Electoral engineering in use? The case of Italy

Transcription

1 EVROPSKÁ VOLEBNÍ STUDIA EUROPEAN ELECTORAL STUDIES Institut pro srovnávací politologický výzkum Institute for Comparative Political Research No. 2/06 evs Roč. 1, č. 2, str Vol. 1, No. 2, pp ISSN Název článku: Electoral engineering in use? The case of Italy Autoři: Dalibor Čaloud Tomáš Foltýn Abstract: The main aim of this paper is to describe the background of proposing, enacting and implementing a new electoral system in Italy, prepared by Berlusconi s proponents to make his re-election into office easier. The article deals also with the possible classification of the system, where authors argue against describing it as a proportional system with majority premium and recommend instead the term mixed conditional. Keywords: electoral system, Italy, Mattarellum, Proporzionellum, majority premium, mixed conditional system Projekt "Evropská volební studia" byl zpracován v rámci Výzkumného záměru Ministerstva školství, mládeže a tělovýchovy České republiky "Politické strany a reprezentace zájmů v soudobých evropských demokraciích" (kód ).

2 1. Mattarellum Thirteen years ago, the Italians decided to change their electoral system for parliamentary elections. After the outbreak of corruption affairs (the so-called revolution of judges), and growing mass support for the referendum movement, the almost purely proportional electoral system - which was blamed by many for all the negative aspects of the post-war political system in Italy: ubiquitous corruption, instability of governments, fragmentation of the party system, and lack of turnover could finally be modified. Because it was up to the discredited political parties representatives to adopt a new electoral system, a compromise version was passed. This is why the compromise solution fulfilled no one s expectations neither of supporters of the first-past-the-post system (FPTP), nor for those who preferred the French two-round system. The mixed electoral system adopted (so called Mattarellum) was three quarters decided according to the British FPTP system, and one quarter of seats were distributed according the proportional system (PR) with a 4% threshold. The system since that time has suffered from a substantial lack of confidence among many scholars (comp. Sartori 2001, Katz 2003) as well as among the majority of Italians. The mixed electoral system aimed to solve two basic problems. It was supposed to reduce party fragmentation, and enhance the pro-bipolar competitiveness of a party system that could allow for turnover of governments. Many critics pointed out that Mattarellum proved unable to reduce the number of parties, and that its effectiveness in creating strong majorities in both chambers was doubtful at best. Nevertheless, hardly anybody could deny the fact that the Mattarelum in the last two elections ( and 2001) managed to transform a relative majority of votes (outside of an earned majority) to an absolute majority of seats (manufactured majority). It was the Mattarellum, too, which forced the fragmented array of political parties to bind together into two approximately equally strong coalitions that competed within a bipolar defined party system according to the anticipated effect of the system (Morlino 1996: 9). 1 Though only in the lower chamber. 186

3 The 2006 parliamentary elections were supposed to confirm this trend, which the voters had even begun to appreciate (Istituto Piepoli 2005), but the Mattarellum never got the opportunity to prove itself again and verify these assumptions. After the regional elections in April 2005 the Mattarellum was sentenced to serve out its time, then make room for another electoral system. 2. Proporzionellum Many politicians of the governing Case delle Libertà (CdL) considered the results of regional elections as some kind of last warning before the next parliamentary elections. Berlusconi s allies demanded some changes (for example, a certain increment of support of southern parts of Italy), and for the first time in a long while they begun to question Berlusconi s leadership of the center-right block, forcing the prime minister to resign. After forming his second (third) government 2, Berlusconi in response commenced to speak publicly about his project of a single party (partito unico) of all non-communists (moderati), and let his coalitional partners know that they would have to either join this project or compete in next elections by themselves. Simultaneously, Berlusconi warned of the possibility of being forced to return to the proportional electoral system, declaring that such an option would not represent the best interest of the country (see CdS 2005b, c). Therefore Berlusconi must have been surprised when the main target of his threats (UDC) not only rejected such a project, but itself proposed a return to the proportional system. In this situation a weakened prime minister switched his support to the electoral system he had condemned only few weeks earlier. There are two complementary explanations of his behavior. With an eye to the upcoming parliamentary elections, the Italian prime minister agreed to adopt a new electoral system which would guarantee victory for the rightcenter coalition, or at least reduce the probability of a left-center coalition. The choice of the proportional system was surprising to regular Italians, although it was at the same time the expected choice for many political scientists. While Berlusconi 2 Berlusconi s first government was formed in 1994; the second lasted from 2001 to 2005, and the third from 2005 to Sometimes the last two are considered as the same government. 187

4 had long spoken about adopting a clear first-past-the-post system, (CdS 2005a), he was also aware of the fact that his bloc had been more successful in the proportional part of the mixed electoral system than in one-member constituencies. A return to the proportional system seemed from this standpoint to be the first and most important step toward future victory. But there was still one snag to remove. Berlusconi advocated a bi-polar system, and wanted to leave Italian politics having made the conversion to bipolarity irreversible. But this vision could be accomplished under a proportional system only through the institution of the majority premium. Some scholars therefore predicted in advance that a proportional system with some majority premium was very likely going to become the next electoral system of Italian parliamentary elections (Chiaramonte, D Alimonte 2004: 118). From the first public announcement of an intention to adopt such a new electoral system, to the moment when this system was enacted, several few months passed and many changes were made. Originally there was to be a system of two independent ballots (closed and free) for the Chamber and a 4% threshold for every party. Gradually the threshold was lowered for parties within coalitions to 2%, but this rate was criticized by the Unione party, which maintained that such a figure was clearly directed against them. Many political subjects of the left-center block receive around 2% of the vote, hence the danger of a gaining majority of votes but a minority of seats troubled the representatives of Unione. The consequences of a potentially discriminatory 2% threshold were therefore watered down considerably in the end. Strong protest at this unnecessary change in the rules of the game only few months before elections was expressed by the opposition, which obstructed the enactment of the new electoral system, then made some (somewhat rhetorical) attempts to abolish the new system by referendum. But all in vain: the new electoral system (called proporzionellum see Sartori 2005a, b) would be used for the first time in April 2006 parliamentary elections. 188

5 3. The New Italian Electoral System 3.1. The Chamber of Deputies The new electoral system to both chambers of the Italian parliament was based on Law No. 270 of 21 December On December 16, 2005, the new procedure was approved in parliament, and signed a week later by President Ciampi. The Chamber of Deputies consists of 630 representatives elected to a 5-year term. Of these, 617 are to be chosen in 26 multi-mandate districts according to the system of proportional representation. For the allocation of seats, the Hare quota in combination with the largest remainder method is applied, i.e. the same allocation method as was used under the former electoral system in the proportional tier. Moreover, the system continues to operate with closed lists, in which voters are not allowed to make any changes; on the other hand, the system has returned to the model of one voter one vote. What is completely new, and what makes this system a fascinating case of electoral engineering, are the complex set of thresholds a party must overcome in order to be allowed to proceed: - a political party running individually or as a part of coalition that obtains less than ten per cent, must obtain at least four per cent of the national vote; - a coalition that obtains at least ten percent of the vote must include at least one party that obtains two percent of the national vote or more; - political parties representing recognized linguistic minorities must obtain at least twenty percent of the vote in their corresponding regions (comp. Alvaréz-Rivera 2006, CdS 2005d, La Repubblica 2005). In fact, the complex of thresholds is not as simple as that. According to the very latest changes in the electoral system, the first party under the threshold can also take a seat. In other words, the first political subject polling less than 2 % as a part of coalition makes it into Parliament as well (see La Repubblica 2005, CdS 2005d). The most important feature of the new system is a majority premium awarded to the winning coalition or party. The premium is activated in the event that no party or coalition obtains 340 mandates. This means that the winner automatically receives 340 of 617 seats, i.e. about 55% per cent of the total. By contrast, the remaining 189

6 277 mandates are apportioned among the other parties and coalitions having crossed the threshold. On the other hand, when the party/coalition gains more than 340 out of 617, the majority premium is not applied and the system operates as a classical system of proportional representation. Like the old technique, the new technique provides the Valle d Aosta district with a single seat, to which a deputy is elected according to the FPTP formula. The remaining twelve mandates are reserved for Italian citizens residing abroad. The seats grouped in four regions Europe (including Russia and Turkey), South America, North and Central America, and the rest of the world are distributed according to the Hare quota in combination with the largest remainder method (see Alvaréz-Rivera 2006) The Senate The electoral system for the Italian Senate features a couple of differences when compared to the Chamber of Deputies. First, there is a slight difference in the set of clauses: The threshold that a party (or a coalition) is required to pass operates not nationally but regionally. Moreover, seats are distributed among those coalitions that receive at least 20% of the vote in the particular region, and which include at least one party that receives at least three per cent of the vote, as well as parties that receive at least eight percent of the vote, running individually or within a coalition that receives less than twenty percent of the vote (Alvaréz-Rivera 2006). The allocation itself is based on the Hare quota in combination with the largest remainder method. Secondly, the new law is applied in only 18 of twenty regions. The Trentino-Alto Adige region continues to use the former technique for the Senate, on the principle of one voter one vote, which is used both for electing a candidate in SMD and for the party list in the region. Only one seat is distributed in the Valle d Aosta region according to the FPTP system. The third difference from the system used in the Chamber is the majority premium, which, like the threshold, operates regionally. In the event the winning party or coalition in each of the 18 regions receives less than 55% of the seats in its particular region, its number of seats is increased to amount to no less than fifty-five 190

7 per cent of the seats in the region. The remaining mandates are allocated proportionally among the other lists that satisfy the electoral conditions. Nevertheless, when a party obtains more than fifty-five per cent of the seats in a particular region, the majority clause is not applied, and the system operates as plain PR. However, it wouldn t be Italy if there weren t an exemption the Molise region distributes only two seats, so there is no majority premium applied at all. Finally, six senators are elected by the Italians residing abroad How to classify the new system? The system for elections leaves us with the question of its classification. All papers dealing with this topic classify this system as proportional with a majority premium (Alvaréz-Rivera 2006; Shugart 2006, Ferrara 2006). However, such a description is more a misunderstanding than a correct classification. The new Italian electoral system should be better termed as mixed conditional (using the Massicotte-Blais classification of mixed electoral system, see Massicotte, Blais 1999: ). Massicotte and Blais recognize as mixed conditional those systems in which there are two components proportional and pluralitarian (or majoritarian), and whether one formula is used or not hinges on the outcome produced by the other (Massicotte, Blais 1999: 357). And this is precisely the case of the Italian system used for the 2006 general election. If the winning party (or coalition) obtains less than 55% of the seats i e. the outcome of the proportional tier the number of its seats is increased until it does have (in the Senate no less than 55 per cent regionally): this is the influence of the majority premium. On the other hand, if the winning party receives more than fifty-five per cent of the seats, the system operates as pure PR. Like the Mattarellum, this system transforms a relative majority of votes into an absolute majority of seats. In other words, Proporzionellum implemented in the Chamber makes it impossible for the winning subject to obtain less than a 55% majority of seats. Even if we consider that the new system can produce proportional outputs in the lower house, it is very unlikely that the Senate system can. The majority premium applied on the regional level will probably make the expected 191

8 outputs on the national level very dissimilar to ideal proportionality. This is why, in our opinion, this system cannot be classified as PR; because it can produce an artificial majority, and even this way of implementing the majority premium makes this system strongly distinct from the usual PR (comp. D Alimonte 2005a). 4. Conclusion: Berlusconi as an evil electoral engineer? Having described the basic features of the new electoral system, we should also mention some aspects and questions connected with this system. First of all, the question of legitimacy of this electoral system is not, and probably never will be, completely answered and clarified. The decision to change the electoral system mirrored clearly the will of governing majority but lacked the substantial support of civil society. On the other hand it cannot be said that CdL failed completely to take into consideration the protests of opposition, since considerable corrections of the electoral system were made. However, the most important question must be posed: why did Berlusconi, who declared his intention to create a single party, not carry through with the first-past-the-post system, but instead agreed to a proportional system that would help the small parties to flourish, and prevent the achievement of the single-party goal (comp. D Alimonte 2005d)? The answer seems to be easy: Berlusconi s priority was electoral victory, albeit at the cost of giving up the possibility of creating a two-party system in Italy. In other words, if Berlusconi wanted to diminish the power of the small parties, he failed completely; but his main purpose was to improve his chances of winning. In conclusion we will stress that the implementation of the new electoral system cannot be considered an unadulterated evil for Italy. We must also acknowledge that the pro-bipolar trend may in fact continue. The single parties are still (perhaps more than ever) forced to join one of the huge blocks. Additionally, the direct election of the prime minister was de facto enacted (comp. Polchi 2005). On the other hand, according to the new electoral system every single vote is precious, thus the small parties become indispensable. The fragmentation therefore endures, and is actually likely to increase (comp. D Alimonte 2005b, Sartori 2005a). Apart from the pro-bipolar feature we must mention the aspiration of the new electoral system to ensure governability within the Italian political system. The framers of the system 192

9 hoped to provide a majority of the seats in the Chamber for the winning coalition under any circumstances. Regardless of the heterogeneity of the coalitions, the ability to govern of the lower chamber will probably be safeguarded. The problem is the Senate. The sum of regional premiums may not always work to the benefit of the winner, and the prize could be given into hands of the losers (comp. Natale 2005, D Alimonte 2005c). And so, regardless of the 2006 election results, no one knows for sure whether the winner in the lower house will be the same as in the upper house. The electoral system is therefore not able to ensure the ability to govern, though it seems to promise it. 193

10 References: Alvaréz-Rivera, M. (2006): Election resources on the Internet: Elections to the Italian Parliament, on-line text ( Chiaramonte, A., D Alimonte, R. (2004): Dieci anni di (quasi) maggioritario. Una riforma (quasi) riuscita In: Come chiudera la transizione. Cambiamento, apprendimento e adattamento nel sistema politico italiano. Ed. Ceccanti, Stefano a Vassallo Salvatore, Bologna: Il Mulino, pp Corriere della Sera (CdS) (2005a): Disonestà intellettuale di molti, i dati sono incontrovertibili, Corriere della Sera, Corriere della Sera (CdS) (2005b): Andreotti si è detto contrario al partito unico, Corriere della Sera, Corriere della Sera (CdS) (2005c): Castelli contrario e Cossiga: Silvio, lascia stare, Corriere della Sera, Corriere della Sera (CdS) (2005d): Riforma elettorale: come si verà, Corriere della Sera, D Alimonte, R. (2005a): Solo 9 seggi separand i due sistemi ( D Alimonte, R. (2005b): Rapresentanza e stabilità. Il maggioritario ha difetti, questa legge li peggiora, Il Sole 24 Ore, D Alimonte, R. (2005c): Senato, se 4 regioni fanno la differenza, Il Sole 24 Ore, D Alimonte, R. (2005d): Se la Valle d Aosta non dà il premio. L esclusione riguarda anche gli italiani all estero: dubbi di constituzionalità ( Ferrara, F. (2006): Fear and Loathing on the (Italian) Campaign Trail: Episode One ( html). Istituto Piepoli (2005): Addio al maggioritario? Gli italiani sperano di no ( 194

11 Katz, R. S. (2003): Reforming the Italian Electoral Law In: Mixed-Memeber Electoral Systems. The Best of Both Worlds? Ed. Shugart, M. S., Wattenberg, M. P., Oxford New York 2003, pp La Repubblica (2005): Legge elettorale, I contenuti, La Repubblica, Massicotte, L., Blais, A. (1999): Mixed electoral systems: a conceptual and empirical survey, Electoral Studies XVIII, pp Morlino, L. (1996): Crisis of parties and change of party system in Italy, Party politics, Volume 2, 1996, Number 1, pp Natale, P. (2005): Un senato su mistra per la Cdl, Europa, Ortona, G., Ottone, S., Porzano, F. (2005). A Simulative Assessment of The Italian Electoral System, Working paper n. 60, pp Polchi, V. (2005): Maggioritario addio, si vota il partito, La Repubblica, Sartori, G. (2001): Il sistema elettorale resta cattivo, Rivista italiana di scienza politica, a. XXXI, n. 3, dicembre 2001, pp Sartori, G. (2005a): Il proporzionellum aumenterà i partiti, Corriere della Sera, Sartori, G. (2005b): Proporzionellum, il caos delle idee, Corriere della Sera, Shugart, M. S. (2006): Italy: The crazy electoral system explained ( 195