Changing Directions: Populism as a driving force of political change in the Netherlands

Transcription

1 Changing Directions: Populism as a driving force of political change in the Netherlands Thesis by Bart Pierik ID: Maastricht Graduate School of Governance 2008 Supervisor: Dr. J. Hoogenboezem Word Count:

2 Table of Contents Abstract...p. 3 Introduction. p.4 Chapter 1 Dutch Case Study of populism....p.6 Chapter 2 - Political consequences Short term and long term....p.15 Chapter 3 Empirical evidence for populist influences p.22 Reflection and conclusion Assessing multiculturalism, populism and its impact..p.27 Bibliography..p.29 2

3 Abstract Populism is a style of politics that seeks to renew both subjects as well as processes within modern democracies. In the Netherlands, one populist party in particular was quite successful electorally, and to some extent changed the Dutch political landscape. Unprecedented as the political impact of this populist party may have been, it was not alone in changing the Dutch political debate about immigration- and integration-related matters. More factors were of influence, but the populist parties can be credited with changing the way the Dutch political elite behaves towards the public in deciding about matters like immigration and integration of foreigners. Proof of these findings is provided by empirical analysis of Dutch throne speeches and the amount of parliamentary questions about the subject matter. 3

4 Introduction Populism is an influential force in modern day politics, particularly in the Netherlands. All sorts of opinions can be had on the subject, but one interesting theme sticks out above the rest: what can populists actually accomplish? My research question will therefore be: What has been the influence of a successful populist movement on Dutch democracy? Why ask this question? As with any paper that investigates the past, one can learn from recent developments and employ this knowledge to assess the present, and sometimes the near future. In this case, populism was arguably a changing force in Dutch politics, and to assess whether they actually live up to the promises of change they made, there needs to be an account of their influence. Part of the reason for this question is the fact that this ground remains largely uncovered: few or none good scientific papers about Dutch populism and its impact exist at the moment. This makes it hard for politicians, social scientists and voters alike to interpret populists and their role in the spectrum of Dutch political parties. To answer the research question, I will employ a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. In the first chapter, a number of sources from various disciplines (TV-reports, books about contemporary politics, election programs, newspaper articles) will be used to provide insight in the Dutch political situation and the main populist actors will be introduced. Having seen who these populists are and what drives them politically, chapter 2 will go on to explain what these parties were able to achieve. This chapter provides a qualitative analysis, and employs official government documents and (again) election programs and newspaper articles to paint a complete picture. Chapter 3 constitutes the empirical backbone of this party: parliamentary documents and throne speeches are used to get a measurable report of populists influence through counting populist-inspired parts of these official texts. In the conclusion the empirical and non-empirical parts are combined to draw a conclusion as to the impact of populists. The most successful Dutch populist party, in terms of votes and governing coalition participation, was the LPF, headed by Pim Fortuyn. A main part of its reason for success and later, victory, was its focus on immigration- and integration-related problems in the Netherlands. Because of this, I will look at the way immigration and integration policies are and were treated in Dutch politics, and what populism s influence on this process actually was. The most suitable method for analyzing the (perceived) political and economical problems that are caused by immigration and lack of integration in the Netherlands, and the way the politicians deal with them, is discourse analysis. 4

5 By looking at what was said by those in power, we can see the tone of the debate evolve, and with that also the contents of it. Using the electoral success of Fortuyn as a turning point, we will look at the contributions to the debate about these problems by politicians, and look more in depth at the case of the earlier right-wing politician Hans Janmaat and his CD 1. The way he brought his message, and more importantly, the reactions he got when he represented his voters, tells us a lot about the political climate in the Netherlands in the 90 s. Comparing Janmaat s situation in terms of electoral success and legal consequences of his politics with later right-wing populists will prove to be an interesting and useful example to give insight in the matter at hand. Also very relevant to this climate was an article by politically active writer Paul Scheffer, called the Multicultural Drama : an article that spurred lots of debate about integrationrelated matters, and might be just as influential in itself as some politicians were in the process of the changing discourse. Considering Fortuyns election victory further on, we will see what his political message was (and how he delivered it) in-depth, and move on to see what his heritage is. Did he fundamentally change the debate, and if so, just the style and tone of it or mostly the content? If the political tone used to handle matters like integration really changed, was this just because of Fortuyn or was it more of an evolutionary process including many more actors and events? Using very recent parliamentary texts by the party that is now the dominant right-wing populist representation (the PVV 2 ) we will see if Fortuyn paved the way for new views, and draw a parallel with the opposition Janmaat faced in earlier years. Most importantly, I will go beyond qualitative analysis of debates and articles and provide an empirical basis for a conclusion as to the impact of populism in the Netherlands. Taking into account significant political material of the last ten years, quantitative material will make very clear what the impact of the LPF has been. Having considered all of this material, I will conclude by assessing the influence of various factors on Dutch political discourse. 1 CD stands for Centrum Democraten, i.e. Centre Democrats 2 PVV stands for Partij voor de Vrijheid, i.e. Party for Freedom 5

6 Chapter 1: Dutch Case Study of populism Before we can assess populism s impact through quantitative material and see what its influence is or was in the Netherlands, we need to establish what is meant by populism itself. Emeritus Professor of politics Bernard Crick gives a very good definition which is broad enough to include the styles and manners of the politicians I deem populists: a style of politics and rhetoric that seeks to arouse a majority, or at least their leaders passionately believe is a majority (like moral majority today, who are plainly a minority), who are, have been, or think themselves to be outside the polity, scorned and despised by an educated establishment (Crick, 2002, p.78). A political party (adhering to Crick s definition) that was both widely classified as populist while democratically being very successful with the voters was the LPF 3 in the Netherlands. Starting out as the front man of a party aiming at a more open government 4, Pim Fortuyn soon rose to an almost celebrity status in Dutch politics. After being forced to leave this party because of differing opinions, Fortuyn started his own party to win the general elections of By looking at the impression he made and the amount of votes he won posthumously we can assess the popularity of his populist views. More significantly, we can perform discourse analysis, and see if Fortuyn s views and rise in politics actually changed the style or content of the Dutch political debate. In other words, we can see if populism (i.e. the LPF) can actually change the direction in which a democracy is headed, and if so, what this change might be. Pim Fortuyn was a politician with a very distinctive style: while having a right-wing political views, he was openly gay and an academic (appreciative of being called Professor Pim ), an unusual combination of characteristics among European right-wing leaders. Also quite remarkable for a populist was the fact that he was not too shy to demonstrate that he was part of a socio-economic elite: he had a dark blue, chauffeured Daimler V8, wore Italian tailored suits and lived in an expensive, renaissance-style house in Rotterdam, accompanied by a butler. This did not affect his popularity in a negative way though; one might even say on the contrary. The main reason Fortuyn could get away with being rich and clearly very different from the man in the street in many respects, was that he understood the public and reacted to their political wishes like no other Dutch politician did at the time. The Netherlands have long 3 LPF is an abbreviation of Lijst Pim Fortuyn 4 This party was called Leefbaar Nederland i.e. Livable Netherlands 6

7 been known (and wanting to appear) as a very open, tolerant and liberal country, and Fortuyn s success in the polls with fairly right-wing ideas was somewhat unexpected by the incumbent political elite. Indeed, it can be argued that Fortuyn s victory caused a loss of this very image: that of the Netherlands being tolerant and liberal (Koenis, 2008, p.20, my translation). The social-democrats (one of the parties that lost many votes to Fortuyn s movement) issued an internal report after the elections called De Kaasstolp aan Diggelen 5 (PvdA, 2002) The report points to an increasing sense of discontent with the governing elite and practices of government (PvdA, 2002, my translation) as one of the major reasons for losing the elections by a landslide. One can see an open door for populism here: the public is fed up with both the governing politicians and their policies, and waiting for something or someone new to come along, preferably with the ambition to do things completely differently. It is therefore no coincidence that Fortuyn s political autobiography (also serving as an extensive election program) was called De puinhopen van acht jaar paars (Karakter, 2002), which would translate as The Ruins of Eight Purple Years, referring to the previous coalition which was dubbed the purple government because that is the color one gets when mixing red (social democrats) and blue (liberals). Possibly different from what one might expect, this was actually a reasonably liberal coalition, composed of both left-wing and moderately right-wing liberals and social-democrats. Still, Fortuyn and his political supporters felt that the government in place had failed them, and formulated ambitions based on the differences with the incumbents. To perform a discourse analysis and see Fortuyn s influence, we need to know what we are looking for, hence, we need to take a closer look at Fortuyn s message to be able to recognize it in other political communication. In The Ruins, Fortuyn introduces his discontent by comparing the public sector to a market, pointing out that the public sector does not deliver what its clients (i.e. the voters) want and need, only what itself deems necessary. Because of the exclusive characteristics of Dutch political discourse (only a fairly small majority of the population is a member of a political party) Fortuyn states that democracy is violated, and a small elite decides which way to go without permitting the citizens to be involved (Fortuyn, 2002). If we return to the market metaphor once more, the Dutch public sector represents a 5 This name is very hard to translate into English but comes down to describing an external shock to a carefully crafted, and somewhat isolated status-quo 7

8 sellers market, providing what it feels necessary without real democracy, that is, if one considers democracy to be more than just ticking a box on a ballot every four years (Fortuyn, 2002, p.8, my translation). Regardless of the content of his political program, Fortuyn advocates a high degree of citizen participation (or at least a higher degree than in the current situation) and therefore distances himself from a minimalistic concept of democracy. Fortuyn argues that by leaving so much room for decision-making to the governing elite, a lot of usable political talent present in the public is actually wasted. Among this public, he was mostly known, often praised and regularly criticized for his stance on immigration. Attacking the dominant view held mostly by the left-of-center politicians that the multicultural society, while not an utopia, was faring reasonably well, Fortuyn stated bluntly: I think 16 million Dutchmen is enough. It s a full country (Poorthuis & Wansink, 2002, my translation). When reminded by journalists that his party (LN) had forbidden him to make this statement, he responded by saying that he did not feel the need to take this limitation seriously anymore. In his book, Fortuyn attacks the Muslim group of immigrants more specifically: (f)rom our perspective that of modernity much of Islam and its culture is either reprehensible or utterly retard (Fortuyn, 2002, p.154, my translation). He proves his point by observing the economic position of Muslim countries compared to many Western states, without taking into account factors like colonialism and its heritage, protectionism, geography or natural resources. Dutch business benefited immensely from cheap guest labor in earlier decades, but Fortuyn assumes that the influx of immigrants is bound to have negative effects. Some of the suggestions Fortuyn gives for solving this problem seem radical, to say the least: Cancel the Schengen treaty ( ) revision of the 1951 UN Refugee treaty ( ) when impossible, cancellation of it ( ) reduce the number of shelters for asylum seekers, because every supply creates its own demand in this sector (Fortuyn, 2002, p , my translation). Note how Fortuyn does not draw a line between regular immigration and refugees, thus offering solutions for one part of this domain that only apply to the other. If anything, the break with old politics where style was concerned was very clear, and Fortuyn honored his ambition to break up the current situation. His party becomes ever more interesting when it is put in a historical perspective, so we can see what its influence really is (and is not). Now, it would be a severe simplification to reduce our discourse analysis to a before/after-comparison, but chronology can be a good base line in this case. To ensure this paper is relevant in view of the current situation and sources are sufficiently available, we will mainly focus on the last twenty years or so. In the years between the second world war and 8

9 the period we will concentrate on, the Netherlands attracted many immigrants, mainly from countries like Morocco and Turkey, to fill a large gap of unemployed labor, for which the Dutch companies could not find staff. As it was assumed that these people would come and work for a limited period only, integration was not a primary target and people often planned to return to their home countries after a few years (SCP, 1998), resulting in the term gastarbeiders (guest workers). Still, reality did not follow these plans and many people stayed in the Netherlands after their job contracts had expired (SCP, 1998). However, not having felt the need to integrate in Dutch society and being unable to communicate without the right language skills, this first generation of non-european immigrants encountered many problems in finding their way in the Netherlands. These problems somehow remained in a blind spot for Dutch politics for a long time. Indeed, there was a very stable consensus that the multicultural society was a good thing in general, and far-right or even xenophobe parties were shunned and remained largely unsuccessful, as we will see. Right-wing populism before Fortuyn A good example of a right-wing populist in this era was Hans Janmaat, party leader of the Centrum Democraten 6. A portrait of Janmaat made by Dutch public television broadcaster KRO ( Profiel, 28 th of September 2005) shows an almost tragic figure, who sees most of his fellow MP s leave the room or shun him when he commences his speech. We see an antihero, a lonely man who often loses track in the midst of his furious reasoning, and who often cannot even get media attention without ending up in an unsympathetic light (KRO Profiel, 2005). In his political ambitions, Janmaat was often slightly less radical and less xenophobic than the Centrum Partij he left before setting up his own movement. Nevertheless, there can be no mistake about on what side of the political spectrum the CD must be placed. According to the party s profile on Europa-nu.nl 7, one of the main political goals of the CD was the abolition of the first article of the Dutch Constitution. By this article, all forms of discrimination of all people in the Netherlands on the basis of religion, political color, race, sex, or other characteristics is forbidden (Kluwer College Bundel Wetteksten, 2003). Another notable point made by Janmaat was his trademark quote Vol is Vol (which translates full is full, i.e. the country s capacity to take in new immigrants is exhausted). Technically, this is not a racist comment, as it does not mention foreigners explicitly, let alone making derogatory 6 Centrum Democrats, abbreviated CD 7 This is a website set up by the Bureau of the European Parliament 9

10 remarks about them. Even so, Janmaat and his politically involved wife Wil Schuurman were legally prosecuted on multiple occasions for uttering this phrase and other, similar ones and were convicted several times to pay fines for discrimination and the encouragement of hatred against foreigners (Europa-nu.nl, n.d.). Almost needless to remark, in a country that prides itself on its tolerance and diversity, prosecuting an active politician is a controversial tactic to say the least. Even more remarkable is the fact that, as we have seen earlier, Pim Fortuyn was able to state that the country is full in a newspaper interview in 2002 (Poorthuis & Wansink, 2002), without being convicted for it. This already points to the importance of what the Germans call Zeitgeist for politicians like Fortuyn or Janmaat. Janmaat s unmistakable talent to say the wrong things at the wrong moment (as it is mentioned in the KRO documentary) did little to secure his political success: at the party s high point, it had three seats (out of a 150) in Dutch parliament. That might seem like a small proportion, but it is not entirely without significance. With the number of votes needed for one seat in 1994 (the year the CD won three seats) being (Politiek Compendium 8, n.d.) that means the CD was representing at least voters. Taking into account that non-voting people might sympathize with the CD, that is more than, say, the population of Utrecht at the far-right of the political stage even before Fortuyn made the message more popular. The party s performance may not be overwhelming in a country where the big, governing parties sometimes reach as much as 50 seats, but remember that Janmaat had to work in a political environment that was at least cold or sometimes hostile towards him and his party, and was often seen in a bad media light (KRO Profiel, 2005). Janmaat died in 2002, just before Fortuyn won the national elections with a campaign that certainly had parallels with the CD s message. The big question now is: what made Fortuyn so successful in a country that did not buy Janmaat s message only ten years before? Let us start with the smallest factor first: selling talent. As said, Janmaat was a clumsy and sometimes heartless man; when a popular member of the cabinet (Ien Dales, a social-democratic minister) died unexpectedly, he was quoted saying he would not shed a tear (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman, 1995, my translation) as he was convinced that she was influential in the opposition against his movement. On another occasion, he wanted to ban a minister (Ernst Hirsch Ballin) from his job because he was of 8 The Politiek Compendium is an online resource of parliamentary information, maintained by the Parliamentary Documentation Centre of Leiden University 10

11 Jewish decent and, as a result of his people being migrants, he had to refrain from public office (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman, 1995). When this is compared to Fortuyn, who was harsh in his judgments of the multicultural society nevertheless, Fortuyn comes out on top as better suited for the public debate. He felt more comfortable debating with other politicians, staying in touch with his political anger but rarely making a personal comment like Janmaat s. Also, as pointed out previously, Fortuyn won many people over with his sense of style and talent for debating, both lacking in Janmaat (at least when appearing in public). When Janmaat was urged to dress and act like Fortuyn for a humoristic TV-show, shortly before his death, the transformation is clear: the two politicians were very different in both their political and personal style (KRO Profiel, 2005). Most importantly though, the political climate in the Netherlands was particularly unforgiving for Janmaat and his views, but to make that clear we have to skip a few years ahead. Het Multiculturele Drama (Translation: the multicultural drama) The title for this sub-chapter sounds like something a right-wing populist might say or write, sick and tired of all the political correctness surrounding the immigration and integration debates in the late 90 s. On the contrary: Het Multiculturele Drama is arguably the most influential and important written contribution to the broad political debate about the issues at hand and most revolutionary about this opinion article, published in a national newspaper ( NRC Handelsblad) on the 29 th of January, 2000, was that it was written by Paul Scheffer, a prominent member of the social democrats (PvdA). In this piece, he wonders what went wrong with the Dutch multicultural society, and more importantly, what is to be done about the problems that arise. He is very outspoken against the prevalent optimism or naivety that dominates the debate: (w)hy do we think we can afford to see generations of immigrants fail ( )? ( ) The peace in our society is severely threatened (Scheffer, 2000). Scheffer also refers to the efforts Dutch society in general and politicians in particular made to bridge the gaps between various socials classes and ensure full citizenship for all in preceding centuries, and wonders why something similar is not taking place at the time he writes Drama. Unlike the results of the mentioned battle against sharp class divisions, the current situation is one of unresolved inequality; Scheffer quotes an SCP report (Social-Cultural Planning Bureau, which advises the Dutch government) saying that the non- Western immigrants, on average, lack skills and diplomas which would render them suitable for high potential jobs, hence there is a significant reserve of talent as the SCP puts it 11

12 (Scheffer, 2000). Scheffer goes on to say that the prospects in this respect are not very good, and that the high incidence of unemployment and school drop-outs will weigh down on Dutch society to an ever increasing extent (Scheffer, 2000, my translation). The increasing divide and the lack of political action and willingness to solve the problems reminds Scheffer of the Dutch attitude on the eve of the second World War, trying to stay out of the conflict resulting in the entire nation losing sight of reality (Scheffer, 2000, my translation). Part of the problem is that many immigrants are Muslims, and while Scheffer does not seem to consider the Islam religion aggressive per se, he finds that certain qualities of it, like the harsh punishment of infidels or the lack of respect for the separation of church and state, are not reconcilable with the Netherlands and its culture: there are cultural differences that are not open to ( ) settling and bribery (Scheffer, 2000, my translation). Another part of the problem is the cosmopolitan illusion in which many Dutch politicians seem to be stuck. A few years after the publication of his article, Scheffer himself commented on this: the elite did not understand that to a large part of the population, not just the losers but also the middle class, borders had a protective quality ( ) my position is that ill-considered cosmopolitism only causes a populist backlash (Kleijwegt & Van Weezel, 2006, p.54, my translation). Scheffer did not just make this cosmopolitism up, of course; in an article published a few months after Drama, the Dutch minister for integration policy, Roger van Boxtel, wrote that the people are becoming cosmopolitans, and for a cosmopolitan, a border is there to be crossed (Van Boxtel, 2000). Could it be that we have the core of the populist development right here? Maybe Isaac Newton s third law of motion ( for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction ) can be applied to the rise of populism: through a self-leveling mechanism of some sort, the public will find more of their opinions reflected in a growing populist movement when the amount of inappropriate political correctness reaches an intolerable level. It is not that simple though, or at least it proved to be more difficult in this case. Scheffer s article caused a sensation among Dutch politicians and a special debate about it (and its impact) was held among the parliamentary delegations chairmen. In this debate, front men of all political directions tried to soften the blow: the social democrat (PvdA) leader Ad Melkert was heard saying that (i)t is not about emphasizing the problems, but the opportunities and the leader of the right-wing liberals (VVD) derived hope from all those successful football players and singers, the good food and the lovely clothing (Kleijwegt & Van Weezel, 2006, p.56, my translations). Left-wing green party GroenLinks s delegate 12

13 Rosenmöller wanted a little bit of multicultural hope as opposite to a massively formulated multicultural drama (Kleijwegt & Van Weezel, 2006, p.56, my translation). Only socialist (SP) leader Jan Marijnissen (who is, incidentally, often referred to as being a left-wing populist) recognized a reflection of his own views in Scheffer s piece: (t)he current developments will lead us towards ghettos, de facto apartheid and a caste society (Kleijwegt & Van Weezel, 2006, p.57, my translation). In the end, consensus in the debate was reached about the importance of integration courses and learning the Dutch language. These ideas proved to be viable in the long term as well: integration courses remain an important part of Dutch immigrant policies to date, and another spear point is the recently launched website Hetbegintmettaal.nl ( it begins with language ) that emphasizes the importance of knowledge of the Dutch language to find one s way in society. According to the minister responsible for the integration of minorities at the time, the problems had more causes than people not being fluent in Dutch. According to Van Boxtel, the Dutch approach to immigration was not realistic for a long time: expectations about both quantity of immigrants and their productivity were off. People were placed in a refuge center for years until they were cleared by the department of Immigration, and from that moment on they were expected to participate in Dutch society all of the sudden. Van Boxtel: (w)e had an absurd policy ( ) for four or five years, these people were worn out and then we complained that they did not find jobs immediately (Kleijwegt & Van Weezel, 2006, p.60, my translation). All of these insights were only conceived with hindsight, though. So far, we have seen that Scheffer s article created a lot of noise and commotion, but the reassuring attitude remained prevalent among the political elite. Let us return to Fortuyn, who tried to make clear what was going on outside the living environment of the dominant politicians of the 90 s. Fortuyn agreed with Scheffer s observations concerning the tensions between Islam and the modern Dutch society, and took them one step further. Fortuyn is more general and harsher about Islam and its attitude towards modernity: Islam feels superior and discriminated against at the same time (Fortuyn, 2002, p.156, my translation). His political dissatisfaction is not only brought on by Islam though; Fortuyn follows a much more protectionist line than Scheffer. When talking about the background of immigrant groups in the Netherlands, Fortuyn reckons that over 80 percent of refugees has an economic motive, and with that he blurs the line between immigrants and refugees.. He goes a little further than just this number: (d)o you sense the contradiction that is enclosed in the term economic refugee? It seems like the term happiness seeker or adventurer is more appropriate 13

14 (Fortuyn, 2002, p.164, my translation). One step beyond even; Fortuyn blames the refugees for helping create the brain drain in their countries of origin, because most of them come from higher educated groups (Fortuyn, 2002). These are strong words, especially in a country that often prides itself on tolerance towards all people and an open mind. The strong words and political opinions are shared by many people in the country, though. As it turns out, the public kept to these opinions and this guaranteed a big success for Fortuyn and his LPF: the party won its first national election with an unprecedented 26 seats (out of a 150) in parliament. Some months before that, on the 6 th of March 2002, Fortuyn already won the elections in his hometown of Rotterdam. Even though the polls were already predicting a win for Fortuyn, the purple parties (PvdA, D66, VVD) were baffled, and their leaders, tired and agitated, could not even be bothered to do the polite thing and congratulate their opponent the night after he won Rotterdam (Kleijwegt & Van Weezel, 2006, p.89). When looking at campaign tactics and political statements, it seems that the incumbents never expected Fortuyn to win this much on a national scale a few months later. In spite of the local victory, the purple parties kept insisting the Netherlands was not doing as bad as Fortuyn made it seem, with social democrat leader Ad Melkert even claiming that multicultural society was only imperfect when some social differences were concerned (Kleijwegt & Van Weezel, 2006, p.89). Instead of addressing the tensions felt by the Dutch public, the politicians in power took to discrediting Fortuyn. Similar to what happened to Janmaat, Fortuyn was characterized as extreme right (green party leader Rosenmöller), the Dutch Jean-Marie Le Pen (social democrat Melkert) and prominent D66 (left-wing liberals) member Thom de Graaf went as far as to say that the Netherlands would soon need shelters again, like the one ( Het Achterhuis in Amsterdam) used by famous Jewish girl Anne Frank in WWII (Kleijwegt & Van Weezel, 2006, p.89, my translations). Logically, these were the same politicians that condemned Paul Scheffer and the harsh tone of his article earlier. Only the often powerful CDA (Christian democrats) and the SP (socialists) did not do their best to soften Fortuyn s words: both parties were adamant that the multicultural society in its current form was not sustainable, and it can hardly be considered coincidental that CDA, SP and LPF were the only parties winning seats in the 2002 elections. 14

15 Chapter 2: Political consequences Short term and long term As we have seen earlier, the LPF won 26 seats in parliament, instantly making it bigger than well-known dominant parties like the social democrats (PvdA) and the right-wing liberals (VVD). Because of the very character of the LPF (both new and populist) many of their new MP s had little or no experience in the political environment of The Hague. This combination of a whole new power balance with a lot of new faces made for a turbulent period in Dutch politics. This turbulence also found its way to the government coalition, of which LPF had become an almost inevitable part due to its large wins, and the fact that the CDA had not disagreed entirely with its criticism of multicultural society in the election campaign. It became very clear that the LPF was not counting exclusively on classical political elite to bring their program to life, when the party proposed millionaire Herman Heinsbroek, a flamboyant (he owned a convertible Ferrari and a Bentley) former record executive, to become minister of Economic Affairs. Pretty soon, Heinsbroek got into a big fight with his LPF-colleague Bomhoff, who was minister of Public Health at the time. Notwithstanding the harsh statements and ambitions concerning immigration and integration, the two ministers fell out about the (lack of) trust in a government agency (unrelated to this subject) that was Heinsbroek s responsibility, and less importantly, a long string of controversial leadership changes within the LPF (Haan, 2002). The argument between Heinsbroek and Bomhoff escalated to a point where their coalition partners gave up trust in the governing abilities of the LFP, hence, the government came to a fall, just 86 days after it came to power. It might seem like the LPF s influence was negligible: after a lot of screaming and fighting, their fifteen minutes of fame were over when the cabinet fell in the same week of the funeral of Prince Claus, the Dutch Queen s husband. Their influence on both style and content of Dutch politics and policies extended far beyond their period of governing though, and remains visible in certain domains to date. One of the LPF proposals that successfully found its way to reality is the concept of the deportation center ( uitzetcentrum or vertrekcentrum ). This center serves as a collecting point for illegal aliens who are forced to leave the Netherlands for lack of visa and/or criminal behaviour. Currently, there are three of these centers 9 (in Ter Apel near Groningen, at Rotterdam and at Amsterdam airport). When these centers were first proposed by LPF 9 These centers are operated by the same agency that runs the Dutch prisons, the Dienst Justitiele Inrichtingen (website DJI, n.d.) 15

16 minister Hilbrand Nawijn, responsible for integration and immigration, they yielded comparisons with concentration camps (Dagblad Trouw, ). There were no anti- Semitic motives involved though; in the situation under the purple governments, illegal aliens were not legally forced to leave the country. The reasoning behind that was that these people would soon realize that there was nothing here for them (government services and grants were withheld) and that they would leave on their own (Dagblad Trouw, ). The camps (or later: centers) were conceived to make sure the unwanted immigrants do, in fact, leave the Netherlands after the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) has decided they are not to be granted a permanent residency. Minister Nawijn was never in office long enough to see his proposal being transferred to government practice, but his successor (Rita Verdonk, at the time a right-wing liberals member but currently running her own rightwing populist party, which has yet to survive an election) made sure it happened. The centers were not introduced without criticism: apart from the negative connotation we have seen above, left-wing politicians feared that the terms attached to the centers would not give the immigrants enough time to sort out their legal status with their respective embassies (Moerland, 2005). The criticism was not just political though; a demonstration was held in 2004 against the opening of the center in Ter Apel (Volkrant, ). While the policy of forcing illegal immigrants to leave the country seems very fit to the political ambitions of the LPF, they do not deserve all the credit. Of course, the suggestion for camps or centers as such was first made by LPF-minister Nawijn, but a law he did not write himself provided him with the legal framework to implement the idea. In Article 63, paragraph 1 of the Vreemdelingenwet 2000 (Alien Act 2000) it is determined that (t)he alien that does not possess a rightful residency and that has not left the Netherlands within the legal period established by this law, can be evicted (Vreemdelingenwet 2000, my translation). Ironically, this law was developed by Job Cohen (currently the mayor of Amsterdam) when he was junior minister ( staatssecretaris ) of justice; Cohen is a prominent member of the very same social democrat party that opposed most of Fortuyn s judgments of the multicultural society. He is quite popular within his party and respected abroad (having been named one of Time Magazine s Heroes of 2005 (Daruvalla, 2005) but is often criticized by other parties and citizens for his soft approach to problems concerning criminal youngsters in his city. In short: the Dutch approach to illegal aliens has become harsher over the last few years, but it is hardly a populist revolution; the deportation centers are placed in a 16

17 legal framework that was designed by an influential social democrat (this is also the defense line minister Verdonk chose when she was criticized for the plans). Having seen this very concrete piece of policy, let us take a step back and have a look at a more general problem in democracy: the distance between the voter and the government. Earlier, we saw that Fortuyn was very critical of the Dutch government, which he found lacking in service delivery and democratic quality (Fortuyn, 2002). If the domain of government services would be a market, the consumer should be able to get what he or she wants, not what the supplier wants to offer. The mentality change towards a more clientfocused government is a big one to organize, but it seems like steps in the right direction have been taken. In a covenant written and published in 2005, the Dutch ministry of Internal Affairs (BZK), the co-operation of provinces (IPO) and the union of Dutch municipalities (VNG) agreed to establish a new base line for the relation between various layers of government. In this document, called the Code Interbestuurlijke Verhoudingen (Code of Intergovernmental Relations) the ambition is formulated to work better in general and to work together more often, and more importantly for our analysis: to close the gap between citizen and government (CIV, 2005, p.5). Fortuyn s dissatisfaction with the public sector was heard and taken seriously if we read the introduction, titled Different society, different intergovernmental relations : we see a government that still resembles that of the post-war buildup too much ( ) a government has to realize it is not there for its own sake, but for that of the citizens ( ) what the citizens need are solutions for big issues in society and clarity about essential questions (CIV, 2005, p. 5-6, my translation). Both the criticism as well as the approach resemble Fortuyn s discontent, albeit without the call for more democracy in all government levels. The message in the Code is clear though: the government is only in place for the citizens (and not the other way around) so at least on paper the closed circle of a purple government doing more or less what it wants when it comes to immigration and integration policies should be broken. Fortuyn s name is nowhere to be found in the document, but it could be argued that the success of his appearance and political platform played a role in deciding to write the CIV. So far, we see that the LPF could not turn around the way public policy was developed and executed in a revolutionary way, but then again, that would not be a realistic expectation for a party with 26 out of a 150 seats in parliament. Still, the influence of the LPF and its approach of politics might be more appreciated when looking at other parties. The social democrats 17

18 ( PvdA ) had long been a big defender of tolerant, multicultural policies. Earlier in this piece, we saw that its leader in 2002, Ad Melkert, was mostly grumpy about Fortuyn s electoral success and his fierce attacks on the immigration policies that were in place at the time. However, it was the same PvdA that counted Paul Scheffer among its members, and he was not exactly satisfied with the multicultural achievements in Therefore it is safe to assume that the PvdA is not likely to voice one single opinion on the topic, which makes it all the more interesting to take a look at the dominant views within the party, especially because it is one of the most powerful parties in the country. Despite losing almost half its seats in parliament in the 2002 election (the one won by Fortuyn) the PvdA bounced back after the quick fall of the government in the same year. In spite of another disappointing election result in 2006, the social democrats remain the secondlargest political party in the Netherlands, only surpassed by the Christian democrats ( CDA ). They are certainly an interesting reflecting pool for the LPF s efforts, if not for their size and power than at least for their historical connection to the multicultural society. Let us take a look at the election program of 2006, sufficiently long after the LPF s victory to let its consequences sink into the PvdA s political message. About integration into Dutch society: (i)t is primarily the migrant s responsibility to prepare for coming to the Netherlands, to learn the language, to orientate oneself on the society and to integrate quickly (PvdA Election Program, 2006, p.15, my translation). On the amount of immigrants acceptable: (n)o society has an unlimited absorption capacity for newcomers and an unlimited capability to fight disadvantages and emancipate people. That is why the PvdA pleads for selective migration ( ) we have to be careful with people who have a limited chance to succeed, due to their education level ( ) it means to be actively open to take up people who can be enriching to Dutch society with their talents (PvdA Election Program, 2006, p.15, my translation). It is very clear that the party said goodbye to its forgiving attitude (like Melkert s claim that multiculturalism only had some minor socio-economic flaws) and became a little harsher in its approach to immigration and integration. If there are people who have a limited chance of succeeding like the PvdA proclaims, they must be hindering economic progress and it would indeed be best to keep them out. The changes brought by Fortuyn, and their success, even had their reflection in the party leader s ambitions. A successful Shell-manager in his previous life, Wouter Bos is currently the Dutch minister of Finance serving under prime minister Balkenende, and head of his party at the same time. Almost two years ago, he was the leader of the opposition in parliament and 18

19 tried to win Balkenende s job in the 2006 general elections, so as to have a social democrat for prime minister again. Offering unprecedented access to the press, the PvdA granted permission to public broadcaster VPRO to embed two of their journalists in the campaign. Their material led to a two-part special of the news-documentary series Tegenlicht, called the Wouter Tapes, which was aired a few months after the elections. Somewhat similar to the concept of Journeys with George, about G.W. Bush s 2000 campaign, the portrait of Bos seems quite intimate, often including his self-made voice recordings. The pivotal moment in the documentary, at least to this paper, is when a campaign aide asks him why he should become prime minister, and where his motivation comes from. Somewhat baffled by this question in the midst of a brainstorm session, he needs some time to come up with a definitive answer. When he does find the right words, it becomes clear how much of an impression Fortuyn really made in this party. Bos says that the clue for him to become active in politics lies entirely in 2002: looking at the people standing at the roadside when Fortuyn moved past in his coffin ( ) these were our people, eighty percent of them ( ) I thought: that is the task I will take upon myself, to show everyone that it can be done (VPRO Tegenlicht, 2007, my translation). Bos motivation does not lie solely in the fact that he considers the people who were mourning the death of Fortuyn our people, he also expresses a different opinion on the content than his political predecessors did. In the chapter A Society under Pressure in his book, Bos develops the theory that when ethnical and socio-economic boundaries overlap, solidarity is undermined (Bos, 2005, p.102). When the middle class feels less and less prone to the risks hanging over the heads of the less successful (i.e. the large groups of low-potential immigrants Scheffer wrote about) they are less inclined to co-fund a social security system protecting everyone from these risks. In other words: actually addressing the social inequalities in a multicultural society can help to protect a social security system, as long as these problems are solved eventually. Shunning the issue like earlier PvdA-politicians did does not help this cause, as tensions over the issue are bound to build up under the surface anyway. Citing a conversation with famous American author Robert Putnam, Bos draws a comparison between the Dutch and the American approach to immigration, and explains that it makes all the difference to their success rate (Bos, 2005). By taking in only immigrants with a decent educational background, the Americans have succeeded in overcoming large socio-economic gaps between parts of the population. Bos goes on, and mentioning the 2005 riots in French suburbs, he points out that the Netherlands 19

20 needs to face the big problems with underperforming immigrants, or else; I lay it on thick - there will be a day when the white taxpayer wonders for whom he is actually paying these taxes and premiums, and if he would not be better off taking care of his own business (Bos, 2005, p.105, my translation). This leads to the conclusion (also voiced in the party s evaluation report of the 2002 elections) that to be able to maintain the welfare state in its current form, the influx of immigrants must be strictly controlled. In a chapter called The road taken How not to do it he criticizes the politicians (without naming former colleagues) that pretended there were no problems, thus hindering their possible solutions. So far we have seen what changes the biggest left-wing party did since Fortuyn s election victory in 2002 (or in general, since 2000). It is also interesting to notice how much space has been created on the right side of the political spectrum, and a fit case in point is Geert Wilders. Previously a member of parliament for the moderately right-wing liberal party VVD (losing his seat in the 2002 elections, later winning it back again), Wilders found himself on a different political line than his party when the issue of Turkey possibly joining the EU first became a topic of discussion within parliament. Wilders vehemently opposed this accession, and combined with his harsh stance on Islam-related issues in earlier matters and repeated calls for a more right-wing profile for the party, Wilders left the VVD and set up his own party, first known as the List Wilders. Competing with other recently established right-wing movements in the 2006 elections, he tried to fill the gap that was left open after the short and arguably somewhat failed government stint, and later, their bleaker performance in parliament of Fortuyn s political heirs. Somehow (we will not analyze the many and sometimes controversial campaign tactics here) Wilders came out on top, defeating both the other new movements as well as the remainder of the LPF delegation, and his party, the PVV, won 9 seats out of a 150 in parliament. Undeniably the most right-wing party in parliament today (some might even say in Dutch history) Wilders goes where Fortuyn never went when it comes to banning Islam influences and criticizing immigration and integration policies. On one much publicized occasion, he declared the Muslims holy Quran a fascist book, and called for a ban: (f)orbid this miserable book like Hitler s Mein Kampf is forbidden! (Berkeljon, 2007, my translation). Earlier, he liked the influx of Muslim immigrants to a tsunami, fearing that Muslims will spread out over the Netherlands and will bring crime and nuisance with them, even to the countryside ( ) Their intolerant and violent culture will hit our country in its hart (Du Pré & Ten Hoove, 2006, my translation). Wilders and his parliamentarians do not only express 20

21 these strong opinions through the media (and eventually, to the public) though, they are just as harsh in parliament. On one occasion earlier this year, two PVV MP s filed official questions ( Kamervragen ) in parliament, asking the minister of Living, Neighborhoods and Integration if she would do everything she could to stop the arising of Islam neighborhoods, where Barbarian opinions can become commonplace (Parliamentary Questions , 2008, my translation). In other questions, two MP s of the PVV (one of which was Wilders himself) asked the same minister, and the minister for Youth and Family affairs if kids of Moroccan heritage and their families could be deported immediately, after the children (all legally underage) had harassed and threatened a journalist making a TV-program about their neighborhood. Also, the PVVpoliticians wanted to know if it was possible to protect the Dutch from these street-terrorists, as they make the Dutch no longer feel safe and welcome in their own country. The ministers acknowledged the nuisance of some youth of Moroccan descent, but responded that it was legally not possible to deport them, as long as all of the people in question had a Dutch passport (Parliamentary Questions 2671, 2008, my translation). Like with the PvdA, the election program probably comes closest to a summary of political opinions within a party, so we need to take a look at the PVV s election program, in this case the 2006 one. Staying close to its radical disagreement with most conventional parties, the PVV produced a pamphlet rather than a full election program for the 2006 elections. In this pamphlet, it addresses other issues than just immigration and integration, trying to shed its one-issue party status. Still, the party s ambitions are clearly a follow-up on the changed political climate when it comes to immigrant-related matters. Some of the points in the pamphlet: Turkey in the EU means the Netherlands is out ( ) Replace the first article of the constitution (the one preventing discrimination, BP) with an article that safeguards the dominance of Christian/Jewish/Humanist culture ( ) abandon the double nationality ( ) lower taxes by 16 billion annually (the total tax revenues of the Netherlands were projected to be approximately a 117 billion, BP) ( ) (PVV Election Pamphlet, 2006, my translation). All of these proposals were reasonably popular, judging by the election results, yet it remains hard to tell how successful the party actually remains to be until we see their electoral results in the next elections. Still, we can reflect on the program in the conclusion and look for influences of the legacy of Fortuyn. Before we get to the conclusion, it is time to go beyond the qualitative analysis which I have presented so far and turn to more empirical methods to assess what Dutch populists can and cannot influence. 21