GOVERNMENT FUNDING AND FBOS: A LEGAL, HISTORICAL SUMMARY AND CASE STUDY. Sister Linda Yankoski

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1 North American Association of Christians in Social Work (NACSW) PO Box 121; Botsford, CT *** Phone/Fax (tollfree): *** Website: A Vital Christian Presence in Social Work GOVERNMENT FUNDING AND FBOS: A LEGAL, HISTORICAL SUMMARY AND CASE STUDY Sister Linda Yankoski Presented at Hand in Hand 2004 The Church and Its Agencies in Child and Family Welfare Dallas, TX INTRODUCTION To take government money or not to take government money? That is the question that administrators of many religiously affiliated agencies face. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the use of government monies to establish or prohibit religion. Does entering into government purchase-of-service contracts oblige administrators to alter the way they express religious values in their agencies or how they create organizational culture and deliver services? Within the last decade, the U.S. government has encouraged faith-based organizations (FBOs) to apply for government funding. One means of encouragement was the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Pub. L. No ). The act explicitly allowed states to fund social services through contracts with charitable, religious, or private organizations (P.L , at 1666). The legislation was an attempt to clarify three issues. First, it confirmed that FBOs may compete for government contracts on a footing equal to that of other agencies. Second, the act stated that the government must be able to ascertain whether government-funded FBOs are delivering services in ways conforming to the First Amendment. Third, the act stated that a government-funded FBO has the right to deliver services in a manner and environment that respect the FBO s identity and legitimate legal concerns. In addition, the legislation said that, if more than one provider is available, the service beneficiary may use a state-funded voucher to pay the provider he or she prefers. The ability to select among providers which could be charitable, religious, or private organizations gives the act its common name, the Charitable Choice Act. Although Charitable Choice may appear new to some, the fact is that government in the United States has been purchasing services from religiously affiliated providers for decades, as a subsequent section will show. In 2001, the Bush administration gave FBOs further impetus toward government funding by establishing the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives. The purpose of the office was to equalize the access that all community-based organizations, including FBOs, have to government contracts and grants for the provision of social and community services. The Bush administration hoped that FBO administrators would revisit decisions not to partner with 1

2 government. In many cases, the decisions had been based on fear of government-imposed limits on religious expression. If, in weighing whether to apply for government funding, FBO administrators turned to social science literature for guidance, they probably discovered the ambiguity of the term government funding. Many researchers use that term instead of precisely defining the mechanism for the exchange of services, which may be a contract, grant, or some other means (Di Pietro & Behr, 2002). In answering the question about the effect of government funding on religious mission, the literature is likewise ambiguous. Some researchers point to government funding as one road to secularization (Burtchaell, 1998; Marsden, 1994). Others, such as Monsma (1966), demonstrate that religious organizations can maintain religious character without significant government interference. Administrators may also have noted the lack of long-term case studies in social science literature about government funding and FBOs. In 2003 I presented a doctoral dissertation that chronicled one Pittsburgh-area agency s century of experience in providing social services paid for in part by government entities. The dissertation The Soul of the Matter: The Impact of Government Funding on the Catholic Identity and Mission of Holy Family Institute, used various methods to analyze the effect of involvement with government contracts on the religious identity and mission of Holy Family Institute (Yankoski, 2003). The current paper will summarize the judicial decisions and historical trends pertaining to the funding, by various levels of government, of faith-based social services organizations in the United States. In this discussion, the term government funding means a bargained-for exchange not a gratuitous funding, aiding, or subsidizing (Di Pietro & Behr, 2002, p. 14). In addition, this paper will summarize the Holy Family Institute case study. In many ways the study reflects U.S. trends, but the means it offers for measuring the religious character of an FBO is unique. The study may suggest directions for FBO administrators who today face the to take or not to take question in the current context of Charitable Choice. THE HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT FUNDING OF FAITH-BASED SOCIAL SERVICES PROVIDERS The history of government funding of religiously affiliated social services organizations consists of the development of legal concepts, which have defined the recipients of funding, and the general trends of funding, which can be grouped into eras. For the purposes of this discussion, the term social services includes hospitals. I am certainly unqualified, and it is not my intention, to provide legal guidance on church-state jurisprudence; my goal is only to summarize issues related to FBOs. The Legal Concepts and Cases The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states, Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Within this amendment are two distinct principles. The first relates to the establishment of religion. This aspect of the amendment protects against excessive government entanglement in religion, and it prohibits the government from sponsoring or funding religious activity or aiding one religion over another. This principle is often referred to as the establishment clause. The second principle relates to the free exercise of religion. This aspect of the amendment protects religious belief and practice for individuals and religious organizations. It is often called the free-exercise clause. In the context of religiously affiliated social services organizations, these principles raise the questions this paper has already posed: Can government fund an FBO without establishing 2

3 religion? Can an FBO accept government funding without having to inhibit its free exercise of religious expression? For the most part, judicial interpretations of the First Amendment over the past 100 years allow government monies to go to many FBOs as long as they are not K-12 schools. The basis of the interpretation is the belief that colleges and social service organizations can separate their religious activities from their secular services but that K-12 schools cannot. The reasons for this are complex and multifaceted. The legal criteria for evaluating challenges of government funding to FBOs are based primarily on the legal principles developed in challenges to government funding of religious K-12 schools. One landmark school-related case, Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township (1947), pertained to a New Jersey statute that authorized school districts to make rules and contracts regarding the transportation of students to and from schools, including Catholic schools. On appeal, the case made its way to the Supreme Court. One allegation in the appeal was that the law forced taxpayers to support and maintain schools that taught the Catholic faith, in violation of the First Amendment. In regard to this argument, Justice Black quoted another case, Reynolds v. United States (1878): No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions. In the words of Jefferson, [we must] erect a wall of separation between Church and state. (p. 164). In keeping with Justice Black s emphasis on separation, the Court ruled that bus transportation was clearly separable from the religious mission of the schools and similar to public services such as police and fire protection and sewage disposal (Monsma, 1996, p. 31). Justice Black also stated that the First Amendment implies that the state may not exclude any religious group from receiving the services of public welfare legislation (Everson, 1947). Everson (1947) is significant because it established two legal doctrines: a no-aid-toreligion doctrine and a religious-secular separation. The no-aid-to-religion doctrine made the wall of separation between church and state synonymous with the First Amendment, even though the Constitution does not contain the phrase. Under the doctrine of religious-secular separation, public monies may be expended for pubic services provided by religious organizations, provided that the religious and secular aspects of the organization can be separated (Esbeck, 1997). Another landmark case pertaining to religious schools is Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971). In this case, Rhode Island and Pennsylvania taxpayers challenged public assistance to private schools, a majority of which were Catholic. In Rhode Island, the state paid 15% of the salaries of teachers in religious schools. Pennsylvania s law permitted the state to reimburse religious schools for teachers salaries and for the costs of textbooks and materials used to teach specific secular subjects. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court ruled that the government aid was unconstitutional under the religion clauses of the First Amendment, because the reimbursement relationship involved excessive entanglement of government and religion. The entanglement in the Rhode Island program arose because of the religious nature of the church-affiliated schools, especially with respect to children of impressionable age in the primary grades. Ensuring that the restrictions of the First Amendment were obeyed would require the state to conduct continuous surveillance. The Court ruled that the entanglement in the Pennsylvania case was similar, in that the state would have to monitor teachers, to ensure that they taught secular subjects only and to conduct frequent financial audits. A major outcome of Lemon v. Kurtzman was the three-pronged test, popularly known as the Lemon test, which the Court used to determine the constitutionality of government funding to 3

4 religious organizations. To quote Lemon (1971), three characteristics define a constitutional statute: First, the statute must have a secular purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive entanglement with religion (at ). The test gauges the constitutionality of any law providing aid to religious schools or organizations (Monsma, 1996). In summary, Everson v. Board of Education (1947) helped to establish the no-aid doctrine, and Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) provided a means to test for compliance with the doctrine. The Lemon test has been used extensively in constitutional arguments, primarily those concerned with government aid to religious schools. The test was also used in the only modernday case regarding government aid to religious social service organizations. The roots of the no-aid principle lie in the nineteenth century, in the controversy surrounding the expansion of Catholic schools, which were established to serve Catholic immigrants. In 1875, President Grant warned of the potential conflict between patriotism and intellect (characteristics he attributed to established, mainstream Americans) and superstition and ignorance (characteristics he attributed to the Catholic immigrants) (Laycock, 2000). Senator James G. Blaine proposed a constitutional amendment that would support the president s proposal to establish free schools and outlaw any funding of sectarian schools. Although this amendment failed at the national level, a number of states amended their constitutions to prohibit government funding of sectarian organizations. According to Monsma (1996), the no-aid theory has never been uniformly implemented. Indirect aid to religious elementary schools has been permitted and direct aid to sectarian organizations delivering health and social services has been permitted, as long as the institutions are not pervasively sectarian. The Court s explanations of its pervasively sectarian category are inconsistent and incoherent; in practice, the category seems to be a synonym for elementary and secondary education (Laycock, 2000, para. 33). Only two cases pertaining to the government funding of social services organizations have reached the Supreme Court. In the first, Bradfield v. Roberts (1899), the Court upheld a government capital improvement grant to a Catholic hospital. The Court reasoned that nothing is said about the religious faith of the incorporators of this institution in the act of incorporation. It is simply the ordinary case of the incorporation of a hospital for the purposes for which such an institution is generally conducted (Bradfield v. Roberts, 1899, at 297). The Court s ruling distinguishes between the services provided by he Roman Catholic sisters who staffed the hospital and the religious body to which the sisters belonged. The other social services case, Bowen v. Kendrick (1988), addressed the constitutionality of the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA). AFLA provided government grants to public and private providers, including religious organizations that provided sexuality counseling, emphasizing abstinence, to teenagers. AFLA s challengers argued that funding religious organizations was unconstitutional because government funds were being used to advance religion. To decide the case, the Court applied the three-pronged Lemon test. AFLA passed the first prong of the test; the Court ruled that the purposes of AFLA were secular. AFLA passed the second prong, regarding the advancement of religion, because the Court ruled that the religiously affiliated agencies receiving funds were like colleges and universities that is, not pervasively sectarian (Esbeck, 1997; Monsma, 1996). In addition, the Court relied on another concept: The fact that the FBOs conveyed messages that aligned with religious tenets that is, abstinence from sexual relations did not mean that they were attempting to advance religion. AFLA also passed the third prong, regarding administrative entanglement, because the Court ruled that the 4

5 supervision required of the federal agency was not excessive. The decision to uphold the funding was close, a vote of 5-4 (Esbeck, 1997). One of the most significant facets of the Bowen decision was the application of the Lemon test to institutions other than schools. In Bowen v. Kendrick, Justice O Connor made a statement that Esbeck (1997) reported this way: Accordingly, where the object of the governmental aid is clearly addressed to temporal needs (e.g., food, clothing, shelter, health), in Justice O Connor s view, a social service program that includes religious providers is facially constitutional (p. 5). The separatist view is still at work here. Organizations still have to prove that they are not pervasively sectarian. The separatist view continues to be the prevailing philosophy of the courts. The view comprises three assumptions. The first is that programs and services of religiously affiliated organizations can be divided neatly into sacred and secular categories. The second is that religion is a private matter that should not be a factor in public issues. The third is that government aid benefits the service provider (Esbeck, 1997). Neutrality theorists contest these three assumptions. In their view, religiously affiliated organizations cannot neatly divide the sacred and secular aspects of services. They maintain that religious faith often takes form in public expression. Neutrality theorists also argue that welfare assistance equates to aid to the beneficiaries of the providers services, not to the providers themselves (Esbeck, 1997). Since the 1980s, a number of cases that challenged separatist interpretations of the establishment clause have come before the Supreme Court. Monsma (1996) referred to the concept that resulted from these cases as the equal treatment strain (p. 42); Esbeck (1997) called it the neutrality theory (p. 7). The Court established the basis of the concept in Widmar v. Vincent (1981). In this case, the Court ruled against a state university that prohibited its students religious organizations from meeting in campus buildings but allowed other organizations of students such access. The ruling in this case soon became known as equal treatment, and the concept underlying it was used in a number of cases related to freedom of speech and the use of public facilities by religious groups. In Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind (1986), a unanimous Supreme Court allowed a Christian college to use state rehabilitation funds for a blind student. The Court ruled that the indirect nature of the aid to the school and the direct nature of the aid to the student were the significant features of the case. Although the Widmar and Witters cases did not deal directly with religious nonprofit organizations, they are relevant in that the Court s line of reasoning has been applied to religious organizations other than schools (Monsma, 1996). Aguilar v. Felton (1985) prohibited Title I teachers from going into parochial schools. Agostini v. Felton (1997) overturned Aguilar v. Felton in part. Agostini allowed remedial teachers from public schools to work within parochial schools. This eliminated the need to use Title I monies to buy trailers that were placed on the premises of the parochial schools so that students could receive services in a secular environment. This change allowed both public and private schools to spend more on teaching resources. Grand Rapids School District v. Ball (1985) struck down a Michigan program that sent public school teachers into parochial schools for remedial or enrichment classes (Connell, 2000, p. 28). The justices ruled that not all government aid to assist religious schools in education is invalid and that placing public school employees in parochial schools does not result in statesponsored indoctrination. In June 2000, the Court decided another First Amendment case, Mitchell v. Helms (2000). In this case, the justices ruled that federal aid distributed to state and local government 5

6 entities could be used to purchase instructional materials and equipment for private and religious schools. In affirming this ruling, Justice Clarence Thomas explained that such aid, given without regard to religion, was neutral and did not violate First Amendment principles (Connell, 2000). Referring to these kinds of cases, Esbeck (1997) concluded that the court has moved toward neutralizing government s impact on religious belief and practice (p. 12). He proposed that the neutrality theory allows the government and nonprofit organizations to partner in addressing the temporal needs of those served, without respect to whether a provider is pervasively sectarian. This principle allows providers to retain their religious character as long as the intent of legislation, such as the intent of Charitable Choice, is not the pursuit of worship, religious teaching, or other inherently religious activities. In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002), the Supreme Court again applied neutrality in deciding that Cleveland s voucher program did not violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment. In this case, the Ohio Federation of Teachers, the Ohio Education Association, and the Ohio American Civil Liberties Union brought suit against the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program. The groups claimed that the vouchers the program provided to low-income children to attend the school of their parents choice, including religious schools, violated the Constitution. Most of the participating private schools had a religious affiliation, and 96% of the students participating in the program were enrolled in religiously affiliated schools. Those who favored vouchers contended that the parents were the recipients of the vouchers, not the parochial schools; therefore, government funds did not support religion (Minnow, 2002). In addition, the majority argued that the parents had a range of choices, including conventional schools, charter or community schools, and magnet schools. The majority opinion of five Supreme Court justices determined that the advancement of a religious mission was attributable to the parents and not the state. The Court determined also that the voucher program did not create a financial incentive for religious indoctrination because all schools within the district were eligible for participation, as were all families without regard to religion. Justice Stevens disagreed with the method by which the majority reached their conclusions. He argued that the condition of the Cleveland City School District, the wide range of choices available, and the parental-choice feature had no bearing. The dissenting justices objected to any public funding to support educational programs provided by religious institutions. They believed such funding threatened the separation of church and state, impaired social cohesion, and weakened the foundation of democracy in America. Undoubtedly, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002) will spur debates regarding sound educational policy, privatization, and competition (Minnow, 2002; Pallas, 2002) all of which are beyond the scope of this study. However, this case is relevant to the current study of Holy Family Institute in that it is further evidence of the blurring of distinctions between public and private institutions and between public and private goods (Pallas, 2002, para. 9). Minnow (2002) suggested that this case will make it easier for publicly funded social service programs to use religious actors (para. 9). Judicial interpretations of the religion clauses of the First Amendment, when applied to religious schools and religious nonprofit organizations, are confusing and seemingly inconsistent. The state s expansion in providing social services and its historical partnership with religious organizations calls into question the strict separation of church and state. As Charitable Choice legislation highlights this question, the constitutional issues of coercion of beneficiaries and discrimination in employment will fuel the debate unless mechanisms designed to guide the 6

7 government funding of FBOs can provide government accountability and protect the rights of religious providers and service beneficiaries. The Eras of Government Funding Since 1900 Legal decisions and circumstance shaped trends in government funding in the twentieth century. The Progressive Era, Caring for the poor and needy was primarily a function of the church and private charitable organizations. For the most part, government funding for the needy during the Progressive Era was limited to payments from local and state governments. In addition to pensions, state and local governments provided per-diem payments or subsidies to voluntary organizations caring for neglected, dependent, and delinquent children subsidies well below the cost of care. Payments came without many requirements for the recipient organizations. Governments expected the organizations to use charitable funds to make up the difference between subsidies and actual cost. On the federal level, the Children s Bureau was established in 1912 to develop social policy for the nation s children (Rosenthal, 2000). Private voluntary organizations were concerned that the government would take over their role in child welfare. This concern that government expansion into child welfare services would weaken the voluntary sector, usurp its autonomy, and secularize religiously affiliated organizations continued throughout the twentieth century. The New Deal Era, The Great Depression assaulted most Americans, and private charities did not have the resources to cope with the overwhelming need. As businesses failed and jobs were lost, private money became scarce. Even local and state resources were insufficient. It took an influx of federal funds, the result of New Deal legislation, to turn the situation around. The New Deal changed the face of American welfare. In establishing New Deal legislation in the 1930s, the federal government became involved in funding social services primarily by providing financial support to state and local governments to support their cash assistance programs (Salamon, 1995). This change did not occur without causing a clamor in the social services community and creating alliances among various constituents. The Child Welfare League of America, founded in 1920, allied itself with the Children s Bureau by calling for a public, or government, response to the social problems of children. The Children s Bureau suggested that federal dollars match state funds. This proposal was struck down because of objections from private child welfare organizations, primarily those run by the Catholic Church (Brown & McKeown, 1997; Rosenthal, 2000). Leading members of Catholic Charities were suspicious of the burgeoning welfare state and argued that the role of private agencies should never be turned over to government (Yankoski, 2003). By and large, New Deal initiatives were successful. President Roosevelt, bolstered by success, worked for passage of the Social Security Act in This legislation mandated the use of state funds for and public administration of child welfare services. Many believed this provision threatened private agencies. According to Brown and McKeown (1997), mandated state participation in the financing of child-care programs would jeopardize the local funding of Catholic Charities in key states such as Pennsylvania, where the constitution prohibited the allocation of state funds to private institutions (p. 174). Eventually, language was added to the bill that did not extend either state or federal control over private charitable institutions (p. 7

8 177). The matter of public payments to private institutions became, therefore, a state-by-state political battle. With the New Deal, services once considered charity were now considered the rights of the citizens of the modern welfare state. These rights, as defined by Wilensky (1975), consist of government-protected minimum standards of income, nutrition, health, housing, and education for every citizen, assured to him as a political right, not as charity (p. 1). Before the New Deal, the voluntary sector was often described as separate from and an alternative to government. With the growth of government-sponsored services, the two groups began to intersect and interrelate, clearly suggesting that the paradigm of the separateness of the voluntary sector from government is of minimal usefulness. The Entitlement Era, According to Rosenthal (2000), the major impetus for enlarging the nonprofit sector came during the 1960s, with the passage in 1962 and 1967 of amendments to the Social Security Act. The 1962 amendment allowed federal participation in payment for services, allowing 75% reimbursement to the states; however, purchase-of-service contracts were limited to public agencies. Passage of the 1967 amendment to the Social Security Act expanded the ability of government to purchase the services of voluntary agencies including religiously affiliated agencies. This expansion greatly enhanced resources to nonprofit organizations and enlarged the debate over concerns that such funding would weaken the voluntary sector. A 1963 study of 406 nonsectarian and sectarian (Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish) agencies in 21 states found that 71% of the agencies were involved in some type of purchase-ofservice contracts with government (Coughlin, 1965). Findings from this study indicated that Catholic agencies received 83% of tax funds, with children s institutions and services receiving the largest share. However, as Coughlin (1965) reported, at least some of the agencies of all denominations are engaged in these transactions (p. 64). By the 1970s, government purchase of service from private providers, including religiously affiliated providers, had become an established practice. With the passage of Title XX of the Social Security Act, in 1974, federal dollars became the major source of funding for public and private social services (Bolduc, 1984). According to Salamon (1995), while the role of the federal government grew in terms of providing funds and direction, it did not enlarge in terms of actual provision of services. He called this arrangement third-party government. Meeting the needs of the poor and vulnerable in America resulted in public-private cooperation that includes not only direct grants and contracts from government agencies to nonprofit organizations but also such mechanisms as third-party reimbursement, tax credits, and tax-exempt bonds. These initiatives often resulted in less philanthropic funding for the nonprofit sector, resulting in an ever-greater reliance on government revenues (Grønbjerg & Smith, 1999). The Retrenchment Era, After five decades of unprecedented government expansion of welfare service, the 1980s saw a devolution and retrenchment of government support for welfare and an increased focus on private initiatives. As Salamon (1995) reported, the Reagan administration launched domestic policies aimed at limiting government support for welfare while increasing reliance on the private, voluntary sector. The purpose of reduced government spending on welfare was both to cut taxes and to restore the voluntary sector. However, Salamon (1995) maintained, the result differed vastly from the purpose; instead of enhancing voluntary support, the policy shift devastated many charitable organizations. 8

9 Between 1981 and 1982, the organizations reported a 6.3 percent reduction in their government support. Among some types of agencies, however, the loss of government support was even larger: 29 percent for legal services organizations, 16 percent for housing and community development organizations, 13 percent for employment and training agencies, and 9 percent for social service organizations. (p. 161) Contrary to political expectations, charitable contributions did not make up for the loss of government revenues. Nonprofit voluntary agencies began to rely on fee-for-service income and investments to make up the difference; those agencies that did not do so went out of business. The nonprofit sector decreased in size and number and lost more than $30 billion (Alexander, 1999). Although the nonprofit sector was reduced overall, the nonprofit organizations that participated in Medicaid actually saw growth in their government funds. Indeed, many social service organizations realigned their services within the health care market so they could participate in this funding stream. Medicaid provides funds to nonprofit and for-profit organizations alike, and such participation has led to the marketization and commercialization of the nonprofit sector a trend that continues in the twenty-first century (Alexander, 1999; Salamon, 1995). Services developed for welfare recipients were made available to clients in the traditional insurance market. In this way, nonprofit social service organizations could expand or market their services to other clients and funding resources. During this time, the nonprofit sector experienced considerable financial strain. Agencies were forced to turn to fee-for-service revenues and/or commercial activities. Many nonprofit organizations had to rely on increased charitable contributions to survive. Churches and other community groups were expected to be the safety net for the fallout from these policies, but religious organizations were in no position to fill all the service gaps that appeared. The Charitable Choice Era, 1996 present. As the twentieth century came to a close, two initiatives welfare reform and Charitable Choice dominated the social welfare agenda. In 1996, Congress established the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act and abolished Aid to Families With Needy Children, replacing the latter with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families. In this way Congress dismantled poor-family cash assistance that had been in place for more than 60 years. As a more conservative approach to welfare, the new block-grant system gave states more discretion for spending, along with federal mandates for work requirements, time limits on benefits, and the requirement that unwed teenage parents be enrolled in school and living in adult-supervised settings (Sparer, 1999). The impact of these new welfare provisions, on both the recipients and delivery of social services, will not be known until the lifetime benefits limit for welfare recipients is realized. Current political rhetoric suggests that churches and community organizations will take up the slack, some researchers (e.g., Wineburg, 1996) maintain that this is neither possible nor desirable. In general, it seems clear that government cannot nor should it ever abdicate its role to promote the general welfare of all people (Harvey, 1997). Current Charitable Choice initiatives are based on a number of assumptions about FBOs. One assumption is that churches and congregations are interested in, and have the capacity to, expand their social outreach programs. Research has indicated that black churches are more likely to apply for government funds than are white churches, and Catholic and liberal Protestant congregations are more likely to apply for government funds than are conservative or evangelical 9

10 congregations (Chaves, 1999). This tendency is significant because Catholic and liberal Protestant churches are more likely to be involved already in providing social services. Other than African-American churches, current research does not support the expectation that new types of religious organizations will apply for government funds, as is hoped for with Charitable Choice legislation. Another assumption buttressing Charitable Choice legislation is that FBOs deliver social services more effectively than do secular or public organizations. In a review of research, Johnson (2002) identified 97 studies that examined the interventions of religious groups, congregations, or FBOs. In general, Johnson found that most of the research relied too heavily upon qualitative approaches, such as case studies, and too little on rigorous and outcome-based research design. The research reflected a structural naivete in regard to defining faith. On the positive side, although Johnson s conclusions were preliminary, they consistently supported the notion that FBOs deliver social services more effectively than do secular and public organizations. Another assumption upon which Charitable Choice is based is that FBOs must become secular as a condition of receiving government funding. However, the study by Monsma (1996) demonstrated that a majority of religious organizations wishing to maintain their religious character did so without problems or significant interference from government funders. So far during the Charitable Choice Era, the practice of the government contracting for services has expanded to include religious nonprofit organizations more directly. Such policy development raises issues of accountability that are exacerbated when the agency delivering service has a First Amendment right to religious autonomy (Kennedy, 2002). As this era continues, it will be essential to develop appropriate policies based on rigorous research that will protect the fundamental character of religious nonprofit organizations while ensuring the accountability of publically funded service providers. THE HOLY FAMILY INSTITUTE CASE STUDY The Holy Family Institute case study shows how twentieth-century legal decisions and trends played out in one social services organization. The study involved analyzing a century s worth of records to discover if participation in government contracts had affected HFI s religious identity and mission and, if so, how. Founded in 1900 by the Sisters of the Holy Family of Nazareth, a Roman Catholic order, HFI was originally an orphanage. The institute served a need rooted in the industrial heritage of the Pittsburgh region. Many of its clients were the children of Polish workers killed or injured in mill or mine accidents. The agency changed with the needs of the region s population. Today HFI is a fully accredited social service agency that serves abused and neglected children at its campus in Emsworth, Pa., and in other Pennsylvania locations. Theoretical Framework To analyze the impact of government funding on the Catholic identity and mission of Holy Family Institute, the study used the institutional model of organizational theory and the concept of isomorphism. The institutional model is an approach to the study of organizations that emphasizes the taken-for-granted aspects of organizational life and the ways in which organizations environments (including cultural environments) shape their structures and processes (DiMaggio, 1998, p. 12). According to the model, organizations interacting in the same field will become homogeneous. An organizational field encompasses "those 10

11 organizations, that in the aggregate, constitute a recognized field of organizational life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services and products" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148). Isomorphism is the process in which an organization is changed by other organizations in its organizational field. An example of this occurs when government agencies establish rules, guidelines, and procedures for the receipt of funds. The result is that agency operations overall become more homogeneous. Sometimes organizations purposefully imitate others by adopting successful processes and strategies that other groups developed. The pressures of professionalism cause isomorphism by imposing standards on an organization s modes of operation. In addition, internal forces can influence organizations. These forces include values, processes, and goals held by those most intimately involved in the organization s workings (Tierney, 1988, p. 3). Three forces dictate an organization s action: use of authority, resources sources, and culture (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995; Smith & Sosin, 2001). Institutional theory, applied to religious nonprofit organizations, suggests that through isomorphic forces religious organizations with open boundaries will become like the dominant secular organizations within their field (Yankoski, 2003, p. 73). Figure 1 (below) depicts the principal isomorphic influences on Holy Family Institute: the Catholic Church, through the local bishop through the Sisters of the Holy Family of Nazareth; government contracts for funding and mandates; professional organizations and associations; and peer organizations. As a result of isomorphism, the institute s authority, resources, and culture are likely to become like those of the entities to which it relates. Sources of Government Monies The government paid HFI for its care of children as early as 1910 (Sisters of the Holy Family of Nazareth Archives, 1911). Government entities that purchased services included Allegheny County Juvenile Court and the City of Pittsburgh. In 1935, Allegheny County purchased services directly rather than through the county court system (Holy Family Institute Archives [HFIA], 1936). In the 1960s, passage of the Social Security Act increased the number of county grants and contracts, because the act allowed the federal government to provide welfare funds to states. In Pennsylvania, the state gave the funds, through contracts and grants, to the counties. The counties allocated payments to individual agencies. Amendments to the act, in 1962 and 1967, allowed state governments to enlist nonprofit organizations, including religious organizations, to deliver welfare services (Salamon, 1995). At HFI, revenues from government grants and contracts increased dramatically In this period, government funding doubled in some cases, quadrupled every five years (Yankoski, 2003, p. 179). Government monies as a percentage of all revenue went from a low of 17.5% in 1914 to a high of 91.58% in By 2002, 80% of HFI s $26 million annual budget was from purchase-of-service contracts with government entities or fees from public school districts (HFIA, 2002). Analysis of Religious Character In the case study, data about the religious environment of HFI came from three sources: documents, interviews with 33 alumni who lived at HFI at some time , and a survey of HFI leaders. Data from all sources provided similar information, thereby cross-validating the findings (Stake, 1995). Data were arranged in categories reflecting HFI s authority, resources, and culture. 11

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13 To quantify religious identity and expression at HFI, the study employed a scoring system related to four existing typologies: the Common Ground typology (Working Group Initiatives, 2002) and the typologies developed by Monsma (1996), Benne (2001), and Jeavons (1998). Each typology used different criteria to assess the religiosity of an organization. All four typologies are generic, meaning they do not rely on any particular theological tradition or perspective. The HFI data reflected two distinct periods: , when the sum of government monies was steadily rising, and The later period was, for HFI, a time of dramatically increasing government monies, growing professionalism, and changing religious practices. At the beginning of the second period, the Second Vatican Council called Catholics and their organizations to embrace ecumenism, religious liberty, and amplified roles for the laity in the Church. Findings of the Case Study According to the scores HFI received on all four typologies, before 1965 HFI was a highly religious, faith-saturated, orthodox institution. Until the mid-1960s, HFI was staffed almost exclusively by sisters and the children were predominantly Catholic. The typology scores relating to the second period revealed HFI as a moderately religious, faith-related organization. During this period, HFI was staffed by laypeople and most children were not Catholic. The post-1964 typology-based scores indicated religious diminishment in the period that receipt of government monies soared. The scores seemed to suggest that participation in government funding had undermined religious character. However, the alumni interviews and the survey of leaders relating to the same period told a different story. They testified to a continuously strong religious character. Did the discrepancy stem from the criteria of the typologies? The typologies attribute high religiosity to an agency that! Hires staff according to the agency s faith commitment! Serves clients whose religious affiliation matches that of the agency! Makes religious activities mandatory! Draws resources primarily from people or organizations that share its faith Studying the criteria led to discovery of a paradox: The more HFI adhered to the theological and social teachings of its Church, the more points HFI lost for religiosity, according to the generic typologies. The Catholic Church s move toward ecumenism encouraged organizations such as HFI to hire staff of diverse religious backgrounds. On the generic typologies HFI lost points because HFI does not require staff to be Catholic. The fact that HFI s 1904 charter requires the agency to serve children without respect to religion also lowered the agency s religiosity score. In addition, HFI lost more points because clients participation in religious activities is voluntary. The problem with the generic typologies is that they do not stress theological distinctions. It is my contention, that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to come up with one universal standard for the definition of religious faith and practice. A New Yardstick of Religious Character The generic typologies did not consider the theological distinctions of the Catholic Church. I concluded, therefore, that the generic typologies were an unreliable means of measuring HFI s religious character, and I am not sure that any generic typology that is, a typology not specific 14

14 to the religious affiliation of the agency being assessed can be a reliable measure of religious character. The goal of providing a way to analyze the religious character of a Catholic organization led to construction of the Catholic Typology for Social Service Organizations (CTSSO). The CTSSO assesses religiosity according to 14 criteria that relate to authority, culture, and resources as Catholicism defines them. This is a critical difference between the CTSSO and the generic typologies. The authority structure of the Catholic typology is straightforward in that Church theology and law articulate it clearly. The cultural dimension is more complex. It involves a distinct philosophy and a specific anthropology of the human person, especially in regard to the essential relationship of the person to the community. The principle of subsidiarity governs the role of the individual, the family, the community, and the state. Faith is fundamentally a communal experience. The magisterium, the teaching authority of the Church, is unique to Catholic authority and cultural experience. The social teachings are both proscriptive and prescriptive. For example, the teachings of the Church clearly prohibit a Catholic agency from offering abortion counseling. The prescriptive teachings are qualitative. They are implemented through the discretion of individuals who must act, in every situation, in accord with the principles of the social teachings. Among the teachings is Rerum Novarum, the first of the social encyclicals. Published in 1891, it introduced the notion of and criteria for a just wage. Laborum Exercens, published in 1981, described the subjective value of work. This encyclical maintained that work is an expression of the human personality. Therefore, the work activity and the environment in which it is performed should provide a source of meaning to the worker and the opportunity for community. People are not merely a work force. Even though work may be a necessity, it must always be personal. These principles are part of the teachings of the magisterium. How they are implemented varies according to the resources in the specific situation. In a non-catholic corporation, a group as small as a quorum of the Board of Directors can decide the value system and the criteria to measure fulfillment of the corporate mission. In a Catholic corporation, those criteria are grounded in the ethics, philosophy, theology, and sacramental and social teachings of the Church. As stated in Quadragesimo Anno (1931, para. 20), there is a Catholic social science. It may be that the wage scale in a Catholic organization is the same as that in a non-catholic organization, because the two agencies have the same funding sources. However, in the Catholic agency, the deliberations that determined the scale derive from Catholic social teachings. The criteria that guided the board of the Catholic institution are different from those of the non-catholic institution, even if the outcome is the same in both agencies. Similarly, the Catholic agency s acceptance of or tolerance for certain practices derives from Church social teachings. The board of a Catholic agency may have to live with practices that are legal but less than fulfilling in terms of its mission. For example, a legal wage may not be the same as a just wage, as defined by Catholic social teachings. Maintaining a strong Catholic culture that can act as a bulwark against outside influences requires both formal and informal educational and formational activities. In the specific case of Holy Family Institute, the first and foremost responsibility of the Sisters of the Holy Family of Nazareth is to select the lay people who will govern and manage the organization on the order s behalf. Then the sisters must educate the people they hire, to ensure that they can embody the Church s social teachings in their work. Educational programs must incorporate Catholic social and moral teachings and relate them to a variety of worldviews. 15

15 A Catholic social service organization that strives for Catholic integrity as well as identity must develop and implement methods to monitor the internalization and externalization of its identity and mission. Creating operating structures that include the organization s values is vitally important. The values must become functional characteristics that can be measured. For example, a review of health care benefits would demonstrate the extent of the organization s support for families. A review of compensation would demonstrate whether the organization s wages are fair in comparison to the market or other norms. A review of investments would show whether the organization supports corporations that stand in direct moral conflict with the Church. Other aspects of the cultural dimension that can be codified and embodied in operating structures are celebrations and employee recognition. The events and people an organization celebrates, and the way it celebrates them, show the world what the organization values. Maintaining Catholic identity and mission in a pluralistic society can result in tension because some means to address clients needs may be at variance with Church teachings. For example, the policies of Holy Family Institute require sexual abstinence on the part of the adolescents in residence. Many of the young people have been victims of sexual abuse and exploitation, however, and they have not yet mastered sexual abstinence. In such cases, Holy Family Institute has had to find ways to manage the issues of teenage sexuality within the parameters of the Church and within professional counseling practices. Another area of tension, at least from some legal perspectives, involves the use of symbols. Symbols and rituals are an essential element of Catholic culture. However, the use of Catholic symbols and rituals with clients of various faiths and traditions must be balanced with clients needs and preferences. The third area of tension relates to hiring staff members who hold varying worldviews. Although understanding and interpreting Catholic identity and mission may be difficult for non- Catholics, doing so is not impossible. Selecting employees who can respect and uphold the mission, philosophy, and values of the organization is an important first step. Programs of education and accountability, based on observable behaviors and practices, help to maintain a critical mass of employees who act as mission caretakers. Attention to the symbolic dimensions of the organization, e.g., conducting rituals, telling and re-telling the organizational myths and the presence of artifacts provide the supportive environment in which the intentional human resource processes occur (Cleary, 2001, p. 208). Therefore, although it may seem that Catholic social service organizations have compromised their values by recognizing and including other worldviews in service delivery, the fact is that, according to the renewed theological precepts of the Second Vatican Council, recognition and inclusion are inevitable and even worthy of promotion. This change in theology has profoundly strengthened the Church and her many sister institutions. Ethical decision making based on moral theology can be difficult for anyone, regardless of Church membership. Access to ethicists and formal ethics committees can help individuals and organizations navigate the competing claims of a pluralistic society and provide a means for institutions such as Holy Family Institute to explore ways to expand and fulfill Catholic culture while serving clients needs. Conclusions of the Case Study The study concluded that HFI s Catholic identity and mission, though expressed differently at the beginning of the twentieth century than at present, are intact; HFI did not substantively dilute its religious identity or mission by entering into contracts with government entities. One reason 16