THE FINNISH EXCEPTION: IS THE PARTY COMPETITION IN FINLAND INACCESSIBLE TO RADICAL RIGHT POPULIST PARTIES? 1

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1 THE FINNISH EXCEPTION: IS THE PARTY COMPETITION IN FINLAND INACCESSIBLE TO RADICAL RIGHT POPULIST PARTIES? 1 Elina Kestilä, PhD student, M. Soc. Sci. Department of Political Science, University of Turku, Finland tel elina.kestila@utu.fi Politics of Participation, , Helsinki Workshop: Participation in Established Frameworks: Party System and Voting

2 ABSTRACT Ever since the latest rise of radical right-wing extremism in the 1980s, the main interest in studies has been on occurrences of the phenomenon. Non-occurrences have not received much attention, even though they could have something to offer the research in the field as well. Compared to the other Nordic countries, the radical right has been non-existent or at least insignificant in Finland. The article focuses, therefore, on the Finnish exception and asks if there have been significant cleavage transformations in the party system, which could provide a niche for a successful radical right-wing party. Moreover, it tries to describe and classify the current political actors of radical right-wing persuasion and explain why their efforts have proven to be unsuccessful. The main data used in the study is the European Values Survey ( ), analysed by principal component analysis. Even large-scale surveys, however, do not reach Finnish radical right-wing voters to such an extent that their description would be possible. Thus, radical right-wing policies are evaluated through official platforms of parties under scrutiny as well as through the opinions of candidates in the Electoral machine prior to parliamentary elections of 2003 and EU elections of Theoretical framework consists of several supply and demand side approaches, Kitschelt s winning formula thesis and the New Politics approach serving as starting points. The analysis shows that both supply and demand side factors have prevented the radical right-wing rise in Finland despite the declining party identification, changes in social structure and occasional political dissatisfaction. Strategies and consensus of moderate parties, public control, political history and weak radical right-wing party alternatives can be claimed to have hindered its mobilisation so far, as well as moderate views of the Finnish electorate on socioeconomic and sociocultural issues. More generally, the analysis shows that certain supply and demand side factors assumed to facilitate the success of radical right parties should be evaluated critically: they may exist also in cases of non-occurrences, still not producing a radical right populist party, or benefiting it in the system. 2

3 INTRODUCTION The Nordic countries, known for their political stability, are going through post-industrial changes in their social and economic structures. New issues have emerged in the political agenda and class boundaries become fuzzy. As a consequence, electoral volatility has increased, party identification is declining and pros and cons of the welfare state are under closer scrutiny than before. Party systems that were previously dominated by social democrats, conservatives, liberals, agrarians and communists are gradually fragmenting. Communist parties have merged or collapsed, and four new party types have challenged the new entrepreneurs: left socialists, Christian, Progress and Green. Even though left-right dimension, from which the Nordic party systems rose in the first place, persists to be the most important cleavage determining voters preferences (especially in Sweden), other questions, such as egalitarianism and individualism, have begun to cut the old party lines (see e.g. Grendstad 2003; ; cf. Lane et al , ; Rokkan 1981, 63 75). The cleavage transformation has produced new political actors, although their fortunes have varied across the North. When new radical right populist (RRP) parties emerged in the 1970s and 1980s in Western Europe, only in Denmark and Norway the phenomenon actualised as Progress Parties, which first started as tax revolt movements and in the mid-80s extended their platforms to cover wider range of topics, including anti-bureaucracy and anti-immigrant issues (Svåsand 1998, 77 80). Broadly speaking, and following the definition of Rydgren (2002, 29), the West European radical right-wing ideology is made up of doctrinal and rhetorical ethnonationalist or regionalist core, with which authoritarian views on sociocultural matters and political and cultural populism are entangled (see also Betz 1998). Progress Parties fit, therefore, under the somewhat loose radical right populist party label, although Goul Andersen and Bjørklund (2000, 193) point out that it is questionable if they can be characterized by a stricter concept of the extreme right (see e.g. Mudde 1996). In the 1990s, the Danish People s Party, led by Pia Kjærsgaard has replaced the Progress Party as the strongest radical right-wing movement of the North. Sweden had a short experience of right-wing radicalism as well in the turn of 1990s. An initiative of Sven-Olle Olsson to hold a referendum on the reception of refugees in 1987 first brought out the immigration question in Sweden, which was thought to be immune to the radical right. Consequently, Olsson was discharged from the Center Party and founded Sjöbo Party in Although the party s success proved to be marginal, Olsson became a symbol of immigration issue and paved the way for a progress party-like New Democracy, which received 6,7% support in the 3

4 parliamentary elections of Although Sweden was suffering at the time from economic recession, the ND s appeal started to decline already a year later and the party disbanded due to the ideological and leadership conflicts between the founding members Ian Wachtmeister and Bert Karlsson. The success of more recent actors, the most important being Swedish Democrats, has been limited to some occasional victories at the local level, vote share in parliamentary elections being at highest 1,4% (see e.g. Rydgren 2002, 33 34; Widfeldt 2004, ). As regards to Finland, no relevant radical right-wing party actors have emerged in the party system in recent decades. The article focuses, therefore, on the Finnish exception, and asks if there has been significant cleavage transformation in the Finnish electorate, which could provide a niche for a potential radical right-wing party. Moreover, it tries to describe and classify the current political actors of radical right-wing persuasion and explain why their efforts have proven to be unsuccessful. Roughly speaking, radical right-wing studies have basically applied and combined two types of approaches when explaining the differences in electoral support (Eatwell 2003). Supply side theories and their empirical derivations have focused on party platforms, charismatic leadership, national tradition and the political opportunity structure, including the institutional framework and party system features, and sometimes also contextual socio-economic conditions, like the level of unemployment and the number of immigrants (e.g. Jackman & Volpert 1996; Knigge 1998; Golder 2003; Knigge 1998). Demand side theories have explored individual level attitudes towards immigrants, political elite and institutions, as well as perceptions of individuals on drastic personal or structural socio-economic changes and the emergence of post-materialist values (e.g. Betz 1994; Lubbers et al. 2002; Hellsten 2001). Here the theoretical framework consists of both supply and demand side approaches, Herbert Kitschelt s (1995) winning formula thesis and the New Politics approach serving as starting points. It does not try, however, to replicate Kitschelt s case analyses or to follow the theory faithfully, but to evaluate critically the Finnish exception in the light of empirical arguments and findings of recent comparative studies. The analysis proceeds at two phases. Firstly, we test Kitschelt s (1995) thesis, according to which transformations in social and economic structures of advance capitalist democracies have created a new two-dimensional cleavage space in terms of which the political parties operate. The principal 4

5 data used here is the Finnish data in the European Values Survey (EVS, N=1038), which is analysed by principal component analysis. Secondly, it is estimated how marginal Finnish radical right-wing parties could be positioned in the party field of Finland (according to Kitschelt s model), and how their positioning may affect their success. Unfortunately, no matter how largescale the surveys, they do not reach sufficiently even the electorates of small established parties, let alone voters of marginal radical right. Radical right-wing policies in Finland are, therefore, evaluated only from the supply side, primarily on the basis of the official platforms of parties (SNKY 2003; S-I 2003; SKS 2004), and secondarily through their candidates opinions in the electoral machines prior to parliamentary elections of 2003 (PEM 2003) and EU elections of 2004 (EUM 2004). Before moving to the detailed statistical analysis, however, an overview of the current state of Finnish politics is worthwhile. PARTY COMPETITION AND CLEAVAGE TRANSFORMATION IN FINLAND Compared to other West European democracies, the persistence of class-based cleavage used to be a distinctive feature of Finnish politics. It still largely determines the party competition and voting behaviour, though not as effectively as it used to: from the early 1990s rural-urban dimension, as well as integration-independence cleavage have begun to challenge it (Sänkiaho 1995a, 94 95; 1995b, 67 68; Raunio 2004, 143; cf. Ervasti 1999, ). Constitutional reform of 2000 reduced the power of president and moved the traditional semipresidential system towards parliamentarism. It also had important implications for political parties: their power and responsibility in the political process grew significantly. The parliamentary elections determine now more than in the past the shape of government coalitions: president cannot interfere in the government formation, constraints of foreign policy are no longer relevant and ideological convergence has led to a situation where almost all coalitions, notably between the big three (center party, social democrats and conservatives), are possible (Raunio 2004, 142), even though the current Red Earth government of Matti Vanhanen (2003-) is certainly a more limited coalition than the two preceding broad-based Rainbow Coalitions of Paavo Lipponen ( ). The other side of the coin is that parties as organisations are increasingly vulnerable. Finnish electorate is becoming more volatile, party membership has collapsed and local associations have lost their viability. Since the early 1990s, party loyalty and party identification have declined while 5

6 the accountability of parties has been emphasized: voting tends to be based increasingly on the performance of government and party leadership (Paloheimo 2002, 124). 2 Turnout has fallen since the peak of 1962 and dissatisfaction towards political parties has grown in the 1990s, especially in suburban milieus of the Helsinki area, which have suffered the most from structural changes in economy (Pekonen 1997, 14; Pesonen 1995, 12 21). Furthermore, together with the electoral system used in parliamentary elections (PR based on open lists), distrust in parties has led to personalisation of politics, the main implication of which is the intra-party variation of opinions, for instance in issues concerning the European Union. Green-Pedersen (2004, ) argues that the existence of a pivotal center party has made the party competition in Finland centripetal. The Center Party s success in elections has made government coalitions either on its right or left side impossible. Thus, the right-wing and left-wing parties have gradually converged towards a median voter, first in foreign policy until the late 1970s and then in socio-economic questions in the 1980s and 1990s, which has led to the emergence of Red-Blue and Rainbow coalitions, and to the implosion of party system. Like-mindedness of political parties has, indeed, dominated recent electoral campaigns. The debates in presidential elections of 2000 and in parliamentary elections of 2003 have concentrated especially on foreign policy, like Iraqi question, and their general tone has been rather passionless and consensual (on the electoral campaigns of 2002 and 2003, see Nurmi & Nurmi 2002; Pesonen 2000; Arter 2003). Thus, given the fundamental changes Finnish politics has gone through especially since the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the absence of radical right in the party system, we should next turn to radical right-wing party literature and discuss the explanations recent studies offer the radical rightwing emergence in post-industrial societies. NEW POLITICS APPROACH AND ITS CRITICS Debate over the fundamental essence of the radical right-wing policies has been vivid. Mudde (1996, ) classifies recent approaches into four broad categories, which are far from clearcut and strongly overlap in the literature. Marxist school emphasizes the similarities between radical and moderate right, or sees the former to situate between the latter and fascism, while the extremism-theoretical school defines all radical movements as an anti-thesis of democracy, which has both right-wing and left-wing variant. For the modernisation school radical right extremism is a reaction to modernisation process and/or a counterstrike to the rise of the New Left in the 1970s. 6

7 New politics school, finally, sees the new right-wing and left-wing parties as separate political families, which have, however, some similarities, like new issues, rhetoric and policy-making style (cf. Zilliacus 2001, 33 34). Kitschelt (1995) anchors himself to the new politics school, arguing that changes in social structure and advanced capitalist economy have together created a two-dimensional cleavage space in terms of which the West European parties compete. New left-wing parties promote social policy and Keynesian redistributive patterns of economy, but demand participatory democracy, individualism, cosmopolitanism and liberalism in sociocultural matters. New radical right, in contrast, bases its rhetoric on market liberalism and hierarchy in politics, rejecting individualism and diversity of life styles. Main competitive sphere of preference formation in post-industrial democracies, therefore, varies from left-libertarian to right-authoritarian, and provides a breeding ground, though limited, to the ethnocentric and capitalist appeal. According to Betz (1998, 4), RRP parties strive to challenge the post-war socioeconomic and sociocultural status quo, as well as social democratic consensus, by attacking the welfare state and multicultural society. In post-industrial societies self-placement on left-right dimension is more related to occupational capabilities and sector than to social class: private sector workers, vulnerable to the international competition, may withdraw their support from the welfare state fearing its negative consequences on investments and consumption, while public sector workers are keener to defend redistributive measures. Furthermore, views about citizenship (universalistic/cosmopolitan vs. particularistic/culturally parochial) and modes of collective decision-making shape people s political orientation: strong communicative and cognitive abilities and experiences tend to reduce willingness to support authoritarian and hierarchical politics. Less skilled manual blue-collar workers, losers of the modernisation process, are particularly receptive to the sociocultural appeal of right-authoritarian ideology, while market liberalism attracts lower middle class, especially the petit bourgeoisie (Kitschelt 1995, 4 13; cf. Betz 1998, 6 9).The electorates of radical right-wing parties are indeed often deeply divided in socioeconomic issues, like the size of the public sector and regulation of economy. Since lower middle class demands tax reduction and working class is in favour of comprehensive welfare services, the RRP parties have to tread a fine line between pleasing the former and annoying the latter. The two electoral coalitions may, indeed, be socioeconomically incompatible if an RRP party enters the government (Ivarsflaten 2002, 22 24). 7

8 To succeed, an RRP party must, according to Kitschelt (1995, 19 24), reflect the new value dimension in its ideology. This is not always the case, and parties can be divided in three according to their strategy: (1) The master case of the new radical right, the winning formula, combines xenophobia, authoritarianism, exclusionism and market liberalism to an idea of a strong, hierarchical but small state. Its appeal crosses class boundaries, attracting both petit bourgeoisie and blue-collar workers. 3 (2) A populist antistatist variant of radical right may prove to be successful in certain circumstances as well, although its main emphasis is on the socioeconomic dimension. Antielitism dominates the appeal, and convergence of the mainstream parties around the clientelist political economy may cause dissatisfaction in the cross-class electoral coalition, which typically includes also white-collar workers. Populist antistatist movement is, indeed, a borderline case of the New Radical Right. (3) Racist authoritarian or welfare chauvinist appeals, in contrast, focus on sociocultural dimension, emphasizing xenophobia and anti-immigrant attitudes, as well as national symbols, and reject feminism, diversity of life-styles and environmental protection. Economic redistribution should be exclusive and the welfare state should benefit only the national ethnic community. Nevertheless, the ignorance of market liberalism limits the electoral success only to a small number of blue-collar workers and remains marginal. Welfare chauvinist parties tend to be often neofascist by nature. (cf. Fennema s 1997 alternative classification; see also Taggart 1995; Ignazi 1992). The fortunes of the RRP parties are certainly highly dependent on the strategies of their moderate competitors as well. If main left-wing and right-wing parties are converged enough towards a median voter, or even cooperate or have cooperated in a government, they may open free space from which an RRP party may benefit. Often the radical right indeed adopts neither left, nor right or third way rhetoric. 4 Moreover, continuous participation of moderate right in government coalitions may further increase possibilities of the radical right. Authoritarian voters may expect the moderate conservatives to respond to the challenge posed by left-libertarian party, and feel disappointed if they fail to do so (Kitschelt 1995, 13 19). According to Bale s (2002, 67) somewhat opposite approach the moderate right-wing parties have legitimised RRP parties by adopting their themes in electoral campaigns. This has particularly been true if radical right has owned the issue, which is often the case with questions related to immigration. Strategies of moderate right and RRP parties are, however, highly dependent on the issue-attention cycles of a particular society. Agenda-setting in politics is increasingly influenced by interest groups, international situation and media (Ivarsflaten 2003, 16; Eatwell 2000, 13 14). 8

9 Deriving his argument from the political wilderness of the Swedish radical right, Rydgren (2002) criticizes Kitschelt s theory on determinism and vagueness: same features that should explain the occurrences of a radical right party in a system may exist also in cases of non-occurrences. Thus, Rydgren argues that politicised xenophobia and ethnonationalism are the most important supply side factors, while on demand side political dissatisfaction proves to be significant. Eatwell (2000, 421), in turn, points out that comparative empirical evidence does not always support an idea of a particular winning formula: the continuously successful French National Front has turned strongly towards protectionism (or economic nationalism) in its economic policy in the early 1990s (see also Ignazi 2003, ), and German People s Union has succeeded reasonably well despite its clear ties to fascism. DATA AND METHODS The purpose of the first part of the analysis is to compare voters (and non-voters) of established Finnish parties in terms of their values on the socio-economic left-right-, and socio-cultural libertarian-authoritarian continuums. 5 The data set used in the study is the Finnish data (N=1038) in European Values Survey (EVS ), which is analysed by applying principal component analysis (PCA). The data set is reduced from a large group of interrelated variables into a smaller set of principal components, the number of which may be determined in advance if chosen. Following Kitschelt s (1995) theoretical arguments, those variables were selected from the EVS that fitted in the two categories of interest. Questions about the role of the state (strong vs. weak intervention) and income distribution (market allocation vs. redistribution) represent socioeconomic left-right continuum. Sociocultural continuum covers a wider range of issues: from gender roles (paternalism vs. gender equality), multiculturalism (homogeneity vs. pluralism) and environment (protection vs. suppression) to modes of political participation (respect of authorities and electoral participation vs. direct participation in social movements) and questions concerning the maintenance of traditional domestic order and the promotion of individual and minority rights (e.g. abortion, prostitution. homosexuality etc.). Before the analysis, ten-point scale variables were transformed into five-point scale. Furthermore, the scales of the variables were rearranged so that they would be theoretically consistent throughout and that the interpretation of principal component scores would be possible: therefore, the lower the value, the more economically left-wing or socioculturally libertarian the respondent and vice versa. 6 9

10 Orthogonal rotation, Varimax, was used to maximize the dispersion of loadings within the principal components. The number of principal components was set to two, one describing the socioeconomic dimension and the other the sociocultural one, which together explained 30,7% of the total variation. It turned out that variables concerning environmental issues did not load even moderately on either of the components, so they were excluded from the analysis. Table 1 reveals the loadings of the chosen variables, on the basis of which principal component scores were created and saved as two new separate variables, socioeconomic self-placement and sociocultural selfplacement. Table 1. Varimax rotation for the PCA: sociocultural and socioeconomic values (EVS , Finnish data) I II Justifiable: Divorce*.698 Justifiable: Abortion.685 Justifiable: Homosexuality.648 Justifiable: Euthanasia.594 Political action: Joining in boycotts**.540 Justifiable: Prostitution.508 Political action: Attending lawful demonstrations.502 Justifiable: Taking soft drugs.461 Work should always come first, even if it means less spare time.458 Political action: Signing a petition.446 Work is good, but what women really want are home and children.432 Its humiliating to receive money without having to work for it.352 Government s immigration policy: permissive vs. strict.301 Daily lives: responsibility of government vs. individual.657 Ownership of business and industry: government vs. private ownership.653 Firms: more government control vs. more freedom.619 Pensions: responsibility of state vs. individual.611 Housing: responsibility of state vs. individual.581 Competition: good and innovative vs. harmful and damaging.571 Unemployed: should take any job available vs. right to refuse.565 Income differences: reduction vs. increasing.325 KMO 0.8, Bartlett s test < Total variance explained 30,7% Values lower than 0.3 are suppressed I = sociocultural self-placement II = socioeconomic self-placement In the second part of the study both official party manifestos of two marginal radical right-wing parties, Finland-Fatherland (S-I) and the Finnish People s Blue-Whites (SKS) as well as the opinions of their candidates in the electoral machine of Helsingin Sanomat prior to parliamentary 10

11 elections of 2003 and EU elections of 2004 were explored briefly. 7 The analysis of the responses is, however, only secondary due to the fact that the number of candidates was quite small in both elections. Furthermore, in the parliamentary elections of 2003 the parties had candidates only in some districts. Candidates of the S-I gave ten responses and those of the SKS six. Altogether, the S- I had 30 candidates in the parliamentary elections and 12 in the EU elections, while the SKS had 29 candidates in the former and 12 in the latter. When referring to the responses, first, the name of the machine is given (parliamentary elections of 2003 = PEM2003 or EU elections of 2004 = EUM2004), then the (sur)name of the respondent and finally the number of the question (Q). SOCIOECONOMIC AND SOCIOCULTURAL SELF-PLACEMENT OF FINNISH VOTERS Eight established parties, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Center Party (KESK), the National Coalition Party (KOK), the Left Alliance (VAS), the Green League (VIHR), the Christian Democrats (KD), the Swedish People s Party (RKP) and the True Finns (PS) were placed into twoby-two table according to the principal component scores of their voters (or potential voters) 8 on the basis of Kitschelt s (1995) theory. Furthermore, those respondents who did not identify with any particular party (potential abstainers, undecided or those planning to cast a blank ballot) were treated as one group i.e. no party identification (NPI). Figure 1 illustrates the overall (weighted) dispersion of respondents on the two-dimensional framework. Figure 2 takes into account also the party choice, and describes the proportional distribution of the electorates of five largest parties (KESK, SDP, KOK, VAS, VIHR), other parties (RKP, KD, PS) and the group NPI to the different sections of the two-by-two table. In figure 3 the exploration is done separately on the socioeconomic cleavage (L = left, R = right) and on the sociocultural cleavage (Li = libertarian, A = authoritarian) for the aforementioned groups. Figure 4 summarizes the findings of Figures 2 and 3: only average principal component scores for each group are taken into account. In Figures 1 and 4 scores below zero indicate left-wing (X-axis) or libertarian (Y-axis) oriention and scores above zero right-wing or authoritarian orientation. In Figure 4 the diagonal line crossing the field describes the competitive sphere, i.e. the New Politics dimension, which should be accentuated in advanced capitalist democracies. Furthermore, the possible placements of radical right master case (R), populist antistatist alternative (P) and welfare chauvinist appeal (W) are marked off in the figure 4. Welfare chauvinist appeal is further distinguished from neofascism (F). 11

12 3,0 left-authoritarian right-authoritarian libertarian authoritarian 2,0 1,0 0,0-1,0-2,0-3,0 left-libertarian right-libertarian -3,0-2,0-1,0 0,0 1,0 2,0 3,0 left right Figure 1. Overall dispersion of Finnish voters into socioeconomic and sociocultural dimensions (EVS , Finnish data). As was predictable on the basis of previous studies, the initial inspection (Figure 1) reveals the centripetal tendency of party competition in the two dimensions. If taking a closer look, however, parties are relatively dispersed all over the limited competitive sphere (Figures 2 and 3). To simplify the results, the electorate of the Center party (KESK) seems to emphasize right- (40 %) and leftauthoritarianism (30 %), of the SDP left-authoritarianism (36 %) and libertarianism (27 %), of the conservatives (KOK) right-authoritarianism (40 %) and libertarianism (45 %), of the Left Alliance left-libertarianism (79 %) and of the Green League left (47 %)- and right-libertarianism (42 %) (Figure 2). Electorates of other parties (RKP, KD and PS) are situated, on average, to the left- and right-libertarian parts of the two-by-two table. Abstainers and undecided (NPI) spread rather evenly all over the competitive sphere. 12

13 Figure 3, in turn, shows that especially the supporters of social democrats (L = 63 %, R = 37 %) and the Center Party (L = 40 %, R = 60 %) can be found in both sides of the socioeconomic axis. Furthermore, the electorate of the SDP seems to be deeply divided in sociocultural issues (Li = 46 %, A = 54 %). Voters of conservatives are clearly socioeconomically right-wing (L = 15 %, R = 85 %) and those of the Left Alliance evidently left-wing (L = 87 %, R = 13 %), but in sociocultural questions supporters of KOK can be found from both sides of the axis (Li = 51 %, A = 49 %). In the electorates of KESK and VAS there is the least variation in the sociocultural cleavage: the former is clearly more authoritarian than average (Li = 30 %, A = 70 %) and the latter more libertarian (Li = 77 %, A = 23 %). Of the electorates of the five largest parties three out of five (KESK, KOK and VAS) seem to identify more strongly socioeconomically: sociocultural questions are of secondary importance, even though they differentiate partly the electorates of KESK and VAS from the electorates of SDP and KOK. For socialdemocrats the socioeconomic dimension is less dominant. The greens are united mainly socioculturally: placement on the left-right continuum does not seem to matter. If all voters of aforementioned groups are taken into account, they are divided quite evenly into both parts of both continuums. % KESK SDP KOK VAS VIHR OTHERS NPI ALL Left-authoritarian Right-authoritarian Left-libertarian Right-libertarian Figure 2. Distribution of voters (five largest parties, other parties, abstainers/undecided and all) into four parts of the two-by-two table of New Politics. 13

14 % KESK SDP KOK VAS VIHR OTHERS NPI ALL Left Right Libertarian Authoritarian Figure 3. Distribution of voters (five largest parties, other parties, abstainers/undecided and all) into socioeconomic (100 %) and sociocultural (100 %) continuums. Although the competitive sphere of Finnish parties is rather limited and the party competition tends to be centripetal, exploration of the average principal component scores on the two-by-two table (Figure 4) shows that the voters fill the space quite watertightly. Beginning with the traditional four parties, the Center Party and the Left Alliance seem to be the most attached to the New Politics axis. The KESK is moderately both right-wing and authoritarian, while VAS is moderately libertarian and strongly left-wing. As was predictable on the basis of Figures 2 and 3, for voters of the National Coalition Party and social democrats neither side of the sociocultural dimension is dominant and the distinction between them is only subtle. In socioeconomic issues the gap widens, but generally speaking the economic views of the big three lean remarkably on the right: true counterforce of the conservatives in economic issues is therefore Left Alliance. Interestingly, sociocultural matters seem to dominate the competitive space between small, middlesized or new parties. Both voters of the KD and the VIHR are situated on average slightly on the left side in socioeconomic matters, but the former is the most authoritarian in the whole party spectrum, while the latter is situated at the libertarian end of the limited competitive sphere. Of the more traditional small parties, slightly right-wing and libertarian Swedish People s Party has a leftwing and considerably authoritarian opposite, the True Finns (cf. Hellsten 2001, 46). 14

15 3,0 New Politics (F) libertarian authoritarian 2,0 1,0 0,0-1,0-2,0 (W) VAS KD PS KESK SDP NPI KOK RKP VIHR (R) (P) -3,0 New Politics -3,0-2,0-1,0 0,0 1,0 2,0 3,0 left right Figure 4. Voters of eight main political parties, abstainers/undecided and possible placement of different RRP party types: average scores on economic and sociocultural continuums. It seems, therefore, that the economic continuum dominates the competition between the traditional four (KESK, SDP, KOK, VAS), while smaller and newer parties differentiate more on sociocultural matters, which is, generally speaking, probably due to the historical development of the Nordic party systems. Only the voters of the Center Party and the Left Alliance seem to be attached to some extent to the New Politics dimension, combining both economic and sociocultural matters in their preference formation. Interestingly, those who do not identify with any particular party are the most moderate or centrist in both economic and sociocultural dimensions (Figure 4). The Figures 2 and 3 reveal, however, that potential abstainers are a very heterogenous group and disperse all over the competitive sphere not a ready coalition for an RRP party to mobilise. Thus, the biggest dilemma for the radical right parties is, first and foremost, that those cleavages that should, according to Kitschelt (1995), be beneficial for them divide indeed the Finnish 15

16 electorate, but they seldom overlap in the preference formation of voters. Parties disperse all over the political field according to their emphasis, but since the economic left-right continuum is altogether the most important cleavage for the traditional four parties, it clearly dominates Finnish politics over the sociocultural one. As Figures 1 and 4 reveal, there are plenty of space left both in right-authoritarian and left-libertarian ends, but the combination of neither extremely right-wing and authoritarian nor left-wing and libertarian ideas seems to appeal to the Finnish electorate. As long as the competition of big and small parties stay separate, the distinction between the Left Alliance and conservatives seems to balance the effects of economic convergence of the big three. Furthermore, the considerable distance between Christian Democrats or the True Finns and the Green League may satisfy the most radical voters in sociocultural issues. Therefore, the demand for radical right populism seems to be limited, but what have the supply side alternatives been like thus far? RADICAL RIGHT-WING PARTIES IN FINLAND Finland is the only Nordic country with a fascist heritage. In inter-war years the extraparliamentary, anti-communist and semi-terrorist Lapua Movement ( ) influenced strongly in Finnish parliamentary politics, especially in the ratification of Communist Laws, which banned communist activity throughout Finland. Being outlawed in 1932, the Lapua Movement was succeeded shortly after by the more moderate IKL ( ), whose support in parliamentary elections reached 8,3 % in 1936 (see e.g. Karvonen 1988, 14 29). The peace treaties of Moscow (1944) and Paris (1947) put an end to all radical right-wing activity in Finland. After the World Wars the general political consensus, especially concerning foreign policy and Fenno-Soviet relations, did not seem to provide fertile breeding ground for the right-wing policies, although it may also be argued that the consensus could have created demand for a counterreaction. The protest and criticism towards President Kekkonen, however, were probably channelled first through individual politicians in National Coalition Party and then through the Finnish Rural Party (SMP) since the 1960s. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and Finland decided not to renew the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, the restrictions of the peace treaties were no longer relevant or even possible. Already before the rise of the Progress Parties in Scandinavia the Finnish Rural Party mobilized popular discontentment towards the political elite in the 1960s and 1970s. The success of the SMP, 16

17 however, was more related to the European agrarian populism and the structural change of Finland at the time than to the new wave of right-wing radicalism and ethnonationalist populism. Recent studies rarely include the SMP in the radical right-wing party family (Widfeldt 2000, ; Kitschelt 1995, 55), mainly due to its cooperation with mainstream parties in coalition governments and the lack of (at least visible) anti-immigrant issues in the platform (cf. Sänkiaho 1995a, ; Pekonen et al. 1999, 36). Similarly, the EU-critical and nationalist True Finns, a relatively new party founded by the SMP activists in 1995, is often left outside of the party family. At the end of the 1990 s, Pekonen, Hynynen and Kalliala (1999, 38) estimated that there were approximately 40 associations in Finland with some sort of link to the radical right. They were either anti-immigrant, racist, nationalist or neofascist by character, and had critical views on Russia, immigration and the European Union. Given the ideological fragmentation of the underground movements and their weak membership, it is no surprise that the efforts to establish coherent parliamentary parties have proven to be unsuccessful. Recent elections have witnessed the emergence of two RRP parties, Finnish People s Blue-Whites (Suomen Kansan Sinivalkoiset, SKS) and Finland-Fatherland (Suomi-Isänmaa, S-I), whose support, however, has remained marginal (from 0,1 % to 0,2 % in the national elections). Candidate selection of both the S-I and the SKS has been strongly male-dominated. In parliamentary elections of 2003 over 86% of the SKS s and 97% of the S-I s candidates were men and in the EU elections of 2004 the parties did not have any female candidates. The average age of the SKS candidates is near 50, while the S-I s candidates are remarkably younger, average being near 35 (Statistics Finland 2005a; 2005b). The Finland-Fatherland, led by Väinö Kuisma, started as an extra-parliamentary organisation. The predecessors of the S-I, the Patriotic Right and United People in Great Finland (SNKY), were founded on the basis of the Aryan German Brotherhood, which was inspired by German neonazism of the early 1990s, and attracted some skinhead youth especially in Joensuu and Turku. At present the S-I wants to be distinguished from violent and anarchist neonazi groups, and after directing its attention to the parliamentary arena, it has been forced to tone down the neofascist features of its ideology for strategic reasons. Nationalism has largely replaced National Socialism, and the party s ideological core is entangled with mythology and symbolism of the Finnish national epic, Kalevala, and the belief in Finns as spiritual elite (Kaplan 1999, ; Pekonen et al. 1999, 43 45; Pekonen 2000). 17

18 According to the S-I s platforms (SNKY 2003; S-I 2003), the party is anti-capitalist and nationalist in economic policy: international capitalism deprive the workers of the surplus value of their work, creating inequality. The S-I promotes ethnically exclusive welfare state and is strongly anti-elitist and populist by character. It believes the democracy is declining and supports direct modes of political participation. The ethnic and cultural existence of the Finnish people is one of the party s main concerns, which is threatened by American mass culture, decrease in fertility and immigration. The government, it argues, favours immigrants over Finnish workers in its employment and entrepreneurship policies. As regards to foreign policy, the party opposes the dominant role of the United States in world politics, and in the Middle East question supports Palestinians. Independence policy should replace European Union and possible NATO memberships. The S-I wants to maintain friendly relationship with Russia, but in the Carelia question is stricter and wants to rejoin the lost areas, through negotiations, back to Finland. Socio-culturally the party believes in communality, traditional strict moral values, authoritarian education and environmental protection, which derives from mythology of Kalevala. The official party platforms, broadly speaking, do not differ significantly from the unofficial opinions of candidates. However, there is intraparty variation in intensity and severity of opinions. Racism, ethnonationalism and desire for ethnic purity are more accentuated, as well as economic and cultural xenophobia (see PEM2003: Huttunen (Q13, K17), Nissinen (Q6, Q13), Lehto (Q17); EUM2004: Rasinpuro (Q3 and Q19)). Restrictions of immigration policy, demand for law and order and anti-elitism seem to constitute the common thematic core (see PEM2003: Heikkilä (Q15), Huttunen (Q15); EUM2004: Kuisma (Q16), Rasinpuro (Q1)). Economic programme concentrates mainly on diminishing the income differences and lowering the income taxes of wage earners (PEM2003: Kuisma (Q8), Rasinpuro (Q1); cf. Heikkilä (Q1) and Huttunen (Q1)). The Finnish People s Blue-Whites, previously called Independent National Front ( ) and National Front ( ), is led by Olavi Mäenpää and has strongly local character, main support coming from South-Western Finland. In the municipal elections of Turku the SKS gained two seats in the city council: Mäenpää was the most successful of all the candidates, attracting some media attention (see Ministry of Justice 2004). As regards to the official platform of the SKS (2004), the party argues to plead cause of the unemployed, pensioners and entrepreneurs, and sets common man against political or international capitalist elite. In economic policy the SKS favours lowering of income taxes, but tightening the capital gains taxation. Socioculturally the Blue-Whites believe in national and linguistic identity politics, which is threatened by immigration 18

19 flow and the general decline of society, and is for environmental protection. In electoral machines (PEM2003; EUM2004) the candidates of the SKS promote income tax-relieves and speak for small entrepreneurs. They connect immigration to delinquency and exploitation of the welfare state benefits, demand law and order and have critical attitudes towards the European Union, Russia and the United States (EUM2004: Mäenpää (Q1 ja Q5), Järviharju (Q2), Luukko (Q18), Alajoki (Q14), Kemppainen (Q5)). Thus, following Kitschelt s (1995, 19 24) classification, the Finnish radical right-wing parties are clearly racist authoritarian or welfare chauvinist by character (W in Figure 4), i.e. socioeconomically left-wing and socioculturally authoritarian. The S-I, due to its past, is moving from neo-fascism (F) to welfare chauvinism. Main emphasis of the parties is on the sociocultural dimension, especially on immigration policy, which is closely entangled with the protest towards the political and (international) capitalist elite. The parties largely ignore market liberalism and embrace ethnically exclusive welfare state, promoting, however, certain tax-relieves. Since the immigration issue seems to dominate both party platforms and candidates opinions, a brief review on the attitudinal atmosphere of Finland is worthwhile. FINNS AND IMMIGRATION ISSUE Attitudes of Finns towards immigrants have been explored comparatively surprisingly little, although international surveys on the subject are increasingly available (e.g. European Social Survey 2002/2003). Immigration issue is, certainly, only one of the components of Kitschelt s (1995) sociocultural continuum, and it is by no means the sole predictor of the radical right-wing vote, though probably one of the most explored ones (Mudde 1999, 192; Van der Brug & Fennema 2003; Eatwell 2003, 3 5). Since Kitschelt s theory measures and evaluates interaction of two dimensions and bundles several sociocultural issues, the gathering of the Finnish electorate to the center of the sociocultural continuum (Figure 1) does not describe adequately the tolerance of Finnish voters towards immigrants. Evidently, the immigration issue has not reached continuity in the political debate in Finland, unlike in Denmark and the Netherlands, for instance. This might be, of course, partly due to the low number of immigrants, although a direct connection between the immigration flow and the radical right-wing support has been seldom perceived in empirical studies (see e.g. Kestilä 2005a, 50 51). The number of immigrants arriving in Finland in 2003 was only 0,03 % of the total population, 19

20 which is marginal compared to Denmark (2001; 1,05 %), Sweden (2002; 0,72 %) and Norway (2001; 0,76 %) (Nordic Statistical Yearbook ). The lack of political debate, however, does not tell much about the attitudes of the voting public. By exploring the potential for radical right-wing mobilisation in Finland in the light of single issue and protest voting theories, Kestilä (2005b) has observed that the attitudinal atmosphere in Finland provides a breeding ground for radical right populism as fertile as that in most other West European countries. Comparative analysis on West European countries reveals that Finns are not more tolerant than an average European: they do not openly welcome immigrants and especially fear the cultural and economic consequences of immigration. Furthermore, Finns have relatively negative views of their political elite. Negative attitude towards immigration is, nevertheless, largely latent in Finland, which may partly be due to the lack of credible party alternatives through which the attitudes could be channeled. Rydgren (2003, 60 62) argues that the existence of a potential radical right-wing alternative in a system may increase manifest xenophobia by affecting perceptions of both voters and moderate parties. 9 This is more likely when a country confronts social and economic stress, sociocultural cleavage challenges the socioeconomic, moderate parties adapt to or even adopt radical right-wing policies and an RRP party manages to combine anti-immigrant issue to other politically important frameworks. Although the repression and the inflow of Somali refugees into highly monocultural Finland in the early 1990s offered a breeding ground for the radical right, its key issues were not politicised by media, interest groups or moderate parties, and for that matter, no potential alternatives emerged. In its anti-establishment rhetoric of the 1970s, the SMP did not, at least not explicitly, try to benefit from the immigration issue, although its voters had stricter anti-immigrant views than those of any other party (Sänkiaho 1995a, ). It should be remembered, however, that the SMP started already in the 1960s, when bigger concerns in Finland were emigration, (especially to Sweden) and depopulation of the countryside. In the late 1990s and in the beginning of the new millennium the economic recovery may have further restrained mobilisation potential of the radical right. DISCUSSION Based on the analysis of the party documents, it seems obvious that the current Finnish radical right populist parties have failed to find winning formula in a kitscheltian sense. If the combination of 20

21 market liberalism and authoritarianism is the recipe, the welfare chauvinist and neofascist party alternatives have certainly affected the marginalisation of the radical right in Finland. However, as the party system analysis showed, although a potential radical right-wing party candidate, a master case, would emerge, there might still not be demand for it in the Finnish electorate: quality of parties does not seem to matter significantly. The established parties fill the limited competitive space comprehensively, and voters, in general, tend to cluster towards the middle point in crucial dimensions for the RRP party success. Although both economic and sociocultural cleavages do divide voters into blocs, the interaction of the dimensions is weak. Moreover, potential abstainers are an incoherent and dispersed band of people, which is difficult to mobilise. Hellsten s (2001, 47) results slightly contradict, but also complete, our findings. The Green League, her study argues, have consolidated its position as a main left-libertarian party, while right-authoritarian counterforce is found issue-specifically among several different parties. New politics dimension is therefore in a constant reciprocating movement, but might mobilise voters in the future. Current radical right-wing parties compete on the weaker dimension, while traditional mass parties occupy the stronger one. Small established parties, however, have not invited the radical right in the sociocultural dialogue, and excluded it from the system. The parties themselves, for that matter, have not been able to adapt to the rules of party competition and their local nature further highlights their marginalisation and exclusion. It should be noted as well that in Finnish politics the dissatisfaction towards established parties may be channelled through single individual candidates in established parties. According to Arter (2003, 161), in the parliamentary elections of 2003 an independent candidate on the True Finns list, former wrestler and boxer Tony Halme, might even have done democratic favour by mobilising disappointed youth in the suburbs of Helsinki, partly by adopting radical right-wing rhetoric. Permitting of the radical right-wing activity again in 1991 removed the most important constraint of the RRP parties, and, according to Hellsten (2001, 45 46), re-entering of the National Coalition Party into government after several years of exclusion in 1987 created it even new opportunities. However, after fourteen years the implications of the ideological convergence remain to be seen. In electoral campaigns mainstream parties have certainly taken moderate positions on both economic and sociocultural cleavages (see e.g. Pesonen 2000; Arter 2003), but simultaneously dampened the issues important for the RRP parties and excluded them from those discussions where the political agenda is created. The invisibility of the radical right is, of course, partly due to its insufficient campaign resources and the unwillingness of both moderate and radical parties to conclude electoral 21