Who s to Blame? Punishing Poor Economic Performance in a Centralized Political System

Transcription

1 Who s to Blame? Punishing Poor Economic Performance in a Centralized Political System Quintin H. Beazer 1 Ora John Reuter 2 1 Florida State University qbeazer@fsu.edu 2 University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee Higher School of Economics - Moscow reutero@uwm.edu Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

2 Political Centralization s Poster Boy Under Putin, Russia s central govt. has increased control over subnational politics Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

3 Political Centralization & its Consequences Centralization benefits leaders by giving extra control. This is exactly what non-democratic leaders want. Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

4 Political Centralization & its Consequences Centralization benefits leaders by giving extra control. This is exactly what non-democratic leaders want. But what are the political costs of centralization? Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

5 Political Centralization & Blame Attribution important questions for performance-dependent regimes How does political centralization affect responsibility for local outcomes? In a centralized system, who gets blamed when local economic performance suffers? Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

6 Economic Voting in Centralized Systems a theoretical starting point Voters punish elected officials for poor economic performance. Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

7 Economic Voting in Centralized Systems a theoretical starting point Voters punish elected officials for poor economic performance. Much economic voting research asks: What do voters do when unclear which elected official to punish? ex: literature on clarity of responsibility. Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

8 Economic Voting in Centralized Systems a theoretical starting point Voters punish elected officials for poor economic performance. Much economic voting research asks: What do voters do when unclear which elected official to punish? ex: literature on clarity of responsibility. In Russia s case, we ask instead: What do voters do when can t punish local officials through elections? Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

9 Centralization & Blame Attribution in Non-Democracies competing expectations 1.) Institutions under authoritarianism are window dressing. Formal institutional changes make little difference. Responsibility is clear and obvious (...dictator!). Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

10 Centralization & Blame Attribution in Non-Democracies competing expectations 2.) Institutions under authoritarianism still affect behavior. Formal institutions shape how citizens relate to their leaders. Institutional changes can shift responsibility for outcomes. Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

11 Centralization & Blame Attribution in Non-Democracies competing expectations 2.) Institutions under authoritarianism still affect behavior. Formal institutions shape how citizens relate to their leaders. Institutional changes can shift responsibility for outcomes. This view implies that, under centralization, voters punish those who appointed poorly-performing local leaders. Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

12 Empirical Predictions Appointed local officials voters hold higher-level officials responsible for poor local economy Elected local officials voters do not hold higher-level officials responsible for poor local economy Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

13 Subnational Variation in Elected vs. Appointed Local Execs A research design based on Russian cities Studies comparing appointed vs elected systems have empirical challenges: Unobserved cross-national differences may confound results. National electoral institutions do not vary much over time. Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

14 Subnational Variation in Elected vs. Appointed Local Execs A research design based on Russian cities Studies comparing appointed vs elected systems have empirical challenges: Unobserved cross-national differences may confound results. National electoral institutions do not vary much over time. Within Russia, cities vary in whether or not citizens elect their chief executive. Variation over time and across cities (even in same region). Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

15 Russian Municipalities Data Data on roughly 200 of Russia s largest cities Dependent variable: vote share for United Russia in legislative elections Independent variables: centralization: appointed/elected mayor economic performance: change in unemployment centralization economic performance Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

16 Russian Municipalities Data Data on roughly 200 of Russia s largest cities Control variables: press freedoms, regional political climate, working age population, average income, past UR electoral success Empirical strategy: generalized diff-in-diff Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

17 Regional Elections: UR Punished More for Poor Economic Performance in Centralized Cities DV: United Russia Vote Share % of vote in regional legislative elections (1) (2) Political Centralization dummy; 1 = appointed mayor (2.158) (2.136) Unemployment annual change in unemp. rate (0.615) (0.561) Centralization Unemployment (1.570) (1.476) Number of Observations All Control Variables No Yes Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

18 Marginal Effects of Poor Economic Performance Conditional on Centralization 5 Marginal Effect of Unemployment Elected Appointed Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

19 Types of Centralization: Appointments vs. Party Affiliation Investigating a rival mechanism DV: United Russia Vote Share Political Centralization dummy; 1 = appointed mayor (2.812) Unemployment annual change in unemp. rate (1.592) Centralization Unemployment (1.541) Centralization UR member (1.733) Number of Observations 285 All Control Variables Yes Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

20 National Officials Not Blamed More in Centralized Cities Probing the extent of blame attribution DV: United Russia Vote Share % of vote in Duma elections (1) (2) Political Centralization dummy; 1 = appointed mayor (2.045) (2.267) Unemployment annual change in unemp. rate (0.771) (0.788) Centralization Unemployment (1.333) (1.518) Number of Observations All Control Variables No Yes Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

21 Conclusion Political centralization creates a trade-off for the ruling group. Consolidates responsibility for local performance as well as control over local politics. Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

22 Conclusion Political centralization creates a trade-off for the ruling group. Consolidates responsibility for local performance as well as control over local politics. There are limits to blame attribution. In the Russian case, we observe: Voters punish officials who actually appoint local leaders (regional) No punishment for officials farther from appointment process (national) Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

23 Thank you in advance for comments and suggestions. Quintin H. Beazer Ora John Reuter Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

24 Centralization of Russian Cities Increasing Over Time Proportion of Cities with Appointed Mayors Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

25 Estimated Effects of Centralization on UR Vote Share Conditional on Unemployment 20 Marginal Effects of Appointment (dy/dx) Unemployment t Unemployment t 1 Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

26 Evidence Supports Parallel Trends Assumption A placebo test of differences prior to reforms DV: United Russia Vote Share % of vote in regional elections Eventual Centralization dummy; 1 = appointed mayor in future (1.751) Unemployment annual change in unemp. rate (0.807) Eventual Centralization Unemployment (3.302) Number of Observations 238 City Fixed Effects No All Control Variables Yes Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

27 Differences in Electoral History, by Cities Electoral Institution Electoral History in % vote share Group Means Elected Appointed n 1, n 2 p-value Past Support (regional) (124, 73) 0.04 UR s regional vote share (lagged DV) (1.27) (1.68) Past Support (national) (123, 61) 0.00 UR s vote share in 2003 Duma elections (0.93) (2.10) Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

28 Differences in Political Openness, by Cities Electoral Institution Political Openness subjective expert measures Group Means Elected Appointed n 1, n 2 p-value Strength of Civil Society ( ) (272, 109) 0.01 ordinal; min=1, max=4 (0.05) (0.07) Regional Democracy (282, 113) 0.00 composite score; min=0, max=29 (0.37) (0.62) Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23

29 Results Robust to IV Analysis Using mayor s age as instrument DV: United Russia Vote Share % of vote in regional elections (Reduced) (2SLS) Centralization (IV) dummy; 1 = mayor 47 (1.956) (9.374) Unemployment annual change in unemp. rate (2.278) (1.431) Centralization (IV) Unemployment (2.632) (5.463) Number of Observations All Control Variables Yes Yes Beazer & Reuter (FSU & UWM/HSE) Who s to Blame? Feb / 23