Draft Do not cite. Title: Access and Social Media use by European Interest Organisations

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1 Title: Access and Social Media use by European Interest Organisations Draft Do not cite Co-Author: Dr Paul Alexander Shotton Senior Lecturer Academy of European Studies and Communication Management, The Hague University, Johanna Westerdijkpl 75, Postbus 16880, 2500 BW The Hague Tel: +31 (0) Fax : +31 (0) p.shotton@hhs.nl Co-Author: Dr Adam William Chalmers Assistant Professor Institute of Political Science, Leiden University, Wassenaarseweg 52, 2333 AK Leiden Tel: + 31 (0) Fax +31 (0) a.w.chalmers@fsw.leidenuniv.nl Abstract: The question of interest group access to decision-makers stands at the heart of interest group research and provides insight into mobilization patterns, biased representation and even serves as a proxy for influence. However, despite an impressive literature explaining access, we still know little about the role of social media in granting interest groups access to decision-makers. This paper addresses this lacuna in the context of the European Union. We argue that the extent to which social media use translates into access depends on the different stages of the EU s legislative process. In particular, we argue that social media use will buy greater access to the executive stages of the EU legislative process (with the European Parliament and Council of Ministers) and less to the legislative stages (with the European Commission). We test this argument using data collected from a large-scale survey as well as coding of individual interest group websites. Results for empirical analyses largely support our argument. Key words: Access, influence, interest groups, social media 1

2 Introduction Interest group access to policy-makers is a central theme of interest group research. Access reflects the extent to which interest groups are able to influence policy outcomes in their favour (Austen- Smith 1995; Bouwen 2002; Hansen 1991). While access might not always result in influence, it is a condition sine qua non to exercise influence in the policy-making process (Bouwen 2002). Accordingly interest group scholars have taken up access as a reliable proxy for influence (Beyers 2004; Beyers and Braun 2011; Bouwen 2004a; Bouwen 2004b; Chalmers 2013b; Crombez 2002; Dür and Mateo 2013; Eising 2007a). Variation in access patterns matters because they speak to the degree to which interest group politics is fair and balanced. Research suggests that superior financial and human resources tend to result in some interest groups enjoying an elite status that translates into disproportionate influence over the policy-making process (Binderkrantz, Christiansen, Pedersen 2014; Broscheide and Coen 2002; Coen 1998; Eising 2007a; Woll 2007) Similarly, a great deal of scholarly attention has been paid to the conditions under which interest groups mobilise by overcoming problems of collective active and thus are able to acquire access. In this sense, access is largely a function of a number of important factors. First, the provision of policy relevant information sought by policy makers is a key determinant of access (Bouwen 2004b; Chalmers 2013b). Second the types of groups lobbying (i.e. trade associations versus non-profit organisations) has also been identified as a determinant of access (Beyers 2002; Binderkrantz 2012; Broscheid and Coen 2003; Bunea 2013; Dür and Mateo 2013). The resources (e.g. staff and money) that interest groups have at their disposal act as a key determinant of their ability to access policy-makers. Indeed there is evidence that those interest groups representing industry enjoy disproportionate resources in comparison to their competitors (Coen 1998; Coen 2009; Coen and Richardson 2009; Eising 2007b; Woll 2007). Equally, different lobbying strategies have also been linked to different degrees of access (Beyers 2002; Beyers 2004; Dür and Mateo 2013; Kollman 1998). Finally, the policy area under discussion and its public salience have been shown to impact the access patterns of interest groups (Ainsworth 1993; Hojnacki et al. 2006; Kollman 1998). 2

3 The literature on interest group access is substantial and provides multiple explanations for its role and importance. However only limited attention has been paid to the impact of technologically cutting edge communication strategies upon access, most notably the impact of social media (Chalmers and Shotton Unpublished manuscript; Guo and Saxton 2014; Karpf 2010; Obar, Zube, Lampe 2012). To date research into lobbying strategies has largely focused on more established and dated communication strategies (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Mahoney 2008). However the European Union institutions are increasingly interacting with interest groups and lobbyists in cyberspace through social media, complementing, but not replacing more established forms of decision-makerlobbyist interactions. The 2014 European elections provide ample evidence of to the emerging use of social media by European decision-makers when communicating with their electorate. Additionally interest organisations increasingly rely on social media as a means of mobilising supporters and the public in order to lobby policy-makers. This paper seeks to bridge the gap between the established literature on the determinants of access and the emerging literature on social media lobbying. It asks to what extent does social media use by interest groups translate into access to European Union decision-makers? Our central argument is that the degree of access resulting from social media use is largely dependent upon the stage of policy-making and the European institutions most active at that stage. More specifically, we expect that social media translate into more access during the vote stage of the legislative process (with the European Parliament and Council of Ministers) and less access during the policy stage (with the European Commission) (Crombez 2002). Our argument is that social media is less conducive to transmitting detailed and technical information to decision-makers (information favoured by the European Commission) and more effective in drawing public and media attention to specific issues, making issues more salient, and thus helping to mobilize the public on specific policy issues, all of which is crucial to the vote stage of the EU legislative process. We test our argument via the analysis of a unique database of over 350 interest groups lobbying at the level of the European Union. An important empirical consideration made in this paper relates to the measurement of social media use. To this end, our paper presents two measures of social media use: 1) a self-reported measure about the importance interest groups accord social media 3

4 platforms used in their lobbying activities; and 2) a count of the actual number of social media platforms used by interest groups and derived from internet coding. In addition, our paper conducts a series of robustness checks for our central findings, using alternative measures of access as well as step-wise approach for our main predictors. Empirical analyses confirm our argument that social media does appear to buy interest groups more access to the vote stage of the European Union s decision-making process and thus to the European Parliament and Council of Ministers. Explaining Access Scholars have identified three key determinants of interest group access to decision-makers: interest group characteristics (interest group type and resources), institutional determinants, and lobbying strategies. In what follows we discuss each in turn. Interest group characteristics Numerous studies argue that the access enjoyed by interest groups is biased in favour of those groups with more resources, namely business interests (Chalmers 2013a; Coen 1998; Coen 2009; Dür and Mateo 2012; Lowery and Gray 2004; Schattschneider 1964). Woll (2007) emphasizes the importance of resources and interdependency as a means of understanding influence rather than assuming an elite pluralism (Woll 2007). Access is seen as cumulative and focused on resource rich and professionalized groups (Binderkrantz, Christiansen, Pedersen 2014). Group type is seen as a major determinant of choice between access and public strategies (Dür and Mateo 2013). Group type determines an interest group s preference as to whether to favour an access-based approach versus a more public approach (Dür and Mateo 2013). Evidence also points to the importance of group type and organizational form in determining preference attainment, while emphasizing that information arguing in favour of the median position are more successful (Bunea 2013) Thus, despite some evidence to the contrary (Eising 2007a), resource rich groups, largely industry representatives, are overwhelmingly seen as enjoying greater direct access to policy-makers. Institutional determinants 4

5 All interest groups do not enjoy equal access to the institutions of the European Union. Each institution expresses a preference for certain groups and certain types of information (Bouwen 2002; Crombez 2002). Timing, at what stage of the legislative process an interest group seeks access, is also a selection criteria for interest groups (Crombez 2002). Access to policy-makers results from an exchange of resources, such as information (Austen-Smith 1995; Bouwen 2002; Hansen 1991). Access is a combination of the conception of a plurality of groups seeking to provide information to policy-makers and the characterization of this relationship as an exchange of resources, in this case, information of different forms (Bouwen 2002). Information represents an access good, which is exchanged between lobbyists and institutional decision-makers in return for access (Bouwen 2002; Bouwen 2004b). Interest groups compete to provide institutions with information as an access good. Access results from the suitability of fit in terms of the type of information provided coupled with the generic preference of each European institutions. Subsequent research has supported this access as a proxy for influence (Beyers 2004; Beyers and Braun 2011; Bouwen 2004a; Bouwen 2004b; Chalmers 2013b; Crombez 2002; Dür and Mateo 2013; Eising 2007a). In sum, access literature emphasises the fact that each institution expresses a preference for a different forms of information, which is particularly relevant to its interests and activities (i.e. the European Commission favours expert knowledge) (Bouwen 2002). Lobbying strategies The strategies favoured by different types of interest groups are key in determining the degree of access enjoyed by these interest groups. A distinction is made between insider groups and outsider groups, with the latter seeking influence through indirect means of action such as demonstrations (Grant 1999). Evidence suggests that the sort of interest represented by an interest group, whether diffuse or specific, affects their ability to seek and achieve access (Beyers 2002). Indeed access is not the sole means of influencing the political process, but rather a rival to more public forms of lobbying. However research stresses the importance of access as a means of influencing the European Union s policy-making process, while acknowledging the role of public political strategies (i.e. demonstrations, petitions etc.) for those interest groups with diffuse interests. (Beyers 2004) That said, 5

6 insider and outsider strategies are not exclusive in their availability to interest groups, but indirect strategies are most commonly attributed to cause based interest groups (Binderkrantz 2005). Institutions express different degrees of receptiveness towards strategies of access versus indirect strategies. The European Commission favours direct strategies, while others such as the European Parliament are more receptive to interest groups whose strategies rely upon indirect forms of communication (Beyers 2004; Broscheid and Coen 2003; Maloney, Jordan, McLaughlin 1994). Social Media and Access The body of work on interest group access and its determinants is extensive and continually growing. Despite this, little (or no) inquiry has addressed the use of social media and how it is related to access. There is, however, a body of literature examining social media s increased role in politics. This research has variously examined the effectiveness of social media in fostering civic engagement (Boulianne 2009; Delli Carpini 2000; Jennings and Zeitner 2003), social capital (Hampton and Wellman 2003; Kobayashi, Ikeda, Miyata 2006; V. Shah, Nojin Kwak, R. Lance Holbert, Dhavan 2001), collective action (Lupia and Sin 2003), and social movements (Ayres 1999; Carty 2010; Petray 2011) as well as the extent to which it mobilizes and informs voters (Bimber 2001; Dulio, Goff, Thurber 1999; Polat 2005). Indeed few doubt the emerging role of social media in advocacy activities. However, what role do social media play in the lobbying strategies of European Union interest groups? To what extent do social media buy interest group access? Which European Union institutions are most susceptible to its use and why? To date there is very little literature seeking to clarify the impact of social media strategies upon the access of interest groups to decision makers (De Cock 2011; Guo and Saxton 2014; Karpf 2010; Obar, Zube, Lampe 2012). Existing studies on lobbying tools and strategies are largely focused more on traditional means of communication (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Mahoney 2008). Emerging research on the impact of social media in interest group lobbying indicates that social media is increasingly used in campaigning and in lobbying decision-makers (Edwards and Hoefer 2010; Guo and Saxton 2014; Lovejoy and Saxton 6

7 2012). This literature focuses heavily on non-profit organisations and also plays down the impact of social media upon lobbying outcomes (Chalmers and Shotton Unpublished manuscript). Our theoretical framework draws on the acknowledged institutional differences between the various decision-making bodies of the European Union. Indeed the European Union s institutional triangle clearly demarcates the respective roles of the European Union s institutions. Accordingly the European Commission enjoys executive functions delegated to it by the Council of Ministers. These provide it with powers to draft, consult and implement legislation that has been amended and adopted by the legislative branch of the European Union. In carrying out executive functions the European Commission emphasises that it has always been an institution open to outside input and that it acknowledge[s] the need for such outside input and welcome it (Commission 1993). This openness to input requires that interest groups seeking access provide the European Commission with often technical and highly policy specific information required by the European Commission and legislators in order to perform their duties (Bouwen 2004b; Chalmers 2013b; Kersh 2007). On the other hand the European institutions of the legislative branch, while also open to input from interest groups, seek out information on the European (European Parliament) and national (Council of Ministers) encompassing interests (Bouwen 2001). While all institutions are open to input from interest groups, the European institutions of the legislative and executive branches favour the provision of different forms of information. This raises the question as to the effectiveness of social media for communicating these different forms of information as well as their receptiveness to the communication of such information via social media. Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) define social media as a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010). Social media allows social presence to emerge between two communication partners leading to a classification in terms of the extent to which they comprise richness of the medium and the degree of social presence (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010). The higher the social presence, the larger the social influence of the social media (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010). This view firmly classifies social media as a strategy of indirect 7

8 communication focused on generating dialogue and mobilising social actors. Small and staff poor interest groups are particularly disposed to use social media especially when this use meets conditions, most notably allowing the non-profit to build a community [ ] and [ ] promote involvement with the non-profit both online and offline (White and Rosenthal 2013). In short there is agreement that social media is largely a technology that is suited to communicating and mobilising an interest group s supporters (Özdemir 2012). Social media is an effective tools for facilitating civic engagement and collective action (Obar, Zube, Lampe 2012). Scholars disagree over the impact of social media upon the mobilisation of actors and thus upon political agendas (Gladwell 2010; Karpf 2010; Morozov 2009). More recently scholars have played down the importance of social media as a mobilization tool arguing that the role of social media actually varies with the stage of the advocacy process (Guo and Saxton 2014). Mobilisation is the final stage of a process entailing the reaching out and building of a network of supporters (Guo and Saxton 2014). Social media leads to mobilization and is thus heavily indirect in terms of strategic orientation [ ]; there is little evidence of insider strategies (Guo and Saxton 2014). Literature demonstrates that social media fosters communication, civil engagement, social presence and represents an indirect strategy for mobilisation. Social media represents a mobilisation strategy most effective when used to communicate with a view activating stakeholders to put pressure upon policy-makers. Evidence of the impact of social media at the European level either confirming or disproving its value of mobilising supporters or interacting with policy-makers is absent. Little evidence exists pointing to the value of social media as a tool for direct interaction with policy makers. When looking at the European Union the impact of social media upon advocacy actions can largely be expected to concern those European institutions most susceptible to mobilisation strategies via civil engagement and social presence. In the European Union one would expect the European Parliament to be most receptive to these strategies. The European Commission is committed to systematically consult civil society, for example during public consultations and through lobbying during the drafting phase. However its work requires expert information provided by European level associations and less from civil society and members of the public. The European Parliament and to a 8

9 lesser extent the Council of Ministers represent the legislative branch. The European Parliament is the prime target for social media. It has consistently reiterated the central role it accords to civil society and to lobbying in the provision to policy-makers of policy relevant information on the European encompassing interest. The Council of Ministers, requiring national interest information, is open to stakeholder input, but largely via the national level. Accordingly, social media appears less well suited to transmitting information of a technical nature as favoured by the European Commission and to a lesser extent the institutions of the legislative branch. The power of social media lies in its ability to talk to the public and the media, generating attention for specific issues and thus increasing their salience in particular for those institutions more susceptible to indirect strategies. This conjunction of institutional preference and the outsider dimension of social media lead to our central hypothesis: The use of social media results in greater access to the European Parliament and Council of Ministers than the European Commission. Research Design Data for this analysis were collected via a large-scale online survey of interest organizations lobbying in the European Union as well as through Internet coding of respondents. Our survey population of 5484 individual interest organizations was drawn from the European Union Transparency Register. i From this population, we drew a random sample of 1300 organizations for the survey. After eliminating certain organizations based on missing contact information, we ended up contacting 1219 organizations. A total of 358 responses were collected, putting the response rate at about 30%. To ensure reliability of responses, we made every effort to contact organization presidents, directors or upper-level management. To the same end, the survey was made available to respondents in the EU s three working languages: English, German and French. Table 1, below, organizes responses by interest organization type following the Transparency Register s classification scheme (due to missing data we were not able to code seventeen organizations, reducing our n to 341). The distribution of responses corresponds approximately to existing empirical research mapping the EU interest group population (Greenwood 2011; Wonka et al. 2010). So-called specific interest groups (especially trade, business and professional associations) as well as diffuse groups, like NGOs, appear to be the most 9

10 prevalent types of groups in the EU. By contrast, public authorities, trade unions, religious organizations, academic organizations and law firms, all with low response rates, are typically less prevalent. On balance, the representativeness of the sample of interest groups used in this analysis does not seem to differ greatly from existing research. (table 1 about here) The purpose of this analysis is to assess the extent to which using social media grants interest groups access to the EU decision-making process. Our main argument is that access is largely a function of the different stages of the EU legislative process. In particular, social media should provide more access to the vote stage of the process (and hence to decision-makers in the European Parliament and Council of Ministers) and less access to the policy stage (and hence to decisionmakers in the European Commission). In order to test our argument we conduct a regression analysis of the impact of using social media on interest group access to the European Commission, European Parliament, and Council of Ministers. We isolate the effects of social media use by including a series of competing variables explaining access. These are derived from the existing literature and include: alternative lobbying strategies (direct and indirect lobbying); interest group resources; and interest group type. In what follows we explain how all of these variables were operationalized and provide details about data collection. Access Access refers to the frequency with which individual interest organization interact with EU decisionmakers in the three main European Union institutions: the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. In the context of our online survey, we asked respondents the following question: How frequently is your organization in contact with the main EU institutions? Contact means interaction of any kind. Survey data measured the frequency of contact between an interest organisation and representatives of the EU institutions using the following scale: Never, Once p/y (per year), 2-5 p/y, 6-9 p/y p/y, Biweekly, Weekly. Measuring access in this 10

11 manner is consistent with other empirical research on access in the EU (Beyers 2002; Bouwen 2004a; Bouwen 2004b; Chalmers 2013b; Dür and Mateo 2013; Eising 2007a). We also include a second indicator measuring access specifically to the European Parliament. This data is derived from the European Union s Transparency Register and refers to the number of lobbyists in each organization who are accredited to enter the premises of the European Parliament (EP accredited). Naturally, this data cannot tell us about access to the European Commission or the Council of Ministers. Our aim in including this alterative measure of access is to provide a robustness check for data gathered via our online survey. Values for this indicator were log transformed in order to normalize distribution. Social media use One of the central empirical considerations made in this analysis regards measuring social media use as a lobbying strategy. Combing insights in Nah and Saxton (2013) (forthcoming) and van der Graaf et al. (2013) we conceptualize use in two different ways: first, as a measure of interest organizations reported use of social media for lobbying purposes; and second, as a count of the number of the social media platforms used by interest organizations. Data for self-reported use were gathered using a survey question assessing the importance of social media tools in the advocacy tactics of individual interest organizations. Specifically, our survey asked respondents: How important is it for your organisation to use social media tools [ ] when interacting with: European Commission, European Parliament, and Council of Ministers. Importance was measured on a 1-5 Likert scale, ranging from 1 = very unimportant to 5 = very important. For the survey, we provide respondents with the following definition: Social media refers to such things as Facebook, Blogger, Twitter, Wordpress, LinkedIn, Google Plus+, Tumbler, Wikia, Pinterest, MySpace, YouTube, foursquare, Reddit, etc. Data for the count of social media platforms were gathered via web-based coding of interest organizations individual websites and a search using the internal search engines of social media platforms. Specifically, social media platform use was coded as the presence or absence of 11

12 organizations having an account with the three most common social media platforms identified in our survey Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIN. A count measure (ranging from 0, no platforms used, to 3, all three platforms used) was coded as the number of platforms used by organizations. This approach follows the approach established in existing research (Van der Graaf, Otjes, Rasmussen 2013). Alternative lobbying strategies In order to isolate the effects of social media use on access we also consider alternative lobbying strategies. To this end and following the existing literature, we make a general distinction between direct strategies and indirect strategies. ii Both alternative strategies were measured using survey questions. For direct strategies we asked survey respondents: How important is it for your organisation to use DIRECT MEANS (Face to face meetings, phone calls, s, position papers etc.) when interacting with EU decision-makers. For indirect strategies we asked: How important is it for your organisation to use INDIRECT MEANS (public events, demonstrations, petitions etc.) when interacting with EU decision-makers. For both questions, importance was measured on a 1-5 Likert scale, ranging from 1 = very unimportant to 5 = very important. Interest group resources Group resources are important in determining an interest group s access patterns. We examine the effects of resources on access through the coding of an organization s resources. To do so we measure group resources in terms of the number of staff working in a given interest group. This indicator was coded using data from the Transparency Register. Staff is measured as the number of persons in a given organization engaged specifically in lobbying activities. Initial analyses of staff indicated that the distribution of values for this variable was highly skewed. We therefore log-transfer this variable in order to normalize distribution. Interest organization type Much of the existing interest group literature makes a fundamental distinction between types of interest organization. In particular, a distinction is made between specific interest groups and diffuse 12

13 interest groups. Specific interest groups (i.e. socio-economic and producer interests such as business associations and corporations) have well-circumscribed and concentrated constituencies, considerable financial, organizational and informational resources, as well as (presumably) privileged access to key decision-makers. Diffuse interest groups, such as NGOs and citizen groups, lack a well-delineated and concentrated constituency, defend the interests of broad and general segments of society, have limited resources and are routinely denied direct access to decision-makers. We control for the impact of organization type by introducing a dummy variable for specific interests into our empirical analysis. We coded specific interests using the group type classification scheme used in the Transparency Register. Specific interests include corporations, business and professional associations, as well as consultancies, and law firms. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the indictors used in this analysis as well as the predicted effect of each on the dependent variable. (table 2 about here) Analysis We examine the impact of social media on interest group access using two different measures of social media use: self-reported use and a count of the number of social media platforms used by interest groups. We assess the impact of these two different measures in the European Union s three main decision-making institutions: European Commission, European Parliament, and Council of Minister. Table 3 and 4 presents our regression results in a total of eight different models using both self-reported access to the European Commission, European Parliament and Council of Ministers as well as data on lobbyists accredited to access the European Parliament. The dependent variable for the all the model is an ordinal measure of interest group access. We therefore opted for logistic regression analysis in all of the models. Estimating the two different measures of social media use acts as an important robustness check for our findings. Additional robustness checks, including a step-wise 13

14 analysis of the main predictors of access, were carried out and the results are presented in the Appendix. (table 3 and 4 about here) The results presented in the two tables provide rather ambiguous evidence supporting a resource-based explanation of interest group access. First, the models using self-reported data on access show no significant differences with regard to group staff carrying out lobbying activities. However, models 3 and 7, uses the EP accredited indicator for access suggests a significant positive correlation between access and staff resources. Importantly, the reduced sample size in these two models might call into question the strength of these findings. Nevertheless, the self-reported measures of access suggest that that patterns of access do not appear to be determined by superior resources nor by a lack of resources. This finding speaks to a growing debate amongst interest group scholars on the role of resources in interest group lobbying activities. Mounting evidence presents contradictory results, with many studies finding a link between resources and influence, success and access, while other find no such link (Klüver 2013). Regression results cast similar doubt on differences related to interest organization type. Specific interest groups (like corporations or business association) appear to have no advantage in terms of access, showing no significant differences in any of the eight models. Thus, contrary to longheld assumptions about the broad advantages enjoyed by specific interest groups, our results suggest that being a specific interest has little bearing on access to the EU legislative process. A central finding of this analysis is that direct lobbying strategies play an important role in interest group obtaining access to the EU. The six models using self-reported access show positive and statistically significant correlations between direct lobbying and access. In other words, groups that use more direct lobbying strategies also have more frequent access to the European Commission, European Parliament and Council of Ministers. These effects are particularly strong with the European Parliament. Odds ratios describe the magnitude of these effects. This finding gives purchase to the existing interest group literature suggesting that direct lobbying strategies, like brief writing, 14

15 phone calls and face-to-face meetings, are critical for interest group influence and access (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Mahoney 2008). By contrast, indirect lobbying strategies appear comparatively ineffective in gaining access. This is especially apparent in the case of the European Commission and Council of Ministers. Nevertheless, it does appear that groups which place more importance on indirect strategies do enjoy greater access to the European Parliament. However, some caution needs to be exercised in interpreting this result. This finding is only marginally significant (at the 90% confidence level) and only in model 6. The regression results presented in tables 3 and 4 provide considerable support for our central hypothesis. That is, the use of social media seems to be best translated into access during the vote stage of the European Union s legislative process. Models 2 and 4, using a self-reported measure of social media use, suggests that with a one-unit increase in the level of importance interest organizations accord to using social media lobbying strategies, the odds of gaining access are 1.19 greater in the European Parliament and 1.20 greater in the Council of Ministers. The results for both are statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. This effect is greater in terms of the impact of the count of the number of social media platforms being used and access to European Union s institutions in the vote stage of the legislative process. Specifically, model 6 suggests that groups using more social media platforms have 1.34 greater odds of access to the European Parliament. Importantly, this trend does not extend to the Council of Ministers, where there are no significant differences shown in the model. Conclusions To a large extent, the findings presented above give purchase to our central argument that social media lobbying strategies can buy interest groups access to the European Union. However, the findings do suggest that direct lobbying strategies, like face-to-face meetings and letters, are still the best means for obtaining access. Nevertheless, social media cannot be discounted amongst other lobbying tactics. An important condition for the impact of social media on access, however, is related to the different stages of the European Union s legislative process. As expressed in our central 15

16 hypothesis, we expect that social media are more conducive to lobbying during the vote stage rather than the proposal stage of the European Union s legislative process. The type of highly technical and expertise-driven information that defines much of the lobbying the proposal stage simply limits the effectiveness of social media tools. Decision-makers in the vote stage, by contrast, are more susceptible to lobbying strategies that increase the public salience of certain policy issues. Social media is bit explicitly for this type of advocacy activity, as others studying social movements have demonstrated. A central advance presented in this analysis relates to our measurement of social media use. Specifically, we approach this task by measuring social media in terms of both self-reported use by way of an online survey as well as a count of the number of social media platforms currently being used by interest groups in our sample. Assessing both measures provides an important robustness check for our regression analyses and paints a more compelling picture of our central findings. In fact, our main results relate to social media use where consistent across the two different measures in the various regression models presented above. Of course, there are also limits to this approach. Selfreported measures, while providing insight into the importance of using social media, are problematic insofar as respondents tend to over-estimate the frequency and importance of certain actions and behaviors (Prior 2009). A count measure of the different social media platforms used by interest group, while giving us a sense of whether or not interest groups have adopted this new technologies, do not say much about the extent to which these platforms are actually being used in lobbying practices. Further research could address these issues with more fine grained measures of use. In particular, data on the number of Facebook follower or Tweets (for Twitter) could prove useful in this sense. Any analysis of the impact of social media use on access needs to also include a consideration of other potential determinants of access. This papers does by including different lobbying strategies, interest group resources, and interest group type in our statistical analysis. Doing so has helped us isolate the effects of social media use on variation of access across the different EU decision-making institutions. Nevertheless, further research would benefit from including a greater number of 16

17 alternative explanations and control variables. For instance, issue salience and issue characteristics might also explain variation in interest group access. One approach would be to tailor survey questions about social media use in the context of lobbying on specific policies or specific policy issues. Alternatively, comparative case studies could examine the impact of social media on access across different policy or issue debates. 17

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22 Figures and Tables Table 1. Survey Responses Interest Organization Type Frequency % Non-governmental organizations, platforms, networks & similar organizations Trade, business & professional associations Professional consultancies Think tanks & research institutions Companies & groups Trade unions Other similar organizations Local, regional & municipal authorities Self-employed consultants Academic institutions Organizations representing churches and religious communities Other public or mixed entities, etc Law firms 0 0 Total Table 2. Descriptive Statistics Variable Indicator Mean Std. Deviation Min Max Access Commission Parliament Council EP accreditation (log) Social Media Use Social media use (self-reported) Social media use (number of platforms) Direct lobbying Indirect lobbying Resources Staff (log) Interest Group Type Specific

23 Table 3: Interest Groups and Self-Reported Use of Social Media (1) (2) (3) (4) European European EP Commission Parliament Accredited Council Social Media use * * (1.14) (1.77) (0.51) (1.87) Direct lobbying 1.463** 1.644*** ** (2.16) (2.90) (0.83) (2.02) Indirect lobbying (0.28) (1.40) (-0.07) (0.44) Interest group staff ** (0.33) (-1.04) (2.52) (0.21) Specific interest group (0.48) (1.13) (-0.32) (0.42) Log likelihood LR chi Pseudo r-squared N Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Table 4: Interest Groups and Self-Reported Actual Social Media Use (5) (6) (7) (8) European European EP Commission Parliament Accredited Council Social Media use *** (1.27) (3.13) (0.69) (1.22) Direct lobbying 1.429** 1.603*** * (2.02) (2.75) (0.84) (1.94) Indirect lobbying * (0.66) (1.89) (-0.06) (0.82) Interest group staff ** (0.24) (-1.40) (2.56) (0.15) Specific interest group (0.66) (1.53) (-0.03) (0.66) Log likelihood LR chi Pseudo r-squared N Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <