Alternative Pathways to Peace and Development in Rural Chiapas, Mexico

Transcription

1 Alternative Pathways to Peace and Development in Rural Chiapas, Mexico Keith Hollinger Dissertation submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy In Planning, Governance, and Globalization Joyce Rothschild Markus Schulz Max Stephenson Ioannis Stivachtis May 2, 2011 Blacksburg, VA Keywords: Peacebuilding, community resilience, sustainable development, collective democracy, democratization Copyright 2011

2 Alternative Pathways to Peace and Development in Rural Chiapas, Mexico Keith Hollinger ABSTRACT The concept of peacebuilding holds enormous importance for international relations, particularly in regions facing violent conflict and those recovering from such conflict. However, in order for peacebuilding to be a viable alternative to traditional peace operations, scholars and practitioners need to have a shared understanding of what peacebuilding is and what goals it hopes to achieve, in addition to fluid strategies for implementation. This dissertation seeks to identify strategies for building sustainable peace through sustainable community development and democratization. Using a qualitative metasynthesis of five ethnographies conducted in Chiapas Mexico, this dissertation develops mid-range theories, or strategies, for building peace in Chiapas and in regions experiencing low-intensity conflict more generally.

3 Acknowledgements The tradition of the acknowledgements has become a device for more than simply saying thank you to editors, supporters, and readers. It is also a way of acknowledging intellectual and interpersonal sources of inspiration and growth. Those who have helped me in my own personal growth and inspiration have been numerous. First, I would like to thank my wife, Eva for her patience, understanding, persistent motivation, and finally for taking the time to carefully correct my overzealous use of commas and paragraphlong sentences. I would also like to thank my children, Noah and Maya. They have provided the inspiration to move forward in the darkest of times especially in those times when I questioned why I was pursuing a Ph.D. My intellectual growth was inspired by my wife and enabled by a thoughtful and attentive committee. Dr. Joyce Rothschild paved the way for this research by introducing me to the methodology, and wisely suggesting at the beginning of the project that I would find the most useful clues for peacebuilding in the Zapatista community structures. While I was unsure of this at the time, it proved to be an insightful and accurate prediction on her part. Dr. Max Stephenson, Dr. Markus Schulz, and Dr. Ioannis Stivachtis were instrumental in the completion of this project. Each brought an area of expertise that informed my research and guided me toward a more concrete analysis of the situation. This project would not have been possible without the careful consideration and creative input of my committee. To each of you, I say Thank you. iii

4 Table of Contents Chapter 1 Introduction... 1 A Brief History... 6 The Zapatista Experience Research Questions Chapter 2 Research Design Research Questions Philosophical Assumptions Methods The Case Identification Process Research Instrument Applying the Research Instrument Conclusion Chapter 3 Conflict and Peace Conflict Peace Peace Operations Peacebuilding in Theory Chapter 4 Conflict and Peace in Chiapas Causes of the Conflict The Spark that Ignites the Fire Obstacles to Peace Clues to Peacebuilding Conclusion Chapter 5 Development and Democracy Economic History Current Economic Situation Development Community Resilience Conclusion Chapter 6 Development and Democracy in Chiapas iv

5 The Chiapaneco Experience Capacities and Vulnerabilities for Development Pluriethnic Regions Conclusion Chapter 7 Pathways to Peace Summary of Findings Constructing the Pathway to Peace Implications for Peacebuilding Limitations Directions for Future Research Conclusion References Appendix A v

6 Acknowledgements The tradition of the acknowledgements has become a device for more than simply saying thank you. It is also a way of acknowledging the intellectual and interpersonal sources of inspiration and growth. Those who have helped me in my own personal growth and inspiration have been numerous. First, I would like to thank my wife, Eva for her patience, understanding, persistent motivation, and finally for taking the time to carefully correct my overzealous use of commas and sentence fragments. I would also like to thank my children, Noah and Maya. They have provided the inspiration to move forward in the darkest of times especially in those times when I questioned why I was pursuing a Ph.D. My intellectual growth was inspired by my wife and enabled by a thoughtful and attentive committee. Dr. Joyce Rothschild paved the way for this research by introducing me to the methodology, and wisely suggesting at the beginning of the project that I would find the most useful clues for peacebuilding in the Zapatista community structures. While I was unsure of this at the time, it proved to be an insightful and accurate prediction on her part. Dr. Max Stephenson, Dr. Markus Schulz, and Dr. Ioannis Stivachtis were instrumental in the completion of this project. Each brought an area of expertise that informed my research and guided me toward a more concrete analysis of the situation. This project would not have been possible without the careful consideration and creative input of my committee. To each of you, I say Thank you. vi

7 Chapter 1 Introduction The goals of peacebuilding are significant not only to the people involved in conflict, but also to the world in general. With increasing concern over the environment, natural resources, agriculture, and health in the 21st century, the world has witnessed increases in small wars that spill across borders and become transnational conflicts. Examples include several of the conflicts in Africa that began as inter-ethnic disputes over resources and unresolved social cleavages created by colonization, but spread to neighboring countries as refugees fled community-level violence and genocide. The low-intensity war in Chiapas reflects the global nature of many contemporary conflicts; the transnational solidarity network that formed during the course of the conflict has been the foundational case for the study of the concept of network warfare and netwars (Ronfeldt, Arquila et al. 1998; Arquila and Ronfeldt 2001). Arquila and Ronfeldt (1997) define netwar as societal-level ideational conflicts waged in part through internetted modes of communication; [differentiating it from] cyberwar [which is fought] at the military level [of civilization] (27). While the centrality of the internet to the Zapatista experience is questionable (Schulz 2007, 130), it has become clear that human networks of Mexican and international activists and NGOs played a significant role in securing a cessation of violence following the uprising (Arquila and Ronfeldt 1997, Bob 2005, Schulz 2007), and it is these human networks that have been critical in the peace process. 1

8 Traditional approaches to peace focused on nation states and were designed for interventions in inter-state conflict; however, these approaches are inadequate for addressing the complex demands of intra-state civil conflict and network warfare. Fortunately, relatively recent developments in peace theories and supporting technology offer the potential for the promotion of peace that is conceived as pluriethnic cooperation built through mutual respect for cultures, religions, human rights, and dignity, as opposed to peacebuilding strategies that inadvertently promote structural violence or that seek peace through formal military intervention. In other words, the alternative approach is to build mutual respect and prevent conflict rather than intervening once violence starts; it involves seeking peace at the lowest levels of society and not simply with elite representatives of different groups. This dissertation seeks to extend our understanding of successful peacebuilding strategies and structures that can promote the development of cooperation over competition, reconciliation and resilience over domination. The findings of this dissertation will be limited by the recent development of the Zapatista government and economic structures. That is, since the political and economic structures were only implemented in 2003, only limited information is available about how successful these structures have been at improving the lives of the Chiapanecos. This dissertation project engages ethnographies conducted in Chiapas between the 1960s and 2005 (published in 2007). Although it is impossible to predict with certainty whether or not the strategies identified will 2

9 work long-term, they offer insights into bottom-up peacebuilding techniques that can, in the meantime, promote democratic governance of the social, political, and economic processes necessary to build sustainable peace. Peacebuilding, and for that matter, conflict, occurs at the intersection of economic, political, and social conditions, and with that understanding, the project employs an interdisciplinary approach. Beginning from a theoretical perspective of bottom-up peacebuilding as described by Hemmer and Garb, et al. (2006), the project undertakes a metasynthesis of five ethnographies conducted in southeastern Mexico, in order to investigate the relationships among conflict and peace, and democratization and development. The goal of the project is to develop a perspective on bottom-up peacebuilding that will be applicable to lowintensity intrastate conflicts, particularly complex conflicts where actors are difficult to categorize and/or indigenous rights play a critical role. For instance, in Chiapas, the actors involved in the conflict and the nature of the conflict have changed over time. The conflict has always involved the Mexican Government, but with the growth of populist parties in the state and federal government, the role of the federal and state governments in direct action against the Zapatistas and the EZLN has diminished. The military still plays a role in the conflict; however, it is unclear how much of this role is directed from the federal level. The dissertation focuses on the conflict in Chiapas, which was selected for a number of reasons. First, it is a conflict that, at least in the eyes of some of the participants, has been underway for more than 500 years. Second, it was a 3

10 grassroots intrastate conflict that has devolved into a low-intensity conflict, which is characteristic of the nature of the most common active conflicts around the world. A final reason the Chiapas conflict is a useful case for analysis is the widespread academic interest in and engagement with the Mayan population in the region and with the Zapatistas 1 themselves. The conflict has captured the interest of academics, activists, and media outlets in many regions of the world. As such, an abundance of qualitative data presents a challenge of scale and requires a delimitative precision of scope to make this project manageable. At the same time, it allows development of a vivid picture of the people in Chiapas and the nature and course of the conflict. The Zapatistas have worked closely with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and activists from all over the world to promote a democratic space for collective leadership, bottom-up development, and indigenous autonomy and self-determination. In essence, the Zapatistas are building upon the resilience of the Indígenas to build peaceful, resilient, and sustainable communities with comparatively limited resources. This fact also makes them a strong choice for this study, as many of the unique developments at the local level are in this case invaluable to broader questions of peacebuilding. 1 The movement is named after Emiliano Zapata who has become a hero of the rural farmers and communities in the some of the poorest regions of the country. Zapata fought for land reforms that favored the peasants in the Mexican Revolution of 1910 until he was ambushed and killed in a carefully staged, feigned, defection of a colonel in the Mexican army in His movement fell apart and his and reforms were never fully realized. 4

11 Despite a significant presence of international and domestic NGOs and foreign aid agencies from around the world, there has been no formal international peacebuilding operation established in Chiapas that addresses the civil conflict between the Indígenas 2, the political and economic elites in Chiapas, and various components of the Mexican government; mediates peace negotiations; coordinates development; and helps to build resilient communities. Additionally, domestic peacebuilding efforts such as the Federal Comisión de Concordia y Pacificación (COCOPA- Commission for Agreement and Pacification) and the civil society Comisión Nacional de Intermediación (CONAI-National Commission of Mediation) failed to bear lasting fruit (Earle and Simonelli 2005, 95). In response, some of the Mayans have taken steps toward coordinating development and building autonomous sustainable communities, rather than accepting development programs that address not their needs but the needs and objectives of the government, Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), or NGOs and their donors. The remainder of this chapter sets the scene for the project with a brief examination of the history of the Chiapas conflict and at peacebuilding in the region. The chapter concludes with an outline of the specific research questions addressed by the dissertation project. 2 Indígenas is used in this dissertation as an identifier for the indigenous people of Mexico; in particular, it refers to the indigenous people in Chiapas. 5

12 A Brief History I begin my description of the Zapatista experience with a brief discussion of the history of the Maya people. This will help to situate the Zapatistas as an indigenous movement that is the product of thousands of years of history. The history of the Zapatista movement is long and bloody. They find their roots in the Mayan Culture, which has endured as a continuous Mayan linguistic agricultural group for over two-thousand years in Mesoamerica (Coe 2005). They flourished as a civilization: they developed mathematics and a written language; they had historical records, a common religion, astrology, and a hierarchical caste system within which communal property was held by familial groups (Webster 2002; Coe 2005). This came to a gradual end with the collapse of the classical Mayan civilization around 925 AD and the subsequent dispersion of the Maya into the jungles, where they maintained their agricultural heritage, but not on the same scale as before. The Mayan diaspora is blamed on many factors, including environmental degradation and social upheaval. By the time the Spanish arrived, the Maya were spread out across Mesoamerica and had no central authority to be conquered (Coe 2005). The Spanish conquest of Mexico was marked by brutality, but it was met by resolved resistance in the lands of the Maya. The first Spanish conquistador in Mexico, Hernández de Cordoba, died at the hands of Mayan warriors in The last Mayan city, Tayasel that fell in 1697 to the Spanish conquest was on Lake Peten Itza in modern day Guatemala. The Maya of Mexico have repeatedly 6

13 staged uprisings against conquerors and subsequent elite landowners throughout post-conquest history. Neil Harvey (2005) provides a vivid picture of indigenous uprisings. The Tzeltal Revolt of 1712 was brutally suppressed to discourage future uprisings. Interethnic conflict was left unaddressed as Indígenas apparently complied to avoid additional punishment. The Ladinos had punished the Indígenas they captured by cutting their ears off (42). In the mid s liberal and conservative factions of Ladinos were engaged in a conflict over who would control the indigenous labor and natural/agricultural resources in Chiapas. Tzeltal and Tzoltil Mayans rebelled as a result of increasing taxation by both the conservative and liberal factions of ladino elites (46). By 1870 the rebellion, which had as its goal local community autonomy over regional control, had been violently suppressed by Ladino militias (47). The period of the Mexican Revolution did not see significant indigenous uprising in Chiapas. The Ladino elites enacted the Servant Liberation law, which cancelled the debts of indentured servants, limited the length of the work-day, and obliged landowners to pay the campesinos. These concessions facilitated the landowners ability to enlist the Indígenas in an army to fight off constitutionalist forces (Jung 2008, 92). More recently, land invasions in the latter half of the twentieth century have marked indigenous rebellion, at first organized by socialist activists, and later undertaken by various indigenous groups. These invasions have been based on legitimate petitions to land that were delayed for years, invasions aimed at wresting control of the most arable land from large landholders, and also 7

14 invasions orchestrated by corrupt individuals seeking profit. These invasions were also violently suppressed. For instance, the massacre at Golonchán in 1980 is notable. Landowners disguised as police accompanied by federal soldiers under the command of General Absolón Castellanos Domingúez fired on the Golonchán community of invaders for two hours. The barrage, which included cannon fire, left 12 dead and 18 wounded (Bobrow-Strain 2007, 105). While this is only a brief overview of the numerous indigenous uprisings, it demonstrates not only a long history of resistance, but also a long history of trying to reclaim lands that had been seized from them over time. Additionally, it demonstrates the history of violent suppression of rebellions and as such seems to justify the fear of repression that is shared amongst the Zapatista communities (Marcos 2007). The Lacandon jungle was colonized during efforts at pacifying indigenous unrest without threatening the large landholdings of the Chiapas elites, and in an effort to relocate communities for the development of hydroelectric power. This period of colonization created a pluriethnic region of Indígenas in the jungle, which served as the location in which the Ejercito Zapatista Liberacion Nacional 3 (EZLN) would build an indigenous army of thousands of campesinos 4. The concentration of multiple ethnicities of Indígenas in the Lacandon jungle created an atmosphere in which Zapatistas would grow to prefer community and 3 The Zapatista National Liberation Army 4 A term that indicates a peasant without the designation of ethnicity 8

15 regional autonomy over autonomy based upon indigenous identity or ethnicity. (Hernández-Castillo 2001; Nash 2001). The Indígenas in the Lacandon jungle live in communities that are vastly different from their ancestral lands, both ethnically and ecologically. When the EZLN makes the statement that they are the product of 500 years of oppression, they are demonstrating their shared identity to the world. For the Mayans in Chiapas, the resistance to the Spanish conquest never ended. The period of independence was marked by efforts at acculturation and oppression of indigenous identities as the Creolo 5 conquerors retained the economic and political power in the region. Interestingly, these efforts at forced acculturation created a class of mestizos, persons of mixed Creolo and indigenous descent. The period of the revolution was marked by acculturation and oppression. The mestizos became the heirs to power after the revolution; again, the Chiapaneco elites retained their power and authority by adopting the rhetoric of the revolution, and their power was preserved by the state government through efforts to destabilize land redistribution in the state. The elites in Chiapas were holding the reins of government when the revolution occurred, and as agricultural producers, they were the backbone of the Mexican economy (Ross 1995; Harvey 2005; Bobrow-Strain 2007). Finally, in the neoliberal period, the Indígenas found themselves once again threatened by oppression and violence. The Mexican government worked carefully in the indigenous 5 In this dissertation this term is used, as it is by Indígenas in Chiapas, to indicate a person of nonindigenous European descent. 9

16 communities in an effort to co-opt their organizations, and has used violence and the persistent threat of violence to prevent the Indígenas from threatening the economic and political efforts of the Chiapas elites and the power of the PRI (Ross 1995; Hernández-Castillo 2001; Nash 2001; Earle and Simonelli 2005; Harvey 2005; Bobrow-Strain 2007; Speed, Castillo et al. 2008). On January 1st, 1994, the primarily indigenous EZLN emerged from their jungle communities to foment revolution in Mexico. On the day that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) became active, this relatively unknown guerrilla group in Chiapas, Mexico, captured the attention of the world. It is no surprise that while discussing the military response to their uprising in 1994, the Zapatistas write in The Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle that they were running and fighting, and fighting and running just like our ancestors had done, without ever surrendering or giving up or being defeated (EZLN 1996). They had organized, trained, and outfitted like a secret whispered in the jungle for ten years. The EZLN argued that the NAFTA was detrimental to the already marginalized indigenous peoples because it would promote an increase in the concentration of power and resources into an increasingly smaller portion of the Mexican population and expose the small production farmers to open competition with the mechanized, mass production, corporate farms in the United States (Marcos 2007, 273). The Mexican government, realizing that there was significant domestic and international support for the Zapatista movement, moved to contain its overt 10

17 military response in the early days of the uprising and entered into negotiations with the Zapatistas. In 1996, the Zapatistas and the Mexican government entered into a peace agreement called the San Andres Accords. Some of the provisions of these accords were to cement indigenous rights into the Mexican constitution and to take measures to reign in neoliberal policies that threatened the livelihood of indigenous communities across Mexico. These provisions were never realized (Ross 1995; Hernández-Castillo 2001; Nash 2001; Earle and Simonelli 2005; Harvey 2005; Bobrow-Strain 2007; Speed, Castillo et al. 2008). Instead, the Mexican legislature rejected the accords that had been negotiated between the Zapatistas and the federal government, and by 2001 had completely negated the accords and made an effort to exclude indigenous autonomy from Mexican politics (Marcos 2006). The government chose to pass a constitutional amendment that placed indigenous rights in the public domain by bringing indigenous people into the domain of public interest but not granting them collective rights. Additionally, it acknowledges the autonomy of indigenous communities at the local level but makes no concessions for regional governance. Finally, the accords grant the indigenous autonomous communities preferential access to natural resources located in their autonomous communities but does not grant collective rights over them. This watered down version of the San Andres Accords was a serious disappointment to indigenous rights activists. (Jung 2008, 192-3) They had been denied their right to govern their own communities and determine the course of their community s development 11

18 (Hernández-Castillo 2001; Nash 2001; Earle and Simonelli 2005; Harvey 2005). The Zapatista response was to enact the provisions of the San Andres Accords despite the congressional rejection. The result was the development of autonomous governing bodies and the subsequent launch of the Other Campaign in 2005, a political assault on status quo politics that helped to change the face of Mexican government. While the Zapatistas did not see the realization of revolutionary politics sweeping the countryside in 1994, they experienced a growth in solidarity movements that provoked demonstrations against the military response across Mexico (Ross 1995; Nash 2001; Earle and Simonelli 2005). Because of this response by a global and domestic civil society, and the media attention they gained, the Zapatistas were able to strengthen the indigenous rights movement by bringing it out of the jungles of Chiapas and making it, and themselves, available to a broader audience within Mexico and abroad (Ross 1995; Ronfeldt, Arquila et al. 1998; Arquila and Ronfeldt 2001; Schulz 2007). The Zapatista movement has had a greater impact on the federal government than a traditional guerrilla organization would be able to achieve because of its collaboration with an international support network of indigenous rights, human rights, and other national and international activists (Ross 1995; Ronfeldt, Arquila et al. 1998; Arquila and Ronfeldt 2001; Nash 2001; Bob 2005; Schulz 2007; Munoz Ramirez 2008). One of the more important outcomes of this collaboration is the ability of the Indígenas to bring their claims, arguments, and 12

19 demands to a broader international audience. For instance, when the Mexican Supreme Court declined to rule on the procedural challenge to constitutional revisions that eliminated article 27, the Indígenas that brought the case took it to the International Labor Organization (ILO) under Convention 169 that guarantees indigenous rights, self-determination, and autonomy (Jung 2008, 189). Additionally, the Zapatistas benefitted from a domestic media support network (Bob 2005). Since the uprising, "indigenous rights have been placed squarely on the national agenda" (Bob 2005). The Mexican government is no longer able to ignore the needs of the indigenous peoples of Mexico as it had done for decades, and is limited in its capacity to oppress the Indígenas organizations and communities. This limitation of capacity for overt engagement with the rebels and their support networks has prompted the government to undertake a strategy of low-intensity conflict in the region, supported by the militarization and paramilitarization of the region and accompanied by counterinsurgency development that seeks to divide communities and erode local support networks for the indigenous organizations in Chiapas (Ross 1995; Hernández-Castillo 2001; Nash 2001; Earle and Simonelli 2005; Harvey 2005; Bobrow-Strain 2007; Speed, Castillo et al. 2008). The increase in violence along the northern border also increases the potential for Mexican government to increase pressure on the southern border (along which the Zapatista communities are numerous) in the name of fighting human and narcotics trafficking. 13

20 The Zapatista Experience The historical link to each other and to the land upon which they have lived for millennia is exceptionally strong among the Zapatista communities. These links provide an interesting perspective on the conflict in Chiapas. First, a strong connection to the land helps to explain their passion regarding indigenous rights and land reform issues. Second, the history of oppression and resistance makes them professional activists in a sense. Five hundred years of resistance to an invading force is an exceptional experience for any culture to endure. While it has not been persistent uprising, it surely has been persistent resistance and resentment. While resistance is difficult to find historical evidence for, as it typically occurs in a hidden transcript (Scott 1990), the repeated indigenous rebellions and more recently, land invasions, serve as evidence of this resentment and resistance (Ross 1995; Nash 2001; Harvey 2005). This history makes the Zapatistas community-building efforts amidst an indigenous uprising particularly interesting and complex. In fact, several aspects of the Zapatista experience set it apart. The conflict in Chiapas has transformed from passive resistance, to violent revolution, then to an armed, but non-violent, resistance (the causes of these transformations are discussed in Chapter 4); this transformation has been crucial to subsequent developments in the region. Similarly, the role of the Mexican government has evolved over time. While the military is still involved in a protracted occupation of the Lacandon rainforest, it is not as pervasive as it was 14

21 before Vicente Fox took office (Martinez-Torres 2006, 108). While the Federal government had been involved in oppression and the destruction of Indigenous society in the past, at other times it has been a strong supporter of indigenous movements in Chiapas, at times standing as a guardian against the ruling local elites. In this conflict, there are no absolutes. The Indígenas are not all Zapatistas, the Ladinos are not all opposed to indigenous autonomy, and the government at all levels has both supporters and enemies of the Zapatistas serving in office. Peacebuilding operations typically prioritize disarmament as the prerequisite for all other peacebuilding initiatives (Junne and Verkoren 2005). In the case of the Zapatistas, it seems that the strategy of disarmament (in the absence of a significant intervening force, and without the complete demilitarization of the region) would have undermined the possibility of peace and opened the door for the silencing of the Zapatistas' voice, and by extension the silencing of the voices of the communities they represent. Given that evidence of violence perpetrated against the civilian Mayan population is abundant throughout the history of Mexico, the indigenous people of Mexico have every reason to believe that if they disarmed they would be crushed and silenced by the Mexican government through the Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional (SEDENA), vigilantes, and mercenaries. Furthermore, the Indígenas in Chiapas have a long and well-documented history of being violently oppressed, as the Mexican authorities and paramilitaries (sometimes covertly supported by authorities) have traditionally 15

22 employed deception, brutality, assassination, and rape as strategies for subjugating the indigenous population. The Guardias Blancas and Chinchilunes are PRI-aligned paramilitaries that carry out attacks on indigenous communities, establish checkpoints on roads leading through the indigenous communities, and are often found to be involved in official evictions and other official military actions (Ross 1995; Hernández-Castillo 2001; Nash 2001; Earle and Simonelli 2005; Harvey 2005; Bobrow-Strain 2007; Speed, Castillo et al. 2008). There are dozens of these paramilitaries and armed gangs in Chiapas, and their number and level of violence is increasing with the militarization of the region. In a communiqué dated January 18 th, 1994, Subcommandante Marcos revealed the suspicion that if the EZLN disarmed, the Indígenas would suffer a distinctly violent response: When an armed political force (like the Mexican Federal Government) asks another armed political force (like the one from the EZLN) to turn in their guns, that means, in political and military terms, a request for unconditional surrender. In exchange for this unconditional surrender, the federal government offers us the same as always: an adjustment of internal accounts, a package of declarations, some promises, and more bureaucratic dependency. We are suspicious of the request to lay down our weapons. Mexican and Latin American history teaches us that those who turn in their arms, trusting the forgiveness of their pursuers, end up mutilated by some death squad or political faction or the government. Why shouldn t we believe the same will happen here? (Subcommandante Marcos 1995) At the time of this statement, the Zapatistas were naively unaware that the violence they were experiencing would become localized by the federal 16

23 government s efforts to promote the goals of counterinsurgency and lowintensity conflict, which included the destruction of the EZLN and all indigenous organizations that refused to align with the PRI and the Ladinos that still dominated state politics. PRI-sanctioned violence has included the torture and murder by armed men of the indigenous leader Maximiliano Hernández in 1996, the murder by PRIista-aligned campesinos of a member of a peasant organization after an electoral dispute, and the torture, murder, or assassination of thousands of others in the region since 1994 (Hernández-Castillo 2001; Nash 2001; Harvey 2005). Consider also the January 1994 torture and disappearance of three Indígenas from the Morelia ejido outside of Altamirano described by John Ross (1995, ). In the wake of the Zapatista rebellion the men of the town were assembled on a basketball court in the town center. The military left the men face down on the court for hours within earshot of the screams of men inside the local church being tortured with electrical lines attached to their scrotums and by dunking their faces in the baptismal. One soldier commented that the town was going to be full of orphans (114). Finally, three men, covered in blood, were escorted out of the church, placed in a military ambulance, and never seen again. The community reportedly found their bones, clothes, and false teeth in a nearby pit used to dispose of animal carcasses. The military and government took great pains to prevent the identification of the bodies; one federal pathologist claimed that the bones had been in the pit for three years. The military repeatedly seized 17

24 the bones at a checkpoint outside of town as independent pathologists attempted to get them out of the community and to a lab in efforts determine the identity and cause of death of the men to whom the bones belonged. Paramilitary violence in Chiapas became more visible to the world with the massacre in Acteal in The massacre of Acteal was carried out by the Red Mask paramilitary organization. The victims were members of an autonomous community in Chenalhó. The PRI-aligned Indígenas in the town center were aggravated because the community elected a mayor from the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), but he was prevented from taking office by the PRI elites. The PRI paramilitary began attacking the PRD supporters when they decided to declare an autonomous community, seating Avendaño, the elected mayor, in a parallel government. Eventually the group had to flee town and went to a neighboring ejido (a state-sanctioned communal farm). On December 22, 1997, while the PRD supporters prayed in church, the Red Masks attacked and killed forty-five of the unarmed Indígenas, thirty-six of whom were women and children. They ripped open the bellies of four pregnant women and chopped up the embryos with their machetes (Nash 2001). The mayor of Chanalhó had distributed the weapons to the group, and the Mexican military had conducted their training, which included viewings of pornographic videos (Nash 2001). During the three hours of torture and murder, the Mexican military stationed at the edge of town did nothing to intervene (Jung 2008). The brutality of this massacre sent chills throughout the region. Thousand of Zapatistas fled 18

25 their homes and communities, fearing more attacks and massacres (Earle and Simonelli 2005). The campaign of terror was fully engaged. The Ladinos fear of the Indígenas army, the EZLN, was diminishing with the presence of massive numbers of troops that allowed the paramilitaries to operate with impunity. While the perpetrators at the local level of this massacre were charged with their crimes, the inquiry stopped locally and refused to acknowledge that the murderers were a paramilitary group supported by the PRI. Nonetheless, human rights groups in the region were able to make these larger connections and now live in the same fear as the Zapatistas (Nash 2001; Earle and Simonelli 2005) Thus, the fact that the Zapatistas remain armed, although they refuse to use their weapons even in the face of overt and covert provocation (Weinberg 2000), has allowed their communities to maintain some sense of security in the face of ongoing threats from paramilitary violence, assassinations, and military oppression. Conversely, though, it provides the Mexican government with the opportunity to cast them as revolutionary guerillas akin to the narco-guerilla groups that were common in Latin America in the latter half of the twentieth century. The Zapatistas shadowed the 2005 presidential campaign with events aimed at raising awareness of the corruption involved in Mexican politics and providing an alternative perspective for governance in a campaign called La Otra 19

26 Campagña (Marcos 2006). The Other Campaign did not field its own candidate for president, nor did it endorse any of the standing candidates. Rather, it raised awareness of the political process and informed voters that there were valid reasons for questioning the electoral process. The Zapatistas represent a post-modern revolutionary force, introducing a bottom-up form of democratization that reconfigures state power from within through the mobilization of a community and from without through participation in a global civil society. The power transformation perpetuated by the Zapatistas has affected both Mexican domestic and foreign policy and, even more significantly for the purposes of this project, has far-reaching implications for sustainable peacebuilding. The Zapatista experience is unique both because of the internal organization of the Zapatista communities and because of the connection to an armed insurgency group, the EZLN. In the autonomous communities, there is a markedly horizontal structure in which the collectively democratic communities hold power, and the EZLN, the armed branch of the Zapatista movement, is controlled by the autonomous communities, and does not act without their guidance. From the beginning, the EZLN framed themselves as the representatives of the oppressed, but not as the vanguard that needed power to protect them. In other words, although they had every opportunity to take power and form a guerilla government, placing loyal municipalities under their control, the EZLN 20

27 did not do so. Instead, they requested protection under the Geneva conventions and set up local elections, so the people of the communities they liberated would be able to hold free and fair elections and choose their leadership amongst themselves. This was unique in and of itself. And, despite a continued identity as an oppressed indigenous people, the Zapatistas fought not for an autonomous state, but for local autonomy of the development process in their communities, a return on the proceeds for the natural resources being extracted from the region, and a place within Mexican society of dignity and respect (Marcos 1995). The concept of autonomy is negotiated at the local level and as a result is different in each region. In the Lacandon jungle, it reflects a pluriethnic community that makes development decisions and governs itself. The Zapatistas sought to have their autonomy formalized in the San Andres Accords, which would have established indigenous autonomy as a level of the Mexican government. With the abandonment of the San Andres Accords by the federal Government in 2002, the Zapatistas established their communities independent of the government. The result is that they have developed a shadow government that ironically runs alongside other shadow governments established by disenchanted candidates for office in the official Mexican government. Nonetheless, the autonomous communities seek control over the flow of natural resources such as timber, oil, and agricultural products extracted from the region. They are very careful to maintain a Mexican nationalist identity as Indígenas as to avoid the argument that they seek independence. In a way the Zapatistas are aware that as a part of 21

28 Mexico, Chiapas will be better off than attempting to take on the global world alone. The Zapatistas have learned through their coffee cooperatives that economies of scale offer not only increased access to the world, but also a level of security in difficult times. Additionally, it seems that any claim for independence will erode their critically important relationship with Mexican civil society, which seeks to bring the indigenous identity into Mexico, not further exclude it, or acculturate it. At first, the EZLN sought a revolution that would sweep across Mexico and replace the Mexican government with a newly elected one that would rise from mass elections amongst individual communities. They sought to change the paradigm of governance in Mexico; they sought democracy with free and open elections, land reform, and the abandonment of neoliberal economic policies that further marginalized an already marginalized indigenous population in Mexico. These goals were different from the socialist movements in Latin America that preceded them. The Zapatistas were not the vanguard of the oppressed; they were, instead, the oppressed themselves, seeking dignity and respect (Schulz, 2007, 136). Earle and Simonelli highlight a second unique characteristic of the Zapatistas efforts at reconciliation, development, and democracy: the Juntas de Buen Gobierno. The Junta is a governing body that oversees development in the region. They coordinate aid efforts such that one community is not privileged over another. Their goal is to maintain equity in development of the region 22

29 rather than have fully developed municipal centers that attract the jealousy of other municipalities (Earle and Simonelli 2005). In other words, the autonomous government is to ensure an equitable process of development in which one community does not receive the lion s share of development in the region, while more remote or smaller communities have no development projects. Additionally, autonomy over the projects also means that the community decides what development it needs through consensus. This was a response to the development efforts being concentrated on more urban communities, focused on aspects of the community that created divisions, like aid focused only on production processes involving women, or faith-based aid that only benefitted the converts and congregation of the specific religious organization, etc. (Hernández-Castillo 2001; Nash 2001; Earle and Simonelli 2005; Harvey 2005). Upon realizing that, although revolution was not spreading throughout Mexico and the world, a civil society was rallying behind them in Mexico and abroad (Schulz 1998), the Zapatistas rethought their strategies and demands. They are continually re-framing themselves and their cause through Declarations and other publications, and these prolific writings are one of the aspects that make the Zapatistas' approach to community building unique. Indeed, volumes of books have been produced by the Zapatistas and their supporters that tell the story of the Zapatistas in the words of the Mayan peasants who make up both the Zapatista movement and the EZLN; many overlap, but all include something unique, an interview, a perspective, a story. 23

30 Another unusual aspect of the Chiapas conflict is the attention it received from domestic and international media in the early days of the uprising, due largely to timing in regards to the NAFTA. Clifford Bob (2005) suggests that this media attention was instrumental in the Zapatista s ability to reach a broad international support system. Indeed, the media provided the world with the initial exposure that eventually developed into a transnational solidarity network which, in turn, spawned numerous anti-capitalist and anarchist movements around the world. International civil society responded so strongly, staging protests across Mexico and bringing thousands of people into the Federal District of Mexico City, that the Mexican government announced a unilateral cease fire after only 12 days of conflict (Bob 2005). Amidst protests to the military response in Mexico City and international pressure to end the conflict swiftly, civil society had mobilized to reign in the violence in the absence of an international peacekeeping force. The NGO response was critical to the success of the Zapatistas, critical enough that the transnational solidarity network is considered by David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla of the RAND Corporation to constitute a level of combatant in the Zapatista s Social Netwar (Ronfeldt, Arquila et al. 1998; Arquila and Ronfeldt 2001). While NGOs quickly responded to the conflict, either in a support/solidarity role, or in a human rights observation role, there was no formal response to the Zapatistas from any of the major International Government Organizations (IGOs) like the United Nations during this time. In 24

31 all fairness, in 1994 it was uncommon for an IGO to enter a conflict without being invited by the established government, or a neighboring country experiencing a spill-over of violence from a conflict. However, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was one International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO) that chose to respond, and it was critical in the official recognition of the Zapatistas as legal combatants and not simply another Latin American narco-guerilla organization. In response to the EZLN s call for the ICRC to intervene in the conflict, the Red Cross gained access to 70 Zapatista prisoners by January 18 th, Despite this rapid response, access was restricted by the Mexican government s apparent distrust of the organization (Megevand 1995). Peacebuilding in the region is not only unique in its situation; it is unique in its methods. The conflict was not designated a peacekeeping mission. The UN has never been directly involved in a peace operation in the region. The peacebuilding efforts that occur in Chiapas are a spontaneous response from civil society and other supporters from around the world. Within days of the uprising, the Mexican civil society was demonstrating in cities, demanding that the Mexican military and Zapatistas cease their violent activities and begin a dialogue for peace; within a few more days, that support to end the violence was global (Ross 1995; Zapatistas 1995; Nash 1997; Ramirez 1998; Leon 2001; Nash 2001; Rus, Hernandez Castillo et al. 2003; Vodovnik 2004; Marcos 2006; Mentinis 2006; Ross 2006; Pena-Vargas and Ruggiero 2007; Munoz Ramirez 2008). The 25

32 human rights organizations and activists, indigenous rights organizations and activists, and thousands of others claiming solidarity with the Indígenas descended upon the region and established permanent peace camps to protect the indigenous communities (Hernández-Castillo 2001; Nash 2001; Harvey 2005). These organizations and activists spontaneously involved themselves as a peacebuilding force. Activists from around the world converged on the region to act as guardians of human rights, to promote peace negotiations, and to help improve the situation on the ground to make room for peace. Under the protection of non-state actors in protective peace camps, the Zapatistas have practiced with an experiment in revolutionary democracy and development (Earle and Simonelli 2005). They chose voice over violence early in their open struggle for justice and have maintained that strategy throughout betrayals, violent attacks from paramilitaries working for land-holders, and even from other indigenous peoples in their communities. While this last may seem counter-intuitive, the reality is that some of the Mayans in the region are politically aligned with the PRI; others, in the hope that they will be better off in the long run, simply wish to move beyond resistance and accept the government aid that seeks to co-opt their struggle for rights and turn it into acquiescence. In other words, there are differing political, economic, and social capacities amongst the Mayans, and these shape responses to the Zapatistas' efforts. The Mexican government uses strategic counter-insurgency aid to the region, in which they offer small forms of assistance to individuals in the region 26

33 in exchange for the renunciation of claims to autonomy in self governance and development. Because of this, the Zapatistas, as a group, refuse aid that comes with requirements for abandoning their cause or their moral perspective of the way life could and should be in Chiapas. Instead, the Zapatistas approach development and peacebuilding from the ground up, using very few resources and with the full participation of the community. Zapatista leaders do not go to meetings with the people to speak and persuade; they go to listen and be persuaded. When a decision is to be made, the leadership, or more accurately the representatives, takes what they know of the situation to the people, and there is deliberation in a horizontally-organized collective of the entire community. Perhaps this is why there has been such a valuable adherence to the cease-fire agreement. It would be unacceptable for the EZLN to take military action without the approval of every Zapatista community, and that would require the approval of the entirety of the community s population (Earle and Simonelli 2005). The Indígenas have a strong cultural identity that has survived centuries of efforts to acculturate them. They seek to revive aspects of this heritage in the autonomous communities (Earle and Simonelli 2005) through their collective form of governing. This, coupled with intellectual advice from activist academics and church officials, may be largely responsible for their ability to build cohesive resilient communities. That is, what has worked in Chiapas may 27