The Extension of Child Protection Activities in North East Nigeria

Transcription

1 NOHA RUG Module 1: Context and Stakeholder Analysis The Extension of Child Protection Activities in North East Nigeria Combating grave abuse and violations against children in newly acessible LGA s A Stakeholder Analysis for OCHA Nigeria March 2017 Molly Lambert

2 A Stakeholder Analysis for UNOCHA Expansion of Child Protection Activities in NE Nigeria Analyst Molly Lambert Key Findings Ø Increased access in Borno state is highlighting increased need and critical protection issues for children Ø Unreliable Civil-Military relations pose a threat to the success of the Humanitarian Response Plan 2017 Ø Desensitization of protection issues within military forces in NE Nigeria limiting the safety of children in their presence Executive Summary 2.1 million children have been affected by the Boko Haram violence and military counter-operations in North East Nigeria. Most directly affected are those children in the states of Yobe, Adamawa and Borno, where newly accessible territory has revealed critical protection needs. UNOCHA and the Child Protection Sub Working Group now wishes to extend child protection activities from IDP camps and host communities to rural areas and those regions newly accessible to humanitarian access. (OCHANigeria, 2016, ACAPS, 2016) This briefing paper will show the findings of an analysis into the stakeholders that are decisive in eliminating child protection issues and those that will allow or inhibit a successful extension of services to areas not typically protected by host community or IDP camp status. To inform UNOCHAs strategic operations, the questions of who OCHA is currently cooperating with in North East Nigeria, which stakeholders OCHA would benefit from working with, who could pose a threat, and who could be used as brokerage to mitigate a threat, will be addressed. To move forward, it is advised that OCHA take into consideration a number of recommendations that require adjustments to their current strategy. Figure 1: Map of accessible areas in North East Nigeria (UNOCHA, 2016) The Issue Children affected by the insurgency are suffering from a number of critical issues which affect their dayto-day life; family separation, community rejection, sexual exploitation, exploitative labor, violence, abuse and trauma. The HRP 2017 highlights the needs of children in camps within the main urban areas and addresses the need for; reintegration support for children released from armed forces and psychosocial services and support for separated children through case management & reunification systems. However, activities must be extended outside IDP camps and host communities into rural areas and those regions newly accessible to humanitarian access since the end of (OCHANigeria, 2016) Children trapped in conflict areas, those inaccessible to humanitarian actors and those in rural areas newly accessible, especially in Borno State are in critical need of protection services as well as urgent emergency assistance.

3 Stakeholders Figure II: Security Dimensions NE Nigeria OCHA Nigeria The UN secretariat for coordination of humanitarian assistance in partnership with other actors in the response to emergencies in Nigeria. (OCHA, 2017) The Nigerian Federal Government Partnership and commitment to alleviating suffering through Humanitarian Response Plan 2017 with OCHA. But economic decline and recession ongoing challenge limiting capacity to respond to the crisis. (PSWG, 2015) Child Protection Sub Working Group (CPSWG) Led on a national and state level by UNICEF and the State Ministry of Women s Affairs and Social Development (SMWASD). Coordination forum for INGO, NGO, institutions & donors involving child protection in emergency response interventions. Under umbrella of Nigerian Protection Working Group (PWG). Membership strong and active. OCHA working directly with 12 members in NE Nigeria. (CPSWG, 2015) International Committee of the Red Cross Nigeria (ICRC) Nigerian NGO working to provide emergency assistance through food aid, water, first-aid and livelihood support. Also undertaking advocacy of IHL within Nigerian military & police force, and negotiates with military for release of unlawfully held detainees. Has extensive access in comparison to other NGO s through local volunteer network and associations. (ICRC, 2017) Does not currently interact with OCHA. The Nigerian Armed Forces Main mandate to fight BH. Grave human rights record; extra-judicial killings of militants, corruption, civilian abuse & humiliation. (Int. Crisis Group, 2017) Weak capabilities & structure. Nigerian Children 481,000 children in need in NE Nigeria. 30% of these are unaccompanied. Exposed to child labor, begging, abuse, recruitment, sexual exploitation & physical violence. (OCHANigeria, 2016) Human Security Context The main driver of insecurity in NE Nigeria remains the on going attacks by BH and the collateral damage caused my the military operations attempting to diminish their power. As a result, the N. Eastern part of the county, especially that of Borno state in the Lake Chad Basin is now experiencing severe displacement issues, a severe food crisis with warnings of famine, major human rights violations, and critical protection issues. (OCHANigeria, 2016) With the country in its own recession due a global drop in oil prices, and social services that cannot cope with the strain and destruction of the conflict, and a government that is unable to enforce the protection of its own citizens through its military forces, there is an inherent ongoing humanitarian crisis. (FEWS, 2016) The Nigerian military s human rights record shows a grave disconnect with the protection of civilians and their mandate. While the MNJTF and the vigilante CJTF have been implicated in both wide-ranging abuse and the recruitment and use of child soldiers. (Int. Crisis Group, 2017) A new wave of BH attacks in February have further hindered humanitarian access to those who need it most. (OCHA, 2017) Boko Haram (BH) Radical Islamic extremist militant group against the Westernization of society aiming to alter the religious composition of Nigeria & to eradicate secular education. Since the escalation of their attacks in 2014, they have been accused of mass killings, kidnappings, using captive children to carry out their own attacks and many other human rights abuses. In its territorial expansion within NE Nigeria it has attacked everyone in its path, including government forces, civilians and children. (Freedom House, 2016) Since the spilit of BH into two factions in 2016, plus the eastablishment of MNJTF & the enhancement of the military response, the group has weakened, allowing the military to gain control of many LGAs. At the same time, the group still threatens isolated villages in the region - challenging the claim of victory by the Nigerian military. (Aljazeera, 2016) Multi-national Joint Task Force (MNJTF) Objective to combat BH & other terrorist groups operating in Lake Chad Basin, create secure environments in affected areas of BH & facilitate IDP returnees. Made up of forces from Cameroon, Niger, Chad, Benin & Nigeria. Not taking adequate steps in civilian protection during operations. (Institute Security Studies) Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) Vigilante group operating in fight against BH since Recognized as source of local intelligence & manpower by MNJTF. However, their presence has provoked intense retaliation by BH against their communities. Implicated in abuse, recruitment & use of child soldiers, & some reports of dealing weapons to BH. Nigerian military claim to give orders but CJTF continue to claim independence. (Int. Crisis Group, 2017)

4 Stakeholder Matrix: Indicating each stakeholders position, salience, capabilities and thus effective power in moving forward or not moving forward in the extension of child protection activities to areas recently accessible to humanitarian assistance. Actor Position Salience Capabilities Effective Power CPSWG Strongly in favor. Wants all children in Nigeria to be protected, but members have access and protection issue for their own staff. Strongly willing to invest. (0.8) Only coordinating agency with power to empower other organizations (4) 3.2 OCHA Strongly in favor of extension. Highlights the need for protection beyond LGA headquarters, but for IDP s more generally. 1 Willing to invest but also has other goals on their agenda (0.6) Mainly a coordination agency of other organizations, only able to support the development of common priorities, but has ability to influence the direction of funding pools like CERF. (3) 1.8 ICRC In favor of protecting children, but more focused on emergency assistance. 2 Willing to invest (0.4) Have enhanced access is hard to reach areas through volunteer network. 3 (3) 1.6 Nigerian Gov. In favor of extension of protection; endorsement of Safe Schools Declaration 2016 to protect schools form military use, military reforms to respond better to protection of civilians, & development of IMTF to further commitment to HRP, but many other issues to deal with. 4 Only one of many issues to be addressed in Nigeria, so only slightly willing. (0.3) Has power in theory, to negotiate change with some actors negatively affecting the issue (Armed Forces, CJTF, MNJTF). Countrywide recession limits power to contribute to HRP funding. (4) 1.2 N. Military Indifferent to goal. Official mandate to protect all Nigerian children, however many attacks on BH areas have not taken protection of civilians into consideration. 5 Issue of little importance, but protection outlined in their mandate. (0.2) Limited power due to size due to size, but strong capabilities to affect change if collective mandate put into practice. (3) 0.6 CJTF Mandate to drive back BH forces. Some interests in child protection, as many members are youth from affected communities. 6 Does not place protection of children as an important issue (0.1) Limited power due to informal structure, but collectively strong power to affect change in status quo. (2) 0.2 Nigerian Children Strongly in favor. Those living outside LGA structures critically in need of Protection. 7 Strong interest in outcome. (1) Very limited capabilities to change their situations (0) 0 MNJTF Indifferent to goal. Mandate to drive back BH forces. Has reportedly been implicated in recruitment of child soldiers. 8 Protection of children of no importance, negatively opposing (- 0.2) Hold little power to change, as no control over collective behavior of soldiers due to differences in perceptions of leadership. (2) Boko Haram Not in favor. Has kidnapped children, and used them to carry out attacks. 9 No interest in issue, negatively opposing (- 0.7) Hold intrinsic power to change the status quo (6) *Position indicates the position the stakeholder holds in the preferred outcome of the goals of OCHA on extending child protection activity, being in favor, or not in favor of the goal. *Salience in this instance is determined as the stakeholder s willingness to invest in regard to the specific outcome of the extension of child protection activities. Ranging from - 1 (unwilling) to +1 (strongly willing). *Capabilities is determined as how much power a stakeholder has with regard to assisting or opposing the extension of child protection activities, compared to other stakeholders within the current context. Ranging from (0) no capabilities, to (6) high capabilities. *Effective power is determined by = Salience [- 1 to 1] x Capabilities [0 to 6]

5 Figure III: **The corresponding graph visualizes the findings of the Stakeholder Matrix. The x-axis indicates the salience that each actor has in terms of increasing child protection activities in previously inaccessible areas of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa state. The Y-axis indicates each actor s capabilities in this regard. Negotiation Analysis As a result of this stakeholder analysis it is clear that the CPSWG has the most effective power to positively influence an increase in child protection activities in the region, and could benefit from their relationship with OCHA Nigeria in doing so in terms of material capabilities and willingness to do so. However at the same time, BH have just as much effective power to negatively influence this outcome. The MNJTF and CJTF could also pose a threat to a positive outcome in this regard. The Nigerian government, although having some strong capabilities and salience to influence the extension of activities, is negatively affected by a weak control over its military, its budget deficit and a number of other equally important humanitarian needs. The ICRC, although not currently working with OCHA Nigeria, have capabilities in terms of negotiation and access and a relationship of sort with Nigerian forces. Matrix II: Relationship Network Analysis The following matrix illustrates the current relevant stakeholders in Borno, Yobe & Adamawa State and the relationship, if any, they have to OCHA Nigeria, as identified through the respective stakeholder analysis. The relationships can be identified as follows; Green lines à Co-operation, Red broken lines à threat, Blue dotted lines à Co-operation with government only, Green dotted line à Co-operation with other stakeholders, but not OCHA

6 Structural Holes and Brokers From the corresponding relationship network matrix it is clear that there are structural holes between OCHA Nigeria and the militant forces present. To close these holes OCHA should use their strong relationship with the Nigerian Federal government to act as broker, to advocate for concrete operationalized child protection measures and harsher disciplinary benchmarks. To address the gap between OCHA and access, OCHA should use their relationship with the Nigerian government as brokerage to reach the ICRC, in order to negotiate a partnership between the ICRC Nigeria and the PSWG. Through the combined resources of ICRC s expansive volunteer network and the CPSWG s funding and capabilities, the reach of child protection activities could be maximized. There are therefore a number of recommendations for OCHA Nigeria that require adjustments within their current operational strategy. Recommendations Ø Establish a partnership with the ICRC and coordinate cooperation between them and the CPSWG. Combining ICRC s enhanced access and negotiation skills with the resources of the CPSWG will extend the reach of OCHA s operations in hard to reach areas in the region. Ø Advocate for the formalization of the CJTF through the Nigerian military. Ø Advocate for the sensitization of human rights and child protection issues within the Nigerian armed forces & MNJTF, and corresponding disciplinary structures. Ø Advocate for the reestablishment of the Nigerian Ombudsman, in order for those victims, especially children, who have experienced grave human rights violations at the hands of the Nigerian armed forces or the MNJTF, to be able to report. Well established INGO s within the PSWG will be able to coordinate response services with Ombudsman reports. (Okakwu, 2016) Ø Maintain the ongoing strong alliance with the CPSWG and corresponding PSWG. Ø Establish contingency plans and exit strategies for partners within the CPSWG for possible reescalation of violence in areas of operational activity. Ø Appeal to donor countries to fund the HRP 2017 and OCHA & CPSWG operations. A note on Validity and Reliability of Sources All sources used are from reliable sources, however may not be completely from partisan bias as data is developed by existing stakeholders in the region. All data is confirmed to be accurate, but it must be taken into consideration that the region is highly volatile and many areas still remain completely inaccessible leaving large gaps in information.

7 Acronyms BH Boko Haram CJTF Civilian Joint Task Force CPSWG Child Protection Sub Working Group HRP Humanitarian Response Plan ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IMTF Inter-Ministerial Task Force LGA Local Government Area MNJTF Multi National Joint Task Force OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs SMWASD State Ministry for Women Affairs and Social Development SMYSSD State Ministry for Youth Social Support and Development Sources from Stakeholder Matrix** 1 OCHA Nigeria, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Nigeria. Available at: (Accessed 21 2 ICRC, Nigeria: Victims of conflict and violence struggle to survive, 30 June Available at: (Accessed 25 March 2017). 3 USAID, Active USG Programs for the Lake Chad Basin Response. Available at: [map pdf] (Accessed 24 4 Human Rights Watch (HRW), Nigeria: events of Available at: (Accessed 25 5 International Crisis Group, Nigeria: The Challenge of Military Reform. Africa Report N. 237, 6 June Brussels: International Crisis Group. Available at: (Accessed 24 6 International Crisis Group, Watchmen of Lake Chad: Vigilante Groups Fighting Boko Haram, Africa Report No Brussels: International Crisis Group. Available at: (Accessed 26 7 OCHA Nigeria, Humanitarian Response Plan: January-December Available at: Accessed 20 March 2017). 8 Freedom House, Nigeria, Freedom in the World Available at: world/2016/nigeria (Accessed 26 9 OCHA Nigeria, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Nigeria. Available at: (Accessed 20

8 Figures and pictures Figure I: OCHA, Lake Chad Basin: Crisis Overview (as of 19 October). Available at: (Accessed 27 Figure II: Zwitter, A., Comprehensive Context. Correlation and Effect Analysis Tool, ECFAR. Figure III: Zwitter, A., Comprehensive Context. Correlation and Effect Analysis Tool, ECFAR. Photograph: Dudenhoefer, A., Understanding the Recruitment of Child Soldiers in Africa, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes. Available at: Accessed 27 March 2017) Other References Acaps, Crisis Overview 2016: Humanitarian Trends and Risks for Available at: (Accessed 26 Al Jazeera News, Boko Haram: Behind the rise of Nigeria s Armed Group: An investigation into the origins and ideology of the rebel group and its bloody rise, 22 December Available at: htmlFilmmaker (Accessed 23 March 2017) CPSWG, Child Protection Sub Working Group 5W matrix January Available at: (Accessed 25 CPCWG, Child Protection Sub-Working Group: Nigeria, Terms of Reference. Available at: b_working_group_nigeria_0.pdf (Accessed 25 CPSWG, Nigeria CPSWG: HRP Indicators Progress Monitoring Dashboard January to February Available at: (Accessed 23 march 2017). Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWSNET), Current food security outcomes in northeast Nigeria, Feb Available at: (Accessed 25 Institute for Security Studies, West Africa Report: Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force Against Boko Haram. Institute for Security Studies Available at: (Accessed 24 International Crisis Group, Watchmen of Lake Chad: Vigilante Groups Fighting Boko Haram, Africa Report No Brussels: International Crisis Group. Available at: (Accessed 26

9 OCHA Nigeria, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Nigeria. Available at: (Accessed 20 OCHA Nigeria, Humanitarian Response Plan: January-December Available at: (Accessed 20 March 2017). Okakwu, E., Nigeria s Ombudsman shuts down, unable to pay salaries. Premium Times, October 20, Available at: (Accessed 17 PSWG, Protection Strategy for the Humanitarian Crises in North East Nigeria, November Available at: (Accessed 25 PSWG, Nigeria: Protection Impact Snapshot, Completed and On-going Activities, Jan-Oct Available at: (Accessed 24 PSWG, Nigeria: Protection Actors, Completed and on-going Activity, Agencies with registered projects in OCHA Online Project Systems (OPS), September Available at: (Accessed 24 march 2017). UNOCHA, Child Protection: Child Protection Sub Working Group (Nigeria), humanitarianresponse.ie. Available at: (Accessed 23 UNOCHA, Lake Chad Basin: Crisis Update, No. 13, 7 March Available at: pdf (Accessed 27 UNOCHA, About the Crisis, Nigeria. Available at: (Accessed 24