Early Recovery From Conflict: The Challenges of Integrating Humanitarian and Development Frameworks

Transcription

1 Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) Early Recovery From Conflict: The Challenges of Integrating Humanitarian and Development Frameworks The Case of Southern Sudan Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Fragile States Meeting Series, London, 5 th November

2 Outline of Presentation 1. Introduction: Trends in Conflict and Fragility 2. Post-Conflict Challenges 3. Responding to the Post-Conflict Challenges 4. Early Recovery: Bridging the Divide 5. Conclusions: Key Messages 2

3 1. Trends in Conflict and Fragility Since the end of cold war, civil wars are pronounced and endemic to many African countries. Risk of civil wars stands now as the leading contributory cause of vulnerability and poverty in the world. Despite the apparent decline in the occurrence of civil wars in the world, other types of state-threatening violence have been increasing. Of the 32 Chronically Deprived Countries (CDCs) some 22 are classified as fragile states and 19 have experienced major conflicts since As a result strengthening fragile states has become a dominant international concern (WDR 2011). This focus has widened from linking relief and development to integrating aid and security. 3

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5 2. Post-Conflict Challenges: Human, Economic and Social Consequences Health and Mortality Consequences: (Child and Maternal Mortality, IDPs and Refugees) Economic Costs: (poverty, debt, military expend. Humanitarian costs) Political Costs: (Human rights, political instability, social capital and institutional decay) 5

6 3. Responding to the Post-Conflict Challenges 1. Humanitarian: Drive of Humanitarian Passion 2. Recovery: Managing Transition and Bridging the Divide 3. Development: Planning for the Future 6

7 3.1. Humanitarian: The Drive of Humanitarian Passion in Southern Sudan The Operations Life-Line Sudan ( ): Saved many lives and livelihoods unlike the first civil war. Secured and sustained humanitarian access. Encouraged early recovery and capacity development. Promoted humanitarian principles and basic human rights. Effective Coordination (NGOs, UN and Donors). Became the voice of the war victims. More access to basic services. Built wealth of knowledge and understanding. 7

8 3.2.a Recovery: Peace as Social Compact Ending civil wars and sustenance of peace and stability are critical for bridging the divide. Making peace agreement as a basis for a viable social compact. Making peace agreement to end the civil war and to provide a new framework to transform state on the values of justice, equality, democracy, human rights and reconciliation. 8

9 3.2.b. Recovery: Peace Dividends and Pro-Poor Expenditure Managing expectations for sustenance of peace. Quick wins and peace dividends (short vs. long). Pro-poor spending, growth and poverty reduction (JAM focused on long term and less on humanitarian). 9

10 JAM Commitment to Pro-Poor Spending (in Billion USD) High and rising Pro-Poor Ratio, Declining External Share (%) National Government Poverty reducing/non-south expenditure Share of JAM financed externally Government of Southern Sudan Pro-poor/Total spending Share of JAM financed externally

11 Government of Southern Sudan Commitment to Pro-Poor Spending, 2006 (one year after Peace Agreement) 100% 90% 80% 39% 70% 65% 60% 50% 40% 30% 61% Non-propoor Pro-poor 20% 35% 10% 0% Budget Actual 11

12 3.2.c. Recovery: Aid Delivery as Social Compact The following mechanisms we established for delivering aid and bridging the humanitarian and development agenda: Capacity Building Trust Fund (CBTF): Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF): Basic Services Fund (BSF): Sudan Recovery Fund (SRF): Multi Donors Trust Funds (MDTFs): 12

13 Type of Aid Timeline and Type of Assistance Security (AU, UN) and Humanitarian Assistance (CAP/ workplan) Development assistance eg Multi-Donor Trust Fund; bilateral programs Development pledges Track 1 Oslo I Track 2 Oslo II Peace Agreement Two Years after peace Time 13

14 4. Early Recovery Challenges and Trade-offs Provision of Security: security vs. social services quantity (dealing with militia) vs. quality (modern force) voluntary vs. forced disarmament (regional dimension) DDR vs. More Forces (Prisoners Dilemma) decentralization vs. deconcentration of services state vs. community security (traditional authority) Justice vs. Reconciliation (dealing with the past) 14

15 4. Early Recovery Challenges and Trade-offs Establishing and Strengthening Legitimacy: high expectations vs. low capacity (disappointment) legitimacy vs. deliverables military mindset vs. civil mindset appointed vs. elected leaders (power sharing) elections vs. status quo (institutional building) Traditional authority vs. formal authority (local legitimacy) macro vs. micro peace building (social capital) 15

16 4. Early Recovery Challenges and Trade-offs Making the State Function: Establishing Public Service: Decentralization: Service Delivery and Capacity: Accountability: 16

17 5. Conclusions Insurmountable Challenges: Role of Development Partners: What should donors do now? 17