Decentralization and the Transformation of Democracy: Democratic Deepening in the Andes

Transcription

1 Decentralization and the Transformation of Democracy: Democratic Deepening in the Andes Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela Dr. Miguel A. Buitrago This is a first draft! paper to be presented at the LASA 2013 conference on May 28 to June 3 in Washington, DC. Please do not cite without prior consultation with the author.

2 Miguel A. Buitrago [ 1] Introduction The implementation of decentralization measures around the world, within the last five decades, has been characterized as the quiet revolution because the changes made to the systems of government has been considered revolutionary (Campbell 2003). Based on such characterizations as well as the experiences of governments around the world, the UCLG 1 has gone as far as announcing a democratic revolution in reference to the extent those measures have contributed to the democratization process (UCLG 2007, 9). The reason for such aspirational conclusion is twofold: First, initially conceived as a policy tool (UNDP 2002; UCLG 2007; World Bank and UCLG 2008), decentralization has been, in one form or the other, implemented in practically all regions of the world: Africa, Asia Pacific, Eurasia, Europe, Latin America, Middle East and West Asia, and North America. This fact has given the impression of a generalized acceptance of the premises of decentralization within the debate. Second, with the exception of Europe and North America, where the democratic processes are considered consolidated, most countries have implemented such policies with the hopes not only to achieve needed state reform, economic development and eradicate poverty but also to enhance the representative character of the democratic process and stabilize or even consolidate them (UCLG 2007; World Bank and UCLG 2008). In the Latin American context, this has meant that decentralization has closely accompanied the democratization process over the last forty years; a process which was largely based on the idea that liberal representative democracy was the model to be emulated and that decentralization measures were complementary to this process. Mascareño (2008) argued that in Latin America, after all these years of experiencing democracy, the idea that decentralization was intimately related to that process came to be widely accepted. This happened primarily because the achievements of decentralization were united discursively with the destinies of the emerging democracies within the global debate about the re-valuation of the local in search of a new paradigm of development and the democratization of the relationship between the state and society. As a result, decentralization was implemented region-wide with the following main objectives: bringing government closer to the people, legitimacy transparency, accountability, efficiency, citizen participation, the emergence and/or strengthening of civil society, better 1 United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) is a world-wide association of local governments that brings together their leaders to exchange experiences and knowledge on local government and to represent and defend the interests of its members in the world. The web site can be found at:

3 Miguel A. Buitrago [ 2] resource distribution, better public services, reduction of poverty as well as redistribution of power, electoral system reform to elect local authorities directly, transfer the decision-making power in favor of the local level, and distribution of financial resources. Based on these objectives, countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico have sought to deepen their federal systems, while the unitary Andean countries have been, in many ways, the laboratory where decentralization reforms have been in part first applied in the region. The Andes, in particular, has been one region in which the limitations and contradictions of implementing decentralization in favor of democracy have been very visible. In particular, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Colombia and Venezuela have sought to bring stability into their liberal and representative systems of government. What is more, they expressly sought to deepen their fragile democratization processes in order to achieve consolidation. Based on those aspirations, proponents and political elites have modified (and continue to do so to this day) the systems of government through the reform and also the introduction of institutions to promote, primarily, the involvement of citizens in the political process to consequently bring democracy closer to the people (World Bank and UCLG 2008). However, while the region has accumulated a respectable amount of years under what can be called procedural democracy largely assumed to be due to democratically oriented decentralization measures the democratic systems of these countries have been notoriously volatile, swaying between relative procedural stability and severe periods of political and social crises. Several examples come to mind, the phenomenon of presidential breakdowns, increased social and political unrest, many notorious unconstitutional outcomes, the emergence of new political elites coming from social movements rather than traditional political parties, the collapse of the political system and the ever weakening belief in the virtues of democratic institutions. This paradox brings to light the troublesome relationship between decentralization and the democratic process. The result of all this has been a rising skepticism from the part of citizens towards democracy and the promises it has made. Some scholars have called to attention the lack of studies empirically testing the link between decentralization and the deepening of democracy (Oxhorn et al 2004). There is very little empirically-based work written about the effects of decentralization on the democratic process. Most of what has been written lies within the assessments of decentralization as a policy, whereby democratization is an underlying component and a quasi-automatic result. The majority of studies make an implicit assumption about democratization being an underlying condition for

4 Miguel A. Buitrago [ 3] decentralization and local democracy (Rondinelli 1984; Diamond 1999; Oxhorn et al 2004). Therefore, there is a need for more studies dealing directly with the exploration, the better understanding and the analysis of this relationship (Montero and Samuels 2004). On the back of that context, this paper aims at answering the following research questions: How has decentralization affected the democratic deepening process? Has decentralization achieved its objectives of deepening the democratic process? What are the mechanisms by which decentralization shapes democracy? How has the institutional framework been transformed by decentralization? To what extent do these institutions transform democracy into a more/less deliberative, representative and participative process? It is important to think about the effects decentralization has had on the liberal-representative democratic process. As mentioned above, initially decentralization was conceptually considered as a policy tool; a mere piece of legislation, which would help the State achieve efficiency in the provision of public services, accountability and transparency as well as establish its presence all over the territory and become aware of the local necessities in places other than the most important cities in the country. While these were sensible objectives and very relevant at the time, the implementation of decentralization turned out to be much more complex than it had been expected. The source of this complexity is found at the nexus of decentralization and democracy. Because decentralization has been so closely related to democracy, the expectations about decentralization have been substantial and not unfounded. Decentralization, after all, has had from the beginning on the potential to bring about significant state reform through the introduction of legislation which seeks to materialize ideological objectives guided by values, in this case, liberal democratic values. This has been especially evident in the Andean region because the changes made to the regime systems through legislation have potentially had a direct and significant impact, not only on the governing systems but also on the lives of the citizens. Such decentralization programs overwhelmingly relied on the reform or creation of institutions which were to constitute political spaces as well as mechanisms where the democratizing objectives and values were to realize. The introduction of deliberative, participative and additional representative spaces 2 has been one form in which the regime system has been substantially modified with the reform or introduction of 2 Institutions such as councils, assemblies, committees, town hall meetings and juntas, where the citizenry could come together in different formats to deliberate and participate or to delegate their representat ion.

5 Miguel A. Buitrago [ 4] new institutions. Another form of modifying the system of government has been the introduction of new forms of organization 3 and the formal recognition 4 of existing civil society organizations where people also find places to deliberate, participate and be represented or become representatives. How far and significant such reforms could be has only become clearer after the evaluation of the first experiences with the efforts to deepen the democratic processes. The implications of the changes to the democratic system of government have had significant effects on the character of the democratic process. While the desired effects have been to transform democracy into a more deliberative, participative and representative process, the real effects may not be as desirable or they may even be unforeseeable. The study of the Andean region s experience is particularly useful because it is in this region where the general belief on decentralization s democratizing benefits was placed into practice. Out of these experiences there have been many positive as well as negative lessons learned. Some of the negative have been raised, for example, by Mascareño (2008) who expressed several doubts about the implementation of decentralization: a process of re-centralization (Latin America), the claim that the relationship between the degree of decentralization and the degree of consolidation of democracy is inverse (this is a function of political culture, functioning of political parties, participation system and accountability), the institutional context is weaker in non-consolidated democracies, the effects of decentralization on democracy are not causal but are accumulative (this gives democracies room to evolve on their own), decentralization affects the strength of the political party system which places pressure on it by disintegrating the system making the parties less efficient in aggregation of preferences and therefore affect democratic governance. To this list I would add the possibility of an anti-systemic group gaining power and contributing to the regression of the democratic process. That is, in a setting where the institutional context in a non-consolidated democracy is weak, decentralization opens up political spaces to encourage the participation of citizens in the political process. This opportunity may be the right one for some groups with anti-democratic intentions to engage the system and pursue the taking of power. Since the democratic principles give any group, at least theoretically, equal opportunity and 3 For example indigenous organizations based on ethnicity or other based on territory. 4 That is the formal attribution of legal entity status that the courts or an official agency gives to an organization.

6 Miguel A. Buitrago [ 5] incentives to gain power, any given anti-systemic group have the best conditions to achieve their political goals. This paper, taking an institutional approach, centers on the experiences of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, where a common base for comparison exists because almost all democratic processes introduced in these countries (for that matter in Latin America in the last 30 years) were based on the idea of liberal democracy. First, all countries share a common contextual framework, i.e. culturally, politically and historically. They speak Spanish, therefore sharing a common language and culture as well as a geographic area in South America. Second, they joined the democratization process during the third wave of democracy, which places them at a specific period in time. Third, each country has been experimenting with decentralization within the larger context of development help and democratic consolidation. Fourth, however, while each of them implemented decentralization with a similar aim, each decentralization program was implemented under different conditions, with particularly different objectives, with different motivations and varied reforms. Venezuela, for instance, was a federal country with strong centralist tendencies. Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador, in contrast are unitary countries with centralist tendencies as well but different social, economic and political conditions. Bolivia and Ecuador share a strong ethnic component with groups having a common identity. Colombia has dealt with an armed conflict spanning over 40 years while preserving democratic features. Chile and Peru will not be taken into account because, the first one did not formally engaged into a decentralization program and the second country has been lagging the rest of the countries behind, to the extent that it has only achieve a timid type of financial decentralization. Moreover, in this paper I concentrate on the period before the introduction of the so called socialism of the XXI century. Primarily, because during this period liberal democracy was the model to be adopted and the reforms sought to get as close as possible to the ideal model. The regimes that followed the period in question and subscribed to the above mentioned ideology, starting with Venezuela, introduced a more authoritarian type of democratic model, which begin with the introduction of a new constitution. Furthermore, I seek to make explicit the ways in which the implementation of decentralization shapes the democratic system of government. In order to achieve this I conduct a cross-comparison study of four Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela) looking at their democratic government systems reforms introduced through legislation. I focus on the reforms and the institutions that were introduced.

7 Miguel A. Buitrago [ 6] Next, I assess the variation in the changes within the system based on three dimensions of democratic deepening, i.e. participation, deliberation and representation. Last, empirically observing the cases, I draw some conclusions. Decentralization and the deepening of democracy Since the 1950s, much has been written on the subject of decentralization as a policy instrument with a potential to shape the state. Especially during the 1970s and 1980s, proponents, based on liberal and neoliberal tenets, aptly argued that decentralization would induce economic development, reduction of poverty, and, above all, bring much needed reform to an ailing centralist state that had been showing its imperfections and inadequacies for a long time (Reis 1967; Finot 2001). The widely accepted argument in this debate proposed that decentralization was an agent of local, regional and thus national development (Rondinelli et al. 1983; Hollis 1997; Salinas 2000). That meant, based on the principle of subsidiarity, that it would be more efficient for subnational governments to take up responsibility in particular areas of government services such as education, health, and local investment in infrastructure instead of the central government. Therefore, the debate centered on the performance of government, including efficiency, transparency, and accountability in the provision of public goods (Faguet 2003; Hiskey and Seligson 2003). An additional important point in this debate was the fact that central governments were to provide for the adequate financial resources to decentralized subnational governments (Galindo and Medina 1995; Tanzi 2001; Stein 1999). This debate weighted the benefits of automatic transfers and attributions to tax local constituencies in efforts to self-reliance of local governments. Lastly, another important point was the discussion about citizen participation and how important was it for the positive development of decentralization (Blanes 1999a; Blanes 1999b; Bade and Sainz 1998; Thevoz 2001). Throughout the 1970s, and for a better part of the 1980s, the conception of decentralization was dominated by the neo-liberal side of the argument, primarily substantiated by the work of the development agencies. However, as the experiences with decentralization around the world accumulated, the first assessments began to appear in the 1990s. Proponents and scholars alike recognized the limitations, contradictions and, most of all, the implications of decentralization for the democratic process. These implications went well beyond development and the reform of the sate. Because decentralization had been increasingly implemented with the idea of bringing

8 Miguel A. Buitrago [ 7] democracy to the people and provide incentives for those people to take part in the political process, scholars and practitioners began to pay attention to the link between decentralization and democratic elements such as subnational level elections or mechanisms for citizen participation, for much weak that they were (Manor 1999, 8-10). In addition, the debate contemplated the relationship between decentralization and inter-governmental relations (Arandia 2002), social equality (Gómez 2006), constitutional issues (Barrios 2004), conflicts (Kieveliz and Schorttshammer 2005), the strengthening of civil society (Montero and Samuels 2004; Selee and Tulchin 2004) and the political considerations of politicians to decentralize (O Neill 2004). As the new millennium arrived, conceptual differences emerged, such as the definition of decentralization, the types to be implemented, who initiated the efforts, the objectives to be achieved and the effects after implementation (Manor 1999). The most recent debates have discussed how decentralization has been able to influence democratic governance and participatory democracy (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007; Cameron 2010; Goldfrank 2011). All in all, decentralization has become yet another contested concept. However, it developed a peculiarity. Because it was generally associated with the democratization process, pretty much all agreed on one thing: that decentralization contributed to the deepening of democracy. Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) concluded that decentralization encompassed not only the transfer of power, authority and responsibility but also the sharing of authority and resources for shaping public policy within society. Because decentralization has been associated so closely with democracy in the sense that it contributed to citizen participation in the political process, the debate has significantly overlapped with the discussion on democratic deepening. Fung and Wright (2003) defined democracy to be understood as a system of government where aside from holding regular free and fair elections, people assuming equal rights should actively take part in government and are some how part of the decision-making process, then the question of deepening of democracy as in making democracy more democratic should address the aspects of deeper participation, deliberation and enhanced representation. They pointed out the deficiencies representative democracy had been showing throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. They also pointed out that as a result there were attempts being made at deepening democratic ideals, such as citizen involvement and consented solutions to social problems, around the world. These efforts to deepen the democratic process involved the implementation of reforms to precisely render the process more participative, deliberative and empowered.

9 Miguel A. Buitrago [ 8] The debate on the deepening of democracy has primarily concentrated on the participation aspect of democracy and the development of a vibrant civil society as well as the development of the institutional arrangements in which participation can be practiced. According to Gaventa (2006), the deepening of democracy is a strand or a school of thought within the democracy wide debate about the construction of a concept. He says that deepening of democracy focuses on developing and sustaining substantive and empowered citizen participation in the political process that what is normally found in liberal representative democracy alone. On her part, Harbers (2007, 40) defined it as such: Deepening of democracy calls for the restructuring of state-society relations. One of its central elements is the emphasis on the promotion of democratic values such as participation and deliberation. Democratic deepening requires opening the political system to all citizens (Adams 2003, 133). Because even under formally democratic Latin American regimes access to the political system has been denied to large sections of society, the creation of more inclusive political-institutional arrangements is necessary. In agreement with Fung and Wright (2003), Harbers (2007, 41) further highlights that: [While] proponents of deepening democracy, who criticize polyarchy as insufficient, share with it an emphasis on institutionalized processes. Much of the deepening democracy literature focuses on institutional design....participatory institutions should facilitate and structure the active involvement of large numbers of citizens in policy-making. Getting the institutions of participation right is therefore a central concern. The assumption is that if the institutions are right the democratic process will deepen. However, these institutions are themselves subject to weaknesses or even failures. The Human Development Report 2002 argues that to tackle democratic deficits, much attention must be paid to institutions and democratic politics. Institutions must be accountable because they can be subverted by corruption, captured by local, regional or local elites, they can have an inadequate reach and have gaps in the democratic practice. Nonetheless, these democratic institutional deficits can be addressed by: a) developing stronger vehicles for formal political participation and representation through political parties and electoral systems (improving governance in political parties, promoting participation of minorities, building electoral systems and limit the distorting influence of money in politics); b) decentralizing democratically by devolving power from the central to the local governments (widen participation, especially of minorities); and c) developing strong and independent media.

10 Miguel A. Buitrago [ 9] Furthermore, according to Gaventa (2006), there is a consensus over citizen participation in institutional arrangements and its relationship with the deepening of participation. He argues that the new questions focus on how to do this right. He posits four sub-schools or approaches to strengthen citizen engagement: a) civil society democracy; b) participatory democracy; c) deliberative democracy; and d) empowered participatory democracy. First of all, civil society democracy argues for the strengthening of civil society as a counterbalance for the state. One critique to this sub-school is that the virtues of civil society are assumed. Concerning participatory democracy, it focuses on the deepening democratic engagement through the participation of citizens in governance, i.e. co-governance. A particular critique is that participation can easily become abused or captured by elites. Regarding deliberative democracy, it focuses on the nature and quality of deliberation that occurs when citizens come together. The critique to this sub-school is that many times the deliberative process is arduous, complex and not conducive to efficient and fast solutions. And finally, empowered participatory governance was developed by Fung and Wright (2003). It entails bottom-up participation, pragmatic orientation to solve concrete problems, foster deliberation, focus on devolution, coordination and supervision by strong central body, and attempt to harness state power. Lastly, Harbers (2007, 41) proposes five dimensions of participation that contribute to the deepening of democracy. First, she argues that the moment of participation in the policy process is important as most participation is brief (referendum or election). Participation should be over longer periods of time and throughout the policy process. Second, processes need to be institutionalized and turned into regularized pattern of interactions with civil society organizations. Third, participation should have a concrete orientation towards problem solving because citizens are closer to the problems. Fourth, opinions should be generated through deliberation as citizens participate as equals in this process. Fifth, legitimacy should be derived from the deliberative process. The significant overlap between the debates about decentralization and the deepening of democracy provide the basis and the rationale for the linkage between decentralization and democracy. Both debates concentrate on participation, deliberation as well as more implicitly the representation of citizens. Central to this argument is the role of institutions, which make-up the institutional framework in a democracy.

11 Miguel A. Buitrago [ 10] Democratizing institutions: participation, deliberation and representation Figure 1 Reform Creation Decentralization Modification of the Liberal-Representative System of Government Electoral Institutions Governmental Institutions Non-governmental Institutions Deliberation Participation Enhanced Representation Democractic System's Deepening Dimensions If decentralization has been able to shape the democratic system of government, the reason has been because decentralization provides for institutional reform and invention (Grindle 2000). Manor (1999) has argued that any decentralizing reform needed to be accompanied by democratic elements if it was to be accepted by all. These democratic elements are mainly meant to be participative and deliberative mechanisms which allow an increased and more direct involvement of the citizen in the affairs of local, and even national, governments. This statement can also be formulated in terms of the democratic deepening debate, which conceptualizes a democratic deepening process in three dimensions: deliberation, participation and representation, albeit participation takes much more attention than participation and representation is largely implied. These dimensions qualify a deep democracy, where there is a significant level of citizen involvement in the political process, and this involvement is in the form of deliberation or participation, aside from being already representative. At the same time, the democratic process becomes even more representative because, the more participation, the more representation of the general population through the participation of citizens in the participatory mechanisms introduced in the system of government. This last consideration assumes that not all citizens can

12 Miguel A. Buitrago [ 11] actually participate, with some preferring to designate representatives and others simply not wanting to take part in the system. Manor (1999) has proposed several types of democratic mechanisms, which can basically be denominated electoral and non-electoral institutions. In the efforts to transition from a centralist to a decentralized state, the direct election of subnational authorities is a significant step towards deeper democracy and decentralization. At the same time, the reform or introduction of participatory or deliberative institutions such as assemblies, control committees, deliberative bodies, councils or direct democracy elements such as citizen initiatives, referenda and recall referenda, constitute a whole array of possible mechanisms decentralization may introduce in order to further the depth of democracy. Since these mechanisms are introduced through legislation, they are a significant change in the democratic system of government. In this respect, the analysis in this paper assumes that a liberal type democracy is in place. Liberal, in the sense that, it is a representative democracy based on Schumpeterian tradition where elites act as intermediaries between the governed and government and those elites represent the interests of the governed. It is also an idea based on the concept of polyarchy, or as others call, electoral democracy. This means that the democracy fulfills the basic requirements outlined by Dahl in his discussion of polyarchies. In addition, however, this type of democracy seeks to guarantee some, if not all, of the most basic social, political and human rights that citizens are attributed to. This idea goes beyond the basic political rights touched by polyarchies and reaches the realm of liberalism by asserting rights such as freedom of violence, social equality, etc., among which citizen participation is an important value as well as a right (Diamond 1999). This paper also assumes that decentralization is a dynamic, multi-level and multi-dimension process (Buitrago 2012). It is a multi-level because it can be implemented at the supra-national, national, subnational and local levels of government. It is a multi-dimensional because it can be implemented in a temporal, degree and type manner. The temporal dimension includes decentralization that can be applied in a big-bang fashion or at once, or alternatively it can be either implemented according to a specific sequence, degree (as in intensity) or deliberatively designed to be progressive, as in incremental phases. Decentralization can also be implemented by degree, which is by deconcentrating, delegating, devolving or giving altogether autonomy. Finally, decentralization can be implemented in political, administrative, financial and economic

13 Miguel A. Buitrago [ 12] areas of interest. Lastly, decentralization is a dynamic process because any one of these elements can move in any direction, either contributing to the progression or regression of the process (Buitrago 2012). The conception of decentralization as a process provides us with an analytical framework flexible enough to resemble reality but constrained enough by the parameters already mentioned. Within this framework, depicted in Figure 1 above, decentralization is then considered to have primarily introduced significant reforms to the democratic systems of government in the countries being analyzed. For one, decentralization legislation introduced, in accordance to the objectives drawn by each government, institutions which aimed not only to further decentralization but also to incentivize the participation of citizens in the political process, as active or passive actors. The type of institutions can be categorized as electoral, governmental and non-governmental institutions. First of all, electoral institutions aim at increasing the level of participation of the citizenry in national, regional and local elections. These types of institutions serve primarily to strengthen the representative dimension of democracy as well as induce legitimacy for the system. Citizens are free to get involved in political parties and aspire to a candidacy as well as in other civil society organizations, in the case these are allowed to take part in elections. Important to highlight are the introduction of subnational elections in countries with centralist traditions, such as the Andean countries. Governmental institutions are those institutions which further the representation, participation and deliberation dimensions. These institutions are local or regional assemblies introduced by the decentralization in places where there was no government representation and no other type of institution for citizens to become involved in the political process. Such assemblies provide any citizen with the opportunity to directly become involved in the political process. In addition, decentralization can also introduce deliberative (in many cases consultative) bodies which may serve, for the most part, a coordinating role between subnational and local governments with the national government. These entities allow citizens to become involved in the political process with out them having to take part in elections. Finally, decentralization can also introduce non-governmental entities which might have a controlling function, such as control committees or a representative function which might seek to organize and strengthen civil society, such as indigenous organizations. Similarly, these institutions allow citizens to get involved without having to take part in elections and becoming a part of the political machinery.

14 Miguel A. Buitrago [ 13] The institutions introduced by decentralization have a democratizing potential because they help achieve many of the objectives sought by the decentralizing agent. For example, the political and administrative decentralization of government duties to subnational levels of government can significantly and determinately expand the presence of government over the entire national territory to places where government was not existent. This expansion of government helps bring the democratic process much closer to the people. In this sense, people might be able to vote more often, deal with bureaucratic duties that were unreachable before and even enjoy the presence of the state closer to the people. Another example is financial decentralization where financial resources are transferred from the national to the subnational level of governments. This way, much needed resources reach local governments and these governments can build up their services for citizens. Lastly, institutions which open political spaces for the participation of citizens serve several purposes. Primarily, institutions, such as control committees or civil society organizations, provide incentives for people to take interest in the local political affairs. Moreover, beyond the interest in the political process, such participation has the benefits of accumulating valuable democratic skills such as experience and better understanding of the state and the democratic process and thus building up social capital as well as perhaps being a spring board for further involvement in the political process in other levels of government. Of course, that democratizing potential is dependent on other factors which are not able be accounted for in a study such as this. Much of the success depends on the very multidimensionality of decentralization. Every element mentioned has potential to contribute or not to the democratization process. For example, if a government does not decentralize the obligations of a state in a sensible manner and instead it deconcentrates rather than devolve, the incentives for citizens to participate are bound to be low. Deconcentration, in many respects, means a significant dependency from the center. If the responsibility to educate is deconcentrated to the local level but the ability of hiring or firing teachers still dependent on the national government, the local government is heavily dependent on the central government and thus it cannot fulfill the expectations of the citizens. The same might happen if the obligations are devolved but not the financial ability to dispose of an own budget. Similarly, administrative decentralization may place many burdens to a local government that is not politically decentralized.

15 Miguel A. Buitrago [ 14] Decentralization processes in the Andes Table 1 Year Legislation Bolivia 1994 Law 1551 Law of Popular Participation 1994 Law 1585 Political Constitution (reform) 1995 Law 1654 Law of Administrative Decentralization 1996 Law 1702 Reforms to Law No LPP 1999 Law 2028 Law of Municipalities 2000 Law 2150 Law of Political and Administrative Units 2001 Law 2296 Law of Municipal Expenditures 2004 Law 2650 Reform to the Political Constitution of the State 2004 Law 2769 Law of Referendum 2004 Law 2771 Law of Citizen Organizations and Indigenous Peoples 2005 D.S Call to Elections for Prefect ( ) Colombia 1986 Constitutional Reform of the Municipal Government 1991 Political Constitution of the State 1994 Law 134 Citizen Participation Mechanisms 1994 Law 136 Municipal Councils 2000 Law 617 Territorial Entities Financing 2001 Constitutional Reform 2001 Law 715 General System of Participation Ecuador 1993 Law of State Modernization, Privatization and Provision of Public Services 1997 Special Law for the Distribution of 15% of the Central Government s Budget in Favor of Sectional Governments 1997 Application Regulations for the Special Law for the Distribution of 15% of the Central Government s Budget in Favor of Sectional Governments 1997 Special Law for the Decentralization of the State and Social Participation 1998 Political Constitution of the Ecuadorian Republic Venezuela 1961 Constitution of the Republic of Venezuela 1989 Law for the Election and Removal of Governors 1989 Reform of the Organic Law of the Municipal Regime to create and elect a Mayor

16 Miguel A. Buitrago [ 15] 1989 Organic Law of Decentralization, Delimitation and Transfer of Competencies 1993 Partial Regulation n 2 of the Decentralization Law which Creates the National Commission for Decentralization 1993 Partial Regulation n 3 of the Decentralization Law which Creates the Territorial Council of the Government 1993 Decree n which Creates the National Council of Mayors 1996 Law for the Special Assignments to the States Derived from the mines and hydrocarbons sectors Source: Compendio Normativo Sobre la Descentralización, 2005 and Compendio de Leyes: Legislación Boliviana desde 1825 a 2009; Velazques, Fabio Dilemas e Incertidumbres de la Descentralización en Colombia. In La Descentralización en el Ecuador: Opciones Comparadas. Quito: FLACSO Ecuador. (pgs ); Political Data Base of the Americas (PDBA); Ojeda, Lautaro. 2000; La Descentralizacíon en el Ecuador. Avatares de un Proceso Inconcluso. Quito: Abya-Yala; Barrera, Augusto Agotamiento de la Descentralización y Oportunidades de Cambio en el Ecuador. In La Descentralización en el Ecuador: Opciones Comparadas. Quito: FLACSO Ecuador. (pgs ); Carrión, Fernando and Manuel Dammert La descentralización en Ecuador: Un tema de estado. In La descentralización en el Ecuador: Opciones comparadas, edited by Fernando Carrión, Quito: FLACSO; Hurtado, Edison Política, Descentralización y Autonomías en el Ecuador ( ). Incentivos, Debates y Agendas Pendientes. In La descentralización en el Ecuador: Opciones comparadas, edited by Fernando Carrión, Quito: FLACSO; Mascareño, Carlos El federalismo Venezolano: Bases historico-politicas y relaciones intergubernamentales. In Arreglos Federativos y Relaciones Intergubernamentales. Un Panorama de las Américas. Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada, Brasil. Unpublished. Decentralization in the Andes, while at least mentioned in many of the constitutions in the decades prior to the third wave of democratization, took hold during the initial phase of the redemocratization era. There were two significant developments that led to this: a) the economic crisis of the 1970s, which uncovered for many the significant weaknesses of the central state and was the reason why the state lost legitimacy; and b) the return to democratic rule, which laid the real incentives for decentralization due to the politicians desire to bring back the lost legitimacy of the state and the desire to consolidate the young and fragile democratic processes (Finot 2001; Mascareño 2008). Many scholars have long argued about the impossibility of discerning a model of decentralization applied to Latin America. In fact Carrión (2003, 20) argues that because the concept is contested, there is no one definition. This means that, since the manner in which decentralization has been applied in each country has been different, according to each case s particular necessities, experiences and political environment, each decentralization process has produced a particular model very different from the others. However, other scholars have recognized certain trends despite this heterogeneity. For example, Blackman (2003, 57-58) observes three: 1) the direct election of sub-national authorities; 2) the coming closer of local authorities to the local population, which furthered more interaction among the citizens and the state; and 3) the nonlinear progression of all the processes, which might result in stagnation, progression or regression

17 Miguel A. Buitrago [ 16] of the process. Carrión himself makes a distinction, albeit a temporal one, in which he differentiates among phases of implementation. The first phase he calls municipalization, which is when the municipality emerges as the center of attention and where power tends to concentrate at the sub-national level. This happens even to the extent to place in question the national level. The second phase is one where the intermediate or middle level of government regains importance and therefore more emphasis is placed on it by the national governments. The third and current phase is the ebb the decentralization process is experiencing, where many countries are re-designing their processes or re-thinking their approaches to decentralization (25-28). In the Andean countries under analysis, some of these trends are observable. Table 1 shows that the decentralization processes under the liberal democratic model in the region were implemented from roughly the mid 1980s to the first half of the 2000s with a series of constitutional as well as legal reforms. Pioneer in this endeavor was Colombia. Confronted with a long running armed conflict which had resulted in a loss of control in large parts of the territory, the Colombian state, and even more the most affected local population, saw decentralization as a means to regain that control. Especially important was the inclusion of the citizenry in the political process in order to gain legitimacy. Caught up in the weaknesses of its centralist-federalism, Venezuela sought to enhance its federalist system of government. On their part, Bolivia and Ecuador were heavily influenced by regional demands for more decentralized decision-making (Carrion 2003; Ojeda 2003). For the most part, decentralization reforms concentrated on the departmental and municipal levels of government as well as on the type and degree dimensions. All of the countries under analysis have national, intermediate and municipal levels of governments, albeit with different nomenclatures. Bolivia and Colombia use departments for their sub-national levels, while Ecuador uses province and Venezuela uses federal state. All countries except Bolivia make a difference at the municipal level between rural and urban municipalities, where rural municipalities often do not reach the full recognition as municipalities but rather as districts. While in Colombia urban municipalities are denominated districts or co mmunes, rural municipalities were denominated corregimientos 5. In Ecuador, where this distinction was also used, a municipality was an urban municipal territory while the rural municipality was called 5 Corregimientos are a legacy of colonial times. In Castilla they were a form of territorial organization where a Corregidor would govern in the name of the crown.

18 Miguel A. Buitrago [ 17] parroquia 6. Venezuela, on its part, makes a distinction between municipality, metropolitan district and parroquia. Each of which have their own territorial reach with the metropolitan district often reaching beyond the municipality and the parroquia often being a division of the municipality. All countries except Venezuela eventually provided for the organization or creation of indigenous municipalities or territories. All countries under analysis applied primarily two types of decentralization: administrative and financial decentralization. Based on the premise that without adequate financial resources no decentralization could be achieved, all countries provided for the transfer of financial resources to the sub-national entities. Bolivia set up an automatic transfer to the municipal governments which the national government could not intervene anymore, while Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela conditioned the transfers to the accomplishment of a set of objectives. All countries however, primarily deconcentrated and delegated tasks to the sub-national governments. This was in contrast to providing devolution or real autonomy. Often is the word autonomy used, however the real case is deconcentration and devolution. All countries except Bolivia deconcentrated administrative tasks to both, the intermediate and municipal levels of governments. Bolivia was the only country where the municipal level was overwhelmingly privileged to the detriment of the department level, which at some point in time prompted the question whether it was needed or not. All countries delegated the responsibility over the provision of education, health, sanitation, sport, culture and infrastructure services. Bolivia and Ecuador went beyond and made serious attempts at devolving some responsibilities, Bolivia to the municipalities in the provision of infrastructure and Ecuador in the use of privatization to address infrastructure services as well. Finally, all countries in this study aimed at providing for citizen involvement, however only Colombia and Bolivia realized these objectives to a large extent creating institutional mechanisms for participation. The institutional arrangements: Political spaces for the deepening of democracy Within the framework of their decentralization efforts, the countries under study created and reformed a series of institutions which aimed at providing political spaces for citizen involvement in the political process (to different degrees) and enhance the deliberative quality and the 6 Parroquia comes from the Catholic Church and is the jurisdiction where the Párroco or Priest has its influence. It is soften comparable to a neighborhood.

19 Miguel A. Buitrago [ 18] representativeness of their systems. In that regard, several types of mechanisms were introduced, which were not mutually exclusive and could overlap to a larger extent. Along the participative dimension, all countries being studied introduced or reformed governmental institutions to enhance or incentivize more participation in elections; for example, the figure of referendum and that of the citizen initiative as well as deliberative or consultative mechanisms. Such institutions were part of the national, intermediate and municipal levels of government in the sense that they were part of the administrative apparatus or were connected to the work of the government. For example, all four countries included enhancements or reforms to the electoral rules, albeit voting rights were already firmly established in each country. Moreover, they introduced the figure of referendum in its several varieties. Bolivia adopted the national and local referendum. The national referendum served the national government to consult the citizenry on issues of national importance. In addition, the recall referendum was adopted to give citizens the chance to remove the president from office, at the national level and the mayors, at the municipal level. Ecuador adopted the option of recall referendum and Venezuela the option of a referendum at the municipal level. Colombia is the country that adopted the most varieties of referendum. For instance, Colombia makes a difference between referendum, popular consultation and plebiscite. A referendum was to be employed to either approve a proposed law or revoke a law in execution, and it can be initiated by the citizenry at every level of government. A popular consultation was adopted to consult the citizenry in a matter of national, intermediate or municipal importance and could be initiated by the respective government. A plebiscite is the consultation mechanism the national government uses to consult the citizenry about a determined government action. In similar terms, Ecuador adopted the popular consultation mechanism. In terms of citizen initiative, Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela adopted the mechanism to allow citizens to propose legislation. However, only Bolivia and Colombia allowed their citizens to make such proposals at all levels of government, while Venezuela restricted it to the national level and to the municipal level only in the case of creating or merging municipalities. In the areas of consultation and deliberation, only Bolivia and Colombia adopted the town hall meetings and the more restrictive local deliberative and consultative institutions such as juntas and councils. The town hall meetings were meetings, organized by the local government, to

20 Miguel A. Buitrago [ 19] which the citizenry had the right to attend. These meetings served primarily to exchange knowledge and information as well as opinions between the citizens and the local legislatures. Local juntas and councils were adopted primarily to provide a consultative and deliberative place where citizens, in their official functions, could exchange opinions over local issues. But, participative mechanisms could also stand without the involvement of government. In contrast to Colombia, which did not introduce any non-governmental mechanism of participation, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela introduced several. Bolivia created the vigilance committees, which in essence were state-controlling institutions made up by representatives of civil society organizations. These would control the local government s actions on policy-making, investment, and public service. Ecuador adopted the organization of political movements, neighborhood committees and federations as well as parroquial juntas and indigenous and black peoples organizations. These institutions would control local governments and bring to attention local issues. In similar terms, Venezuela introduced the neighborhood associations, which had local focus. Along the deliberative dimension, all countries reaffirmed their structures across all levels of governments, according to their territorial organizations. That is, all countries established their intermediate and municipal governments with the respective departmental assemblies in Bolivia and Colombia, provincial or regional councils in Ecuador and state legislative assemblies in the case of Venezuela. Moreover, all countries established the municipal assemblies or councils. These are two of the most important deliberative institutions where elected citizens can d irectly take part in the political process. In addition to these, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela created other deliberative institutions for their respective intermediate administrative divisions. For instance, Colombia created district councils and local juntas, with a district being a level between a department and a municipality and a junta being at times within a municipality. In similar terms, Ecuador created provincial, regional, canton councils and Venezuela parroquial juntas. Within the non-governmental area, Bolivia was the only country which introduced the so called vigilance committees and the education and health juntas. In the vigilance committees, representatives of the local civil society discussed the actions of the local government and could agree on actions to be taken against it if irregularities were found. By the same token, the