Democratization in a Divided Society Outcomes and Issues in International Assistance Misa SHOJIYA

Transcription

1 Working Paper Series No. 66 Democratization in a Divided Society Outcomes and Issues in International Assistance Misa SHOJIYA Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies Ryukoku University

2 Mission of the Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies Poverty and other issues associated with development are commonly found in many Asian and African countries. These problems are interwoven with ethnic, religious and political issues, and often lead to incessant conflicts with violence. In order to find an appropriate framework for conflict resolution, we need to develop a perspective which will fully take into account the wisdom of relevant disciplines such as economics, politics and international relations, as well as that fostered in area studies. Building on the following expertise and networks that have been accumulated in Ryukoku University in the past (listed below), the Centre organises research projects to tackle new and emerging issues in the age of globalisation. We aim to disseminate the results of our research internationally, through academic publications and engagement in public discourse. 1. Tradition of Religious and Cultural Studies 2. Expertise of Participatory Research / Inter-civic Relation Studies 3. Expertise in Southwest Asian and African Studies 4. New Approaches to the Understanding of Other Cultures in Japan 5. Domestic and International Networks with Major Research Institutes

3 Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies Democratization in a Divided Society Outcomes and Issues in International Assistance Misa SHOJIYA Working Paper Series No

4 C2009 Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies 1-5 Yokotani, Seta Oe-cho, Otsu, Shiga, JAPAN All rights reserved ISBN The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies. The publication of the Working Paper Series is supported by the Academic Frontier Centre (AFC) research project In Search of Societal Mechanisms and Institutions for Conflict Resolution: Perspectives of Asian and African Studies and Beyond ( ), funded by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, and Ryukoku University.

5 Democratization in a Divided Society Outcomes and Issues in International Assistance Misa Shojiya * INTRODUCTION The main objective of this paper is to examine outcomes and issues in international assistance efforts for the democratization of divided societies in order to consider appropriate approaches to democratization assistance for peacebuilding in Afrasia. Today democratization in peace-building has become a significant theme for the international community. This is due to the fact that the international community shares the recognition that promoting democracy is the key for the success of peacebuilding processes in regions where there is a potential risk of recurrence of armed conflict. As David Held writes about democracy, 1 the international community recognizes that democracy forms the core of political institutions embodying democratic virtues or is the core component of the institutions based on a pursuit of a good life guaranteeing free and equal participation which is the foundation of the above recognition. In addition, the institutions which should be rebuilt in postconflict regions are necessarily those with the intention to reconstruct the identity of their fragmented states. Therefore, coexistence is also the key for institutional reconstruction in divided societies. 2 In the 1990 s democratization is argued extensively in the academic discipline of International Relations (IR). In the academic debates promoting democratization by international community s assistance is sometimes controversial, and therefore, the assessments of democratization project are different from different perspectives. It is because democratization by the international community provokes the arguments on the issue of sovereignty, one of the core themes in IR. This paper assesses the ten-year international assistance program for the democratization of Bosnia Herzegovina (Bosnia) from The Bosnian War ended by the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) in 1995 and since then the international community has been involved deeply in a peacebuilding process. According to the DPA, the main objective was to build a democratic state with international assistance, where all the nations Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs can live together in one state after the bitter conflict. As we can imagine, the process of promoting democracy in post-dayton Bosnia was tremendously challenging. Since the experience of post-dayton Bosnia is an enormous and comprehensive peacebuilding project * Misa Shojiya is Research Assistant at Afrasian Research Centre for Peace and Development Studies; Doctoral Candidate of the Graduate School of Law, Kobe University. 1 David Held, Democracy to Sekai Citsujyo (Democracy and Global Order) (NTT Syuppan, 2002), p Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence (Lexington Books, 2001), p

6 in the post cold war era, the case provides us with some significant lessons for the future of Afrasian states. 1. Democratization for Peacebuilding 1-1. Definitions Democracy is defined by seven attributes: elected officials; free and fair elections; inclusive suffrage; the right to run for office; freedom of expression; alternative information and associational autonomy, according to Robert Dahl. 3 In the 1990s Boutros Boutros-Ghali, former United Nations Secretary General, expanded the concept of democracy with an idealistic nuance to be a system of government which embodies, in a variety of institutions and mechanisms, the ideal of political power based on the will of the people 4 and defined democratization as a process which leads to a more open, more participatory, less authoritarian society. 5 This paper also defines democratization as a process, nevertheless, without any idealistic nuance, as the overall process of regime change from beginning to end, including both stages of what are generally called in the comparative literature transition to a liberal democracy and its subsequent consolidation Democratization in peace research Focusing on peace and security, democratization has been argued in different contexts from different perspectives in IR. Firstly, researchers in peace studies focus on democratization in postconflict peacebuilding as one of the elements of peace operations after the end of the Cold War. The concept of postconflict peacebuilding is a relatively recent one and so it was variously defined by each researcher. It was Boutros-Ghali in An Agenda for Peace who argued peacebuilding alongside of the other three elements of peace operations, which are preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. 7 In the earlier stage researchers and practitioners emphasized economic operations as the central implementation of peacebuilding operations, however, other operations, such as governance, security and reconciliation were emphasized later. Nicole Ball argued that this tendency of the researchers and practitioners to prioritize the economic aspects of peacebuilding projects was due to the fact that they recognized that economic reconstruction could prevent people in postconflict areas from being mobilized for anti-peace actions. 8 3 Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (Yale University Press, 1989), p Boutros Boutrous-Ghali, An Agenda for Democratization, UN Document, A/51/761 (1996). 5 ibid. 6 David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton (2 nd edition, Pluto Press, 2000), p Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, UN Document (1992). 8 Nicole Ball, The Challenge of Rethinking War-tone Societies, in Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, Pamela Aall, eds., Turbulent Peace (USIP, 2000), p

7 Nevertheless, this trend has changed as a result of several examples indicating the risks for peacebuilders inherent in overestimating economic reconstruction as a main implementation to consolidate peace in war-torn societies. 9 Experience at the international level clarified the significance of the political aspect of peacebuilding to researchers. The political elements of democratization became to be considered as one of the core implementations in peacebuilding operations. For instance, Elizabeth Cousens identified democracy as one of the five basic objectives of postconflict peacebuilding which include a self-regulated ceasefire; self-regulated peace; justice; equality; and democracy. 10 Also, Barnes argued three forces in favor of democracy in postconflict reconstruction: first, the favorable image of democracy in public opinion polls around the world; second, the generally agreed principles of democracy such as participation; and third, economic well-being being associated with democracy. 11 The topic has been argued with reference to these contexts in the post Cold War era in peace studies. However, each researcher and practitioner prioritizes different element for implementation during peace operations. For example, Cousens emphasized self-enforcing peace as the priority in the operation among the five objectives mention above. 12 However, some argue that democracy is not a panacea for national integration in divided societies. For example, Frederick G. Whelan wrote democratic theory itself offers no clear guidance 13 on the conflicts on self-determination. In fact, most civil wars in the 1990s included the problems of self-determination in divided societies. Also, some data argued for a higher possibility of war outbreaks during the transitional periods of democratization contrary to democratic peace theory. 14 The data was been explained by the mechanism that the higher the political participation, the more nationalistic leaders will emerge. Other researchers criticized the issues of democratization on the basis of external actors. Bertram concluded that the UN peacebuilding strategy which prioritizes democratization is limited by three dilemmas: the sovereignty dilemma, the neutrality dilemma, and the security-versus-democracy dilemma. 15 Roland Paris is skeptical of the efficacy of the present principle of peacebuilding, which he thought of as liberal internationalism ibid., p Elizabeth Cousens, Introduction, in Elizabeth M. Cousens, Chetan Kumar and Karin Wermester, eds., Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), pp Samuel H. Barnes, The Contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Postconflict Society, The American Journal of International Law (January 2001), p Cousens (2001), op.cit., p Frederick G. Whelan, Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem, in J. Roland Pencock and John Chapman, eds., Liberal Democracy (New York University Press, 1983), P Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War, International Organization (Spring 2002). 15 Eva Bertram, Reinventing Governments, Journal of Conflict Resolution (September 1995), pp Roland Paris, Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism, International Security (Fall 1997), p

8 1-3. Democratization in practice As for the practices of democratization, the international and regional organizations are the main actors of the implementation, for instance, international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the World Bank (WB), the United Nation of Development Programme (UNDP), and regional organizations such as the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The representatives of these organizations consider democratization as one of the core objectives for their projects, some in the field of postconflict peacebuilding and others in development. Samuel Barnes points out this trend in which democracy has become the dominant political philosophy of the multilateral community. 17 Especially, the UN assumes a significant role as an agent of democratic transitions in Third World states long torn by civil strife. 18 In an earlier stage, Boutros-Ghali in office presented An Agenda for Democratization in 1996 and expressed his belief in the linkage of peace and democratization. 19 Nevertheless, these organizations have different purposes and goals in their operations. For example, the UNDP shifted its focus from on economic growth and administrative capacity building to on a new aid concept of democratic governance in 2002 in the Human Development Report. 20 This report emphasized the significance of political freedom in the context of human development, and it argued that democratic institutions have an important role in promoting a fair society and economic development. On the other hand, the OSCE, the leading regional organization in the field of democratization assistance, built the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in 1992 (originally, Office for Free Elections), and started to play an active role in democratization not only in the European region but also in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The OSCE s active involvement of democratization in the 1990s seems to be based on the idea that democracy is a necessity for good governance, which is essential for protecting minority rights. Concrete initiatives within the OSCE democratization assistance extend across extensive areas including constitutions, administrative institutions, elections, parties, civil society, judicial institutions, police, human rights, medias, and so on Case Study Ten Year Democratization Project in Bosnia In Bosnia, the OSCE took the initiative of democratization for peacebuilding after the civil war. Bosnia is no doubt an interesting case regarding democracy and democratization 17 Barnes, op.cit. 18 Bertram, op.cit. 19 Boutrous-Ghali, (1996), op.cit. 20 The UNDP Website, Human Development Report 2002: Deepening democracy in a fragmented world ( accessed September 1, 2005). 21 The OSCE Website, Activities-democratization ( accessed September 1, 2005). 4

9 because of its history. In its history, the former Yugoslavia failed the processes of democratization twice in the twentieth century, and Bosnia is a microcosm of the former Yugoslavia both with respect to ethnic ratio and the mosaic of demographic patterns. The first failure of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (originally, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) from 1918 to 1941 was caused mainly by the flaws of a majoritarian democracy in a multiethnic state. Thereafter the dissolution of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (originally, the Federal People s Republic of Yugoslavia) from 1945 to 1991 including the former Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina can be summarized as the failure of the democratization of a communist regime. Thus, historically, Bosnia was a showcase of the possible problems of democracy as a part of the former Yugoslavia, and then became an interesting case of democratization efforts by the international community during the 1990s. Peacebuilding project after the Bosnian War of the 1990s is the first experiment of a comprehensive and massive project of peacebuilding by the international community with the main objective of building a democratic state. With reference to Yugoslav history and the Bosnian War, it could be imagined that a project to promote democracy in the divided Bosnian society would have been a tough challenge. Especially, the Bosnian war brought the tragic situation that neighbors killed each other and more than two hundred thousand people died. The bloody memory of the war in Bosnia is a disadvantageous element for successful democratization. In addition, the ethnic distribution in Bosnia can be considered to be antithetical for successful democratization because Bosnia had no distinct majority nationality (45% Bosniaks, 35% Serbs, and 18% Croats in 1992 at the eve of the war). In this situation, the biggest obstacle to democratization in Bosnia is the fact that the majority of two of the nationalities disagreed with the state (in a 1997 survey, 91% of Serbs and 84% of Croats disagreed with a united state, though 98% of Bosniaks supported it). 22 Since the democratic processes in such divided societies as Bosnia have the possibility of causing a negative outcome, that is, a reoccurrence of armed conflict, the project can be to be predicted to be a herculean task Dayton Peace Accord (1995) The war ended by the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) signed in December 1995 in Bosnia. The accord includes the Bosnian constitution, which is the framework of rebuilding the future Bosnia. In the first paragraph of the Annex 4 of the DPA or the Bosnian Constitution, democratization is the key for the post-conflict peace-building as following: Based on respect for human dignity, liberty, and equality, Dedicated to peace, justice, tolerance, and reconciliation, Convinced that democratic governmental institutions and fair 22 Sumantra Bose, The Bosnian State A Decade after Dayton, International Peacekeeping (Autumn 2005), pp

10 procedures best produce peaceful relations within a pluralist society, ( ) Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with Others), and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina hereby determine that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina ( ). 23 The international community appointed the High Representative and authorized it to lead the operation by the Annexes of the DPA. The High Representative was in charge of the constitution and the OSCE for election and human rights, and the European Court of Human Rights was in charge of judicial institutions and the Council of Europe was in charge of the Human Rights Chamber in the democratization project of Bosnia. Thus, with the cooperation of the international and regional organizations based on a particular liberal democratic value, a majestic project of state building started. Charles-Philippe David wrote that realists think that (t)erritorial and political concessions take precedence over reconstituting a unitary and democratic state. 24 Because two major nations do not have a consensus for one state as noted the survey above, it might be said that the Bosnian peace-building started in a realist context. However, liberal context was highlighted by the international community s assistance for democratization as the main goal of the Bosnian peace-building. The successful implementation of election became to be recognized as the most significant milestone of the Bosnian peace-building operation in the next stage Post-Dayton Bosnia the first election ( ) Now, with an election result in hand, we entered into by far the most difficult and decisive phase of our peace implementation efforts of The enemies of yesterday had to be turned into the partners of tomorrow, as we had to try to start setting up the first fragile common institutions of the country. 25 Carl Bildt, the first Bosnian High Representative ( ) The international community originally planned a year transitional international administration; nevertheless, it was extended two years after the election. This decision is closely related to the result of the first election of post-dayton Bosnia in September A free and fair election has been the main implementation for assisting democratization and the key measure of its success and failure. Because of this, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) decided to conduct elections at both the national and local levels as early as September Because it was only nine months after the cease-fire, many involved were concerned about the timing. 26 Some OSCE staff expressed their concern at the outcome due 23 The OHR Website, The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina ( accessed September 1, 2005). 24 Charles-Philippe David, Alice in Wonderland meets Frankenstein: Constructivism, Realism and Peacebuilding in Bosnia, Contemporary Security Policy (April 2001), p Carl Bildt, Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998), p Paris, op.cit., p

11 to the lack of time for preparation. 27 However, the international community was optimistic of the outcome of the first election in post-dayton Bosnia. The Peace Implementation Council (PIC) composed of 42 states and 13 international organizations stated the election as the symbol of the democratic birth of the country. 28 The result of the election, however, exposed the fact that a free and fair election is not sufficient for successful democratization. Ironically, the election resulted in the complete victory of the major nationalist parties of each nationality, which were the central actors in the Bosnian war. The electoral result of the Bosnian state parliament election in September 1996 was: the Party of Democratic Action (SDA Bosniak nationalist party) occupied 45.2% of the parliament seats; Serb Democratic Party (SDS Serb nationalist party) 21.4%; and Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ Croat nationalist party) 19.0%. 29 With the reference to the result of the last election result in the former Republic of Bosnia in 1990 (SDA 36%, SDS 30%, and HDZ 18%), the Bosnian people chose the three nationalist parties, which advocated nationalist movements leading to armed conflict. Contrary to the optimistic expectation of a victory for the moderate and democratic parties by the international community, the nationalist parties occupied as much as 95% of the parliament seats (the fifth party, the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the sixth, the Party for Peace and Progress are also nationalist parties). At the point the international community came face to face with the paradox of democratization in that people choose undemocratic leaders and parties via a free and fair election, which is the core democratic procedure in the first place. The election of the presidency resulted in the same situation. According to the Bosnian Constitution in the DPA, the state presidency should be composed of the representatives of the three nations selected by election. Alija Izetbegovic, famous for his Muslim nationalist claim, became the first chairman of Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH) presidency in post-dayton Bosnia, and the other two members were also Serbian and Croatian nationalists. Thus, all the members of the BiH presidency belonged to the leading nationalist parties since the pre-war period. This result shocked the international community, but a much worse situation was revealed immediately after the election. Immediately after the election, the BiH presidency did not function as a united decision-making body and caused a serious paralysis in Bosnian politics due to the hostile attitude of each member in addition to the fact that the members acted as representatives of their nationality and asserted the interests of their own nationalities. For instance, the first significant task of the presidency was to build a framework for the Council of Ministers at state level. However, no agreement could be reached about the seat distributions to each 27 Susan Woodward, Bosnia and Herzegovina in Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention (Columbia Press, 1999), p Chandler (2000), op.cit., p Milisav Kasapovic, Parliamentary Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Electoral Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1997), pp

12 nation. After tough negotiations, the Council was finally set up in January 1997, but only after the efforts of the High Representative. The elected government faced the difficulty of reestablishing democratic institutions due to conflict among each national group. In addition, the elected presidency and parliament had little chance to create the policy proposals independently of the OHR. 30 The political situation became more serious in the next stage of the Bosnia peace-building Post-Dayton Bosnia the Bonn Power ( ) (T)he bridge at Mostar (was) destroyed in 1993 and now under reconstruction. ( ) Like the rebuilding of the Mostar bridge, it (the Bosnian statebuilding) combines local and international resources, human and material. ( ) (W)hile there has been discernible progress over the past ten years, we are still far from the other side of the river. 31 Earlier in this period, neither the BiH presidency nor the parliament functioned as the state legislature body, because they could reach few decisions due to excessive use of veto by each national group. Although reconstructing institutions was an urgent and critical issue not only for democratization but also for the whole peacebuilding project, the Bosnian peacebuilding fell into a serious situation in which rebuilding a framework for the institutions was not possible. Thus, Bosnian politics became paralyzed which demonstrated that the society was still divided along nationalist lines. Under these circumstances, the international community decided to extend the international administration indefinitely in December At the same time, the characteristics of international intervention changed in post-dayton Bosnia. The change can be seen most clearly in the democratization process by the OHR and the OSCE. To overcome the political paralysis, the OHR and the OSCE decided to use coercion. Since the international community thought that the nationalist parties were the main obstacle in the operation, it was rational for the international community to authorize the High Representative, which is termed the Bonn Power. Supported by the international community, Carlos Westendorp, the second High Representative, extended his mandate by his interpretation of the agreement. He started to intervene directly in extensive areas the legal execution and the dismissal of office-holders and officials, the regulation of the media, the educational curriculum, and the return of refugees and internal displaced persons. This extensive mandate by Westendorp s interpretation of the DPA came to be endorsed by the international community at the conference of the PIC in Bonn in December In it, the council authorized the High Representative the extended mandate as following: 30 Chandler (2000), op.cit., p Chales C. Pentland, Bridges to Peace: Ten Years of Conflict Management in Bosnia (Queen University, 2003), p

13 The Council welcomes the High Representative's intention to use his final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of the Agreement on the Civilian Implementation of the Peace Settlement in order to facilitate the resolution of difficulties by making binding decisions, as he judges necessary. 32 In this manner, the High Representative can implement interim measures when parties cannot reach agreement, and enforce measures against public office-holders or officials who violate the DPA implementations. 33 This authority is called the Bonn Power and caused controversy regarding the issue of Bosnian sovereignty since the interpretation of the power can be flexibly enforced without any limit. Nevertheless, it was true that the democratization in post-dayton Bosnia had become completely stagnated before the High Representative commenced use of the Bonn Power. For example, the BiH parliament passed few laws and the presidency reached few agreements, and symbolically, they could not reach the agreement even on basic issues such as the national flag, the currency, and common car number plates. Thus, in this period the High Representative had to make decisions using the Bonn Power on a range of issues from these basic issues to the legal resolutions. The Bonn Power is a symbol of the dilemma of democratization enforced by external actors. Surprisingly, the High Representative made around 300 biding decisions in the extensive areas such as institutional establishment, economic reforms and human rights during this period. In this manner with the strong support of the international community, both the OHR and the OSCE made enormous efforts to eliminate extreme nationalist politicians though electoral system reform after They believed that eliminating the extreme nationalists from Bosnian politics is a shortcut for the democratization in Bosnia. 34 For that purpose, the OHR removed extreme nationalist politicians or officials from their posts, deprived them of the right to run for elections, and promoted cooperation among smaller parties. In addition, the OSCE promoted electoral system reforms at all levels. By this strategy, Westendrop dismissed 16 public office-holders and officials, and Wolfgang Petrisch, the third High Representative from 1999 to 2002, removed 78 from office. The removals by the High Representative were questioned since there is no clear guideline on the legal procedure for removal from office. Moreover, the OSCE s electoral reform also evoked external and internal criticism. The OSCE revised the electoral law at the canton level in While each national group chose the members of the House of People as representatives from their group, no boundary of national group in the new system, and 32 The OHR Website, PIC Bonn Conclusion ( accessed September 1, 2005). 33 ibid. 34 Chandler (2000), op.cit., p Bosnia has two entities the Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska, and in the Federation there are ten cantons. 9

14 this led to a strong Croat protest. However, the OSCE continued to vigorously reform the electoral system. At the entity level, the OSCE introduced the Preferential Voting System at the presidential election of the Republika Srpska. 36 This system requires the candidates to consider minorities in order to get seats, is designed to ease conflict among national groups and enhance protection of minorities. 37 At the election in 2000, the OSCE expected that this system should have been advantageous to the Serb Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), a moderate party appealing for cooperation with the international community. However, these electoral reforms did not work as expected. 38 It resulted in another victory for the SDS, the leading nationalist party. In addition, the election in 2002 also ended with the same result. Thus, although the OSCE made enormous efforts to create a plural party system and to foster moderate parties in Bosnia, it did not lead to good results. Although the focus by the international community in the Bosnian democratization during this period was elections, the High Representatives were also actively engaged in the other areas of democratization. With respect to reforming the media, Westendorp warned Srpska Radio TV, the public broadcasting entity which was under the control of the SDS (the leading Serb nationalist party), not to broadcast nationalistic programs. Srpska Radio TV ignored such warnings resulting in a decision for forcible intervention and occupation with cooperation of SFOR (NATO Stabilization Force) in After that, Westendorp used the Bonn Power in the other areas of democratization such as education, human rights, and the civil society. Contrary to Westendorp, Petrisch understood the significance of the civil society for Bosnian democratization, and emphasized the necessity to empower the Bosnian population. 39 However, it is ironical that he removed as many as 78 public office-holders and officials at all the levels state, entity and canton by utilizing the Bonn Power. Later, he talked about his days in office as following: To my mind, imposing democracy and civil society seemed a contradiction in terms. However, during the first one and a half years of my mandate I indeed had to act as the most interventionist High Representative ever. 40 This remark indicates the dilemma which the High Representative faced during his office and the contradiction of the Bosnian democratization during the period Post Dayton Bosnia a new phase? ( ) On 23 July 2004 a reconstructed replica of the framed srari most or old bridge across the Neretva river in Mostar ( ) A galaxy of notables from the Yugoslav successors states and the international community graced the occasion, which was covered live by major international broadcast media ( ). The local reaction to this international jamboree was 36 Sumantra Bose, Bosnia after Dayton (Oxford University Press, 2002), p ibid. 38 ibid. 39 Florian Bieber, Introduction, in Dzemal Sokolovic and Florian Bieber, eds., Reconstructing Multiethnic Societies (Ashgate, 2001), p Bose (2005), op.cit., p

15 circumspect. 41 Sumantra Bose In 2002, post-dayton Bosnia seemed to come into a new phase for democratization because the OSCE transferred the authority on Bosnian election to the local and left the prime role in managing the Bosnian elections at all the levels. In addition, the constitutions in each entity were amended in a significant respect in April This amendment was realized by the local claim regarding the equal rights of the three nations in each entity. 42 The amended constitution guarantees equal rights to participation among the three nationalities so that it can promote democratization process especially in terms of human rights in both entities. 43 However, the reality of the slow Bosnian democratization process has not changed so much. The first elections after the departure of the OSCE ended in another victory for nationalist parties, and so there is a clear contrast between the progress of economic and social reconstruction and the progress of political reconstruction. In democratization, the High Representative still made decisions pursuant to the Bonn Power even in The High Representative, Paddy Ashdown had made two removals from office and 36 decisions just in 2005 (at the point of August 13, 2005), though the number of the decision by the Bonn Power was clearly decreased. 44 On the other hand, there is a significant strategic change in the Bosnian peace operation, that is, the transition to EN ownership. 45 This strategic shift started with the slogan of From Dayton to Europe, advocated by Petritsch from In this respect, Chandler argued this shift can be seen in the OHR reform: the BiH Council of Ministers came to have a responsibility for the task of the Directorate for European Integration (DEI), an organization which deals with the preparation for European integration of Bosnia in This is a crucial transformation for the whole of the Bosnian peacebuilding project. Nevertheless, in terms of democratization, it seems to be just a shift of power from the international community to a regional organization. For example, due to the transformation of power, the EU came to join the Bosnian policy preparation and implementation. 48 With respect to this situation, Mladen Ivanic, the BiH Foreign Minister, expressed his perspective as following: 41 Bose (2005), op.cit., p Izetbegovic, the chair of the BiH presidency at the time, took a legal action in the Constitutional Court of Bosnia in 1998 claiming that the unequal treatment to the three nationalities in each entity in terms of political participation was unconstitutional. 43 The OHR Website, Agreement on the Implementation of the Constituent Peoples Decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina ( default.asp?content_id=7273, accessed September 1, 2005). 44 The OHR Website, HR s Decisions ( accessed September 1, 2005). 45 David Chandler, From Dayton to Europe, International Peacekeeping (Autumn 2005), p The OHR Website, Interview: Wolfgang Petritsch, "I Expect Full Implementation of the Decision on the Constituency of Peoples on March 11, 2002 ( =7115, accessed September 1, 2005). 47 Chandler (2005), op.cit., pp ibid., p

16 (T)he key questions about internal constitutional arrangements of BiH should remain issues for citizens of BiH themselves. International institutions should no longer play a determining role in that, since they could easily come to play partisan roles in the political battles, which would undermine all the positive achievements of the international community in BiH. 49 Thus, as seen in the above words describing the ten years of the Bosnian democratization by the international community, there has been a gap between the international and local people from the starting point to ten year after. 3. Assessments 3-1. Consolidated Democracy This paper assesses the outcomes of democratization assistance in Bosnia from the perspective of democracy consolidation. Since democratization is a process of change resulting in subsequent consolidation, it is essential to understand what kind of condition we can perceive as consolidation. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan explain completed democratic transition and consolidated democracy as follows: A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government de fact has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and juridical power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure. 50 Some questions were raised regarding Bosnian democratization process based on the above definition of consolidated democracy. As to the agreement about political procedure, the international community, especially the OHR and OSCE have intervened in decision-making processes and made hundreds of binding decisions. For instance, there was severe opposition by the Bosnian people to the OSCE s electoral reforms. In 1998, the OSCE faced a strong Croatian movement protesting the electoral reform at the canton level, which was mentioned in the previous chapter of this paper. When the OSCE added reforms to the electoral system for the 2000 election, the major Croatian nationalist parties objected strongly and boycotted both executive and legislative activities at state level. This movement took a more ominous turn by enhancing the Croatian self-determination movement in Croat cantons. In addition, even though the OSCE s proposal of the Election Law was overturned in the BiH parliament in 2000, the OSCE introduced 49 Mladen Ivonic, The International Community and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambridge Review of International Affairs (July 2005), p Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (John Hopkins University Press, 1996), p

17 some of the electoral systems at the 2000 elections against the above parliament decision. Furthermore as seen in the number of dismissals of public-holders by the OHR, some scholars raised a question about legitimacy of the OHR s power being superior to a Bosnian government which was elected by the Bosnian people. For example, the High Representative utilized his authority in the ouster of the Republika Srpska president Nikola Poplasen, who was elected by a free and fair election in Even in the tenth year of the Bosnian peacebuilding operation, Paddy Ashdown, the High Representative decided two removals from office during the first half of For example, Nikola Lovrinovic was removed from his position as Minister of Education of the Central Bosnia Canton in July 8, In fact the High Representatives made several hundred decisions under the name of the Bonn Power. Although Ashdown made decreasing use of the Bonn Power, he made even 36 decisions just during the first 8 months of His decision on Judicial Reform in 2005 became a problem during his office, because it indicated that the High Representative still had to use coercion to build Bosnian institutions. Thus, the Bosnian democratization processes have embraced some difficult issues in terms of consolidated democracy Dilemma of Democratization Assistance The post-dayton Bosnia exposes the dilemmas of democratization by external actors. On the other hand, the situation in postconflict Bosnia might have been exacerbated without the external intervention as indicated by the two-year paralysis in Bosnian politics after Dayton. However, the ten-year democratization process in post-dayton Bosnia has exposed the paradox of democratization assistance. This includes the stateness problem. Linz and Stepan argue that the issue is caused by profound differences about what should actually constitute the polity 53 and which demos ( ) should be members of that political community. 54 The Bosnian experience indicates that the external actors will face the dilemma to promote democracy in a democratic way when the state embraces a serious stateness problem. In other words, the international community will encounter serious problems for the implementation of a democratization project in a divided society where consensus is lacking. In Bosnia there is no consensus of a united state, which is the most significant precondition for democratization. The Bosnian people do not seem to accept the concept of a united state in the DPA under the pressure of the international community. Indeed, the opinion surveys by the UNDP conducted in 2003 shows that the concept of a state of citizens was supported by only 52% of Bosniacs, 17% of Croats, and 9% of Serbs. 51 The OHR Website, HR s Decisions ( accessed September 1, 2005). 52 ibid. 53 Linz, op.cit., p ibid. 13

18 Moreover, the concept of democracy implies the dual material and ideological aspects: the material aspect includes institutions and procedures; and, ideological aspect includes norms and identity. Consequently democratization in postconflict peacebuilding faces two serious problems. Firstly, democratization risks falling into a pitfall in which a state merely holds democratic institutions and elections as a result of prioritizing the material aspect of democracy. 55 Thomas William Simon criticized this kind of situation as procedural democracy. 56 Also, democratization processes in peacebuilding might be adversely affected by a strong backlash if people do not become to share the ideology or culture of democracy. Some scholars raised the questions of the above problems in Bosnian case. 57 The case study of Bosnia indicates that democratization assistance would be a challenging task for the international community especially in non-western regions which do not share the ideology and culture of democracy in its history. CONCLUSION The international attempt to democratize Bosnia for peacebuilding has provoked arguments in IR. However, the case provides some lessons for future democratization assistance for peace-building in Afrasia. The most significant lesson through the experience for the international community is the fact that assistance for democratization for peace in divided societies is a tremendously difficult challenge when people do not reach an agreement on the framework of their state without sharing democratic ideology and culture. Today international cooperation is significant for prevention of armed conflicts. However, it might be necessary to reassess the approaches of democratization assistance for peacebuilding. For that purpose, it is necessary to clarify the issues in the processes of democratization, and also crucial to reconsider the reasons why democracy is significant for peace consolidation in postconflict regions. One of the issues of democratization assistance is how to regulate binding power especially in its ranges and procedures. In the Bosnian case the nationalist parties utilize the binding power of the international community as their attacking target or their common enemy in their propaganda. They take confrontational attitudes especially against the High Representative and the OSCE to show their people that they protect their national interests. In other regions such as Afrasia the international community has much influenced in some states because they are deeply dependent on international assistance. One of the key to successful democratization assistance is how to regulate binding power of the international community or international and regional organizations. 55 Chandler (2000), op.cit., pp Thomas William Simon, The Injustice of Procedural Democracy in Dzemal Sokolovic and Florian Bieber, eds., Reconstructing Multiethnic Societies, pp Chandler (2000), op.cit., p

19 Moreover, the Bosnian case indicates the significance of instilling the democratic virtue in a local community to promote democratization processes for peacebuilding. For that, the significance of protecting human rights should be reemphasized. Especially, to protect the minority rights is the key condition for peace consolidation in divided societies embracing the risk of reoccurrence of armed conflicts. 58 Therefore, securing human rights of minorities by democratic institutions would be highlighted in democratization assistance. However, in the context the international community should be cautious to take an action based on the same concepts of democracy and human rights in both western and nonwestern regions. 59 In fact some argued that the minority human rights are underestimated in post-dayton Bosnia because the Dayton institutions focus on main three nations. The national population census during pre-war period indicates that there are 7.9 % or 345,786 of the other ethnic groups. It was reported that these minority groups were guaranteed neither individual nor group rights under the post-dayton institution. 60 At last, the significant role of the EU as a regional organization should be noted in the Bosnian democratization. It has influenced the Bosnian democratization processes deeply, and Afrasian cases could learn a lesson from it focusing on the role of regional organizations. In the twenty-first century, the international community had to get involved in the other peacebuilding cases such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and so on. The international community does not seem to be very interested in Bosnia any more at this point. However, Bosnia is not in a secure political situation yet. It has been deadlocked because the government does not function properly. Furthermore, it is reported that the Serb secession movement might be aggravated leading to the potential risk of a reoccurrence of armed conflict. In the situation, it is the positive side of Bosnian future that the Bosnian people share the consensus of EU membership. The Bosnian peacebuilding strategy of from Dayton to EU indicates a potential direction to overcome antagonism between each nation in Bosnia. For that Bosnia made a progress by signing the agreement of stability and union with the EU as the pre-step to EU membership in June, When Bosnia becomes a member of the EU successfully in the near future, a part of the Bosnian sovereignty will be delegated to the regional organization with the agreement of the Bosnian people in a democratic way. Thus, a new era of democratization might have started in the trend. The democratic resolution of the issues of divided societies by supernational polity seems to crossover the resolution provided by the theory of Cosmopolitan Democracy which David Held presented as a new democratic theory for a global era today. 61 The project to consolidate democracy in divided societies must confront the issues of stateness and the clash between individual and group rights which liberalism has embraced. The political system democratically multilayered with 58 Ted Robert Gurr, Ethnic Warfare on the Wane, Foreign Affairs (2000), pp Hugh Mial and Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution. (Polity Press, 1999), pp Keiichi Hashimoto, PhD diss., Osaka University (2003), p Held, op. cit. 15

20 supernational polity can be effective to resolve the issues of divided societies. The resolution requires subordinating the sovereignty of states to the superior framework of law; on the other hand, people in a group can expect to govern themselves under the multilayered framework. 62 Bosnia will come across a new phase of democratization process when it becomes a member of the EU. It will provide a new lesson and insight for Afrasia where some countries suffer from conflicts and pursuit the effective approaches of democratization for peacebuilding. REFERENCES Abu-Nimer, Muhammed Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence. Lexington Books. Barnes, Samuel H The Contribution of Democracy to Postconflict Societies. The American Journal of International Law. January. Bertram, Eva Reinventing Governments. Journal of Conflict Resolution. September. Bildt, Carl Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Bose, Sumantra Bosnia after Dayton. Oxford University Press The Bosnian State a Decade after Dayton International Peacekeeping. Autumn. Boyd, Charles Making Bosnia Work. Foreign Affairs. Boutros-Ghali, Butoros An Agenda for Peace, UN Document, A/47/277-S/ An Agenda for Democratization, UN Document, A/51/761. Chandler, David Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton (2 nd ed.). Pluto Press From Dayton to Europe. International Peacekeeping. Autumn. Cousens, Elizabeth M. and Charles K. Cater Toward Peace in Bosnia. Lynne Rienner Publishers. and Chetan Kumar and Karin Wermester (eds) Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies. Lynne Rienner Publishers. 62 ibid., p