Political Contestability and Contract Rigidity An Analysis of Procurement Contracts
|
|
- Shanna Bishop
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 An Analysis of Procurement Contracts Jean Beuve U. Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne Marian Moszoro Harvard University and Stéphane Saussier Sorbonne Business School Paris Dauphine March 21,
2 The EPPP research group in Paris Public-private partnerships «at large» Many sectors Data Applied economics based on contract theories Transaction costs Incomplete contract theory Relational contracts Incentive theory Many theories and many questions but few ingredients specific to public contracts 2
3 Perception of Public Contracts inefficient low quality delays expensive corruption, favoritism bureaucratic, red tape politics intricate, convoluted scrutiny, regulation controls, inspections protests, courts specific, rule-based... formal and rigid Are public contracts intrinsically different from private ones? 3
4 Public Contract Rigidity and Third Party Opportunism A fundamental difference between private and public contracts is that public contracts are in the public sphere, and thus, although politics is normally not necessary to understand private contracting, it becomes fundamental to understanding public contracting (Spiller 2008, An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts, NBER Working Paper 14152, p. 3) Third-party opportunism (TPO) prevents the use of relational contracts for public-private transactions Political contestability and public scrutiny are issues for public authorities public contracts are rigid 4
5 Scholarly Progression: A Research Agenda Theory Development Spiller 2008: An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts Formalization & Testable Hypotheses Moszoro & Spiller 2012: Third-Party Opportunism and the Nature of Public Contracts Moszoro & Spiller 2014: Political Contestability, Scrutiny, and Public Contracting Operationalization & Test of Hypotheses Moszoro, Spiller & Stolorz 2013: Rigidity of Public Contracts Aneja, Moszoro & Spiller 2014: Political Bonds: Political Hazards and the Choice of Municipal Financing Instruments 2015: Political Contestability and Contract Rigidity: An Analysis of Procurement Contracts 5
6 «TPO» in a Nutshell Mainstream contract theory deals with incentives and frictions of the (two) contracting parties There are third parties and some of them may be... Figure: Monster-in-law Marian Moszoro... not necessarily interested in the success of the relationship! (political opponents, excluded bidders, and interest groups) 6
7 Moszoro & Spiller (2012) - Results Opportunistic challenges is a key differential hazard of public transactions Rigidity in public contracting is a political risk adaptation by public agents Public agents limit the risk of third parties challenges through formalities and rules... externalizing the associated costs to the public at large Public Oversight Political Contestability = Contractual Rigidity 7
8 Contract rigidity What we call contract rigidity refers to rule-based (bureaucratic) implementation; i.e., the addition of contractual provisions and specifications that impose ex post stiff enforcement, intolerance to adaptation, and penalties for deviation Objective: to reduce the probability of being challenged Example is the city of Bordeaux water contract: 603 KPIs! Example is the City of Paris and the Velib with penalties that were never applied leading to the renegotiation of the contract Example is St Etienne car parks contract: The contract is challenged on the fact that it is either a gift, or poorly negotiated. 8
9 Research Question and Propositions Are public contracts more rigid than private contracts? Testable predictions: 1. Contracts subject to public scrutiny show more rigidity clauses than purely private (i.e. relational) contracts 2. In the sub-sample of public contracts, rigidity increases with political contestability 3. Public contracts are more frequently formally renegotiated 9
10 Data requirements The ideal experiment: Public and private contracts for the same standard object Sequence of contracts contracting parties write with each other with variation over time in contestability associated with one contracting party What we have: Data concerning car park contracts signed between 1985 and 2009 in France. One private operator Data on local elections (every 6 years) There is only one contractor and car parks arguably entail a standardized product and service A large part of the contractual heterogeneity comes from the procurers characteristics and time-varying political contestability. 10
11 Why Car Park Contracts? A relevant sector MATURE STANDARD PUBLIC vs PRIVATE 73% of car parks managed through PPPs Few asset specificity Few bilateral dependency Existence of public-public and public-private contracts COMPETITION DIFFERENT TYPES OF CONTRACTS POLITICAL CONTESTABILITY Growing competition (international and local operators) Concession contracts Political competition at the local level Credibility of outside option Operating contracts Provision of services contracts Public scrutiny SEE NEXT SLIDE 11
12 Are Car Park Contracts Politically Sensible? Political contestability and public scrutiny Car parks : the opposition requires a renegociation Copé, f***ing mayor, thief mayor 12
13 Summary: Data & Propositions: Private partners (24 Contractees) 47 contracts C1 C2 C3 P1: Contracts subject to public scrutiny are more rigid than purely private relational contracts P3: Public contracts more frequently rengotiated One private contractor P2: Public contracts rigidity rises in political contestability M1 M3 M2 396 contracts 793 amendments Signed between 1985 and 2008 Public authorities (152 Municipalities) 349 contracts 13
14 Empirical Strategy Controls Public vs private Contracts Political contestability within public contracts Frequency of amendments Pol. contestability 14
15 Dependent Variable: Contract Rigidity Apply algorithmic data reading and textual analysis to compare the complexity of public contracts subject to public scrutiny with relational private contracts 15
16 Keywords in Rigidity Categories: Dictionaries 16
17 Contract Rigidity at First Glance We used the normalized frequencies of word categories: And 17
18 Explanatory Variables Dummy Public versus Private (Public) Political Contestability HHI: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the first round of elections preceding the date of signature Residual_HHI: Concentration of all non-winning parties to measure the strength of the political opposition Win_Margin: Margin of victory between the winner and the runner-up party (+ Win_Margin²) Distance: Time between the date of signature and the date of future election (+ Distance²) 18
19 Control Variables E.g. Type of contracts (Concession, Operating, Provision_of_Services) Size of the city (number of Inhabitants) Political color of the mayor (Left_Wing vs Right_Wing) Renewed contract (dummy) Past_Contracts number of contracts signed between the two parties since 1985 Trend Past_experiences number of years the two contractors know each other Participation to the election (Election_participation) Number of corruption cases at the city level three years before the contract signature (Corruption) 19
20 Results 20
21 UAB March 2016 P1: Public vs Private Contract Rigidity 21
22 Election participation & corruption added P2: Political Contestability Effect (Public Contracts) ( ) 22
23 P2: Political Contestability Effect (Private Contracts) ( ) 23
24 P2: Political Contestability Effect (Whole Sample of Contracts) ( ) 24
25 P3: Frequency of Contract Renegotiations Public contract should be renegotiated more frequently through formal amendments than private ones (i.e. no relational contract) When faced with unforeseen or unexpected circumstances, private parties, as long as the relation remains worthwhile, adjust their required performance without the need for costly renegotiation or formal recontracting (Spiller 2008, page 1) 25
26 P3: Frequency of Contract Renegotiations Such high rates of contract renegotiation have raised serious questions about the viability of the concession model in developing countries. Guasch et al. [2008, p. 421] Vs. In a sense, [...] the frequency of contract renegotiation may provide concessions a relational quality [Spiller, 2008, p. 22]. 26
27 Discussion and Conclusion 27
28 Limitations Algorithmic textual analysis imperfect interpretation Algorithmic textual analysis is still in its early stage and is not yet close to human interpretation, especially when it comes to legal nuances! But, strong results we obtained even with imperfect methods, are indicative that correlations are not spurious. Better algorithms and dictionaries in the future will corroborate these findings Corruption as confounding factor Not much relevant to our setting ; Corruption is never significant Omitted variables: demand stochasticity and prices No data; year and geographic fixed effects 28
29 Thank you 29
30 Additional Material 30
«The specificities of public-private contracting»
Stéphane Saussier Saussier@univ-paris1.fr http://www.webssa.net MBA Social Leadership University Ben Gurion «The specificities of public-private contracting» SSA 2016-1 NPOs and contracting NPOs have to
More informationTHIRD-PARTY OPPORTUNISM AND THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CONTRACTS: OPERATIONALIZATION AND APPLICATIONS
THIRD-PARTY OPPORTUNISM AND THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CONTRACTS: OPERATIONALIZATION AND APPLICATIONS Marian Moszoro IESE Business School, Barcelona Pablo Spiller University of California, Berkeley & NBER Public
More informationRigidity of Public Contracts
Rigidity of Public Contracts Marian Moszoro 1 Pablo Spiller 2 Sebastian Stolorz 3 1 University of California, Berkeley and Kozminski University 2 University of California, Berkeley and NBER 3 George Mason
More informationPolitical Contestability and Public Contract Rigidity ú
Political Contestability and Public Contract Rigidity ú Jean Beuve 1, Marian Moszoro 2, and Stéphane Saussier 3 1 Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne 2 George Mason University 3 IAE-Sorbonne Business
More informationPublic Procurement. Stéphane Saussier Sorbonne Business School IAE de Paris Class 2
Public Procurement Stéphane Saussier Sorbonne Business School IAE de Paris Saussier@univ-paris1.fr http://www.webssa.net Class 2 Today! Public procurement, transaction costs and incomplete contracting
More informationRegulation, Public Service Provision and Contracting
Regulation, Public Service Provision and Contracting 1 Stéphane Saussier Sorbonne Business School Saussier@univ-paris1.fr http://www.webssa.net Class 2 Incomplete Contracts and the Proper Scope of Government
More informationPUBLIC CONTRACTS AND POLITICAL CONTESTABILITY: INSIGHTS FROM FRENCH INSTITUTIONAL CATERING 1
PUBLIC CONTRACTS AND POLITICAL CONTESTABILITY: INSIGHTS FROM FRENCH INSTITUTIONAL CATERING 1 Emmanuel RAYNAUD (corresponding author) UMR SADAPT, AgroParisTech, INRA, Université Paris-Saclay, 16 rue Claude
More informationThe Political Cycle of Public-Private Contract Renegotiations: Evidence from the French car park sector
The Political Cycle of Public-Private Contract Renegotiations: Evidence from the French car park sector Le Squeren, Zoé Sorbonne Business School, Chair Economics of Public-Private Partnerships zoe.le-squeren@univ-paris1.fr
More informationCorruption: Costs and Mitigation Strategies
Corruption: Costs and Mitigation Strategies Presented by Bernardin AKITOBY Assistant Director INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND SEPTEMBER 2017 Motivation Corruption has been identified as one of the most important
More informationPublic Private Partnerships and Efficiency: A Short Assessment
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES EPPP DP No. 2014-06 Public Private Partnerships and Efficiency: A Short Assessment Antonio Estache et Stéphane Saussier Juillet 2014 Chaire Economie des Partenariats Public-Privé
More informationPolitical Contestability, Scrutiny, and Public Contracting
Political Contestability, Scrutiny, and Public Contracting Marian W. Moszoro and Pablo T. Spiller October 7, 2014 Abstract In politically contestable markets, part of the lack of flexibility in the design
More informationREFORMING WATER SERVICES: THE KEY ROLE OF MESO-INSTITUTIONS
Innovative approaches to performance for urban water utilities Mines-Agroparistech, 03-09-2014 Claude MENARD Centre d Economie de la Sorbonne Université de Paris (Panthéon-Sorbonne) menard@univ-paris1.fr
More informationThird-Party Opportunism and the (In)Efficiency of Public Contracts
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Reports and Technical Reports All Technical Reports Collection 2012-04-30 Third-Party Opportunism and the (In)Efficiency of Public Contracts Marian Moszoro http://hdl.handle.net/10945/33893
More informationPolitical Contestability, Scrutiny, and Public Contracting
Political Contestability, Scrutiny, and Public Contracting Marian W. Moszoro and Pablo T. Spiller September 24, 2017 Abstract Do public agents undertake socially ine cient activities to protect themselves?
More informationNBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THIRD-PARTY OPPORTUNISM AND THE NATURE OF PUBLIC CONTRACTS. Marian W. Moszoro Pablo T. Spiller
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THIRD-PARTY OPPORTUNISM AND THE NATURE OF PUBLIC CONTRACTS Marian W. Moszoro Pablo T. Spiller Working Paper 18636 http://www.nber.org/papers/w18636 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC
More informationThe 2017 TRACE Matrix Bribery Risk Matrix
The 2017 TRACE Matrix Bribery Risk Matrix Methodology Report Corruption is notoriously difficult to measure. Even defining it can be a challenge, beyond the standard formula of using public position for
More informationThe TCE approach of Regulation and Politics
Regulation, Public Service Provision and Contracting 1 Eric Brousseau University Paris-Dauphine eric@brousseau.info Class 4 Contracting with the Government: Collusion, Lobbying, Third Party Opportunism,
More informationWhen does ideology matter? An empirical analysis of French municipalities' make-or-buy choices
EPPP DP No. 6-5 When does ideology matter? An empirical analysis of French municipalities' make-or-buy choices Jean Beuve Zoé Le Squeren Décembre 2016 Chaire Economie des Partenariats Public-Privé Institut
More informationNBER WORKING PAPER SERIES AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF PUBLIC CONTRACTS: REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS. Pablo T. Spiller
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF PUBLIC CONTRACTS: REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS Pablo T. Spiller Working Paper 14152 http://www.nber.org/papers/w14152 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
More informationWho s to Blame? Punishing Poor Economic Performance in a Centralized Political System
Who s to Blame? Punishing Poor Economic Performance in a Centralized Political System Quintin H. Beazer 1 Ora John Reuter 2 1 Florida State University qbeazer@fsu.edu 2 University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee
More informationLobbying and Bribery
Lobbying and Bribery Vivekananda Mukherjee* Amrita Kamalini Bhattacharyya Department of Economics, Jadavpur University, Kolkata 700032, India June, 2016 *Corresponding author. E-mail: mukherjeevivek@hotmail.com
More informationInstitutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance by Douglass C. North Cambridge University Press, 1990
Robert Donnelly IS 816 Review Essay Week 6 6 February 2005 Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance by Douglass C. North Cambridge University Press, 1990 1. Summary of the major arguments
More informationPolitical Economics II Spring Lectures 4-5 Part II Partisan Politics and Political Agency. Torsten Persson, IIES
Lectures 4-5_190213.pdf Political Economics II Spring 2019 Lectures 4-5 Part II Partisan Politics and Political Agency Torsten Persson, IIES 1 Introduction: Partisan Politics Aims continue exploring policy
More informationPublicizing malfeasance:
Publicizing malfeasance: When media facilitates electoral accountability in Mexico Horacio Larreguy, John Marshall and James Snyder Harvard University May 1, 2015 Introduction Elections are key for political
More informationLDC Urban Climate Change Adaptation: Challenges and Opportunities. Matthew E. Kahn USC and NBER
LDC Urban Climate Change Adaptation: Challenges and Opportunities Matthew E. Kahn USC and NBER kahnme@usc.edu 1 Introduction Urbanization should bring about poverty reduction through raising economic opportunities
More informationSupplemental Online Appendix to The Incumbency Curse: Weak Parties, Term Limits, and Unfulfilled Accountability
Supplemental Online Appendix to The Incumbency Curse: Weak Parties, Term Limits, and Unfulfilled Accountability Marko Klašnja Rocío Titiunik Post-Doctoral Fellow Princeton University Assistant Professor
More informationCorruption and business procedures: an empirical investigation
Corruption and business procedures: an empirical investigation S. Roy*, Department of Economics, High Point University, High Point, NC - 27262, USA. Email: sroy@highpoint.edu Abstract We implement OLS,
More information(ii) sufficient transparency, fair competition and adequate ex-ante publicity must be ensured;
DRAFT Annex Award of procurement contracts by beneficiaries established in the Russian Federation other than public entities as defined in point (k) of Article 2 of the Agreement and other legal entities
More informationEconomics 270c. Development Economics. Lecture 6 February 20, 2007
Economics 270c Development Economics Lecture 6 February 20, 2007 Lecture 1: Global patterns of economic growth and development (1/16) The political economy of development Lecture 2: Inequality and growth
More informationACCOUNTABLE DEMOCRACY
ACCOUNTABLE DEMOCRACY www.accountabledemocracy.org Guillem Compte CONTENTS ١. What is accountable democracy? ٢. Why accountable democracy? (Background) ٣. How does it work? ٤. Conclusion ٥. Why accountable
More informationGovernance, Corruption, and Public Finance: An Overview
Chapter 1 Governance, Corruption, and Public Finance: An Overview Vito Tanzi Introduction Growing attention has been directed in recent years to the role of government. Governance in general and corruption
More informationEnriqueta Aragones Harvard University and Universitat Pompeu Fabra Andrew Postlewaite University of Pennsylvania. March 9, 2000
Campaign Rhetoric: a model of reputation Enriqueta Aragones Harvard University and Universitat Pompeu Fabra Andrew Postlewaite University of Pennsylvania March 9, 2000 Abstract We develop a model of infinitely
More informationEfficiency Consequences of Affirmative Action in Politics Evidence from India
Efficiency Consequences of Affirmative Action in Politics Evidence from India Sabyasachi Das, Ashoka University Abhiroop Mukhopadhyay, ISI Delhi* Rajas Saroy, ISI Delhi Affirmative Action 0 Motivation
More informationAnti-Corruption, Governance and Procurement
Anti-Corruption, Governance and Procurement 13th Procurement, Integrity, Management and Openness (PRIMO) forum on Curbing corruption in public procurement May 23-25, 2017 Kiev, Ukraine Hiba Tahboub Manager
More informationFirm-level Perspectives On State-business Relations In Africa: The Food-processing Industry in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia
Firm-level Perspectives On State-business Relations In Africa: The Food-processing Industry in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia By Paul Kamau (with Goodluck Charles, Søren Jeppesen & Peter Kragelund) Paper presented
More informationThe Citizen Candidate Model: An Experimental Analysis
Public Choice (2005) 123: 197 216 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-0262-4 C Springer 2005 The Citizen Candidate Model: An Experimental Analysis JOHN CADIGAN Department of Public Administration, American University,
More informationImpact of Human Rights Abuses on Economic Outlook
Digital Commons @ George Fox University Student Scholarship - School of Business School of Business 1-1-2016 Impact of Human Rights Abuses on Economic Outlook Benjamin Antony George Fox University, bantony13@georgefox.edu
More informationPlease do not cite or distribute. Dealing with Corruption in a Democracy - Phyllis Dininio
Paper prepared for the conference, Democratic Deficits: Addressing the Challenges to Sustainability and Consolidation Around the World Sponsored by RTI International and the Latin American Program of the
More informationCorruption and Good Governance
Corruption and Good Governance Discussion paper 3 Management Development and Governance Division Bureau for Policy and Programme Support United Nations Development Programme New York July 1997 Copyright
More informationThird Party Voting: Vote One s Heart or One s Mind?
Third Party Voting: Vote One s Heart or One s Mind? Emekcan Yucel Job Market Paper This Version: October 30, 2016 Latest Version: Click Here Abstract In this paper, I propose non-instrumental benefits
More informationVolume 35, Issue 1. An examination of the effect of immigration on income inequality: A Gini index approach
Volume 35, Issue 1 An examination of the effect of immigration on income inequality: A Gini index approach Brian Hibbs Indiana University South Bend Gihoon Hong Indiana University South Bend Abstract This
More informationRed flags of institutionalised grand corruption in EU-regulated Polish public procurement 2
Mihály Fazekas 1 Red flags of institutionalised grand corruption in EU-regulated Polish public procurement 2 26/2/2016 1 University of Cambridge, Government Transparency Institute, mfazekas@govtransparency.eu
More informationNew institutional economic theories of non-profits and cooperatives: a critique from an evolutionary perspective
New institutional economic theories of non-profits and cooperatives: a critique from an evolutionary perspective 1 T H O M A S B A U W E N S C E N T R E F O R S O C I A L E C O N O M Y H E C - U N I V
More informationSummary of the Results of the 2015 Integrity Survey of the State Audit Office of Hungary
Summary of the Results of the 2015 Integrity Survey of the State Audit Office of Hungary Table of contents Foreword... 3 1. Objectives and Methodology of the Integrity Surveys of the State Audit Office
More informationExecutive summary 2013:2
Executive summary Why study corruption in Sweden? The fact that Sweden does well in international corruption surveys cannot be taken to imply that corruption does not exist or that corruption is not a
More informationFinancial disclosure and political selection: Evidence from India
Financial disclosure and political selection: Evidence from India Ray Fisman Boston University with Vikrant Vig (LBS) and Florian Schulz (UW) 6/26/2018 1 Holding politicians to account: asset declarations
More informationOnline Appendix: The Effect of Education on Civic and Political Engagement in Non-Consolidated Democracies: Evidence from Nigeria
Online Appendix: The Effect of Education on Civic and Political Engagement in Non-Consolidated Democracies: Evidence from Nigeria Horacio Larreguy John Marshall May 2016 1 Missionary schools Figure A1:
More informationRed tape, bribery and government favouritism: evidence from Europe
Crime Law Soc Change DOI 10.1007/s10611-017-9694-2 Red tape, bribery and government favouritism: evidence from Europe Mihály Fazekas 1 # The Author(s) 2017. This article is an open access publication Abstract
More informationCORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT. Lessons for Portugal Susan Rose-Ackerman
1 CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT Lessons for Portugal Susan Rose-Ackerman PORTUGAL IN THE TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL INDEX In Portugal corruption is a serious problem. TI ranks Portugal 29 th of 180 countries
More informationSession 2: The economics of location choice: theory
Session 2: The economics of location choice: theory Jacob L. Vigdor Duke University and NBER 6 September 2010 Outline The classics Roy model of selection into occupations. Sjaastad s rational choice analysis
More information1 Electoral Competition under Certainty
1 Electoral Competition under Certainty We begin with models of electoral competition. This chapter explores electoral competition when voting behavior is deterministic; the following chapter considers
More informationSuggestions Recommended for Approval
SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO THE DALLAS CITY CHARTER Items in bold are policy issues Items underlined are changes to city department operations Items in italics are technical corrections (Comments are in parentheses)
More informationWhen Do Voters Punish Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from Brazil
Experimental Evidence from Brazil Miguel F. P. de Figueiredo UC Berkeley F. Daniel Hidalgo MIT Yuri Kasahara University of Oslo CEGA Research Retreat UC Berkeley November 4, 2012 Project Overview Research
More informationKey elements to be considered for the Inter-American Convention against Corruption review methodology
www.tilac.org www.transparency.org Key elements to be considered for the Inter-American Convention against Corruption review methodology 8 April 2002 Transparency International and its chapters throughout
More informationFighting monopsony, a lack of competition that harms workers
Fighting monopsony, a lack of competition that harms workers Ioana Marinescu University of Pennsylvania & NBER Harvard Law, June 2018 Ioana Marinescu, UPenn & NBER Fighting monopsony Harvard Law, June
More information(COM(97)0192 C4-0273/97)
Resolution on the communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Union policy against corruption (COM(97)0192 C4-0273/97) A4-0285/98 Resolution on the communication from
More informationThe role of Social Cultural and Political Factors in explaining Perceived Responsiveness of Representatives in Local Government.
The role of Social Cultural and Political Factors in explaining Perceived Responsiveness of Representatives in Local Government. Master Onderzoek 2012-2013 Family Name: Jelluma Given Name: Rinse Cornelis
More informationRegulatory Governance of Network Industries: Experience and Prospects
Regulatory Governance of Network Industries: Experience and Prospects Jean-Michel GLACHANT European University Institute (with Eshien Chong from U. of Paris Sud) The network industry experience: Competition,
More informationAn Overview Across the New Political Economy Literature. Abstract
An Overview Across the New Political Economy Literature Luca Murrau Ministry of Economy and Finance - Rome Abstract This work presents a review of the literature on political process formation and the
More informationCorruption in Brazil: an analysis of irregularities at the state level. Ana Luiza Melo Aranha
Corruption in Brazil: an analysis of irregularities at the state level Ana Luiza Melo Aranha University of British Columbia Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais May 2013 Selected Paper prepared for presentation
More informationThe BEEPS Interactive Tool
The BEEPS Interactive Tool James Anderson, BEEPS User The Basics On The BEEPS Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey Joint initiative of the World Bank and EBRD Detailed survey of over
More informationChapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 1 Introduction 1 2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION This dissertation provides an analysis of some important consequences of multilevel governance. The concept of multilevel governance refers to the dispersion
More informationPERCEPTIONS ARE SOME PEOPLES REALITY: WHAT KIND OF COURT ARE YOU?
PERCEPTIONS ARE SOME PEOPLES REALITY: WHAT KIND OF COURT ARE YOU? PRESENTED BY: CAROL E. GAUNTT, CMCC MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE CITY OF WILLOW PARK FACE AND VOICE OF JUSTICE IN TEXAS OBJECTIVES Describe How
More informationWhat does the U.K. Want for a Post-Brexit Economic. Future?
What does the U.K. Want for a Post-Brexit Economic Future? Cameron Ballard-Rosa University of North Carolina Mashail Malik Stanford University Kenneth Scheve Stanford University December 2016 Preliminary
More informationBandits on patrol: An analysis of petty corruption on West African roads
Bandits on patrol: An analysis of petty corruption on West African roads Toni Oki University of Cambridge World Bank ABCDE 2016 Summary 1) How might the spatial distribution of petty corruption be predicted?
More informationThe Geographic Disparity in Voter Turnout for Boise City's November 2017 Election The Boise Commons
The Geographic Disparity in Voter Turnout for Boise City's November 2017 Election The Boise Commons November 27, 2017 Matthew Shapiro, Principal Investigator Table of Contents Executive Summary... 3 I.
More informationGovernance and the City:
Governance and the City: Global Determinants of Urban Performance and Implications from an International Perspective Daniel Kaufmann, Frannie Léautier & Massimo Mastruzzi The World Bank Institute http://worldbank.org/wbi/governance/
More informationThe Corporate Value of (Corrupt) Lobbying
The Corporate Value of (Corrupt) Lobbying Alex Borisov, Eitan Goldman, and Nandini Gupta Strategy and the Business Environment Conference, May 2013 The value of (corrupt) lobbing March May 2013 2012 Role
More informationCorruption, Political Instability and Firm-Level Export Decisions. Kul Kapri 1 Rowan University. August 2018
Corruption, Political Instability and Firm-Level Export Decisions Kul Kapri 1 Rowan University August 2018 Abstract In this paper I use South Asian firm-level data to examine whether the impact of corruption
More informationThe Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative. Electoral Incentives
The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives Alessandro Lizzeri and Nicola Persico March 10, 2000 American Economic Review, forthcoming ABSTRACT Politicians who care about the spoils
More informationPowered by TCPDF (
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org) RULES OF THE COMPETITION TABLE OF CONTENTS I. ADMINISTRATION AND GRIEVANCE REDRESSAL... 1 II. ELIGIBILITY & TEAM COMPOSITION... 1 III. LANGUAGE, DRESS CODE AND CONDUCT...
More informationVote Buying and Clientelism
Vote Buying and Clientelism Dilip Mookherjee Boston University Lecture 18 DM (BU) Clientelism 2018 1 / 1 Clientelism and Vote-Buying: Introduction Pervasiveness of vote-buying and clientelistic machine
More informationThe Chilcot inquiry into the
Does public debate about the pros and cons of the UK s involvement in Iraq undermine the chances of military success? Radha Iyengar examines the incentives of Iraqi insurgent groups to commit acts of violence,
More information! # % & ( ) ) ) ) ) +,. / 0 1 # ) 2 3 % ( &4& 58 9 : ) & ;; &4& ;;8;
! # % & ( ) ) ) ) ) +,. / 0 # ) % ( && : ) & ;; && ;;; < The Changing Geography of Voting Conservative in Great Britain: is it all to do with Inequality? Journal: Manuscript ID Draft Manuscript Type: Commentary
More informationWomen as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India
Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India Chattopadhayay and Duflo (Econometrica 2004) Presented by Nicolas Guida Johnson and Ngoc Nguyen Nov 8, 2018 Introduction Research
More informationONLINE APPENDIX: DELIBERATE DISENGAGEMENT: HOW EDUCATION
ONLINE APPENDIX: DELIBERATE DISENGAGEMENT: HOW EDUCATION CAN DECREASE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES Contents 1 Introduction 3 2 Variable definitions 3 3 Balance checks 8 4
More informationOrganized Interests, Legislators, and Bureaucratic Structure
Organized Interests, Legislators, and Bureaucratic Structure Stuart V. Jordan and Stéphane Lavertu Preliminary, Incomplete, Possibly not even Spellchecked. Please don t cite or circulate. Abstract Most
More informationDEFINING AND MEASURING CORRUPTION AND ITS IMPACT
DEFINING AND MEASURING CORRUPTION AND ITS IMPACT MANUEL BALÁN ASSISTANT PROFESSOR POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT MCGILL UNIVERSITY MANUEL.BALAN@MCGILL.CA September 29, 2017 Objectives
More informationGovernance, Economic Growth and Development since the 1960s: Background paper for World Economic and Social Survey Mushtaq H.
Governance, Economic Growth and Development since the 1960s: Background paper for World Economic and Social Survey 2006 Mushtaq H. Khan Economists agree that governance is one of the critical factors explaining
More informationAre Polls Good for the Voter? On the Impact of Attitudes Towards Surveys in Electoral Campaigns
Are Polls Good for the Voter? On the Impact of Attitudes Towards Surveys in Electoral Campaigns Paper presented by Claire Durand, Universite de Montreal John Goyder, University of Waterloo ISA Research
More informationCREATING AN ENABLING LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK. Prof. Maria Chiara Malaguti Senior Legal Advisor World Bank
CREATING AN ENABLING LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK Prof. Maria Chiara Malaguti Senior Legal Advisor World Bank 1 FROM GENERAL PRINCIPLE 3 TO THE 2009 REMITTANCES SURVEY 2 A. GENERAL PRINCIPLE 3 OF THE
More informationIntersections of political and economic relations: a network study
Procedia Computer Science Volume 66, 2015, Pages 239 246 YSC 2015. 4th International Young Scientists Conference on Computational Science Intersections of political and economic relations: a network study
More informationSHOULD THE UNITED STATES WORRY ABOUT LARGE, FAST-GROWING ECONOMIES?
Chapter Six SHOULD THE UNITED STATES WORRY ABOUT LARGE, FAST-GROWING ECONOMIES? This report represents an initial investigation into the relationship between economic growth and military expenditures for
More informationExplaining the two-way causality between inequality and democratization through corruption and concentration of power
MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive Explaining the two-way causality between inequality and democratization through corruption and concentration of power Eren, Ozlem University of Wisconsin Milwaukee December
More informationA REPLICATION OF THE POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF FEDERAL EXPENDITURE AT THE STATE LEVEL (PUBLIC CHOICE, 2005) Stratford Douglas* and W.
A REPLICATION OF THE POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF FEDERAL EXPENDITURE AT THE STATE LEVEL (PUBLIC CHOICE, 2005) by Stratford Douglas* and W. Robert Reed Revised, 26 December 2013 * Stratford Douglas, Department
More informationThe Collective Action Factors: Russian Mass Protests
: Russian Mass Protests 2011-2012 Motivation Why do individuals participate in collective actions? (Olson, 1965): small groups VS large groups The aims of collective actions specific public goods => «free-rider»
More informationCan Politicians Police Themselves? Natural Experimental Evidence from Brazil s Audit Courts Supplementary Appendix
Can Politicians Police Themselves? Natural Experimental Evidence from Brazil s Audit Courts Supplementary Appendix F. Daniel Hidalgo MIT Júlio Canello IESP Renato Lima-de-Oliveira MIT December 16, 215
More informationCOMPASS contracts for the provision of accommodation for asylum seekers
Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General Home Office COMPASS contracts for the provision of accommodation for asylum seekers HC 880 SESSION 2013-14 10 JANUARY 2014 4 Summary COMPASS contracts for
More informationPROBLEMS OF CREDIBLE STRATEGIC CONDITIONALITY IN DETERRENCE by Roger B. Myerson July 26, 2018
PROBLEMS OF CREDIBLE STRATEGIC CONDITIONALITY IN DETERRENCE by Roger B. Myerson July 26, 2018 We can influence others' behavior by threatening to punish them if they behave badly and by promising to reward
More informationADVISORY OPINION To: [John] Re: Case No A, Lobbying Date: August 24, 2001
ADVISORY OPINION To: [John] Re: Case No. 01021.A, Lobbying Date: You are a [sales representative], and an owner of [the company ] in Chicago. In January 2001, you called the Board and asked how the lobbyist
More informationMedia Ownership, Concentration, and Corruption in Bank Lending
Media Ownership, Concentration, and Corruption in Bank Lending Written by Joel F. Houston, Chen Lin, Yue Ma One summary sentence: One of determinants in banking corruption is the effectiveness of media
More informationDeterminants and Effects of Negative Advertising in Politics
Department of Economics- FEA/USP Determinants and Effects of Negative Advertising in Politics DANILO P. SOUZA MARCOS Y. NAKAGUMA WORKING PAPER SERIES Nº 2017-25 DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, FEA-USP WORKING
More informationClassical papers: Osborbe and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997)
The identity of politicians is endogenized Typical approach: any citizen may enter electoral competition at a cost. There is no pre-commitment on the platforms, and winner implements his or her ideal policy.
More informationANES Panel Study Proposal Voter Turnout and the Electoral College 1. Voter Turnout and Electoral College Attitudes. Gregory D.
ANES Panel Study Proposal Voter Turnout and the Electoral College 1 Voter Turnout and Electoral College Attitudes Gregory D. Webster University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Keywords: Voter turnout;
More informationNEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY. Division of Materiel. Schedule W. Compliance with NYS State Finance Law Sections 139-j and 139-k ( Lobbying Law )
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY Division of Materiel Schedule W Compliance with NYS State Finance Law Sections 139-j and 139-k ( Lobbying Law ) Solicitation No.: 1/13 NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY COMPLIANCE
More informationBachelorproject 2 The Complexity of Compliance: Why do member states fail to comply with EU directives?
Bachelorproject 2 The Complexity of Compliance: Why do member states fail to comply with EU directives? Authors: Garth Vissers & Simone Zwiers University of Utrecht, 2009 Introduction The European Union
More informationRural Migration and Social Dislocation: Using GIS data on social interaction sites to measure differences in rural-rural migrations
1 Rural Migration and Social Dislocation: Using GIS data on social interaction sites to measure differences in rural-rural migrations Elizabeth Sully Office of Population Research Woodrow Wilson School
More informationCentre for Competition Law and Policy. The National University of Advanced Legal Studies
FIRST EDITION, 2017 APRIL 7-9, 2017 KOCHI, KERALA Organised by: Centre for Competition Law and Policy The National University of Advanced Legal Studies OFFICIAL RULES 1 1. REGISTRATION a) Participation
More informationPresidents and The US Economy: An Econometric Exploration. Working Paper July 2014
Presidents and The US Economy: An Econometric Exploration Working Paper 20324 July 2014 Introduction An extensive and well-known body of scholarly research documents and explores the fact that macroeconomic
More informationCorruption and quality of public institutions: evidence from Generalized Method of Moment
Document de travail de la série Etudes et Documents E 2008.13 Corruption and quality of public institutions: evidence from Generalized Method of Moment Gbewopo Attila 1 University Clermont I, CERDI-CNRS
More information