Special Report: Nigeria's Boko Haram Insurgency

Transcription

1 Special Report: Nigeria's Boko Haram Insurgency Increased scope of militancy disproves ceasefire; group's paramilitary tactics to challenge security forces November 2014

2 2Page Table of Contents Executive Summary... 3 Current Situation... 3 Ongoing Militancy in Midst of Ceasefire... 4 Boko Haram's Change in Tactics... 6 Diversification of Modus Operandi... 8 Local Response Government's Initiatives in Lead-Up to 2015 Elections Increased Regional Initiatives Conclusion... 13

3 3Page Executive Summary The recent announcement of a ceasefire between the Nigerian government and Boko Haram was premature. The militant group s fragmentation and prevailing lawlessness have contributed to the ongoing insurgency in Nigeria s northeast. As of November 2014, the Islamist militant sect has established territorial integrity in the area under its control in the northeast, hindering the counterinsurgency campaign. Boko Haram is likely to continue to mobilize paramilitary forces southwards in Adamawa State as well as near the northern borders with Niger and Chad. Militancy attacks are likely to persist outside of the group s core territory so as to destabilize the wider northern region and compel the military to overstretch its forces. The most vulnerable are locales are those in which the militants wield existing operational infrastructure. Ahead of the February 2015 elections, the government is undertaking a revamped effort against insubordination, allocating additional resources to the counterinsurgency campaign and pursuing regional cooperation. Yet, these measures will unlikely prevent the group s ability to launch attacks beyond the northeast with the aim of fomenting instability during the polls. Current Situation On October 17, high-ranking Nigerian officials, among them the Chief of Defense Staff, announced a ceasefire agreement negotiated with the Islamist militant sect Boko Haram. The alleged agreement was to take effect immediately, with both military troops and militant forces ceasing combat. The militant sect was also said to have agreed to release more than 200 schoolgirls abducted by Boko Haram in the village of Chibok, Borno state, in April In contrast, in a video released on October 31, a man proclaiming to be Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram, denied the existence of a ceasefire between the militants and the Nigerian government. The video went on to assert that the delegates claiming to represent the militants in negotiations with the Nigerian Federal Government in Chad did not speak for Boko Haram. In the period following the October 17 announcement, insecurity persisted in Nigeria s northeast perpetrated by suspected Boko Haram militants. Most notably, insurgents reportedly captured the town of Mubi in Adamawa State, and engaged troops of the Multinational Joint Task Force (JTF) in the town Malam Fatori, Abadam Local Government Area (LGA) in northern Borno State. Recent reports indicate that members of the Civilian JTF, together with military forces recaptured the town of Mubi on November 13, yet a large militant force continued to mobilize, reportedly attacking Chibok village in Borno State during the same day. Clashes, abductions, bombings and raids were reported throughout the northeastern states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (henceforth the northeast). Reports indicate that as many as 90 people were abducted in the communities of Wagga and Garta in Adamawa state and Ndongo in Borno State. At least 47 were reportedly killed when a suicide bomber detonated in a school in Potiskum, Yobe State, which

4 4Page followed a previous suicide bombing at a Shiite ceremony in the same locale. Further deadly clashes took place in the towns of Damboa and Mafa in Borno, as well as Michika LGA in Adamawa and Fotokol and Kolofata in Cameroon s Extreme North Region. Furthermore, militancy in the form of suicide bombings, car bombs and shootings sprees persisted outside the northeast, in locations elsewhere in the north such as Gombe, Bauchi in two separate attack on November 7 and 16 and Kano in September and November. Attacks also took place in states to the south in the Middle Belt region in Kontagora, Niger and Kogi. Timeline of Increasing Boko Haram operations since (Source The New York Times, Oct. 23, 2014) Ongoing Militancy in Midst of Ceasefire Despite probable negotiations, ceasefire announced prematurely; militants fragmentation, lack of military hierarchy and prevailing lawlessness contributing factors Despite the ongoing insurgency throughout Nigeria, and in particular within the northeast, we assess that negotiations between the Nigerian government and proclaimed representatives of Boko Haram did take place in the month of October. First, we draw this assessment on the credibility of the accounts describing the negotiations. These include separate interviews with western media outlets by the Nigerian Chief of Defense Staff, the Chadian Foreign Minister and a man proclaiming himself to be Boko Haram s Secretary. Second, the release of the 27 hostages by the militant sect in Cameroon on October 10 was attributed by the Chadian Foreign Minister to be a show of good faith during the negotiations. Whilst the exact circumstances of the agreement leading to the release of the Cameroonian hostages cannot be independently confirmed, we assess that in all likelihood their release was secured through

5 5Page some of form of deal, lending further credence to the possibility that negotiations were taking place with Boko Haram. That said, mounting evidence indicates that the ceasefire announced by Nigerian government officials on October 17 was premature. First and foremost, this is underscored by the increased violence in Nigeria s northeast in recent weeks. In the period immediately following the announcement of the ceasefire, the Nigerian government reportedly attributed the violent incidents to criminal elements that operate in the region and are seeking to capitalize on the prevailing lawlessness. To an extent, we assess that this explanation for some of the violence in the northeast over recent weeks is credible given that armed elements, motivated by either financial interests or political ambitions, sought to derail the aforementioned negotiations. Moreover, we assess that the clear dissonance between the proclaimed negotiations and the security situation on the ground indicates a fragmentation within the Islamist militant sect. What remains unclear is if the self-proclaimed Boko Haram negotiators represent the main bulk of the militant force or a fragmented faction. The scope and caliber of the insurgency operations in recent weeks lead us to assess that the main Boko Haram force was not represented in the negotiations with the Nigerian government. While small scale raids, abductions or clashes with security forces could have been perpetrated by criminal groups or rogue militant cells, we assess that recent operations such as the captures of Abadam and Mubi, as well as the execution of militant attacks in areas that are not part of the group s strongholds, such as Kogi, Gombe and Bauchi States, required manpower, equipment and coordination unlikely to be at the disposal of fringe elements. Thus we assess that a major force of Boko Haram is not committed to the negotiations with the Nigerian government. This assessment was Boko Haram Leader Abubakar Shekau further corroborated in the October 31 video of a man proclaiming himself to be Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram s leader, denying the existence of a ceasefire. Given this, we assess that the insurgency is likely to persist in Nigeria over the coming weeks and months. The extent and nature of the militant operations in the near term are likely to be shaped by the current strategic landscape of the conflict in Nigeria s northeast.

6 6Page Boko Haram's Change in Tactics Increasing adoption of paramilitary techniques facilitates entrenchment, defense of growing core base of operations In recent months, Boko Haram gained and maintained control over territory in the eastern part of Borno State and northern Adamawa State. While the fog of war persisting in northern Nigeria limits the ability to outline a precise map, accumulating reports indicate that through the rapid capture of smaller locales and isolated military units, alongside concentrated efforts targeting a few strategic locations, most notably Gwoza, Bama and Mubi, the militant group has been able to establish territorial integrity in the areas under its control. Conservative estimates suggest that as of November 2014, Boko Haram controls an uninterrupted strip along the Cameroonian border, from the town of Mubi in the south up to Gamboru in the north. Following the group's capture of Mubi on October 29, Boko Haram renamed the town 'Madinatul Islam' or 'City of Islam', which we assess indicates the group's perception of this town as the capital of its territory or caliphate. Additional incidents in the village of Doron Baga and Abadam LGA indicate that the militant sect is able to effectively mobilize large forces further north, along Lake Chad. Boko Haram's approximate area of control outlined in green

7 7Page We assess that achieving territorial integrity, rather than controlling isolated patches of territory, is likely to contribute to Boko Haram s fortifications, hindering the military s counterinsurgency efforts. An uninterrupted region of control provides the militants with strategic rear bases from where it can replenish supplies while also collecting money and goods from the subjugated local population. To an extent, this may force the militants to adopt increased paramilitary warfare while moving away from their more traditional guerilla modus operandi. This shift in tactics, which they have been increasingly adopting, could potentially undermine their competitive advantage vis a vis the military. With the exception of the militants defeat in the town of Konduga, thus far Boko Haram s paramilitary tactics have proven effective against the Nigerian troops in the region. It is commonly reasoned that a militant group will not fare well against an established army in a traditional military conflict. However, in Nigeria s northeast, the military repeatedly failed to take a preemptive initiative against the militants. In incidents where the military has invested the resources to fortify its presence, most notably in the outskirts of Borno state capital Maiduguri, it has been able to fend off repeated large scale paramilitary attacks. Yet thus far the military has failed to implement a similar level of resilience in other locations in the northeast. Moreover, the Nigerian military has shown a high level of disorganization, insufficient training and supplies, and lack of loyalty amongst the ranks, which have hindered its ability to act as a legitimate military force. As such we assess that despite the ongoing counterinsurgency operations, the militant sect is likely to maintain control over the core of its territory in the absence of a concerted and organized military operation. Whereas in the past the military may have been able to encircle militant strongholds, cutting off supply lines and staging simultaneous attacks, it will now have to concentrate its efforts on the front lines of the militants territory. The change in strategy that the military will need to implement may result in setbacks to the counterinsurgency efforts in the coming weeks. Nevertheless, the Nigerian military may still be able to register successes against the militants within the aforementioned area. The consolidation of the main Boko Haram force into a recognizable territory provides the military with a clearer target for broader assaults, such as aerial or artillery strikes.

8 8Page Diversification of Modus Operandi Boko Haram diversifies modus operandi to adjust to various strategic landscapes across Nigeria In the immediate term, we assess that the military campaign is likely to concentrate in the vicinity of Mubi, an important commercial hub in Adamawa State. A combined force of armed civilians and military forces has been able to recapture the town, yet the earlier militant assault highlighted the vulnerability of the strategic location. While accounts of the battle conflict, some suggest it required only a small militant force to drive out the military troops stationed in the city, who reportedly fled to Cameroon. If this is the case, government forces may choose to quickly mobilize to recapture the city, so as not to allow Boko Haram to fortify its hold of the city. In contrast, we assess that Boko Haram is likely to utilize its paramilitary capabilities to attempt to expand the territory under its control. In Adamawa State, the sect may mobilize southwards along the Cameroonian border. Given its established modus operandi, we assess that militants are likely to target smaller communities and isolated military units, making its way towards strategic locations. The November 13 assault on Chibok demonstrates this tactic; the village is situated on the outskirts of Boko Haram s established territory and reportedly hosted a relatively small military presence. Local accounts of the fighting indicate that the militants advanced a large force to capture the community, albeit temporarily. In the case of Adamawa, the militants may well be advancing towards the capital city of Yola. That said, a direct assault on Yola is unlikely in the immediate term, since we assess that at this point Boko Haram is not yet deployed so as to enable such an assault. Instead, the militant group may seek to employ localized attacks, such as raids and bombings to destabilize the surroundings of Yola, and disrupt the military deployment in the area, while also using these assaults as a psychological warfare tactic against the local population. Such tactics will be a combination of the group s former strength as a guerilla force while implementing its newer paramilitary capabilities. In this way Boko Haram may pave its path towards Adamawa s capital city, ahead of a potential assault. In Borno State, we assess that the bulk of Boko Haram s paramilitary operations are likely to concentrate north of its current strongholds, along Lake Chad and the border with Niger, as demonstrated by the militants repeated assaults against Abadam LGA. Securing a presence along these border areas could potentially assist the militant sect in establishing new routes for the transfer of supplies, ammunition and manpower, similar to manner it currently operates along the Cameroonian border. In particular,

9 9Page secure passage across the Nigerien border will provide the group with easier access to arms smuggling routes in the north of Niger, believed to be transferring weapons from Libya to Mali. During this same period of increased operations in the northeast, the Islamist militant sect has been affiliated with attacks, such as shooting sprees, suicide attacks and car bombs outside its core theater of operations in the northeast, in the adjacent States of Bauchi and Gombe, and other incidents in greater Nigeria. We assess that in so doing Boko Haram seeks to destabilize the country, undermine the rule of law in the northeast and compel the military to overstretch its forces. Such attacks across the north in areas beyond its base of operations are therefore likely to persist in parallel to the direct confrontation between the military and militants in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. We assess that the most likely targets for these types of attacks outside Nigeria s northeast are locales where Boko Haram wields an existing operational infrastructure, such as dormant cells, ammunition caches and local knowledge. The recent attacks in Kano, Bauchi, Gombe, all took place in locales where the militant sect has operated previously. Moreover, as the February 2015 general elections grow near, Boko Haram may seek to expand the geographical scope of its operations with the aim of destabilizing the country and capitalizing on the elevated tensions, while also portraying the incumbent administration of President Goodluck Jonathan in a negative light. Successful attacks outside of the north, expanding into the Middle Belt, will create immense psychological impact on the Nigerian population as Boko Haram has rarely carried out such operations. In this context, the recent attacks in Kontagora, Niger and Kogi States are significant, and we assess that they are indicative of the group's plans for additional militant actions in the Middle Belt in the coming months. Map depicting attacks likely carried out by Boko Haram over recent months outside of group's strongholds in northeast.

10 01Page Moreover, a high profile attack in a central location such as the capital Abuja or the commercial hub of Lagos would generate a widespread impact both nationally and internationally, and thus may be deemed as a highly attractive aim during this pre-election period. While we assess that Boko Haram does not possess an operational infrastructure in the south of the country similar to that in the north, it has in the past demonstrated an ability to orchestrate attacks in Abuja in May and June. In addition, over the past year Boko Haram has employed different militancy tactics, such as car bombs and female suicide attacks, in locations throughout the north of Nigeria. Such tactics were often frequent for a period, and then largely disappeared. We assess the militants could have been testing and perfecting various assaults, which may now come into play ahead of the elections. The recent return to such tactics in the attacks in Kano, Bauchi, Kogi, and Gombe following a lull of a few months supports this assessment. Local Response Local communities in northeast to undertake increasingly aggressive, vigilante actions to counteract deficiencies of state security forces Armed civilian vigilante groups, commonly referred to as the Civilian JTF, are likely to play a significant role in the evolving strategic balance in the northeast. The civilian JTF has, in the past, been active in the fight against Boko Haram s militancy in the area, yet its operations subsided as the military intensified its counterinsurgency campaign. However, as it became increasingly apparent that the military efforts are oftentimes ineffective in containing insurgency, the civilian JTF revamped its operations. Mounting reports from recent confrontations with Boko Haram in northeastern locales such as Maiha Town, Mubi, Chibok and Michika indicate that vigilante groups are once again instrumental in the campaign against the Members of vigilante Civilian JTF. militant sect. As the security vacuum left by the Nigerian military persists in the northeast, we assess that the civilian JTF is likely to further intensify its operations in the coming weeks. The Civilian JTF's successful operations will confirm local perceptions that such a non-official force is necessary to counteract the deficiencies of the military. While it has often proven effective in combating the militants, growing vigilante operations may challenge the official state security apparatus running the counterinsurgency operations in the region, undermining the military s operational hierarchy and thus potentially further destabilizing the region.

11 00Page Government's Initiatives in Lead-Up to 2015 Elections Revamped efforts against insubordination, better allocation of resources unlikely to improve military's capabilities as elections will interrupt momentum of counterinsurgency In the lead-up to February 2015 elections, pressure is increasing on President Goodluck Jonathan s administration to present notable progress against Boko Haram. Consequently, the government will most likely seek to present a facade of progress in the counterinsurgency campaign in the northeast. Boko Haram militancy is likely to play an important role in the heated political discourse, and the incumbent cabinet will be incentivized to deliver noticeable achievements to use in the electoral campaign. We assess that the premature announcement of a ceasefire on October 17 was an example of such an effort. That said, maintaining security in the south of the country in face of the elections and associated political tensions will place additional burden on the Nigerian security forces. This in turn may lead to diversion of troops and resources away from the northeast to be deployed throughout the country. Still, the Nigerian government is currently undertaking several initiatives in the hope of regaining momentum in the counterinsurgency campaign. First, a revamped effort is underway to repress indiscipline among fighting troops in the region. Indiscipline has long been undermining the security operation, manifesting in negligent conduct, disobedience, reports of cooperation and intelligence sharing with Boko Haram by soldiers, and at times open mutiny. Recently, military authorities moved to prosecute hundreds of soldiers accused of disobedience in a series of well publicized arrests. Controversially, in September a court martial sentenced to death 12 soldiers who were stationed in Maiduguri and charged with mutiny. We assess that by adopting these measures, the military authorities seek to deter future manifestations of indiscipline. This indicates that the military is aware of the magnitude of Nigerian soldiers on training exercise. the challenge posed by low discipline. However, it is not at all certain that deterrence alone can prevent future incidence of disobedience. Often times, low morale drives low discipline, and reports of low morale among fighting troops persisted even in times when the military enjoyed a favorable momentum. Thus, we assess that without providing a positive incentive, in the form of better equipment, training and higher monetary compensation, further instances of insubordination and indiscipline remain likely over the coming weeks. Second, and in close relation to the issue of poor equipment and training, the Nigerian federal government recently approved the borrowing of 1 billion USD designated specifically to assist the operation against Boko Haram. Bearing in mind that Nigeria s military expenditure is estimated at little under 2.5 billion USD in 2013, an additional 1 billion USD worth of equipment, ammunition and supplies

12 02Page can potentially make a considerable impact on the conflict. Over and above the operational advantage likely to be obtained by the fighting troops, it may also help to mitigate some of the prevailing discontent and increase morale. That said, lack of transparency and frequent instances of corruption that are endemic to Nigeria may hinder the final amount reaching the fighting troops in the northeast, potentially curbing the impact of the 1 billion USD loan. Increased Regional Initiatives Regional cooperation crucial for the counterinsurgency campaign Alongside strengthening its domestic military presence in the area, the Nigerian government has moved to increase collaboration with its neighbors to contain Boko Haram. On October 7, the heads of state of Benin, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, as well as the Cameroonian Defense Minister, committed to join a regional force to fight the Islamist militant sect in the area surrounding Lake Chad. Boko Haram s cross border operations, in particular in Cameroon s Extreme North Region, provide the President Jonathan with other West African heads of state. sect with an important strategic breadth in its core operations in Nigeria. Thus, we assess that an effective regional force that is able to cut off the militants from their extraterritorial bases and hideouts will significantly impact the strategic landscape of the conflict. However, at the time of writing the extent and nature of the joint operation remain unclear, with the legal framework and martial substance still to be put in place. Cameroon has been trying to secure its border with Nigeria for several months, and it is unclear what, if any, new measures will be introduced by the regional force. At this point, despite several high profile successes in the fight against Boko Haram, we assess that militants maintain operational presence in the Extreme North Region. A regional force has the potential to overturn the situation, yet it will require genuine commitment of the regional actors.

13 03Page Conclusion The October 17 announcement of a ceasefire between the Nigerian government and Boko Haram was premature, highlighting the fragmentation within the militant sect and the federal government s search for prompt notable achievements at the midst of the electoral campaign season. Currently, Boko Haram has been able to diversify its tactics to adjust to the various strategic landscapes in which it operates. These include paramilitary mobilization along the Cameroonian and Chadian borders in Borno and Adamawa States, guerilla warfare throughout the states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, and militant attacks in adjacent states and throughout the north of the country. These tactics are often deployed in tandem, reinforcing one another and allowing the militant sect to resist the military s counterinsurgency campaign. Given the current balance of power in Nigeria s northeast, we assess that Boko Haram militancy is likely to persist in the coming months. Moreover, ahead of the general elections in February 2015 the group is likely to increase its efforts to execute high profile attacks in a strategic location such as Abuja or Lagos, so as to capitalize on the heightened national and international attention and reflect negatively on the incumbent administration. Historical precedents indicate that Boko haram likely wields the necessary capabilities to carry out such attacks.

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