in Rwanda, Russia in Georgia, and NATO in Bosnia, military intervention is pursued only when and where the national interests of major powers are engaged. 38 If sixth generation peacekeeping involves state-making for a transitional period (as in Kosovo and East Timor), then coalitions of the willing combine the key attributes of both fifth and sixth generation peacekeeping. With coalitions of the willing arrangements, such as in the Solomon Islands and Iraq, the UN proper and its agencies play a limited role in peace-restoration activities. But as experience shows from these two disparate examples, it is shortsighted to marginalize the UN on sensitive issues of post-conflict stablization and reconstruction, particularly those UN departments and agencies mandated and equipped to assist such situations. War-torn societies stand to lose from UN disengagement, and questions of legitimacy about the intervention may arise. As the Solomon Islands case illustrates, the UN system brought institutional knowledge and the practical experience of development professionals to reconstructing the fragile island state. After a slow start following the TPA, UN agency recovery and political reform operations picked up in 2002/2003 with the introduction of several new projects. Financial and political support for UN agency interventions relied to a large extent on Australia and New Zealand, as UN post-conflict activities are mainly funded through ad hoc and voluntary donor-pledged non-core resources. With the arrival of the RAMSI, however, Australia appears to have resorted to a policy reminiscent of the period immediately following the signing of the TPA and, to a lesser extent, US UN relations in Iraq at the conclusion of major hostilities in In time, however, public and political attention fades, though peace- and state-building require a commitment of years if not decades (as well as significant technical and financial resources). The rationale and conditions are therefore likely to improve for mutually beneficial cooperation between the RAMSI and the UN system in the reconstruction of the Solomon Islands. Guiding Principles for Future Cooperation To guide efforts towards practical cooperation in the Solomon Islands and elsewhere, it is useful to establish a policy framework or division of labour for future UN system collaboration with regional and global arrangements involved in peacebuilding and the reconstruction of war-torn societies. Some guiding principles of this framework might include the following. Identify, support (politically and financially) and harmonize the comparative strengths of the UN system and other external actors. Unlike major powers that take action when and where their national interests are engaged, the UN represents the international community and, therefore, serves as the guardian of the international interest. With operations in every developing country, the UN and its funds and field organizations bring substantial knowledge, experience and resources to post-war reconstruction efforts. From the reintegration of conflict-affected groups and sensitive political development activities (decentralization and parliamentary strengthening, for example) to a range of tools and

12 184 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING technical services, the UN system maintains a proven track-record. Major powers need to be better informed about its comparative advantages and involve the most relevant parts in the planning and execution stages of a long-term peacebuilding and reconstruction mission. In particular, the UN can bring legitimacy to an external intervention and engage in negotiations and programming with local actors that, in particular circumstances might, be more ready to deal with the UN than a regional or global hegemon. Involve local leaders from different backgrounds in decision-making and coordination of reconstruction assistance. Even when state collapse appears to lead a country in the direction of anarchy and violence, every effort must be made to involve legitimate leaders within government and civil society in the prioritization and management of foreign aid flows. Building local ownership, in both reconstruction strategy formulation and implementation, is fundamental to addressing urgent social, political and economic issues and, over time, lessening dependence on bilateral and multilateral assistance providers and their foreign advisers. Judge the merits of development assistance through a governance and conflict prevention lens, by assessing whether it favours or impedes efforts to ensure that sources of discord are not transformed into sources of violent conflict. Conflict is a normal and healthy aspect of democratic governance. The difficulty, especially in burgeoning democracies and fragile states, is ensuring that conflicts are addressed as peacefully and as transparently as possible. Tools, such as the UNDP s Peace and Conflict-related Development Analysis, can be useful in analysing the causes of conflict and formulating appropriate donor and programme responses. Local leaders, the UN system, and other external assistance providers should meet regularly to ensure adequate forward planning and coordination, as well as to address politically sensitive matters and other obstacles. Regular and effective communications are fundamental to establishing appropriate common strategies, particularly when seeking to harmonize near-term priorities or influence the policy decisions of weak or uncooperative local counterparts. Open channels of dialogue are also essential to sequence interventions that are highly complementary, such as in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Reinforce the effectiveness and legitimacy of local leaders by investing in local capacity and by crediting local actors first, and external actors second, with reconstruction success stories. Although major powers will face tremendous domestic political pressures to show results in a limited period of time, it is imperative to the success of a peacebuilding and reconstruction mission that once law and order are re-established, the top priority becomes increasing the capacity and legitimacy of local leaders. For local actors to succeed in rebuilding legitimacy and a reasonable degree of national unity, the progress achieved by local leaders, however incremental, should be reported regularly through the media. The Agenda Ahead for the Solomon Islands? If the above principles are applied and sustained over the coming decade, both the Solomon Islanders and the RAMSI stand to gain as far as tackling some of the

13 THE SOLOMON ISLANDS: UN AND INTERVENTION 185 most sensitive and intractable issues at the core of the conflict. A well-resourced and politically-backed UN system, whose comparative strengths are understood and utilized effectively, can be made consistent with the interests of a regional hegemon and host government. In terms of concrete programming in the Solomon Islands, four areas of common action to address the root causes of human insecurity include the following. Create better employment and educational opportunities for youth, including ex-combatants. A large majority of the country s militants were recruited from groups of disenchanted young people in search of new livelihoods and identities that were often incompatible with village life. Targeted support is still urgently required to provide ex-combatants, displaced and conflict-affected youth with meaningful and sustainable livelihoods through income-generating, educational and social reconciliation activities. Prepare a National Action Plan on the Control of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons. Building on the successful weapons amnesty of 1 21 August 2003 and the first national report on the weapons trade, 39 the RAMSI and the UN/UNDP should collaborate closely to harness indigenous capacity for long-term weapons collection, storage and disposal through the police and customs services (especially since it is known that militants have cached some weapons in remote parts of the country, including military-style weapons). Establish land-dispute settlement mechanisms that respect traditional customs: According to a credible analysis, reconciliation of traditional and nontraditional authority, as they pertain to dispute resolution and land issues, will be critical to preventing future conflict in the Solomon Islands. 40 Joint leadership by the RAMSI and the UN system in the sensitive area of land-dispute settlement is needed, beginning with the establishment of a commission of inquiry on land issues, such as codification of customary land management principles. Devolve power to the provinces and villages, through constitutional reform, Provincial Development Plans (PDPs), and the transfer of financial resources. The idea of devolving power from the capital Honiara to the provinces fuelled debate in the Islands even prior to independence in During the conflict, the debate further intensified leading, in late 2002/early 2003, to a UNDP-sponsored socioeconomic impact study and two rounds of consultations on proposals for devolution, involving an estimated 30,000 people meeting in some 200 village centres. Based on this impact study, followed by village-level consultations in all nine provinces and a national consultation for MPs and Provincial Premiers, lawyers drafted a constitution in late 2003 that would substantially transfer political, administrative and financial powers to the provinces. The UN system can bring significant technical and human resources to the realization of these reforms, beginning with the preparation of participatory PDPs that help to localize the analysis and priorities outlined in the government s National Economic Recovery, Reform, and Development Plan Coalitions of the willing led by a dominant regional or global hegemon threaten to undermine some of the core properties of multilateralism, including the sharing of responsibilities and information among many actors, adopting predictable patterns of behaviour and representing an international interest.

14 186 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING Multilateral and multidimensional peacebuilding approaches led by the UN system demonstrate unique advantages in coping with the complex challenges in violent conflict prone environments. At the same time, in the absence of a reformed and stronger UN system for collective global security, more military, policing and governance reform interventions that serve the interests of major powers can be expected outside the framework of the UN system. Until the UN and its family of organizations are mandated, politically supported and equipped sufficiently to lead post-war stabilization and reconstruction exercises, such as in the Solomon Islands, the optimal arrangement envisaged to maximize the impact of external assistance is one in accordance with the above guiding principles. When a principled approach built on trust, comparative expertise, demonstrable results and local ownership is pursued by major reconstruction actors in cooperation with the UN system, the needs and interests of citizens and the government of a recovering war-torn society are best served. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I drafted this article in September 2004 while serving as a Fellow at the UNDP Oslo Governance Centre (OGC) and gratefully acknowledge comments by Kuniko Ashizawa, Morten Boas, Craig Collins, Francesca Cook, Espen Barth Eide, Nick Rene Hartmann, Ian Johnstone and the staff of the OGC. Responsibility for the conclusions remains entirely my own. NOTES 1. Government of Australia, Framework for Strengthened Assistance to Solomon Islands: Proposed Scope and Requirements, Canberra, 5 June 2003, p Centre for Human Security at the Liu Institute for Global Issues, Forgotten Wars: Solomons, in Human Security Report 2005, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005 (forthcoming). 3. Parties to the Townsville Peace Agreement, Townsville Peace Agreement of 15 October 2000, Honiara: Government of the Solomon Islands, Amnesty International, Guns and greed in Solomon Islands, The Amnesty International Wire, Vol.33, No.22, March 2003 (at Amnesty International Country Report, Solomon Islands: A Forgotten Conflict, London: Amnesty International Publications, W. Friesen and J.J. Schoorl, Solomon Islands, 2002 (at and U.S. Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, January 2003 (at pf.htm#econ). 6. See: Terms of Reference for the UN Needs Assessment Team to the Solomon Islands, 9 October 2002, UN Department of Political Affairs, New York. Led by the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the assessment team comprised representatives from the Department of Peace- Keeping Operations (DPKO), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNDP and DPA. 7. The proposed UN Peacebuilding Office would have extended beyond existing DPA-led arrangements in Tajikistan, Liberia and Bougainville, by establishing co-management of the office with the existing UNDP Peace and Development Programme in the Solomon Islands. 8. The government s vocal support in the UN General Assembly for Taiwan s membership in the UN would have likely resulted in a Chinese veto in the Security Council. The activities of UN agencies are not subject to UN Security Council approval. 9. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001, p.xi.

15 THE SOLOMON ISLANDS: UN AND INTERVENTION Concern for the safety of Australian and other nationals living in the Solomon Islands led to an evacuation led by the Australian Defence Force in July See, e.g., Rowan Callick, John Howard, Big Man of Pacific, Islands Business Magazine, 19 Dec (at Aisake Casimira, For Whose Security?, Ecumenical Centre for Research, Education and Advocacy, Sept. 2003, unpublished MS; ABC Asia Pacific Feature on Lawlessness in the Solomons, 6 July 2003 (at Pacific Islands Forum, Biketawa Declaration, 28 October 2000 (at /Oct06.htm). 13. See, e.g., Tom Allard, UN slated as Solomons action nears, Sydney Morning Herald, 27 June Interview by ABC News with Downer titled Alexander Downer responds to foreign policy criticism, 27 June 2003 (at See, e.g., Forum Foreign Affairs Meeting Outcome Statement, 30 June 2003 (at: gov.au/geo/spacific/regional_orgs/ffamm_solomons_0306.html). France expressed an interest in providing personnel and material assistance to the mission. But this offer was rejected by Australia on the grounds that the RAMSI was a PIF initiative, to which France does not belong. 16. Article 54 reads: The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security. 17. In outlining the case for intervention to the Australian Parliament, Prime Minister John Howard stated: It is vital that we do all that we can to arrest this downward spiral, which, if not addressed could result in the total collapse of the Solomon Islands governance and sovereignty.... [Australia s] leadership of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands reflects both a national interest and an international expectation. A failed state would not only devastate the lives of the peoples of the Solomons but could also pose a significant security risk for the whole region. Failed states can all too easily become safe-havens for transnational criminals and even terrorists. Poor governance and endemic corruption provide the conditions that support criminal activities. Transcript, 12 Aug (at speeches422.html). 18. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Our Failing Neighbor: Australia and the Future of the Solomon Islands, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2003, p Government of Australia (see n.1 above), pp UN Security Council, Press Statement on Solomon Islands by Security Council President, press release SC/7853, 26 August Howard (see n.17 above), pp Ibid., p Kenneth Bush and Sue Le Mesurier, Solomon Islands Peace and Conflict Development Analysis: Emerging Priorities in Preventing Future Conflict, Honiara: UNDP, 2004, p For a comprehensive analysis of new approaches to transitional administration, see: Richard Caplan, A New Trusteeship? The International Administration of War-Torn Territories, Adelphi Paper 341, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2002 and Simon Chesterman, You, the People: Transitional Administration, Statebuilding, and the United Nations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Robert Muggah and Carol Nelson, Solomon Islands, Disarmament and the Weapons Free Village Campaign, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2004, pp.9, 12. This followed two amnesty periods in 2000 and 2002 that produced over 2,000 mostly homemade, sub-standard weapons. 26. Nick Warner, Operation Helpem Fren: Rebuilding the Nations of the Solomon Islands, speech to the SI National Security Conference, 23 Mar (at department/040323_nsc_ramsi.html). 27. Ibid. 28. See, e.g., Catholic Archbishop Adrian Smith, RAMSI could do more to help Solomons: Church Leader, 17 June 2004 (at Although Australian engagement in the Solomon Islands and wider South Pacific shifted in 2003, including careful diplomatic manoeuvring to secure the election of the first Australian to serve as the Pacific Islands Forum Secretary-General, it is far from certain that Australia would intervene in similar future situations in the South Pacific. 30. Given Australia s predominant position in the Solomon Islands, Australian support for UN system peacebuilding and reconstruction activities was an essential first step to enable UN agencies, dependent on ad hoc voluntary contributions from donors, to leverage funds from other donors. This type of dependency is unlikely to change given that the limited core resources of

16 188 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING UN agencies (that are also voluntarily earmarked by donors each year) are mainly programmed in more stable development situations, where accessing additional resources from bilateral agencies is often more challenging than in crisis and post-conflict settings. 31. Interviews with a DPA official, 14 Aug. 2002, New York; with a senior Australian diplomat, 13 Aug. 2002, New York; and with Jose Salema, UNDP Chief Technical Adviser to the Solomon Islands Ministry of National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace ( ), 27 Sept. 2004, via In addition to disregarding advice on the weapons collection process by the UNDP Chief Technical Adviser and a UNDP Small Arms Expert, the Australian-backed International Peace Monitoring Team and Peace Monitoring Council turned down a request by the DPA to serve as an official observer in the meetings of the Peace Monitoring Council. Interviews with a DPA official, 14 August 2002, New York and Salema (n.31 above). 33. For instance, undermining a request of the SI Police Commissioner, the Australian-led mission relegated the UNDP to a low-profile, advisory role in the August 2003 weapons collection amnesty exercise, downplaying the UNDP s previous analysis of the situation, technical support for the government and Police Commissioner, and global experience in the area of reducing small arms and light weapons. On the other hand, Australia s actions can party be explained by its can do mentality and the RAMSI s extensive media coverage in Australia, heightening the urgency to show quick results that additional partners might have encumbered. 34. Townsville Peace Agreement (see n.3 above). 35. Benjamin Reilly, Internal Conflict and Regional Security in Asia and the Pacific, Pacific Review, Vol.14, No.1, pp Bush and Le Mesurier (see n.23 above), pp Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur, Cascading Generations of Peacekeeping: Across the Mogadishu Line to Kosovo and Timor, in Schnable and Thakur (eds.), United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement, Tokyo: UN University Press, 2001, p Ibid., p Solomon Islands National Report on the Implementation of the United Nations Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, Honiara, June Solomon Islands Peace and Conflict Development Analysis, in Bush and Le Mesurier (see n.23 above), pp.6 9.