Introduction: Second-Generation Security Sector Reform

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1 Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: Introduction: Second-Generation Security Sector Reform Paul Jackson To cite this article: Paul Jackson (2018) Introduction: Second-Generation Security Sector Reform, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 12:1, 1-10, DOI: / To link to this article: Published online: 21 Mar Submit your article to this journal Article views: 951 View Crossmark data Citing articles: 3 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

2 JOURNAL OF INTERVENTION AND STATEBUILDING, 2018 VOL. 12, NO. 1, INTRODUCTION Introduction: Second-Generation Security Sector Reform Paul Jackson International Development Department, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK ABSTRACT Security sector reform (SSR) has become a commonly used tool for international approaches to insecure countries. Despite its frequent deployment as a key element of statebuilding, SSR suffers from both a lack of a conceptual hinterland and also lack of strong evidence of success. This special collection of papers explores these ideas, starting from an assumption that there are serious issues with SSR in practice. SSR, alongside many other facets of international aid programming, has suffered from an excess of technocentric and managerial approaches, with politics relegated to the sidelines. These articles outline what this means in practice and what a second generation of SSR could look like: an approach based on process and politics rather than linear managerialism. KEYWORDS Security sector reform; peace-building; statebuilding; development; security Security sector reform (SSR) has become part of the standard toolbox of interventions within conflict-affected states and those seeking to stabilize or avoid fracture. As Sedra (2018, XY) points out in his contribution to this special section, in May 2014 at the United Nations Security Council s opening debate on the adoption of Resolution 2151, the first standing resolution on SSR, United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon explained that a professional and accountable security sector under the framework of the rule of law can strengthen public confidence in the State and provide the stability necessary for peacebuilding and development, stressing that the aim of SSR is a collective goal of the UN (UN DPKO and UNMAS 2014). This statement both reiterates the importance of SSR as an approach to statebuilding and recognizes the mixed and incomplete record of SSR interventions. Indeed, the rapid development of policy tools and the adoption of SSR internationally has been matched by a lack of empirical evidence to make a judgement of its success or failure. SSR has been subject to considerable definitional debate, but the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) SSR handbook outlines a comprehensive overarching definition that identifies international support to SSR as seeking to enhance the ability of countries to meet the range of security and justice challenges they face in a manner consistent with democratic norms, and sound principles of governance and the rule of law (OECD DAC 2007, 21). This comprehensive definition has been taken up in varying forms by most international organizations engaging in SSR, and is also reflected in the 2008 UN Secretary-General s report, Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform (Ki-moon 2008). CONTACT Paul Jackson p.b.jackson@bham.ac.uk 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

3 2 P. JACKSON Although emanating from the OECD, this approach has been taken up by several regional actors in the pursuit of broader democratic, development and security goals. The African Union (AU) created its African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform in 2014, which confirms the values of SSR but also proposes regional approaches to the participation of AU states and security forces in SSR programmes. This is dealt with in more detail by Sedra s contribution to this special section (2018). Despite some AU progress, and greater emphasis on regional approaches through organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization of American States (OAS), there has been some reluctance to engage in SSR implementation, so SSR remains a largely state-centric project at least partly because of concerns over sovereignty and external interference. This means that SSR has only rarely been implemented in its comprehensive form thus, the strong underlying normative agenda of democracy and human rights has tended to be subordinated to technical exercises in training and equipping, and state effectiveness. This special section starts from the view that SSR, particularly in its incarnation led by the United Kingdom (UK), has mainly been a managerial technical exercise in institution-building (Jackson 2011; Waldman 2014). SSR has been seen as part of the UK s core mission of poverty alleviation, and has seen (in)security both as a major part of its development focus and as a major threat to human security (DFID 2000). Much of the UK s focus on post-conflict security and the reconstruction of states stems from its experience in Sierra Leone. From 1997 until the present, a whole of government approach for UK policy emerged that integrated aspects of security and development into something that became known as SSR (Jackson and Albrecht 2009). Whilst Sierra Leone was pivotal in showing that military intervention could work in 2000, it was also representative of a broader move towards the integration of security and development that influenced subsequent interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Mali and Libya (Broszka and Hänggi 2004). Academic studies of SSR have not historically been fully linked to the broader statebuilding debate or to the dialogue on liberal peace-building; rather, they have been driven by policy perspectives and subject to what Peake, Scheye, and Hills (2013, 32) refer to as benign analytical neglect. As a result, much of the work on SSR has been very specific and focused on particular activities rather than looking at broader interventions as an expression of, and in relation to, broader social and economic reform. What is wrong with the first generation? Despite its popularity amongst donors, as well as various bilateral donor strategies on SSR, the core ideas as outlined within this documentation have rarely been realized in practice. An emphasis on a normative agenda of good governance, rule of law, human rights and democratic civilian control has its own opposition within countries that view external interference as an infringement of sovereignty. It is not only the abstract ideal of sovereignty which is violated by such programmes, but also social practice. Despite a few successes, a survey of SSR implementation cases over the past decade shows a consistent pattern of undercutting intrinsic aspects of the SSR model (Bakrania 2015). Critical analysis of the SSR model has begun to emerge at the same time as criticism of the Western statebuilding approach to peace-building has developed. And yet, the high-level aspirations of SSR remain strong, even if there is a widening gap between these aspirations and the actual situation on the ground.

4 JOURNAL OF INTERVENTION AND STATEBUILDING 3 SSR is a fundamental element of statebuilding more broadly, since the provision of security and justice sits at the core of what states are, as parts of legitimacy (as a provider and arbiter of justice) and the social contract (as a provider of security). As such, SSR represents a window into the statebuilding process more broadly and into the underlying and usually unwritten assumptions that are made by international actors when constructing states. The neglect of politics may lead to what Lemay-Hébert (2013) refers to as the empty-shell approach, whereby the one size fits all solution to importing states may produce a state that operates in favour of local elites but lacks fundamental legitimacy with the population more broadly. Despite a somewhat mixed and incomplete record of SSR interventions, many international actors are currently involved in SSR programmes, including, for example, the UN in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), France in Mali, and the UK in Ethiopia and Nepal. These programmes employ an array of approaches and a complex mixture of international organizations, governments, non-state actors and private companies. Whilst SSR is not a monolithic approach, there is a strong family resemblance between programmes that implies a shared understanding of what states should look like. At the heart of SSR are the core values of democracy, good governance, gender equality, transparency and accountability, as well as a desire to propagate universal human rights. The OECD handbook on SSR is a very clear statement on this, putting forward the view that SSR should be focused on partner agreements with recipient countries with the aim of achieving four core objectives: the establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability in the security system; the improved delivery of security and justice services; the development of local leadership and ownership of the process; and, sustainability of justice and security sector delivery (OECD DAC 2007). Despite the family resemblance, there has been a conceptual debate about the scope and boundaries of security as a sector. Generally, comprehensive SSR programming goes beyond the operational capability of security services in, for example, anti-drug operations or counterinsurgency, and incorporates deeper, more politically sensitive elements. These range from the parliamentary oversight of security institutions through to the strengthening of civil society groups, improving intelligence systems, and addressing the justice system, incorporating the police, penal and judicial aspects. The justice sector is particularly interesting in that it is frequently characterized by poor formal coverage or capability on the part of courts, lawyers and/or judges, leaving ample room for local customary justice systems to flourish. In terms of peace-building, justice remains critical as a measure of state legitimacy and ability to enforce laws fairly, as well as a potential source of further conflict if mishandled. As such, resistance to SSR is perhaps unsurprising, since these elements go to the very core of what states are and what power means within the state. Any SSR programme substantially impacts on local power relations and, furthermore, decisions taken in the heat of the moment about SSR under stabilization can have unforeseen long-term implications (Jackson and Albrecht 2016). Any introduction of democracy, for example, empowers those who seek to provide democratic oversight and, at least theoretically, shifts control over security institutions from the few to the many, thus potentially undermining the power bases of the elite and seriously affecting issues like local ownership (van Veen 2016). The broad approach does not clarify things or make the idea of SSR more coherent. The list of elements that can be included in any given SSR programme continually increases,

5 4 P. JACKSON whilst there is very little further clarity in terms of sequencing or prioritization (Schroeder and Chappuis 2014). Despite much discussion and debate surrounding SSR, most donors have failed to mainstream SSR work in their main programmes. There has been a failure to create firm and coherent linkages between development and security agencies that has resulted in the lack of a coordinated approach in the field (Jackson and Albrecht 2014). The result of this is that SSR usually consists of a rather mixed group of ad hoc policies and initiatives that do not lead to a coordinated approach to dealing with partner countries. The lack of a comprehensive strategy effectively means that SSR in practice too frequently consists of a series of small uncoordinated programmes delivering traditional development and security activities renamed as SSR. The DRC is an example where there is not only no comprehensive SSR plan, despite several donors espousing the aims of SSR, but also where different donors are carrying out activities that are different within the same sector but use the same SSR label. For example, the French version of SSR consists of training and equipping, the Belgians are doing something similar, the European Union (EU) is attempting to coordinate, and the UK is concerned with accountability as well as capability, while also being involved with police training along with the South Africans. At the same time elsewhere on the continent, the United States (US) version of SSR hires Dyncorp to train the Liberian army without any contextual elements like civil command and control. This is further complicated by agency at the local level, where there has been a tendency for local actors to be selective in exactly how SSR initiatives have been implemented. The influence of local elites in influencing the direction and implementation of reforms remains important but under-researched. This is particularly important in the context of where SSR programmes have taken place, and these have been dominated by the post-conflict reconstruction of failed states. This context has dominated most SSR thinking, but it is here that Chanaa s (2002) conceptual contextual divide is the greatest (see also Podder 2013). There has been much thinking on what constitutes the security sector and the technocratic details of SSR, but far less emphasis on the contexts within which SSR is likely to be implemented. This has led to some technocratic and prescriptive SSR efforts failing on a political level and potentially making fragile situations worse, or at best not improving the security situation. As Podder (2013) points out, there is a need for the development of local institutions and capacities in place of externally driven social engineering that remains externally dependent, and this is fully compatible with the original aims of SSR itself in reconstructing legitimate institutions. Failure to account for the politics of SSR, in terms of both local power relations and everyday political relationships underlying state structures, has tended to lead to a technocratic approach focused on improving the effectiveness of security institutions rather than on the politics that provide the context for security. Short-term stabilization efforts have tended to take precedence over longer-term democratic transformations partly because the immediate context of stabilization is one of urgency, but also because that is how international donors work. As Jackson and Bakrania show in their contribution to this special section (2018), this involves a tendency to prize the measurable over the unmeasurable and time-bound programmes over underlying transformation of processes. An early emphasis on security has led to the securitization of much of the subsequent agenda as programmes head into a form of securitized path dependence where the

6 JOURNAL OF INTERVENTION AND STATEBUILDING 5 security agenda governs all subsequent actions, including justice (Jackson and Albrecht 2014,10 15). SSR programming, then, may end up reinforcing and strengthening political elites through making the means of control more effective without transforming the democratic system of oversight. What is second-generation SSR? The SSR literature and SSR practitioners are clearly aware that historical approaches have been subject to such challenges and that what amounts to social engineering is difficult on many different levels. However, what is clear is that the approaches to dealing with these challenges do not involve re-examining the underlying assumptions of the model but designing newer technocratic solutions to problems bigger budgets, more time, better planning and better technical knowledge of staff (Jackson and Albrecht 2009, 2014, 2016; Waldman 2014). Critically it also involves a move to more measurable outcomes in an area where measurability is a real issue. 1 These methodological approaches share a common belief that better implementation and knowledge allow outcomes to be better managed and, above all, more accurately predicted. The collective knowledge amongst international researchers about both statebuilding and also SSR in terms of causal relationships and also real outcomes on the ground remains somewhat limited. In particular there is a dearth of knowledge about whether or not the international interventions surrounding security have had a long-term impact on peace within the partner countries, including the question of whether or not international intervention makes peace more likely or less. In fact there have been very few systematic analyses of SSR interventions that have looked beyond the immediate programme evaluations (Munive 2014). As such, many within this field have a tendency to overestimate the transformative abilities of powerful external actors acting on very different local structures. SSR appears unable to explain resistance to programmes beyond discussions around spoilers since it only truly recognizes itself as being a technical process. For all the discussions in the literature on politics being paramount, the emphasis here is very much on finding entry points, and those who would be sympathetic to the aims of SSR in other words, who on Earth would not want liberal democracy? Contemporary policymakers are left with the problem of creating liberal states out of non-liberal ones, and an inability or unwillingness to understand or recognize resistance to this process. This is usually resolved by international actors through pretending they have created a liberal state, holding elections, withdrawing, and then blaming the locals afterwards (Lemay-Hébert 2013). The states that are left behind are usually flexible and sometimes fragile constructs that exist with fluid boundaries and have to cope in insecure environments. Whilst the normative imperative of SSR is to create a secure environment for citizens where security services are accountable and capable, the reality is that many states lack the capacity to provide oversight except through a powerful regime, and the rationale of security services is then in danger of switching from security of the people to regime protection, something that has happened in environments as diverse as Zimbabwe and Iraq. Even in benign political environments, a critical issue within security and justice is that the state may be entirely incapable of providing security or justice for many of its citizens, usually in rural or border areas, so the question remains: who provides these services and what choices do the end users of these services have?

7 6 P. JACKSON The question of end users of security and justice remains a controversial issue, with critical scholars like Chandler (2007) arguing that first-generation SSR was designed to provide security for the international organization of states rather than people within those states subject to SSR a form of new imperialism. The discussion on resistance and hybridity led by scholars like Mac Ginty (2010) and Richmond (2011), who highlight the resilience of local and customary systems in the face of international intervention, also emphasize local agency and choices. However, the assumption that they are valued because they are used may be misleading. Traditional authorities and chiefdom systems may be cheap (to donors) and easily understood (by users), but they also traditionally discriminate against some groups at a local level. Not all local-level initiatives are beneficial or enjoy universal support. While it is becoming increasingly clear that SSR is in need of a new paradigm, as the debate over second-generation SSR unfolds it is hard not to feel a hint of nostalgia for the normative clarity of first-generation approaches. For all the flaws of the original SSR model a weak empirical track record being the most glaring grounding SSR firmly in liberal-democratic principles and Weberian notions of statehood did at least have the merit of providing a coherent vision of the desired endpoint of reforms and a loose set of instructions for how to get there. For Western donors and practitioners in particular, SSR interventions in fragile or conflict-affected countries based on the principle of making their security sector look more like our security sector were easily justified, especially given assumptions about the self-evident superiority of liberal security orders. Conversely, implementation failures could just as easily be laid at the feet of local actors who were unwilling or unable to adapt to the demands and responsibilities of a modernizing security sector. In contrast, reading through the emerging literature on second-generation approaches to SSR can feel a bit like wandering through the woods with neither map nor compass. Nagging doubts over the means of SSR are now accompanied by growing uncertainty about its ends, as it becomes increasingly evident that conventional prescriptions about strengthening the ability of state institutions to monopolize the means of violence are no longer either appropriate or realistic in the vast majority of fragile or post-conflict states in which SSR is undertaken (Albrecht and Buur 2009, 397). Beyond the generic aspiration to improve security governance, in other words, we are no longer entirely sure where we want to go or how to get there. This unsettled state of affairs has taken the broader SSR community back to important first principles, such as whether the future of SSR will be (or should be) broadly liberal or post-liberal in character, or whether its emphasis should be on top-down or bottom-up approaches (or a mix of both). It has also left both scholars and practitioners grappling with a set of unwieldy concepts including ownership, resilience, inclusivity and hybridity that both reflect more complex and nuanced understandings of security relations in societies in transition and demand more sophisticated analyses of how to intervene effectively in such environments. What does this special section contribute? This special section consists of four articles that explore different aspects of second-generation SSR. Paul Jackson and Shivit Bakrania, in their article Is the Future of SSR Nonlinear? (2018), build on some of the critical elements outlined within this introduction

8 JOURNAL OF INTERVENTION AND STATEBUILDING 7 using a mapping of SSR literature that aims at identifying what is and is not known about SSR. As such it is the most comprehensive picture of SSR and security and justice available, and it mirrors the experiences and emphases of previous interventions. The article takes this as its starting point and develops an approach partly deriving from what is missing or undeveloped within the literature, pointing to a potential second generation of SSR and how it might develop further. The article goes beyond traditional criticism of SSR, highlighting issues with the reification of the local and a lack of understanding of hidden politics. Drawing on Scott and Lederach, as well as strong indicators within the history of SSR literature, the article puts forward a view that SSR needs to develop a nonlinear approach based around a proper understanding of institutions and their politics, with an emphasis on processes over organizational structures and recognition of hidden politics and linkages between different stakeholders. In this way the authors situate debates about second-generation SSR within the broader literature and provide a potential way forward based on what is not known about SSR. Timothy Donais builds on this in his article, Security Sector Reform and the Challenge of Vertical Integration (2018), by looking at one of the most difficult issues in SSR, namely local ownership, focusing on the tensions between externally driven programmes and domestic governments. Linking explicitly with peace-building literature that recognizes the importance of local local and state society political relationships, his article recognizes that such dynamics are of particular relevance to SSR, given that at the very heart of the SSR project is a renegotiation of the terms through which power is managed within a given society usually in the absence of settled institutional structures and the presence of ongoing insecurity. Furthermore, if SSR is really an element of statebuilding then the local turn in peace-building brings a view that the agency of the governed matters, and not just those who govern or those who support them internationally. Perhaps the most important contribution of his article is that it examines critical issues of evolving state society relations, specifically around reconciliation of both national and local ownership rather than privileging one over the other. In a similar way to the Jackson and Bakrania article, Donais then moves on to emphasize that this may be achieved only through process rather than institutional structures, and this then leads on to different approaches that are more pragmatic and inclusive, more nuanced processes that attempt to reconcile different visions of what security means and whose security matters. Generational change within SSR will therefore require a shift from the view that security is something that is delivered by states and consumed by citizens to a far broader analysis of who actually provides security and what that means in practice. Given this, the very idea of local ownership becomes far less clear and far more unwieldy as a label, which may explain the limited effectiveness of conventional approaches to local ownership. Donais article uses this view as a means to explore the paradoxes of national and local ownership and the challenges of reconciling these two forms of ownership. Mark Sedra takes a slightly different perspective in his article, Adapting Security Sector Reform to Ground-Level Realities: The Transition to a Second-Generation Model (2018), starting from the fact that the rapid institutionalization of SSR policy and practice in the international security and development communities has only been paralleled by its meagre success rate in the field. The policy practice gap within SSR has been shown up in practice with very few success stories and a dearth of detailed evaluations of SSR experiences, the practical application of SSR has shown the undercutting of the holistic

9 8 P. JACKSON aspects of the theoretical SSR model. Sedra identifies critical analyses of SSR emerging from the academic and policy research community with some support amongst practitioners that, as he states, tend to mirror the debates around statebuilding. Sedra identifies this as an introspection after difficult interventions in Iraq but more particularly in Afghanistan, where perceived failure has created a conducive environment for a change in approach. Musing that SSR may not actually survive at all, he points out that what remains important are the underlying principles that support the concept. This creates a strong link to the idea of process outlined in the first two articles, but Sedra goes further, pointing out that the issue with SSR in practice has largely been about how the coherent and integrated approach is partly what gives SSR its intrinsic power as an idea. Treating SSR as a loose menu of standalone principles, best practices and ideas ignores the original point of the concept, which was to demonstrate the intrinsic interconnections of the security and justice system and encourage integrated interventions. Identifying three potential schools of thought for second-generation SSR monopoly, good enough and hybrid he discusses what the future of SSR might look like. The final article of this special section is an example of one of the core changes and challenges facing SSR currently: who does SSR? In her article, Examining the Links between Security Sector Reform and Peacekeeping Troop Contribution in Post-Conflict States, Nina Wilén (2018) shows how SSR and troop contribution preparations are increasingly interwoven and at times perceived as complementary by both external and internal actors. Some of the objectives that are sought after in SSR, such as the modernization of the military forces and the institutionalization of international norms, overlap with the aim of external partners pre-deployment trainings and formations. However, the unintended consequences of this relate to arguments made in earlier articles that reinforcing the technical aspects of security institutions can also reinforce authoritarian and non-democratic power structures. Essentially, post-conflict militaries that supply peacekeeping troops may become far more experienced and capable through that experience and so undermine domestic security. The situation is made worse by the donor approach of preferring pre-deployment training as an investment rather than supporting uncertain outcomes and processes associated with SSR approaches. Overall this special section addresses some of the core issues facing SSR. Importantly, this is emphasized by the notable lack of evidence of success. What these articles show is a key set of underlying features of SSR failure that need to be addressed in any generational change and that go beyond just taking politics in to account. SSR fundamentally alters power relationships within countries, either by introducing different power dynamics following transformational change or by reinforcing existing power structures through increasing the technical ability of security services to protect a regime. Yet, remarkably, much SSR programming has carried on regardless without a comprehensive understanding of the consequences of this approach. Any generational change needs to escape this technocratic trap by emphasizing underlying power structures, emphasizing process rather than structure, taking into account security consumers and also encompassing a wide understanding of the nature of politics beyond the capital city. Note 1. A notable exception to this is Mac Ginty (2013).

10 JOURNAL OF INTERVENTION AND STATEBUILDING 9 Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author. Notes on contributor Paul Jackson Professor of African Politics, University of Birmingham and Research Fellow in the Centre for African Studies, University of the Free State. He has worked on and researched security and governance issues for more than twenty years, and is an adviser to the UK Government, the UN and others. He has written on SSR frequently, particularly on the UK experience in Sierra Leone and the links between SSR and state building. References Albrecht, P., and L. Buur An Uneasy Marriage: Non-State Actors and Police Reform. Policing and Society 19 (4): Bakrania, S Security and Evidence Mapping. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham. Broszka, M., and H. Hänggi Conceptualising Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction. In Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector, edited by A. Bryden, and H. Hanggi. Geneva and Berlin: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Lit Verlag, Chanaa, J Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chandler, D The Security Development Nexus and the Rise of Anti-Foreign Policy. Journal of International Relations and Development 10 (4): DFID (Department for International Development) Security Sector Reform and the Management of Military Expenditure: High Risks for Donors, High Returns for Development. London: DFID. Donais, T Security sector reform and the challenge of vertical integration, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 12 (1), doi: / Jackson, P Security Sector Reform and State Building. Third World Quarterly 32 (10): Jackson, P., and P. Albrecht Security Transformation in Sierra Leone Birmingham: GFN-SSR and DFID. Jackson, P., and P. Albrecht State-Building Through Security Sector Reform: The UK Intervention in Sierra Leone. Peacebuilding 2 (1): Jackson, P., and P. Albrecht Securing Sierra Leone, : Defence, Diplomacy and Development in Action. Royal United Services Institute Whitehall Papers No. 82. London. Jackson, P., and S. Bakrania Is he Future of SSR Non-Linear? Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 12 (1): doi: / Ki-moon, Ban Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform. Report of the Secretary-General, A/62/659-S/2008/39. New York: United Nations. Lemay-Hébert, N Everyday Legitimacy and International Administration: Global Governance and Local Legitimacy in Kosovo. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 7 (1): Mac Ginty, R Hybrid Peace: The Interaction between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace. Security Dialogue 41 (4): Mac Ginty, R Special Issue on Everyday Peace Indicators. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 7: 4. Munive, J Invisible Labour: The Political Economy of Reintegration in South Sudan. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 8 (4): OECD DAC (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee) Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice. Paris: OECD. Peake, G., E. Scheye, and A. Hills, eds Managing Insecurity: Field Experiences of Security Sector Reform. London: Routledge.

11 10 P. JACKSON Podder, S Bridging the Conceptual Contextual Divide: Security Sector Reform in Liberia and UNMIL Transition. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 7 (3): Richmond, O A Post-Liberal Peace. London: Routledge. Schroeder, U., and F. Chappuis New Perspectives on Security Sector Reform: The Role of Local Agency and Domestic Politics. International Peacekeeping 21 (2): Sedra, M Adapting Security Sector Reform to Ground-level Realities: The Transition to a Second-Generation Model, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 12 (1), doi: / UN DPKO and UNMAS (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and United Nations Mine Action Service) Security Council encourages UN Representatives and Envoys to consider the strategic value of security sector reform Resolution van Veen, E Improving Security and Justice Programming in Fragile Situations: Better Political Engagement, More Change Management. Paris: OECD. Waldman, T The Use of Statebuilding Research in Fragile Contexts: Evidence from British Policymaking in Afghanistan, Nepal and Sierra Leone. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 8 (2-3): Wilén, N Examining the Links Between Security Sector Reform and Peacekeeping Troop Contribution in Post-Conflict States, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 12 (1), doi: /