Beyond Nomenclature: Authoritarian Governance in a Democratic World

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1 Beyond Nomenclature: Authoritarian Governance in a Democratic World Timothy Hildebrandt University of Louisville, Center for Asian Democracy Edward Friedman Festschrift University of Toronto, October 24, 2009 Nearly two decades after the end of the Cold War, the pace of political change around the world has slowed considerably. The days of almost routine regime shifts are gone and while many countries have, to some degree or another, democratized, others remain authoritarian. To be sure, the appearance of many authoritarian governments has changed; contemporary authoritarian regimes do not look as they did even a decade ago. To describe this difference, scholars have posited a number of terms. Diamond uses pseudo-democracies to describe states where opposition parties might operate legally but never pose a real threat to the incumbent party (e.g. Central Asia, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, etc.); in these polities, elections are a charade, used to disguise authoritarian hegemony. 1 Levistsky and Way posit competitive authoritarianism to describe regimes where formal institutions are believed important for maintaining legitimacy and political power; here, elections are held, but opposition is constrained and media is curtailed. 2 And Rose and Shin refer to many of these states as incomplete democracies. 3 1 Larry Diamond, Thinking about hybrid regimes, Journal of Democracy (2002), p Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism Journal of Democracy (2002), pp Richard Rose and Doh Chull Shin, Democratization backwards: The Problem of Third Wave Democracies British Journal of Political Science (2001). 1

2 During my early years of graduate school, I initially gravitated toward this semiauthoritarian literature out of a frustration that previous explanations were interested in how contemporary authoritarian states will eventually transition to democracies rather than understanding why they remain authoritarian, showing no sign of significant political change. And while Ed shares this frustration, he never seemed content with this attempt to fix the problem. Nor has he found much satisfaction in my own previous attempts to do the same. Rather than give up and leave it to others, I am attempting once again, but this time with a eye to Ed s critiques of this hybrid regime literature. As I best understand it, his primary criticism is that these attempts have failed to properly examine the effects of persistent authoritarianism on the country as a whole. His concerns are, to a great extent, normative: Ed frequently reminds me that while the Chinese state has adapted to maintain power, there are elements that still are decidedly authoritarian; by branding these regimes as something else, we run the risk of diverting attention from the brutality that still remains. But Ed s concerns are also analytical: by glossing over the effects of incremental political change (movement towards more or sometimes less political openness, democratization versus backsliding) upon social actors we are unable to properly understand the long-term effectiveness in keeping the regime afloat. To be sure, Ed has devoted a good deal of intellectual (and perhaps even emotional) energy in understanding authoritarian persistence. This short memo outlines directions for future research and questions for exploration to this end. The introduction of a new typology, such as outlined above, is helpful for highlighting the fact that non-democratic governments persist in a form different than previously understood. But we must go beyond nomenclature to understand why such governments persist. Moreover, 2

3 despite changes in name (and the embrace of policies that seem more democratic than authoritarian) these regimes can still have negative impacts on those they govern. Thus, we must examine how this new brand of authoritarianism affects society. Such a research program would explain how authoritarian regimes adapt to a predominantly democratic world and examine the impacts of these adaptations on society. It could also explore how the embrace of progressive issues that signal the presence of a truly liberal democracy in one context, actually can be used to embolden authoritarian rule in another. The move from an ideologically divided bi-polar world to a largely democratic uni-polar one has placed considerable stress on authoritarian regimes. For those governments that survived the end of the Cold War, their political monopolies have faced significant threats from economic globalization and the meteoric rise of information technology. The former has forced most authoritarian states out of seclusion and demanded interaction with other governments of all political stripes, while the latter has provided residents of these countries the opportunity to learn of the triumphs of more open political systems and the failures of their own. Governments interested in staying in power cannot ignore challenges to their legitimacy. As such, the construction of new authoritarianism includes a multitude of strategies for building and maintaining these governments fragile legitimacy. For almost all authoritarian regimes, strengthening domestic economies even if it means abandoning key ideological principles upon which the regime first gained control has been prioritized. But economic development is not a panacea for regime persistence. In some cases, uneven development has exacerbated economic inequalities, creating a new pressure point on governments. In addition, rapid economic development carries with it noticeable side effects such as environmental 3

4 degradation, which can drastically alter traditional livelihoods and harm human health. Successful authoritarian governance in today s world demands more than just economic development. Another key strategy discussed in early scholarship on contemporary authoritarianism is the introduction of elections at various levels. In an effort to cultivate the belief that citizens are in control of their own political destiny, some authoritarian regimes have established the right to vote, albeit usually a highly circumscribed and conditional one. This adaptation is not fool proof. Even if intended to be purely superficial, granting citizens the right to vote could incite demand for even more civil rights; at the extreme, it could help push the regime out of power. Alternatively, these voting rights can be seen as they are disingenuous and thus fail to keep society content at all. In recognition of the difficulty of preserving a political monopoly, authoritarian regimes employ a wider portfolio of strategies to assuage concerns of legitimacy. The most interesting adaptation has been the embrace of what are usually considered to be progressive causes. Environmentalism is particularly popular. Authoritarian regimes the world over have publicly addressed environmental degradation, with varying degrees of success and genuine devotion to the cause. Even more surprising, some authoritarian governments have engaged, rather than outrightly rejected, discourses on human rights. Relatedly, some governments have liberalized policies directed at lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) persons. Attention to these issues can be given in response to problems that could directly undermine a regime s legitimacy: solving a pressing environmental problems can diminish a stress placed upon the regime; and increased rights for LGBT can help combat a public health crisis like HIV/AIDS. 4

5 My previous research on many of these issues in China was first predicated on a belief that the government wants to solve these problems. In hindsight, I probably assumed too much about the state s intentions. The government is likely most interested in addressing pressing social problems at the lowest political and economic cost. It might also be less interested in actual responsiveness, for legitimacy can also be cultivated through the appearance of responsiveness. For example, Beijing s effort to improve the city s environmental performance in the run-up to the 2008 Summer Olympics focused on short-term solutions designed to either suppress the most visible signs of environmental degradation (e.g., prohibiting private automobiles from using highways to ensure more blue sky days around the Games) or move pollution to another part of the country (e.g., forcing polluting factories to move operations to other provinces, but not actually adopt cleaner production measures). In addressing HIV/AIDS, the Chinese government s goal has been to control the spread of new infections but not treat those who are actually infected. It has worked to achieve this goal in the most inexpensive ways of ways, such as public education efforts (the most costly work has been with the financial and logistical support of the international donor community). 4 All of these efforts have thus far had the effect of cultivating an image of responsiveness among the general public. This brand of instrumental policymaking is not entirely new; the approach is frequently used by non-democratic state. For example, Massell shows how the Soviet Union quickly expanded women s rights throughout its central Asian territories in order to neutralize threats 4 The Chinese government has more recently adopted an inexpensive but visible response to H1N1. In Chongqing for example, all foreign teachers have been given thermometers by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and asked to take their temperature daily; they are then called to report their temperature. The intent is to quarantine anyone with a fever. The effectiveness of this is clearly dubious, but displays action and attention on the government s part. 5

6 from traditional Muslim leaders. 5 Several scholars have made similar points with respect to environmentalism: Biehl suggests that the Nazi party embraced ecofascism in using ecological concerns to justify ultra-right policies to cleanse the homeland of outside intruders, 6 Forsyth argues that ecological principles and those who fight for them can be used to embolden political hegemons in Southeast Asia, 7 and Weinthal shows how newly independent states in Central Asia brokered environmental agreements to increase legitimacy for their de facto authoritarian regimes. 8 What is new, however, is the increased role of information technology and the rising importance of international audiences in cultivating these images of responsiveness. Information technology carries costs and benefits to the state. It makes the process easier in that it allows for a more thorough and inexpensive dissemination of the government s intended message to areas previously difficult to reach, and more difficult in that counter-messages are more prevalent and messages sometimes harder to control. In addition, for most contemporary authoritarian regimes, legitimacy is crucial for both domestic and international audiences. At the national level, the regime must appear willing and able to address problems of concern to the general public. At the global level, the regime must appear to be a legitimate member of the international community. But it might not just be the international community at large that matters most; certainly, many authoritarian states have made policy decisions that attract the ire of other governments. Given 6 Janet Biehl, Ecology and the Modernization of Fascism in the Germany Ultra-Right in Janet Biehl and Peter Staudenmair (eds.) Ecofascism: Lessons from the German Experience, (San Francisco: AK Press, 1995). 7 Tim Forsyth, Social Movements and Environmental Democratization in Thailand, in Shelia Jasanoff and Marybeth Long Martello (eds.) Earthly Politics: Local and Global in International Politics (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004) pp Erika Weinthal, State Making and Environmental Cooperation (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002), 6

7 that economic development serves as one means to increase legitimacy, the most important member of the international community might be non-governmental actors like multinational corporations (MNCs). While these corporations have adapted business plans, and sometimes even corporate philosophies (e.g., Google and Don t be evil ), to ensure access to some markets, the dynamic might work the other way as well. An authoritarian government s participation in international organizations and agreements, for example, helps cultivate this image and makes it look both credible and reliable in the eyes of potential investors. Granting citizens limited voting rights, combating environmental degradation, addressing HIV/AIDS, or even expanding rights to LGBT persons can make a regime appear less authoritarian. But despite these adaptations, many regimes remain authoritarian in structure and, in some cases, brutal in their rule. This raises some key questions: Do progressive causes, in the hands of non-democratic governments, have a regressive effect? Might the extension of certain rights ultimately hurt, rather than help the causes of political liberalization and individual liberty? To answer these questions, a future research project should contain three distinct, but complementary parts. Beyond examining various adaptations taken by authoritarian regimes, there should be an attempt to uncover motivations for these strategies. This might be achieved by conducting interviews with officials at various levels of government, with the expectation that motivations and interests for embracing or rejecting certain issues would within the state. Second, assuming image does in fact matter we should evaluate the effectiveness of image improvement measures among domestic stakeholders (e.g., does the state achieve its goal of appearing responsive to pressing social issues?). Assuming that members of the international community are also an intended audience, surveys of these actors (e.g., international 7

8 organization, and MNC representatives) could chart the effect of authoritarian government actions. By comparing these opinions of responsiveness to more objective measures of effectiveness (e.g., rates of new HIV infection), we might also be able to explore how far the state can go in telling a good story without following up. Finally, such a research program would explore the effect these adaptations have on both social actors and the issues themselves. Insights from such a study will help us better understand not just how non-democracies maintain power today, but also how the actions they take should make us second guess what we think of as indicators of progress. 8