Transformation Without Negation: An Autonomist Critique of Laclau and Mouffe. Heidi R. Johnson

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1 Transformation Without Negation: An Autonomist Critique of Laclau and Mouffe Heidi R. Johnson LNT Master s Thesis University of Illinois Springfield Fall 2011

2 Johnson 1 Introduction Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe s theory, in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, and autonomist theories, mainly those of Antonio Negri, John Holloway, and Félix Guattari, both provide strategies for social actors to engage antagonistically with oppressive forces. Both are also theories that are closely related to socialism. They involve critiques of capitalism and propose actions that counter capitalism s oppressive effects. These two types of theories are also very different, however. As classical Marxist theorists, Laclau and Mouffe propose a theory of radical democracy that relies upon a model for society in which social movements themselves engage in a contest, or in antagonisms, with each other. These antagonisms result in some social movements negating parts of the identities of other social movements. In contrast to this, autonomist theories allow for individuals to maintain their separate, unique identities. These separate individuals, though, can work towards the same goal of defying the logic of capitalism through adopting alternative lifestyles and practices. Thus in the opening of autonomist John Holloway s book Crack Capitalism, the following statement appears: We negate, but out of our negation grows a creation, an other- doing, an activity that is not determined by money, an activity that is not shaped by the rules of power. 1 This refusal to participate in practices that support capitalism and engagement in alternative practices could be seen as a fight against capitalism, so to speak. To refuse capitalism and to find alternatives to it are the only ways to counter its effects 1 Holloway 2010, p. 3

3 Johnson 2 without giving in to them. A simple example of an alternative practice would be engaging in meaningful relationships with others. Such simple acts defy the commodifying effects of capitalism, which encourage selfishness and greed, not comraderie. It is important to note that this negation of capitalism is morally justifiable and desirable from the points of view of both types of theories, while the negation of groups identities as prescribed by Laclau and Mouffe is, in my view and, I would argue, in the view of autonomist theorists, not justifiable. For Laclau and Mouffe, both conflict and division are markers of a pluralist democracy. I argue that conflict, insofar as it involves negation, is unnecessary and avoidable. Differences can be maintained without conflict, and autonomist theories recognize this. The consequences of conflict and negation would be similar to the consequences of the competion that is present in capitalist societies. Social movements that have more of an advantage or more privilege when compared to other movements would be more likely to achieve hegemony. Autonomist theories seek to protect singular identities rather than proposing their negation. However, if I accept certain aspects of Laclau and Mouffe s theory, I must address the following issue. According to Laclau and Mouffe, if there were no negation, this would mean that the social field and social groups would be fixed, unable to change or undergo transformation. I argue that negation should not be prescribed, as singular identities must be maintained in order for there to be equality and fairness in the social field. Is negation unavoidable, though, if it is accepted that a flexible social field is necessary, as I do? The answer, I argue, is that

4 Johnson 3 it is possible to have transformation of identities, and thus a changing social field, without negation. This is possible through social movements working towards not only their own causes but also one another s causes. Identities change through addition, not negation or erasure. A group can maintain its unique identity and purposes and still be transformed in this way. Part I: The Logic of Hegemony: Exclusion, Negation, and Representation Laclau and Mouffe s theory involves exclusion, negation, and representation that precludes self- advocacy to an extent, and thus should not serve as the model for society. It also does not do what it purports to do maintain an open social field. Autonomism, on the other hand, maintains singular identities while allowing for an open social field. Autonomism is thus preferable to Laclau and Mouffe s theory. Laclau and Mouffe observe that in advanced industrial socitieties there is a multiplicity of movements, such as feminism, anti- racism, environmentalism, and the gay movement in more current language, the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer (LGBTQ) movement. These movements may or may not work together to achieve common goals; their identities and relations with each other are unstable. Hegemony refers to an articulation a relation that is tenuous, between two social actors, i.e. collectivities, in which one collectivity overdetermines the other. It is characterized by antagonism, understood as limitation or negation. Hegemony, allowing for social movements demands to be met, is only possible because of the instability of social space. Hegemony is a relation that lies somewhere between equivalence and difference. There is determination of one by

5 Johnson 4 the other, but differences are also partially fixed. Thus Laclau and Mouffe write, In a closed system of relational identities, in which the meaning of each moment is absolutely fixed, there is no place whatsoever for a hegemonic practice. 2 Hegemony implies that something is shared between two things resulting in changes in their identities that still remain distinct. Radical democracy refers to a type of contestatory politics that recognizes that classical revolution may no longer be the best strategy but that does not accept reformism as a solution either. The goal of radical democracy is ongoing democratization and pluralist democracy. Lalcau and Mouffe write, Every radical democratic politics should avoid the two extremes represented by the totalitarian myth of the Ideal City, and the positivist pragmatism of reformists without a project. This moment of tension, of openness, which gives the social its essentially incomplete and precarious character, is what every project for radical democracy should set to institutionalize. 3 Avoiding both utopian thinking as well as goalless reformism, radical democracy requires an open social field in which contestation is possible. So hegemony and radical democracy for Laclau and Mouffe are related. Hegemony is the result of antagonism or contestation, which is a marker of radical democracy. Finally, Laclau and Mouffe are socialists. They theorize about hegemony and radical democracy for the sake of socialism. I define socialism as a movement that utilizes collective action to seek a more just distribution of wealth and resources for society as well as an end to the exploitation and inequalities caused by capitalism. 2 Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. 190

6 Johnson 5 Historically, with socialism as well as with Marxist theory, the political space of collective action was split into two camps as the forces of production necessitated the development and unification of a working class. For Laclau and Moufffe social space is divided into a multiplicity of groups that experience some kind of oppression and engage in antagonisms with oppressive forces. Laclau and Mouffe both observe and prescribe this division of society, for it is a sign of pluralist democracy. They also prescribe the unification of some classes with others, as many movements may work towards similar purposes. Laclau and Mouffe write, We, thus, see that the logic of equivalence is a logic of the simplification of political space, while the logic of difference is a logic of its expansion and increasing complexity. 4 Political space may be more or less complex, divided into fewer or more bodies of people, but ultimately collectivities are the social actors, not individual people. Autonomism, on the other hand, is a type of politics that focuses on the individual and individual action. The key components of autonomist theories are the critique of capitalism, the focus on the individual, and the recommendations for alternative lifestyles that defy capitalist logic. Autonomism distinguishes itself from other Marxist theories by revoking any ties to party or class, as these exclude some individuals and erase differences. A goal of autonomism is for each individual to be independent, with a singular identity. From the autonomist point of view, viewing collectivities as the primary social actors serves to bury the identities, desires, interests, and goals of individuals. For example, in distinguishing the multitude from 4 Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. 130

7 Johnson 6 other concepts, autonomist Marxists Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri write, in the Preface of Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire, [ ] the people reduces that diversity to a unity and makes of the population a single identity: the people is one. [ ] The multitude is a multiplicity of all these singular differences. [ ] The essence of the masses is indifference: all differences are submerged and drowned in the masses. [ ] [ ] The concept of the working class has come to be used as an exclusive concept, [ ]. 5 All other formulations for social actors in society either eliminate differences and diminish diversity among individuals or exclude many individuals who otherwise would most benefit from inclusion, e.g. those who do not earn a wage. In my view, autonomist theories would see hegemonic articulation as a process that, through negation, wipes out difference, precludes diversity, and excludes those at the very margins of society. Negation and contestation result in some social movements ending up in disadvantaged positions. They also result in adverse effects on social movements identities. Now with this framework in mind, I turn to chapter 3 of Hegemony and Socialist Stategy, Beyond the Positivity of the Social: Antagonisms and Hegemony. In chapter 1 Laclau and Mouffe provide a geneology of the concept of hegemony, and in chapter 2 they trace the historical development of the concept, culminating in the Gramscian watershed. In this chapter they elaborate upon their definition of hegemony and the characteristics of social space that allow hegemonic articulations to occur. Following a passage on the complexity or simplicity of social space, Laclau and Mouffe write, 5 Hardt and Negri 2004, p. xiv

8 Johnson 7 [ ] it is clear that antagonism does not necessarily emerge at a single point: any position in a system of differences, insofar as it is negated, can become the locus of an antagonism. Hence, there are a variety of possible antagonisms in the social, many of them in opposition to each other. The important problem is that the chains of equivalence will vary radically according to which antagonism is involved; and that they may affect and penetrate, in a contradictory way, the identity of the subject itself. [ ] the more unstable the social relations, the less successful will be any definite system of differences and the more the points of antagonism will proliferate. This proliferation will make more difficult the construction of any centrality and, consequently, the establishment of unified chains of equivalence (italics mine). 6 In the space in which they are all similarly situated vis- à- vis oppressive forces, these movements are actually engaged in oppositions with each other. From all sides there is conflict and, I would go so far as to say, competition. To oppose something or be engaged in an antagonism with it is to seek to be the one to set the terms of the relationship. As both sides seek to overdetermine each other but only one can succeed, this process is competitive. In this passage, it also becomes more apparent what an antagonism is: an unstable relation in which the determination of one side by the other occurs to some degree. Antagonism requires a relation that is somewhere between equivalence and difference. If differences were fixed, there would be no antagonism and thus no struggle. If the sides of the frontier were joined in a chain of equivalence, there would be nothing to contest or nothing to determine as all differences would be dissolved. While antagonisms are required for hegemonic articulations, though, it is important to note that not every antagonism results in hegemony. Laclau and Mouffe write, 6 Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. 131

9 Johnson 8 But conversely, not every antagonism supposes hegemonic practices [ ] the two conditions of a hegemonic articulation are the presence of antagonistic forces and the instability of the frontiers which separate them. 7 Antagonism implies a negating and limiting effect; it does not require instability or flexibility of social space. For Laclau and Mouffe, hegemony is only possible because of antagonisms, and social actors are transformed through coming into contact with each other. This involves negation, a prcoess that, for Laclau and Mouffe, is a part of radical democratic politics and as such, should be prescribed. This view is unacceptable, as some groups lose parts of who they are and what they hope to become in the process. In a similar passage, Laclau and Mouffe discuss political space in terms of its division either into two distinct camps the oppressors and the people, which was the division for Gramsci or into many groups, which is the case with multiple social movements. In the first case there are clear boundaries between the two camps. This is not true in the case of multiple social movements. Instead of clear- cut boundaries, there are frontier effects between them, changes in identities caused by the confrontation, contradiction, and negation, of some movements by others. Laclau and Mouffe write, The production of frontier effects which are the condition of expansion of the negativity pertaining to antagonisms ceases thus to be grounded upon an evident and given separation, in a referential framework acquired once and for all. The production of this framework, the constitution of the very identities which will have to confront one another antagonistically, becomes now the first of political problems. This widens immensely the field of articulatory practices, and transforms any frontier into something essentially ambiguous and unstable, subject to constant displacements. 8 7 Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. 134

10 Johnson 9 The production of frontier effects does not result from a clear- cut boundary. Instead this framework consists of unstable boundaries among multiple positions. This framework is constituted by the antagonisms among social actors or movements. This is a problem or issue perhaps because these frontier effects are significant determining forces for society. Or could it be that Laclau and Mouffe recognize that some movements will prevail at the expense of others, and this is a problem? The production of the framework is the first of political problems because it is perhaps the most significant force determining social space. Finally, given Laclau and Mouffe s observation about social space, the field is widened immensely; social movements can engage in antagonisms and undergo or cause transformations that would not have been possible without this particular observation. My view is that this competitive, antagonistic characteristic of relations among social movements mirrors the competitive logic of capitalism, according to which those actors with the most capital and the most privilege have the best chance of accumulating more wealth and opportunity. Some social movements would have advantages in this competition as, for instance, powerful white men who are already the most privileged group in advanced industrial societies determine political space despite opposition from social movements. Thus social movements success is oftentimes directly related to their positions of privilege. I have thus shown how social space is predetermined for Laclau and Mouffe to a degree, despite their insistence that it is contingent. Now, why is it so important that social space be unstable and its division contingent? Explaining this

11 Johnson 10 requirement of contingency, Laclau and Mouffe compare their view to that of Gramsci, for whom the division of social space into two camps is predetermined. (The hegemonic articulation is contingent but not the division of social space into two camps.) Laclau and Mouffe write, War of position supposes the division of social space into two camps and presents the hegemonic articulation as a logic of mobility of the frontier separating them. However, it is evident that this assumption is illegitimate: the existence of two camps may in some cases be an effect of the hegemonic articulation but not its a priori condition for, if it were, the terrain in which the hegemonic articulation operated would not itself be the product of that articulation. [ ] 9 According to Laclau and Mouffe s interpretation of Gramsci, political space is divided into two camps fundamental classes prior to any hegemonic articulation. War of position assumes that there already exist two classes with a line separating them. The structure and superstructure would involve the dominance of one group over the other group; the social field would be fixed instead of unstable. The division would have taken place prior to any collective action. Certainly there is evidence in Gramsci to suggest that this is the case the war of position happens in the context of the state s dominance over the people. In The Prison Notebooks, Gramsci writes, What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural levels : the one that can be called civil society, [ ] and that of political society or the State. [ ] The spontaneous consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is historically caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p Gramsci 2010, p. 12

12 Johnson 11 Here it appears as if there are a structure and superstructure that precede hegemonic formation. Instead of two classes seeking to determine the identity of other class through hegemonic articulation a process requiring effort there is a pre- existing division between the classes. The consent of the masses is spontaneous or naturally- occurring. Rule by the state is the direct result of the state s position in the base structure and superstructure; the dominant group enjoys its prestige, which it did not even earn, but has solely because of its function in the world of production. According to Laclau and Mouffe, if Gramsci was right, then hegemonic articulations would not be necessary in order for there to be social spaces and the frontiers between groups, as these could be naturally occurring. Also, Laclau and Mouffe argue against the need for there to be one hegemonic articulation only in any given political space. So it is the case that instead of being constituted by two fundamental classes, in advanced capitalist social formations there is a [ ] proliferation of [ ] political spaces [ ]. 11 To return to the concept of hegemony, Gramsci, in Selections from the Prison Notebooks, writes, These situations of conflict between represented and representatives reverberate out from the terrain of the parties [ ] throughout the State organism [ ] And the content is the crisis of the ruling class s hegemony, which occurs either because the ruling class has failed in some major political undertaking for which it has requested, or forcibly extracted, the consent of the broad masses, [ ] or because huge masses [ ] have passed suddenly from a state of political passivity to a certain activity [ ] Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p Gramsci 1971, p. 210

13 Johnson 12 The ruling class was dominant because it had the consent of the masses this was a hegemonic articulation but because the ruling class failed in some task, did not fulfill a promise, or forced this consent, or because the masses have suddenly become active these all are situations in which there is a crisis of hegemony. In this crisis, there is an opportunity for counter- hegemonic activity, or interventions that challenge the dominant group s hegemony. Clearly, contingent interventions are important to Gramsci, as all sorts of factors contribute to the interventions without determining them. However, this level of contingency is not enough for Laclau and Mouffe. So it is apparent that contingency is of the utmost importance to Laclau and Mouffe; for there to be hegemony and social transformation, political space cannot have a predetermined formation. This is a problem for Laclau and Mouffe, if, as I have argued, the competitive structure that they advocate largely predetermines the outcomes of this struggle for hegemony. In the book authored by Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Žižek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left, Butler suggests a way of understanding hegemony that points to another aspect or stage of the process that may be problematic: exclusion. She writes, My understanding of the view of hegemony established by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe [ ] is that democratic polities are constituted through exclusions that return to haunt the polities predicated upon their absence. That haunting becomes politically effective precisely in so far as the return of the excluded forces an expansion and rearticulation of the basic premises of democracy itself Butler, Laclau and Žižek 2000, p. 10

14 Johnson 13 Butler sees exclusion as a positive thing, as it is necessary to exclude in order to establish one s own identity, and it is because of this exclusion and subsequent reemergence of the excluded group that political space is not fixed but flexible. But are there not consequences of this exclusion? Would it be possible to have a flexible political space, a space in which democracy can be constantly redefined, without a process of exclusion that may in some cases be harmful to the excluded groups? This is a crucial point, as it would seem that the most subjugated of groups would be excluded, and as a result they would have less power or ability to rule themselves. Today, many excluded groups are not yet visible they have not yet emerged so it is more difficult to identify them, or if they are identifiable, others have represented them. One group, which has had direct, albeit limited representation, is that of undocumented immigrants, many of whom, for obvious reasons, do not engage in activism publicly. Other groups might include the very young and the very old, institutionalized persons, and persons with disabilities, including invisible disabilities, who have less incentive to emerge because they can escape from stigma by keeping this identity private. These persons oftentimes rely upon social services for their health and even livelihood. Their lack of money and resources, as well as the nature of what keeps them subjugated, prevent them from organizing. Even persons with developmental and physical disabilities although great strides have been made in improving their lives and allowing them to be more self- sufficient still oftentimes have to rely solely upon others to be their advocates. If the world were more welcoming and accessible to these groups, perhaps there would be more possibilities for self- advocacy. But in a competitive framework, such

15 Johnson 14 groups most likely would have very little hope of even engaging in antagonisms in the first place, much less of having their interests and identities become hegemonic. Is Laclau and Mouffe s theory of radical democracy even an accurate, acceptable way to describe society? To use one illustration that suggests that it is not, during the first wave of feminism, white women suffragists excluded Black women suffragists in a sort of bargaining effort with white supremacists in Congress to win the vote. This would be negation. According to Laclau and Mouffe s model, white women should have been transformed through this antagonism, including Black women s interests as a part of their own, as a result of the return of the apparition. This did not happen, at least not to the degree that they would predict. Black feminism has largely remained a separate movement. During the second wave feminist movement, the focus was on the domestic roles and reproductive rights of women who were presumably mostly white and middle- class. Race and class privilege allowed white women to lead the movement and benefit the most from it. Even with the third wave, while LGBTQ rights have taken center- stage for both white and Black women alike in the past four decades, race is not a primary focus. Black women remain in a unique subject position, experiencing multiple forms of oppression based on race, sex, class, and sexual orientation. So bell hooks says in Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center, As a group, black women are in an unusual position in this society, for not only are we collectively at the bottom of the occupational ladder, but our overall social status is lower than that of any other group. Occupying such a position, we bear the brunt of sexist, racist, and classist oppression. At the same time, [ ] we are allowed no institutionalized other that we can exploit or oppress hooks 2000, p. 16

16 Johnson 15 In the social structure that allows and encourages oppression and exploitation, black women occupy the very bottom position. In this position, they have largely had to wage their own battles and to be their own advocates, using their own experiences given their unique subject positions as a source of power. In contrast to this, white women often include Black women in their group only when it is to their own benefit to do so. Black women s separation from other women is a good thing, I argue, but the competition and inequality that they experience due to this position are not. While representation by the dominant group white women may be better than nothing, self- advocacy is always preferable to being represented by a different dominant group. Representation by others is fine, but it should at least allow for and facilitate self- advocacy as well. Representation by others, if it precludes self- advocacy, is never adequate and would involve exclusion and negation. One can never know another as she knows herself. Competition is the result of looking out exclusively for one s own interests, while cooperation benefits all of those affected by oppression. hooks writes, While [a woman] may choose to focus her work on a given political issue or a particular cause, if she is firmly opposed to all forms of group oppression, this broad perspective will be manifest in all her work irrespective of its particularity. [ ] Women must learn to accept responsibility for fighting oppressions that may not directly affect us as individuals. Feminist movement, like other radical movements in our society, suffers when individual concerns and priorities are the only reason for participation. When we show our concern for the collective, we strengthen our solidarity hooks 2000, p. 64

17 Johnson 16 So it is possible both to concentrate one s work on a particular cause while at the same time demonstrating connections to many causes. Even if such a woman chooses a particular cause, her commitment to other causes would be evident. Working for one s own self- interest alone results in a very weak movement a competitive one, I would add, in which only a few can have their demands met. And then they would lack solidarity, which is key to the strength of any movement. Hardt and Negri also preserve difference while advocating connections. They propose that society be viewed as a multitude of singularities that are always separate. Changes in the social field do not depend upon antagonisms among those points of difference. Hardt and Negri write, The multitude is composed of a set of singularities and by singularity here we mean a social subject whose difference cannot be reduced to sameness, a difference that remains different. [ ] The plural singularities of the multitude thus stand in contrast to the undifferentiated unity of the people. 16 Continuing on, they state, When we say that we do not want a world without racial or gender difference but instead a world in which race and gender do not matter, that is, a world in which they do not determine hierarchies of power, a world in which differences express themselves freely, this is a desire for the multitude. And, [ ] in order to make differences our strength [ ] we must radically transform the world. 17 With Hardt and Negri s multitude, there is no exclusion, representation, or negation. Difference does not have to be dissolved, even momentarily. In saying that race and gender do not matter, Hardt and Negri mean that in this world that they envision, people would not be competing with each other based upon their differences but instead would allow these differences to be expressed freely and serve as a source of 16 Hardt and Negri 2004, p Hardt and Negri 2004, p. 101

18 Johnson 17 strength. Groups can be different without this indicating any sort of hierarchy with varying degrees of advantage or disadvantage, or dominance. Finally, they write, The multitude is the subjectivity that emerges from this dynamic of singularity and commonality. 18 Hardt and Negri escape from Laclau and Mouffe s criticism that differences among singularities would be closed and thus constitute a totality in that, for them, there is also commonality. Difference and commonality are always found together in the multitude; there is never one without the other. 19 Hardt and Negri are autonomist Marxists, with Negri being one of the more well- known activists who participated in the Autonomia movement in Italy in the 1960s and 1970s. Laclau and Mouffe do not even mention Negri, or for that matter Deleuze and Guattari also autonomists in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Deleuze and Guattari also were writing in the 1960s and 1970s, before Laclau and Mouffe wrote Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Laclau and Mouffe s failure to address these developments in political philosophy shows a weakness on their part. To conclude this first section, as Laclau and Mouffe s theory of hegemony involves representation, exclusion, and negation, their proposals should be abandoned in favor of a model that preserves the unique identities of singular individuals. In the next section, I further explore how hegemonic articulations are 18 Hardt and Negri 2004, p This argument might be supported with further research that falls beyond the scope of this paper. Here I contend that because these are not separate, fixed moments in time, because there is never complete openness or closure, this dynamic does not pose a problem. In so far as Hardt and Negri speak of transformation, one cannot claim that their theory would lead to a totality.

19 Johnson 18 largely determined by external factors, undermining Laclau and Mouffe s argument for contingency. Part 2: Rigging the Race In a capitalist society, many groups are at an advantage over others because of their relative socioeconomic status, access to material resources, career status, and physical and material circumstances. Capitalism further feeds into racial and gender oppression, as it perpetuates class and income disparities along these lines. So it is these factors that determine the outcome in the battle for hegemony, not simply discursive formation. Laclau and Mouffe s point that there is no privileged, or determined, subject of a coming revolution is certainly defensible, but their argument that articulations and identities are contingent and the social field unstable goes too far in that it does not recognize determinism where it does exist through privilege. For Laclau and Mouffe, hegemonic articulations are presented as being contingent, and one might surmise that this means there are no privileges or advantages determining hegemonic articulations since advantages at least, by definition, would be a factor partially determining outcomes. This does not necessarily mean that they think that all groups are on an equal playing field; they would probably agree that this is not the case, or else differences would dissolve and all groups would be the same. However, their silence regarding positions of privilege and advantage in the social field is concerning. Laclau and Mouffe write, It was an a priori unity vis- à- vis the dispersion of its materiality [ ] But once this essentialist assumption is abandoned, the category of articulation is now

20 Johnson 19 a discursive practice which does not have a plane of constitution prior to, or outside, the dispersion of the articulated elements. 20 Nothing determines the points of separation and linkages the precise dispersion among various social movements except the positions or identifications of those movements in a dynamic discursive battlefield. It is discourse that determines the social field, and with this argument Laclau and Mouffe distinguish themselves from all essentialist arguments for specified classes. It would seem that Laclau and Mouffe are not aware of the necessity that would result from their theory of the necessity that exists due to capitalism and the privilege that results from it. On the other hand, perhaps Laclau and Mouffe do not think that hegemonic articulations are completely contingent. In order for there to be negation and contradiction, perhaps a bit of determinism must be present, although it is not the focus. There is textual evidence to support this theory. Laclau and Mouffe say, [ ] our conclusion is that no social identity is ever totally acquired a fact which gives the articulatory- hegemonic moment the full measure of its centrality. The condition of this centrality is, therefore, the collapse of a clear demarcation line between the internal and the external, between the contingent and the necessary. 21 Social identities are unstable, yet they are acquired or fixed to a degree. In fact, it is because the lines between contingency and necessity, or instability and fixity, are blurred that identity formation is possible. Still, Laclau and Mouffe do not acknowledge that competitors begin at different levels of advantage and disadvantage, partially determining hegemonic articulations. They write, 20 Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. 142

21 Johnson 20 [ ] no hegemonic logic can account for the totality of the social and constitute its centre, for in that case a new suture would have been produced and the very concept of hegemony would have eliminated itself. The openness of the social is, thus, the precondition of every hegemonic practice. 22 Laclau and Mouffe see the social field as being open. It might even be the case that with this theory nearly any hegemonic articulation conceivable could come to be. To specify a hegemonic logic would, after all, result in the production of a suture, closing social space for good and thus eliminating the concept of hegemony. So external conditions do not seem to be an issue. The very word hegemony implies contingency and openness to a different configuration of power relations. In the end, Laclau and Mouffe perhaps are cognizant of the privilege and inequality among positions and still see the social field as being primarily open. While their position may not be entirely clear, however, one thing is true: if they recognize the presence of determining factors, they do not see these determining factors as a problem that could be avoided through a better model, and that is a problem. Unlike Laclau and Mouffe, autonomist theorists clearly recognize that with capitalism, there are positions of advantage and disadvantage that are partially determined. Self- determination is the goal, but in a capitalist system, the system determines human activity to a degree. John Holloway writes in Crack Capitalism, All of these people reject, in one way or another, the determination of their activity by money and oppose to that logic another concept of doing, an other- doing, which they seek to determine themselves, individually or collectively. [ ] Of course this is not pure self- determination, because what we consider desirable or necessary is affected by the society in which we live and because we do not control the environment in which we act, but it is a 22 Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. 142

22 Johnson 21 drive towards social self- determination, it is a push not only against but also beyond the determination of our lives by capital. 23 Our lives are largely determined by capital, according to Holloway. We must fight against this determination of our lives by capital, and seek to move beyond it. What factors involving real, material differences among movements are the result of capitalism? They would include socioeconomic status, access to material resources, availability of opportunities for education, for instance, and physical and mental well being, among other things. The amount of money that an individual or social class makes, as well as the number of advantages that accompany certain levels of income, are dependent upon the workings of the capitalist system. Finally, if we accept that there is a correlation between wealth and political power, capitalism leads to inequalities in political power. This affects groups ability to mobilize, achieve hegemony, and participate in a pluralist democracy. As stated above, the fact of capitalism s determination of people s lives runs counter to the argument that people determine their own lives and that social movements determine their own hegemonic articulations. Laclau and Mouffe do not recognize this fact. Laclau and Mouffe s model also proposes competition, which mirrors or accepts this logic of capitalism. The outcome of the competition in a capitalist system is largely predetermined, and so too the competition for hegemony is largely predetermined. Autonomist theorists are wary of the competition perpetuated by capitalism and thus would question the proposals of Laclau and Mouffe. In The Soul at Work, Franco Bifo Berardi has this to say about competition: 23 Holloway 2010, p. 22

23 Johnson 22 Competition implies a risky narcissistic stimulation, because in a highly competitive context, like that of a capitalistic economy and specifically of the new economy, many are called but only a few are chosen. Social norms do not acknowledge the possibility of failure, since this failure would be assigned a psychopathologic context. 24 Capitalism promises rewards to those who engage in battle on its terrain, but in the competition the fact that there are so few winners is largely unrecognized. The losers can only be understood as failures and as bearers of psychopathologies, as social norms promise only success. With the myth of success for all who try hard, only someone who is sick or who deviates from the norms can fail. However, the phrase many are called but only a few are chosen conveys the insight that the winners are largely predetermined. Competition gives people false hope through narcissistic simulation. Because they are participants in something in which all are promised success, each person perhaps begins to think of himself as more deserving of that success than anyone else. So it is apparent how capitalism, and the competition with which it is entwined, results in positions of advantage and disadvantage in the battle for hegemony. The outcomes of the competition and capitalism are mutually reinforcing. However, as I have already pointed to with Laclau and Mouffe, the picture is not so clear- cut. Neither contingency nor necessity tells the whole story. Autonomist theories also recognize this. In New Lines of Alliance, New Spaces of Liberty, Guattari and Negri state, But the privileged point, the hot point in the production of new machines of revolutionary struggle resides within the zones of marginalized subjectivity. And there as well, it goes without saying, not in and of themselves but because they are inscribed in the meaning of creative production processes 24 Berardi 2009, p. 99

24 Johnson 23 considered in their evolutionary position, that is, not arbitrarily isolated within the capitalist economic sphere. 25 In this passage, autonomist theorists recognize contingency or possibility as well as necessity. No external or internal force compels marginalized groups, which social movements would be, to act. On the other hand, marginalized groups are privileged because they are a part of the capitalist economic sphere and the way it has evolved in necessary ways. There is thus an element of necessity to their position. While they must choose to act, they are motivated or spurred by the conditions in which they work and live. Finally, marginalized groups experience privilege too, in a different way. It is their evolutionary position that is the source of their privilege, not pre- existing socioeconomic factors. To give another explanation, if it is accepted that human beings have free will, their action is always partially contingent. Necessity is never total. If necessity and contingency are two aspects that always occur together, then the dualism which Laclau and Mouffe attribute to past Marxist theorists and which they sought to resolve through their argument for contingency may be effectively avoided. In Crack Capitalism, Holloway writes, It is often difficult to distinguish choice from necessity. [ ] What is important is not to draw dividing lines but to see the lines of continuity. 26 People are more or less compelled when they act in the fight against capitalism, or conversely they are more or less acting of their own free will. 25 Guattari and Negri 2010, p Holloway 2010, p. 25

25 Johnson 24 Finally, in contrast to the competitive model in which there is exclusion and negation, with autonomism the connections among groups and individuals of all identifications are emphasized. So Holloway writes, Rather than creating sharp divisions (between the guerrilla leader and the housewife alone on a Saturday night, for example), we need to find ways of making visible and strengthening these lines of continuity that are often so submerged. 27 Here Holloway extends the base of subjectivities to include people who are not necessarily activists at all but who are still affected by capitalism. These people are still capable of revolt in small ways, or resistance, disobedience and refusal. Holloway sees commonalities between even two individuals whose lives could not seem to be any more polarized the guerrilla leader and the isolated housewife. Their motivations to revolt may be different, but their target or goal is the same to end their oppression. So instead of fighting against each other, social movements can join forces and fight for each other s causes as well as for the end of capitalism and the beginning of a new policial- economic system. Part 3: Redirecting Antagonisms My arguments up until this point show how Laclau and Mouffe s theory is defined by antagonism and negation where autonomist theories see connections. Furthermore, capitalism contributes to the antagonisms among social movements that would benefit from instead working together to achieve their separate goals. First, I must note that in focusing on capitalism in discussing social movements, I do not mean to imply that other causes are less important or less 27 Holloway 2010, p. 35

26 Johnson 25 urgent than socialist revolution; It is simply the case that social movements have in common that they are affected and oppressed by capitalism, making socialism a goal that warrants special attention. The other causes may be more urgent at certain points in time, with the urgency of different causes being determined by the political climate. Ideally, social movements would fight both for their own causes as well as for the end of capitalism. Next I must address what happens once Laclau and Mouffe s model is abandoned. Is it possible to have an open social field without it? What would be required? How do autonomist theorists respond to this competitive framework of capitalism in which outcomes are largely pre- determined? Are social change and transformation possible without negation, exclusion, and representation that precludes self- advocacy? To answer these questions, I first turn to Enrique Dussel s theory of the analogical hegemon. Such a hegemon does not lead to the dissolution of difference, to negation, or to hegemony, in which there is an imbalance of power. Rather it involves the incorporation of all differences into an overarching set of goals. All differences are included; nothing is negated. Difference does not imply antagonism. So Dussel states, [ ] through mutual information, dialogue, translation of proposals, and shared militant praxis, these movements slowly and progressively constitute an analogical hegemon, which to some degree includes all demands but might, according to Laclau, prioritize some. In the process of emancipation from Spain in 1810, Liberty! was given an indisputable primacy as a demand that unified all groups into the patriotic bloc of Latin America. 28 In order for there to be an analogical hegemon, groups must be open to sharing with each other their goals, commitments, beliefs, etc. They must agree upon 28 Dussel 2008, p. 32

27 Johnson 26 revolutionary strategies, or militant praxis, and they must be able to translate each other s dialogues in order to come to a mutual understanding. This way all groups can be included in an overarching plan of action. This, I would argue, it the kind of transformation that should happen transformation through addition instead of through negation, cooperation instead of contestation. Dussel agrees with Laclau and Mouffe on the point that some movements might be prioritized over others. But with this type of prioritization outcomes are not pre- determined by capitalism. Rather the movements themselves do the prioritizing or choosing. For Dussel, social movements are prioritized not based on differences caused by capitalism s effects but based on what is most urgent according to the political climate and level of urgency of the needs of different groups. This is much different than the type of prioritizing that would result from Laclau and Mouffe s proposals, according to which the strongest or most capable for winning the competition would be prioritized. It is also different than the conception of history according to which the results are predictable, as in orthodox Marxism, in which the proletariat is the privileged class. It is important to note that Dussel is not an autonomist and thus may still place more emphasis on the collectivity rather than on individuals. Thus in this joining together of causes, one might think that differences would be dissolved. This is not the case, though; transformation without negation is possible, for social movements are included in the analogical hegemon with their identities intact. Differences and unique demands are upheld so that, when necessary, some might be prioritized.

28 Johnson 27 As Dussel is not an autonomist, the people for Dussel is different from Hardt and Negri s multitude. Dussel writes, In this reformulation, the people is transformed into a collective political actor rather than being merely a substantial and fetishized historical subject. 29 Dussel sees this category as being necessary, whereas Negri views [it] as an inadequate and substantialist concept, not far enough away from Marx s understanding of the one subject of history. 30 While Hardt and Negri [ ] opt to eliminate sovereignty and authority [ ] altogether, Dussel identifies the people as the locus of sovereignty and authority. 31 Both Dussel and Hardt and Negri recognize connections and unification among diverse groups, but Dussel is closer to classical Marxism in privileging the people as being the source of sovereignty and authority, attributing almost an essentialist quality to them. Hardt and Negri, on the other hand, simply distrust any claim to sovereignty, writing, The ambiguity of the notion of the sovereign people turns out to be a kind of duplicity, since the legitimating relationship always tends to privilege authority and not the population as a whole. 32 Introducing sovereignty into the picture tends to reintroduce authority for a select few rather than the whole population. I tend to agree with Laclau and Mouffe. Thus I call it the multitude, beleiving that all people should lay claim to their ability to speak for themselves and express their desires. Another way of understanding political subjectivities can be found in Amartya Sen s theory of plural affiliations. Each person has many different 29 Dussel 2008, p Dussel 2008, p Dussel 2008, p. 145 (See footnote 85) 32 Hardt and Negri 2004, p. 79

29 Johnson 28 identities, all of which are shared by other persons, even across borders. In Justice across Borders, Sen writes, A person can see herself as an Italian, as a woman, as an agnostic, as a doctor, and so on; there is no contradiction in this richer understanding of a person s identity. 33 Sen s plural affiliations approach calls upon people of all of these identities to work together to bring justice to society. The different identities do not conflict in one person, and neither should groups based upon these identities conflict. To return to autonomist theory, another way to understand society is through the rhizome. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari write, [ ] unlike trees or their roots, the rhizome connects any point to any other point [ ] it brings into play very different regimes of signs, and even nonsign states. The rhizome is reducible neither to the One nor the multiple [ ] It is composed not of units but of dimensions, or rather directions in motion. It has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (milieu) from which it grows and which it overspills. 34 A rhizome is non- hierarchical; it is heterogeneous, having multiple meanings at its different points. It even has even states without meaning. It is not a unified body, nor is it a multiplicity. It is actually composed of dimensions or directions that move. The rhizome is not measurable in space but is constantly growing in size, overflowing. In other words, the rhizome cannot be pinpointed, measured, or concisely described. It escapes all efforts to understand and contain it, and this is how it is with social movements. They move and grow in unexpected ways. They have neither beginning nor end. 33 Sen 2002, p Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 21